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

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DEMOSTHENES

BY THE
REV. W. J. BRODRIBB, M.A.,
LATE FELLOW OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

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NOTE.

FOR the extracts from the speeches of Demosthenes given in this volume I am to a considerable extent indebted to the scholarly version of the late Mr. C. R. Kennedy. For the famous speech on the Crown, I have made occasional use of a translation recently published by an eminent English lawyer, the Right Hon. Sir Robert Collier. The same speech was, some years ago, translated by Mr. William Brandt, a scholar of Oriel College, Oxford, whose premature death cut short a life of great promise. His rendering of the Greek orator is spirited and vigorous, and I wish to express my obligations to it. W. J. B.

DEMOSTHENES.

INTRODUCTION.

THE familiar names of Demosthenes and Cicero will always be linked together. They are specially representative names. The eloquence of the ancient world seems to be summed up in them. There is a further reason why we should think of them together. Both attached themselves to a falling cause; both had to go into exile; both had the satisfaction of being welcomed back from exile; both, finally, when all was lost, were willing to die rather than survive their country's disgrace. There is, indeed, a striking resemblance between the lives and fortunes of the two men, and none of Plutarch's parallels is more appropriate than that in which he has compared them.

The best and noblest eloquence must be the product of earnest political conviction. Cicero clung to the traditions of the old republic, and regarded the concentration of power in one man as equivalent to his country's degradation and fall. The Greek statesman could not imagine a worse calamity than that Greece should cease to exist as an aggregate of free, self-governing communities, and become a dependency on a foreign kingdom or empire. We cannot but sympathize with such a sentiment. It was a noble one, though at the time it may have been becoming more and more incap-

able of realization, as indeed was the sincere belief of some perfectly honest men who were politically opposed to Demosthenes. The highest aspects of Greek life, and its best influences on the civilization of the world, were intimately connected with Greece as existing according to his conception of what she ought to be. His eloquence is at its highest when he dwells on her fixed resolution in past days to resist to the death anything like foreign dictation or interference. Greece, in his view, was nothing if she once brought herself to endure it.

On the whole, perhaps the Greek was rather a greater figure than the Roman orator. He was at least more single-minded and courageous. His political career was more dignified and consistent, and there were fewer weak moments in his life. Cicero, it is true, was a singularly amiable and a most accomplished man; but he was unquestionably vain and self-complacent. Demosthenes gives us the idea that Athens and Greece were always foremost in his thoughts. As an orator, and statesman, he may claim to rank above Cicero. As an orator, he was the master of a more fervid and impressive eloquence; as a statesman, he had more simplicity of purpose and greater moral courage.

The period of Demosthenes is the fourth century B.C. A brief sketch of it seems almost due to our readers. The speeches of Demosthenes cannot be understood without some acquaintance with Greek politics. Macedon, too, and its rise to importance under king Philip, deserves at least a short notice. The history of the time is somewhat intricate, and could not be thoroughly elucidated in a very moderate compass. An endeavor has been made in the two following chapters to present the reader with a view of its general character.

CHAPTER I.

GREECE IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

ATHENS in the fifth century B.C was at the head of the Greek world. Her empire, like our own, was a "government of dependencies." In its nature it was somewhat precarious. Although it was not specially oppressive, it was in many quarters an object of extreme jealousy. When Athens attempted the conquest of Sicily, it was felt that this was but a step towards ulterior and more dangerous designs. It was a most hazardous attempt, under existing circumstances. On the sea, indeed, Athens was all-powerful; but she had formidable enemies on land very near her—Thebes to the north, Sparta to the south. After her great reverse in Sicily, she was hardly a match for Sparta at the head of the Peloponnese. She still struggled on, and even won some victories, till the long contest, known as the Peloponnesian War, came to an end in 405 B.C. with the decisive battle of Ægos-potami. There, in the waters of the Hellespont, almost her entire fleet was captured by the Spartan admiral, Lysander.

Sparta now succeeded to the headship of Greece. She retained it down to the year 371 B.C. During this period she contrived to make herself thoroughly hated. Her system was to rule by means of oligarchial factions in the different states. These factions she supported

by military garrisons. There was a garrison for a time in the Cadmea, or the citadel of Thebes. It was forced into the city, and subsequently maintained there with a flagrant disregard of justice and equity. The Spartan king Agesilaus coolly asserted that if it was for Sparta's interest it was right. Altogether, the Spartan rule was much more galling than the Athenian had been. Sparta, indeed, always seems to have been a more selfish state than Athens. It is true that Athens in her greatness had been spoken of as "a despot city;" but there was at the same time a feeling that she worthily represented Greece. This could hardly be said of Sparta. She was now cultivating friendly relations with Persia, and had procured the conclusion of a peace with that power, the terms of which were by no means honorable to Greece. This was the peace of Antalcidas in 387 B.C.—one of the land-marks, so to say, in Greek history. It had ever been a Greek tradition that the freedom and independence of the Greeks in Asia ought to be upheld. By the peace of Antalcidas they were put under the dominion of Persia. Athens would hardly have yielded such a point, and in the days of her maritime supremacy she could and would have made it impossible. Sparta was responsible for this disgraceful concession. She made matters worse by seeking to convert her headship of Greece into a downright despotism. In doing this she wrought infinite mischief, and may be almost said to have prepared the way for the subsequent calamities of Greece and its subjection to Macedon. She endeavored persistently to break up the Greek world into a number of petty dependencies, which she might hold under her absolute control. Her systematic policy was to reduce Greece to a collection of separate towns and

even villages, each of which should be completely in her own power. The idea which lay at the root of Greek strength and greatness was, that Greece should be made up of federations, with the leading cities at the head of them. In the face of a common foe these federations, it was hoped and believed, would be attracted to each other, and would feel that they had a common cause. This was Panhellenism. Sparta, by her methods of rule, weakened this idea, and thereby undermined the foundations of the Greek world. The feebleness and disunion of Greece in the fourth century B.C., which were so favorable to Macedon, were, in part at least, due to Sparta's influence. In one instance she inflicted the most direct and positive mischief upon Greece. At the head of the gulf of Torone, in the peninsula of Chalcidice, was the prosperous city of Olynthus, round which had grown up a confederacy of Greek towns that might have been an effectual barrier against Macedon, or any other northern power. This confederacy Sparta, true to her policy, broke up in 379 B.C., and thus gave a heavy blow to Greek interests on the coasts of Macedon and Thrace. But for this, the Ægean and the Propontis might never have known the presence of Macedonian cruisers, and Philip's kingdom might have remained a poor and barbarous territory. Olynthus, indeed, to a certain extent recovered herself, and became again a flourishing and independent city; but the mischief which had been already done was past remedy.

With the great battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. Sparta's ascendancy ceased. Thebes was now raised by the illustrious Epamcinondas into the first place in Greece. North of the Peloponnese she could do as she pleased. She had Thessaly quite under her control, and Macedon

was little better than a dependency. Her next steps after Leuctra, was to strengthen herself in the Peloponnese, and to complete the humiliation of Sparta. This was done by the founding of the two cities Megalopolis and Messene, under the direction of Epameinondas. Sparta, as we have seen, aimed at breaking up and dissolving federations; Thebes, on the contrary, formed the Arcadian townships, forty in number, into a confederacy, of which Megalopolis, the Great City, was made the centre. Messene was then founded on Mount Ithome, and became the rallying-place of a population which had long been unwillingly subject to Sparta. What had hitherto been Spartan territory was actually annexed to it. Sparta's limits were thus greatly narrowed. On the north and on the west she was confronted by independent communities, and her position in the Peloponnese was well nigh destroyed. Though Thebes soon fell back from the pre-eminence to which the genius of Epameinondas had lifted her, Sparta was never able to regain her ancient *prestige*.

Athens, from some cause or other, had much more elasticity and power of recovery than Sparta. There was a life and sprightliness about her citizens which made them quickly forget calamities and rise to new hopes and aspirations. So it was with them after Leuctra. Athens at once was fired with the ambition of winning back her old empire; and she actually succeeded in again becoming the head of a powerful confederacy. The disgust which Sparta had provoked throughout the Greek world was no doubt a great help to Athens. Once more her fleet sailed supreme over the Ægean. As a matter of course, the chief islands joined her alliance. A synod of deputies from her allies and dependents obeyed her summons, and contribu-

tions were voted for the common cause. She had able men—such as Timotheus, Iphicrates, and Chabrias—to command her forces. At the time of Philip's accession to the throne of Macedon in 359 B.C., Athens was the first state in Greece. She was not specially well fitted for war on land, and was in this respect inferior to Thebes, which could send out an army in the highest efficiency. But by sea she was, beyond comparison, the first power. Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and the important cities of Perinthus and Byzantium, were her allies. Samos, off the coast of Lydia, and Thasos, Lemnos, Imbros in the north of the Ægean, had been recently conquered by her; she was in possession of the Thracian Chersonese, of Pydna and Methone on the coast of Macedon, and of Potidæa and other towns in the peninsula of Chalcidice. The waters of the Ægean were thus an Athenian lake. But she could not hold together this confederation. She had no proper control over her generals. They were not in fact the servants of the state, but men of the "Condottieri" type. As a rule, they commanded mercenaries, for whom they could not provide pay without systematically plundering the allies. These generals really maintained their troops by means of "forced benevolences." It could hardly be expected that all this would be patiently endured. In 358 B. C. the Social War, as it was termed, broke out—Rhodes and Byzantium, it would seem, leading the revolt. It lasted two years. The efforts of Athens appear to be rather fitful and wanting in vigor. When a rumor came that Persia was about to support the revolted allies with a fleet of three hundred ships, Athens gave up the struggle and acknowledged their independence. The confederation, of which for a brief space she had been the head, was thus at an end.

This was a great blow to Athens. She was still powerful by sea, but she was very much impoverished, a large part of her revenue having been lost to her through the secession of several of her richest allies. Was it not now best for her to rest from her ambition, and to think no more of "a spirited foreign policy?" So argued one of her citizens, the famous orator Isocrates. He complains that his countrymen "were so infatuated that while they themselves wanted the means of subsistence they were undertaking to maintain mercenaries, and were maltreating their allies and levying tribute from them, in order that they might provide pay for the common enemies of mankind." By these he means the generals, of whom also Demosthenes, his political opponent, says, in one of his speeches, that "they go ranging about and behaving everywhere as the common enemies of all who wish to live in freedom according to their own laws." Athens, he contends, might recover from the losses and disasters of the Social War, if she would only eschew for the future a meddling and aggressive policy, be prepared for self-defence, and devote herself to commerce and the arts of peace. In this way she would, with the great natural advantages she possessed, very soon again become rich and prosperous. This was the advice of Isocrates. It might well seem sensible and timely. And, as a matter of fact, it suited the temper of many of the citizens. There was a disposition to shrink from personal efforts, and, if war became a necessity, to leave it more and more to mercenaries. In such a mood there were dangers, as the event proved, to the cause both of Athens and of Greece.

A peace party was the natural result. It was in power at Athens for some years after the conclusion of

the Social War, the critical period during which Philip of Macedon was step by step advancing to the position he ultimately attained. It had the advocacy of the speeches and pamphlets of Isocrates, who had the command, not undeservedly, of the public ear. It was thus supported by the ablest journalism of the day. Again, it had an eminently respectable man as one of its leaders. This was Phocion, whose integrity was proverbial. Forty-five times was he chosen general, and he gained several victories for Athens. He was alone sufficient to give strength to a political party. Another of its leaders was Eubulus, a man of very inferior type. His great aim was to put the people in a good humor. There was a singular arrangement at Athens by which the State defrayed the cost of the public amusements and dramatic exhibitions for the benefits of the poor citizens. A regular fund was provided for this purpose, and after a time the surplus of the annual public revenue was added to it. It had formerly been the law that this surplus should always during war be paid into the military chest for the defence of the State. Eubulus actually induced the people to pass a law making it a capital offence to propose that this fund should be so applied on any future occasion. Consequently, the only method of meeting the costs of war was the exaction of a property tax from the rich. War under these circumstances could not but involve very serious and sorely felt sacrifices. We may form some idea of the pressure of the burden by supposing the case of an income tax of 4s. or 5s. in the pound among ourselves. No ministry, it is clear, could venture to declare war except under the most palpable necessity, if such a tax were inevitable. Eubulus accordingly conciliated the rich by doing his utmost to

save them from the dreaded burden. He was, as we should say, prime minister of Athens for sixteen years. His position must have been a very strong one, acceptable, as we have just seen, to rich and poor alike. There can hardly be a doubt that his policy impaired the Athenian character, and made the work of Demosthenes peculiarly difficult.

Athens thus entered on a great contest under unfavorable conditions. She was still, from her extensive trade, the richest city in Greece, and she had the means of sending formidable fleets. But her citizens liked ease and comfort, and preferred their cheerful city life to foreign service. Her dominions, too, were rather vulnerable, not being guarded by any regular troops. If they were attacked, they had to be defended by mercenaries, commanded by the sort of general who has been described. Then, too, her commerce, with which her prosperity was closely bound up, might be harrassed by an enterprising enemy, and her supplies of corn from the Black Sea endangered. Thus, in fighting Macedon she was perhaps at some disadvantage, though we may be inclined to think that a little more energy and vigor would have carried her successfully through the struggle. The truth is, she was not for a long time alive to the real danger, and was consequently remiss in seizing opportunities. There was a party which urged alliance with Thebes. But Thebes was more hateful to an average Athenian than Sparta had ever been. Such a party seemed untrue to the old traditions of Athens. Hence it was comparatively weak. Had the danger from Macedon been distinctly foreseen, the alliance would perhaps have been effected. Athens and Thebes united might, it can hardly be doubted, have confined Philip to his own hereditary kingdom and have saved Greece.

CHAPTER II.

MACEDON AND PHILIP.

THE name of Macedon, though it is heard of from time to time in Greek history, can hardly be said to have become really famous till the fourth century B.C. and the reign of Philip. It could never have occurred to the mind of a Greek that this outlying northern kingdom might possibly one day be formidable to Greece and its freedom. There were no signs pointing in this direction; and it may be fairly assumed that no political sagacity could have foreseen such a result. The Macedonians were always looked upon by the Greeks as barbarians, although their royal family—Temenids, as they were called, from their legendary ancestors, Temenus—came from Argos, and the people themselves perhaps had some distant affinity to the Hellenic race. For a long period they were nothing better than a collection of rude tribes, with scarcely any cohesion or organization, and before the disciplined army of a Greek state they would have been utterly powerless. They were surrounded, too, by fierce and unquiet neighbors—Illyrians to the west, Pæonians to the north, Thracians to the east,—all savage, warlike peoples, whom they could only just hold in check. The country, indeed with its rivers and rich valleys and strips of seaboard, had natural advantages which a vigorus prince with organiz-

ing capacity might develop; and this was partially done by Archelaus, who reigned from 413 B.C. to 399. He was a man of great energy, and he may be said to have put Macedon in the way to become a flourishing and powerful kingdom. According to Thucydides,* he had roads constructed, fortresses erected, and established a standing army on a greater scale than any of his predecessors had kept up. Probably the last years of the Peloponnesian war, which were so disastrous to Athens, were favorable to Macedon, and enabled it to acquire an influence on the northern coasts of the Ægean, which previously Athens had possessed. Still, no doubt Archelaus deserves the credit of having steadily applied himself to the work of strengthening and consolidating his kingdom. At the same time, he did his best to civilize his people, and to bring them into connection with the Greek world. He cultivated the friendship of Athens, and sought to introduce its literature and art. He established a grand periodical festival on the Greek type, with all the humanizing adjuncts of music and poetry. The great poet Euripides visited his court at his special invitation, and was treated with such favor and respect that he remained there till his death. The philosopher Socrates was invited, but it appears that he declined the honor. The famous painter, Zeuxis of Heracleia, was one of the king's guests, and he was employed to adorn with pictures the royal palace at Pella, the new capitol of Macedonia. In fact, Archelaus was an enlightened despot; and though he could not eradicate barbarism and make Macedonians into Greeks, he at least gave the higher class a varnish of Greek civilization and culture.

* Thucydides, ii. 100.

It was not unusual for the kings of Macedon to perish by the hands of conspirators and assassins, and this was the fate of Archelaus. The dynasty was now changed; and after a few years of disturbance, Amyntas, the father of Philip, became king in 394 B.C. His reign was not a prosperous one. Macedonia went back, and its very existence as an independent kingdom was in jeopardy. According to one account, Amyntas was obliged to surrender Philip as a hostage to the Illyrians, who were then particularly troublesome. He left his kingdom at his death, in 370 B.C., in an almost desperate plight. The succession to the throne was disputed, and the enemies on the border were as formidable as ever. Macedon, indeed, seemed on the eve of being wholly extinguished. The eldest son and successor of Amyntas, Alexander, was murdered; and shortly afterwards the Theban Pelopidas was invited into the country by the friends of the royal family, with the view probably of securing the throne for the two younger brothers, Perdiccas and Philip. Pelopidas, it seems, forced on Macedonia the adoption of this arrangement, and took Philip with him to Thebes, as a hostage for its being faithfully carried out. Philip passed three years at Thebes, while his brother Perdiccas was king. He then, in 368 B.C., was intrusted with the government of a portion of Macedonia under Perdiccas, and employed his time in equipping and organizing some troops. His brother's reign had a disastrous termination. He was defeated with heavy loss by the Illyrians, and died soon afterwards. And so Philip, now twenty-three years of age, became king of Macedon in 359 B.C., there being only an infant son of Perdiccas whose claim to the throne it was not dif-

ficult, under the circumstances, to set aside with the national approval.

No prince could have begun his reign with gloomier prospects than the future conqueror of Greece. He was encompassed by enemies. There were other claimants of the throne—one of these being Argæus, who was supported by Athens. He thus had to fear attack from barbarian neighbors by land, and from Athenian fleets by sea. The hostile attitude of the Athenians was determined by their very prudent desire to recover the important position of Amphipolis at the mouth of the Strymon. To Athens the possession of this place was of the utmost value, as it was the key to a region rich in gold and silver mines, as well as in forest-timber. To this the people had an eye, in supporting the pretensions of Argæus to the throne of Macedon against Philip. The king, however, met them promptly, and won a victory over a little force which they had sent to Methone on the Macedonian coast of the Gulf of Thermæ. He took some Athenian citizens prisoners; but as he was anxious to conciliate Athens, he treated them with marked respect, and allowed them at once to return. He then made peace with Athens, and waived all claim to Amphipolis, in which his predecessor had placed a Macedonian garrison. The city was now left to itself; and the Athenians, had they been wise, would have spared no effort to secure it. As it was, they let slip a golden opportunity of regaining a position which might have been in their hands a barrier against the growing power of Macedon, and would have certainly enabled them to maintain their maritime supremacy on the Ægean.

Philip meanwhile, having freed himself for the present from the fear of Athens, was at liberty to fence

off his kingdom from the attacks of its land enemies. He had already organized something of a military force, and with this he prepared to strike a decisive blow at the Illyrian, Pæonion, and Thracian tribes, which were perpetually crossing the Macedonian frontier in plundering expeditions. It seems that these tribes, which were scattered over what are now the provinces of Bosnia, Servia, and Albania, were at this time being pushed southwards by a great movement of the Gauls. The Illyrians were Macedon's most dangerous neighbors, and they had inflicted many disastrous defeats on Philip's predecessors. Now they were at the height of their power, and were united for purposes of war under a chief named Bardylis, an able leader and a brave warrior. Philip, after thoroughly vanquishing the Pæonians, which he seems to have done easily, turned his arms against the more formidable Illyrians, and attacked them in western Macedonia, which they had invaded. He won a hard-fought battle, chiefly through the efficiency of his cavalry. The Illyrian army was utterly discomfited, and their chief glad to make peace, and cede whatever portions of Macedonia he had conquered and occupied. The result of this victory was, that the Macedonian frontier was pushed to the lake Lychnitis (now Okridha), and was made far more secure than it had hitherto been, by the occupation of mountain-passes through which the Illyrian invaders used to pour into Macedonia.

The famous phalanx, which we connect specially with the names of Macedon and Philip and Alexander, is said to have taken part in this battle. Philip has been credited with this military invention; but, in truth, he can be said only to have introduced it. He may have considerably modified it, but it had always

been an important element in a Greek army. It was the great Epameinondas of Thebes who seems to have first organized it in its most powerful and effective form. He, in fact, it was who brought the science of war to the highest perfection hitherto known in Greece. Philip, during his residence as a young man in Thebes, may well have had opportunities of personal intercourse with this illustrious general, and derived from him many profitable hints and suggestions. At all events, he had daily under his eyes the magnificent soldiers who had fought and conquered at Leuctra. His first military ideas were thus drawn from the best of all schools, and we may well suppose that a deep impression was at the same time made on his young imagination. He would soon see that the barbarous enemies of Macedon would never be able to stand against really well-trained troops. He had also at Thebes the literary and philosophical teaching which often lays the foundation of able statesmanship. Possibly he may have made the acquaintance of Plato, and there is certainly ground for believing that the philosopher conceived a high opinion of his ability. Nor is it unlikely that he may also at this time have had his admiration directed by some circumstance to Aristotle, whom he afterwards made the tutor of the young Alexander. It is certain that he became imbued with some amount of Greek culture, and that he acquired the power of speaking and writing the language almost as well as a professed orator or rhetorician. He liked to look on himself, and to be regarded by others, as thoroughly a Greek; and this it was, no doubt, which inclined him to be always considerate towards Athens, as the foremost state of Greece. Perhaps he was not too young, before he left Thebes, to imbibe some political notions. In such a city he

would at least have a good opportunity of getting an insight into the character of Greek politics, and he might have early learnt some of those weak points in Greece which his adroitness subsequently enabled him to turn to such profitable account.

Philip, after his victories over the Illyrians and Pæonians, which for a time at least made Macedonia secure on the land side, still reigned over a poor and half-barbarous kingdom. He had much to do before he could hope to become a considerable power in the Greek world. As yet, he did not possess a single town on the coast. He had, as we have seen, given up Amphipolis to please the Athenians. He must have been surprised to find that they did not make haste to recover that important place. But they committed the blunder, and allowed the people of Amphipolis to remain their own masters. Soon afterwards, in 358 B.C., Philip thought he might as well possess himself of it; and when the inhabitants refused to surrender, he laid siege to the city. Envoys were sent to Athens, asking for help; but it is possible that at this crisis the war with the allies had just begun, and that the Athenians may have thus found themselves fully occupied. Philip, too, promised them in a very civil letter that he would put them in possession of it as soon as he had taken it. The Athenians did nothing, though it could not have been very difficult for them to have saved the place and secured it for themselves. This was indeed short-sighted, as they now again had an opportunity of securing a commanding position, and of nipping Philip's power in the bud. It was one of those errors which can never be retrieved. Athens lost *prestige*, as well as a most useful dependency. When Philip took the city, Olynthus, which was not far distant, and was at

the head of a group of Greek townships in the peninsula of Chalcidice, was seriously alarmed, and proposed an alliance to Athens. The offer was rejected, as the Athenians, it seems, still wished to look on Philip as their friend, and were persuaded to trust his promises. The cunning prince contrived not only to buy off the hostility of Olynthus, but actually to win its friendship and to become its ally by the cession of a disputed strip of territory near Thessalonica. The next thing he did was to venture on an openly hostile act against Athens by conquering and wresting from her a most important possession, the city of Potidæa, on the gulf of Thermæ. This, too, he gave up to the Olynthians. Pydna, also, on the shore of the same gulf, opposite to Potidæa, likewise an Athenian possession, fell into his hands through internal treachery; and Athens, it appears, made no effort to save the place. Thus, in a single year, 358 B.C., Philip gained three most valuable positions on the coast, and a severe shock was given to Athenian influence in the north of the Ægean. He had hitherto been poor; now he had the means of raising an ample revenue. Master of Amphipolis, he had free access to the gold region in the neighborhood east of the Strymon. Here he founded the city which we know by the familiar name of Philippi. He had now a well-organized army, and he was able to maintain it. In little more than two years he had immensely increased the strength and resources of his kingdom. But it was not till six years afterwards that Macedon was felt to be a distinct menace to the Greek world.

CHAPTER III.

EARLY LIFE OF DEMOSTHENES.

We cannot be quite certain about the year in which Demosthenes was born. The accounts are conflicting, and we are thrown back on somewhat doubtful inferences. The year, it seems, must have been either 385-384 B.C. or 382-381 B.C. His early life thus coincided with an eventful period, and witnessed more than one remarkable political change in the Greek world. In the years immediately after his birth the supremacy of Sparta was unquestioned. Greece lay at her feet. Her power had made itself felt far beyond the Peloponnese, even on the northern shores of the Ægean. She had overthrown the city which might have become an effectual bulwark against the terrible king of Macedon. Olynthus became her vassal in the year 379 B.C. All was changed eight years afterwards. The decisive battle of Leuctra, in 371 B.C., struck down Sparta and gave the ascendancy to Thebes. For a few years Greece resounded with the fame of her two illustrious citizens, Epameinondas and Pelopidas. But when she lost Epameinondas, nine years after Leuctra, in the brilliant victory of Mantineia, she lost with him the supreme control of Greek politics, retaining merely the foremost rank among the northern states. Meanwhile she had

given, as we have seen, shelter and education to the future destroyer of Greek freedom.

Amid these changes and revolutions, Demosthenes grew up to manhood. His own state, Athens, had achieved nothing specially worthy of record during this period. Still, she was altogether the most famous city of Greece, and was commercially prosperous. The father of Demosthenes, who bore the same name, was a rich and eminenty respectable citizen. He was a merchant and a manufacturer, and belonged to the wealthy middle class. His property was distributed in various investments. He had two manufactories, and each, it seems, had a good business. One was a sword and knife manufactory, and employed thirty-two slaves. The other was a cabinet manufactory, and in this twenty slaves were employed. He had also money out at interest, a deposit account at one of the principal banks, and sums lent, according to a very prevalent Athenian practice, on ship-cargoes. He had, too, a house of some value, and good furniture and plate; and his wife was an heiress, and had her jewels on a tolerably handsome scale. But the lady, whose name was Cleobule, was not of pure Athenian blood, and her birth and antecedents were not quite what could be desired. Her father, Gylon, was a man of distinctly blemished reputation. He had been, in fact, accused of treason—the charge against him being that he had betrayed to the enemy the seaport town of Nymphæum in the Crimea. He did not appear to answer the accusation, and was, according to one account sentenced to death in his absence. But he contrived to do well for himself. He went to Panticapæum, now Kertch, in the Crimea, then the capitol of the kings of Bosporus, and there, through the king's favor, obtained

a grant of land and married a rich wife. She was sneeringly spoken of at Athens as a barbarian and a Scythian—and so Æschines describes her; but it is quite possible that she may have been the daughter of one of those many Greeks who had settled in this remote district to carry on the business of exporting corn to Athens. It was then, as now, a specially corn-growing region. Gylon, it seems, made the most of the king's favor, and traded with great success. He was unquestionably a sharp, shrewd man; and he sent his two daughters well dowered to Athens, and there they both made fairly good matches. Both got Athenian citizens for their husbands—the one marrying Demochares, and the other the elder Demosthenes. We may not unreasonably conjecture that the mother of Demosthenes inherited some natural ability from her sagacious and enterprising father.

It was the misfortune of Demosthenes to be left an orphan when only seven years of age, and to fall into the hands of unscrupulous guardians. His father died worth fourteen talents,—about £3,500 of our money. This, according to modern notions, is a very moderate property; but at Athens it was sufficiently large to place its possessor in the wealthiest class, and to render him liable to the highest rate of direct taxation. There were much larger fortunes, no doubt, as that of Nicias, which is said to have amounted to 100 talents, or about £24,000. Alcibiades was even richer; and Callias, who lived at the time of the Persian war, and secured a good share of the plunder, was what we should call a millionaire, being reported to have been worth 200 talents. Athens, as we have seen, was, of all the Greek cities, by far the richest, and it always contained a number of well-to-do-citizens. The ordinary rate of

interest was extremely high. Money lent even on good security fetched from 12 to 20 per cent.; and some investments, those especially on ship-cargoes—hazardous, no doubt—were yet more lucrative. As much as 30 per cent. was now and then paid on this class of investments. Demosthenes asserts, in his pleadings against his guardians, that a third part of his estate produced an income of fifty minas. This would make the entire income about £600 a year. Now, it appears that a citizen could live just decently at Athens on something like seven or eight minas a-year, or about £32; and in perfect comfort and respectability on fifty minas, or about £200 a-year, provided he kept clear of the various costly public services which were demanded from the rich. Demosthenes, therefore, it is clear, having but one sister, ought to have had a very ample fortune, though he could not have been described as extremely wealthy. His father, being in business, probably got 25 or even 30 per cent. for a large part of his capital, and we should suppose that he was at Athens in much the same position as a man with from £2,000 to £3,000 a-year would be with us. Had his will been faithfully carried out, and a third of the income been set apart for maintenance and education, and two-thirds profitably invested, the son must have been decidedly rich when at the age of sixteen, ten years after his father's death, he attained his majority.

As it was, he found himself comparatively poor. He had to receive something less than two talents, and his income could not have exceeded from £60 to £70 a-year. His father, we may surmise, had misgivings about the administration of the property, as he practically endeavored to bribe the three guardians, two of whom were his nephews, into a faithful discharge of

their trust by giving them full control over almost one third of the property. His sister's son, Aphobus, was to marry the widow, with a fair fortune, and to have the house and furniture during the minority of Demosthenes. His brother's son, Demophon, was to have two talents, and to marry the daughter in due time. In all respects he seems to have carefully provided for his two children, and to have left them in the charge of relatives on whose fidelity he might reasonably reckon. The result can be ascribed only to negligence and dishonesty. The property must have been partly muddled away, partly actually embezzled. Admitting that some of the investments were precarious, and that the business of the two manufactories was simply mismanaged, we can hardly doubt that the trustees were unprincipled as well as utterly careless. It is true, indeed, that Demosthenes was taunted by his rival Æschines with having squandered his patrimony in ridiculous follies; and it was alleged by one of the guardians, in defending the action, that large advances had been made. The boy had, it would seem, rather luxurious tastes, and in the last two years of his minority he may have indulged them freely. But this very inadequately explains the smallness of the sums handed over to him. It is an all but absolute certainty that he was swindled out of his property. The matter ended in his bringing an action against Aphobus, and recovering a verdict for ten talents. It is not certain whether he actually received this amount. Aphobus was rich and influential, and contrived to make further difficulties. We have five speeches connected with this action—three against Aphobus, and two against a brother-in-law of Aphobus, Onetor. It is from these speeches that we chiefly get our information about the property of Demosthenes.

We have not the means of knowing the precise results of the suit, or what benefit, if any, Demosthenes derived from it. Much of the estate had somehow or other disappeared, and he had to enter on life as rather a poor instead of a rich man.

It is probable that his misfortunes had a good effect on his character. They may have been the source of his intense resolution and perseverance. From early years he had a weak constitution, and shrank from the vigorous physical training which was considered an essential element in a Greek education. He had an active mind, and a strong craving for intellectual culture. As became his position and expectations, he went to good schools—though his guardians, if we may believe his statement, were shabby enough to leave his school-fees unpaid. He had a passion for speeches and recitations; and it was said that he once induced his schoolmaster to go with him to hear one of the first speakers of the day, Callistratus, who was delivering a great political harangue on the cession of the border-town Oropus to the Thebans. The occasion may have been a turning-point in his life. But he had an unlucky infirmity; he, who was to be the greatest orator of all time, stammered in his boyhood and youth. It would seem as if his physical defects were too much for his mental vigor and his ambitious aspirations.

Plutarch in his 'Life of Demosthenes' gives us several interesting details about his study and preparation for the career of an orator, and it is satisfactory to find that so high an authority as Mr. Grote thinks that they rest on good evidence. It appears that the youth put himself under the instruction of Isæus, one of the first advocates of the time, who was frequently retained in cases connected with wills and disputes about property.

In his speeches against his guardians he is said to have availed himself of the counsel and guidance of this eminent lawyer. But the most fashionable rhetoric-professor of the day was Isocrates, and Demosthenes was among the number of his most attentive and admiring hearers; though perhaps we must not believe a story according to which he asked the great man to teach him a fifth part of his art for two minas, as he could not afford the regular fee of ten minas, about £40, to learn the whole. One would like to believe that he heard and admired some of the discourses of Plato, who was then in the height of his philosophical glory; and there is a tradition, mentioned by Cicero and Tacitus, to this effect. The literary styles of the two men are no doubt very diverse; yet, as Dr. Thirlwall suggests, it is not wholly improbable that the lofty morality which Demosthenes ventured to introduce into speeches addressed to Athenian assemblies and law courts may have been inspired by the philosopher. That he was a devoted student of the great History of Thucydides, that copied it out eight times, and almost knew it by heart, we may well believe. One of the ancient critics, Dionysius of Halycarnassus, has elaborately pointed out resemblances in the orator to the historian. Strangely enough Cicero, in his Orator,* asks the question, "What Greek orator ever borrowed anything from Thucydides?" We really fail to see the point of this question, unless he meant to limit the term orator to a mere pleader, and even then we think he is wrong. But for the purpose of political oratory there cannot be a doubt that both the style and matter of Thucydides might be studied with infinite profit by a man of real capacity.

* Chapter ix.

Nothing but the utmost energy and perseverance would have enabled Demosthenes to make himself an orator. He had, as already said, to surmount the actual physical difficulties of a feeble constitution and of some defect in his organs of speech. His ultimate success was a decisive proof of a singularly exceptional force of character. It was for this, indeed, as exhibited throughout his whole career, that he specially deserves admiration. We are told that he practiced speaking with pebbles in his mouth; that he strengthened his lungs and his voice by reciting as he ran up hill; that he declaimed on the seashore amid the noise of waves and storms. He would even pass two or three months continuously in a subterranean cell, shaving one side of his head, that he might not be able to show himself in public, to the interruption of his rhetorical exercises. But all this patient and laborious practice did not procure immediate success. No public assembly could be more critical and fastidious than that of Athens. Demosthenes failed repeatedly. One of the old citizens found him on one of these occasions wandering about disconsolately in the Piræus, and tried to cheer him up by saying, "You have a way of speaking which reminds me of Pericles, but you lose yourself through mere timidity and cowardice." Another time he was returning to his home in deep dejection, when Satyrus, a great and popular actor, with whom he was well acquainted, entered into conversation with him. Demosthenes complained that though he was the most painstaking of all orators, and had almost sacrificed his health to his intense application, yet he could find no favor with the people, and that drunken seamen and other illiterate persons were listened to in preference to himself. "True," replied the actor, "but I will pro-

vide you a remedy if you will repeat to me some speech in Euripides or Sophocles." Demosthenes did so, and then Satyrus recited the same speech in such a manner that it seemed to the orator quite a different passage. With the aid of such hints, joined to his own indefatigable industry, he at last achieved a distinct success in the law courts, and his services as an advocate were in great request.

After all he had not much of which, according to our notions, a man could reasonably claim. Success came to him very early in life. He was, as we should say, in large practice at the bar when he was considerably under thirty—an age at which a young English barrister hardly hopes for a brief. Doubtless, at Athens there were opportunities for displaying oratorical ability which do not exist in England. One thoroughly successful speech before the popular assembly might well make the fortune of a man as an advocate. To make such a speech required, we may be sure, marked ability and considerable training; but once made, it must at least have opened a career in the law courts. Athenian law, too, was probably less intricate and difficult than English. It had not such a variety of branches, as seem to be indispensable in so complex a community as our own. The study of it must thus have been a much less arduous task than that which lies before the English lawyer. But it was an admirable preparation for political life. Law and politics were intermingled at Athens very much more than among ourselves; and a lawyer was almost necessarily something of a politician. There, questions which we regarded as purely political, and which would be discussed with us only in Parliament, might come before a law court. An accusation, for instance, might be

preferred against a man for proposing a law or a decree quite at variance with the spirit of the constitution. Such cases were frequent. It was in a prosecution of this nature that Demosthenes, who for some few years had had a good practice as a barrister in civil and criminal causes, made what we may fairly call his first appearance as a political adviser.

CHAPTER IV.

DEMOSTHENES ENTERS POLITICAL LIFE.

In all democracies much will be expected from the rich. This was the rule in the Greek states, and especially at Athens. There the constitution demanded a certain amount of public spirit, and prescribed various modes in which it was to display itself. Athenians loved a bright joyous life, and the wealthier of them were under legal obligations to minister to the popular tastes and contribute to the public amusements. There was a good side to all this. It made the rich feel that they must not use their riches merely for their own selfish enjoyment, but that it ought to be the glory of an Athenian citizen of fortune to put happiness and refinement within the reach of every member of the community. Pericles, in the famous funeral oration, the substance of which Thucydides has given us, had boasted how it was the peculiar genius of Athens to combine mirthfulness and gaiety with a strong sense of political responsibility.

Poetry and music were an essential part of an Athenian's life. They were intimately connected with all the religious festivals. With us the pleasures of the opera are necessarily confined to a select few. At Athens the poorest citizen was enabled to gratify his taste for such pleasures. The law imposed on a man with a certain amount of property the liability of hav-

ing to provide a chorus of singers or musicians on some great public occasion. He had to bear all the expenses himself. Having made up his number, he had to obtain a teacher or choir-master, and to pay him for his instruction. He had also, it seems, to board and lodge the chorus during the time of its training, and he had, further, to furnish them with suitable dresses. All this, of course, he could do by deputy; but if he was anxious, as he usually would be, to do it with credit to himself, he would find that he must give the matter his personal attention. There was a prize for the best performance; and this, if not instrinsically valuable, was sure to be coveted. The choragus, as he was called, had a stall assigned him in the theatre, and it was part of his duty to be present during the ceremony with his crown and robe of office. There seems to have been every variety of chorus—tragic and comic choruses, pyrrhic choruses, and choruses of flute-players. The expense of providing them might range from £100 to £1,200—a large sum in comparison with Athenian wealth. Still this amount was, it appears, often exceeded in an eager competition for the prize. The successful choragus was certain to be a popular citizen.

This, then, was one of the regular charges on the wealthier class. There were others. Athleticism and gymnastic games were a prominent feature in Greek life. At Athens one of the amusements in which they specially delighted was running with the torch, the runners carrying wax lights in their hands, which it was their object not to extinguish. The race in the time of Socrates began to be run on horseback, and the training and preparation for it became one of the public services, which the rich had to undertake. The gymnasiarch, or director of these games, had to defray

all the expenses connected with the spectacle; he had to see to and to pay for the training of the competitors, which was on a very elaborate scale, and might involve a comparatively heavy outlay. Another still more burdensome obligation was the conduct of religious embassies to various places. This was regarded as a duty of the highest and most sacred kind; and whenever the State sent out a special commission to any of the ancient seats of Greek worship, such as Delos or Delphi, to consult the oracle of the god or to offer a solemn sacrifice, it was represented by citizens of wealth and distinction. Anything like parsimony on such an occasion would have been thought peculiarly discreditable, and it was the tendency of an Athenian to go to the opposite extreme. The head of the sacred mission entered the city whither he was bound with a crown of gold and in a splendidly equipped chariot, Alcibiades astonished the Greek world at the Olympic festival with his magnificent horses and his princely expenditure. Even in an ordinary way, however, the performance of this duty must have been a costly service. A minor expense was that of giving a public dinner to the particular tribe of which a man was a member. This too was a burden imposed on the rich. Last of all came the obligation to maintain the fleet in efficiency,—Athens' defence and glory. This—the trierarchy, as it was called—was a service of which we are continually hearing in the speeches of Demosthenes, and to place it on a satisfactory footing was an object he had specially at heart.

All these services, it must be understood, were legally compulsory—not merely enforced on the rich by public opinion, as in our time. At Athens, no citizen who was registered as the possessor of a certain amount of

property could evade them. A man in England may be obliged to serve the office of sheriff once in a way, but to try to create public spirit by law would be repugnant to our notions. In a Greek state there was a much more distinct theory as to what each citizen owed to the commonwealth; and Athens, the very type of Greek democracy, felt it most natural to make these demands on her richer classes. At the same time, she had thought fit to exempt certain persons from the operation of this principle. There were a few whose meritorious services might be fairly considered to have earned them such an exemption—the trierarchy alone excepted. The privilege in some cases was extended to their descendants. Two names were cherished at Athens with peculiarly grateful remembrance, those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the illustrious tyrannicides, who were believed to have given freedom and equality to their city. To their offspring forever was granted immunity from the public burdens we have just described. In like manner, a statesman or a general who had deserved well of his country might be rewarded with the same privilege for himself and his children. With us such men occasionally obtain pensions, which, in a few instances, are continued to their descendants. With the Athenians, they enjoyed what was perhaps almost an equivalent—exemption from costly and burdensome services.

It is easy to see that many abuses might creep into this system; and that even without any very glaring abuses, there might be much envy and dissatisfaction. Privileges of any kind are sure to give offence, and in a democratical community they cannot fail to furnish a handle to demagogues and politicians. We are therefore not surprised to find that at Athens in 356 B.C. a

law was proposed and carried repealing all exemptions and immunities. The author of the law was a certain Leptines, who was no doubt put forward as the spokesman of a considerable party. He contrived to get a measure of a very sweeping kind passed, so that not only were all existing grants of immunity abolished, but it was declared illegal to make such grants in the future, and even to ask for them was forbidden under a heavy penalty. We do not know whether there was any special impulse or provocation under which the people of Athens allowed themselves to be persuaded into passing this law. It roused, of course, a strong opposition, the leader of which was a son of the famous Chabrias, who had fallen in his country's cause, fighting on board his ship at the siege of Chios. The son had inherited from his father one of these honorable grants of immunity. He was, it seems, himself utterly unworthy of it; but he represented a principle, and had, we may be sure, a numerous following. Demosthenes became his advocate, and in the year subsequent to the passing of the law, he assailed it in a speech which has always been much admired.

This was his first political effort. He was quite a young man at the time—thirty years of age at most, probably less. The speech he delivered does not exhibit the fire and force of some of his subsequent orations; it is calm and argumentative, and deserves the epithet of "subtle" which Cicero* applies to it. It is in fact a specimen throughout of close and consecutive reasoning. Leptines' proposal was no doubt popular, and it was supported by many plausible arguments. The circumstances of the State were such as made any exemptions and immunities from public

*Orator, c. xxxi.

burdens of very questionable expediency. Athens had been seriously impoverished by her recent disastrous war with her allies, and many of her richer citizens must, for a time at least, have been sorely straitened in their resources. To exempt such wealthy men from burdens which there was not too much wealth left to bear, might well seem a distinct loss to the State. It increased the difficulty of providing for those public festivals which were so dear to the people. It could also no doubt be plausibly argued that exemptions had been granted too freely, and now and then to thoroughly unworthy persons. Many a man not particularly rich would think himself aggrieved, when he saw some one far richer than himself altogether exempt. The favored few were sure to be envied, and might almost be said to be defrauding the State of what they owed it. The object, in fact, of the law of Leptines was, it might be contended, to insure for Athens the due performance of services which she had a right to claim from every citizen of ample means. The burden, he argued, ought to fall on all such; no exemptions ought to be granted, as it was likely they would be granted unwisely, and the examples of other states, such as Sparta and Thebes, showed that these grants were unnecessary. Besides, merit at Athens was rewarded in other ways; and in sweeping away such rewards as these, they would be really abolishing what was not needed by the possessors, and was at the same time injurious to the State. Thus the new law seemed on the surface a good one, and must have enlisted popular sympathy. It promised to get rid of invidious privileges, to distribute public burdens equitably, and to provide for the celebration of the festivals and games with becoming splendor.

The occasion was thus clearly one to task all the powers of an opposition speaker. If we want a modern analogy, we may suppose a motion brought forward in the House of Commons in a time of national distress, when every tax would be acutely felt, to abolish all pensions ever granted to deserving men and to their children. It is conceivable that such a proposition might find supporters at a trying crisis, and become a powerful party-cry. Demosthenes may well have had an uphill battle to fight. But he took the right ground, and rested his case on the highest moral principles and the most enlightened view of political expediency. The faith and honor of the State, he maintained, must be superior to all other considerations. We may say that the text of his speech was: "A good name is better than riches."

First, he argued that it was unjust to deprive the people of the power to grant special privileges because they had sometimes granted them improperly.

"You might as well take from them all their constitutional rights because they do not always exercise them wisely. Even if a few undeserving persons received these privileges, this was better than that none should be conferred, and that a powerful encouragement to patriotism should be withdrawn. To revoke gifts which the State had bestowed would be a scandalous breach of the national faith. It would cast a slur on democratic government, and create an impression that such governments were as little to be trusted as those of oligarchs and despots. It would be base ingratitude to many distinguished foreigners—for example, to the king of Bosporus, from whose country much corn was exported to Athens, free of duty—and such men for the future would not care to befriend the State in a time of need.

It was nothing to the purpose to speak of Sparta and Thebes, as proofs that these grants of exemption were not required. The whole genius and character of those States were so radically different, that no conclusion could be reasonably drawn from them as to what suited Athenians. It was of supreme importance that Athens, as the noblest representative of Greece, should value above all things a character for justice, generosity, and public spirit. To attempt to bind her for all future time by a law which might be a hurtful and dangerous check on patriotic impulses must be inexpedient. No one could forsee what course politics might take, and it was possible that citizens like Harmodius and Aristogeiton might again be needed. All human legislation must take account of such possibilities and contingencies, improbable as they might seem at the time. The law of Leptines was, in fact, an offence to Nemesis, which ever waits on arrogance and presumption."

These were some of the chief arguments with which Demosthenes combated the reasonings of his opponent. In one passage he reminds his audience how careful Athens had been in the past of her good name.

"You have to consider not merely whether you love money, but whether you love also a good name, which you are more anxious after than money; and not you only, but your ancestors, as I can prove. For when they had got wealth in abundance, they expended it all in pursuit of honor. For glory's sake they never shrank from any danger, but persevered to the last, spending even their private fortunes. Instead of a good name, this law fastens an opprobrium on the commonwealth, unworthy both of your ancestors and yourselves. It begets three of the greatest reproaches—the reputation of being envious, faithless and ungrateful. That

it is altogether foreign to your character to establish a law like this, I will endeavor to prove in a few words by recounting one of the former acts of the State. The Thirty Tyrants are said to have borrowed money from the Lacedæmonians to attack the party in the Piræus. When unanimity was restored, and these troubles were composed, the Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors and demanded payment of their money. Upon this there arose a debate, and some contended that the borrowers, the city party, should pay; others advised that it should be the first proof of harmony to join in discharging the debt. The people, we know, determined themselves to contribute, and share in the expense, to avoid breaking any article of their convention. Then, were it not shameful if, at that time, you chose to contribute money for the benefit of persons who had injured you, rather than break your word, yet now, when it is in your power, without cost, to do justice to your benefactors by repealing this law, you should prefer to break your word?"

He argues, that the envious, grudging spirit displayed in the law is, of all things, most alien to Athenian feeling.

"Every possible reproach should be avoided, but most of all, that of being envious. Why? Because envy is altogether the mark of a bad disposition, and to have this feeling is wholly unpardonable. Besides, abhorring, as our commonwealth does, everything disgraceful, there is no reproach from which she is further removed than from the imputation of being envious. Observe how strong are the proofs. In the first place, you are the only people who have state funerals for the dead, and funeral orations in which you glorify the actions of brave men. Such a custom is that of a people

which admires virtue, and does not envy others who are honored for it. In the next place, you have ever bestowed the highest rewards upon those who win the garlands in gymnastic contests; nor have you, because but few are born to partake of such rewards, envied the parties receiving them, nor abridged your honors on that account. Add to these striking evidences that no one appears ever to have surpassed our State in liberality—such munificence has she displayed in requiting services. All these are manifestations of justice, virtue, magnanimity. Do not destroy the character for which our State has all along been renowned; do not, in order that Leptines may wreak his personal malice upon some whom he dislikes, deprive the State and yourselves of the honorable name which you have enjoyed throughout all time. Regard this as a contest purely for the dignity of Athens, whether it is to be maintained the same as before, or to be impaired and degraded."

The following passage is near the conclusion of the speech. He is arguing against the impolicy of binding the State for the future by such a law:

"To one thing more I beg your attention This law cannot be good which makes the same provision for the future as the past. 'No one shall be exempt,' it says, 'not even the descendents of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.' Good. 'Nor shall it be lawful to grant exemptions hereafter.' Not if similar men arise? Blame former doings as you may, know you also the future? Oh, but we are far from expecting anything of the kind. I trust we are; but being human, our language and our law should be such as not to shock religious sentiment; and while we look for good fortune, and implore heaven to grant it, we will regard all fortune as sub-

ject to human casualties. The future, I take it, is uncertain to all men, and small occasions are productive of great events. Therefore we will be moderate in prosperity, and show that we have an eye to the future."

It may be said that there is much of a modern tone and character about this speech. Its arguments are those of a constitutional lawyer and of a far-sighted politician. It is quiet and temperate, and at the same time singularly convincing. It was successful in its immediate object, and it must have established the reputation of Demosthenes as a political debater of the first rank. From this time he must have felt but little timidity or hesitation in addressing that critical audience—the Athenian popular assembly.

CHAPTER V.

EARLY SPEECHES OF DEMOSTHENES ON FOREIGN POLICY.

Persia in the fourth century B.C. was a more considerable power than we might have supposed from the comparative ease with which it was overthrown by Alexander. The Great King, as he was always called, was in the possession of immense resources. Financially he was much stronger than the Greek world, though his military inferiority had been more than once clearly proved. He was still looked on by the Greeks generally with a sort of wondering awe. He ruled in some fashion a vast empire, and held it together by means of satraps and vassal princes, notwithstanding occasional serious revolts. He had had indeed, in past days, to acknowledge the independence of the Asiatic Greeks; still he was always distinctly felt as a force in Greek politics, with which from time to time he was brought into contact. On the whole, he was regarded as an enemy; but the unfortunate want of anything like hearty union among the states of Greece tended to weaken this feeling, and to make combined action against him all but impossible. There was always, however, a vague fear that he might some day, if violently provoked, crush the Greek world beneath the weight of a huge barbarian invasion.

In the year 356 B.C., the second year of Athens' war with her revolted allies, this fear rose, at Athens at least, to a positive panic. Greek generals, as we have seen, occasionally found it convenient to take service under some Persian satrap, for the sake of the liberal pay on which they could confidently reckon. In the year above mentioned, Chares was in command of a fleet which Athens had sent out to put down her rebellious subjects in the Islands of the Ægean. He was a man thoroughly of the adventurer type; and when he found that he could not pay his troops, which were for the most part foreign mercenaries, he carried off his armament on his own responsibility to the aid of Artabanus, the satrap of the country south of the Propontis, who was then in revolt against the Great King. Artabanus was, at the time, in sore need of help; but Chares gained for him a brilliant victory over the king's forces, and he received for himself and his soldiers a liberal reward. The proceeding was, of course, utterly irregular, and gave great offence at Athens; but the success reconciled them to it. The King of Persia was naturally very indignant, and sent an embassy to Athens to complain of this unprovoked aggression. Soon it was rumored that he was preparing a fleet of 300 galleys to aid their revolted allies and to attack their city. There was intense excitement. Peace was immediately concluded with the allies, but there was a strong feeling in favor of declaring war against Persia. Now, it was said, was the time for an appeal to Phanhellenic sentiment, and to endeavor to unite Greece against her old enemy. We can well imagine that such language was likely to meet with a response in many quarters, and that it might well seem patriotic, and even prudent.

In this case, again, Demosthenes thought it his duty to protest. He did so in a speech delivered in 354 B.C. He must have been, in all probability, on the unpopular side. He had, too, against him the opinion of the famous and clever rhetorician, Isocrates, who had urged in one of his pamphlets the expediency of a Panhellenic combination against Persia. The party of Eubulus, backed up by a number of orators and demagogues, supported this policy. To Demosthenes it seemed an idle dream—the preposterous imagination of a knot of political adventurers. The speech in which he opposed it is calm and statesmanlike. "In no one of his speeches," says Mr. Grote, "is the spirit of practical wisdom more predominant than in this his earliest known discourse to the public Assembly." He tells his excited countrymen some very plain home-truths. "The Greeks," he frankly says, "are too jealous of each other to be capable of uniting in an aggressive war. They might indeed do so in a war of self-defence. Should Athens declare war, the King of Persia would be able to purchase aid from the Greeks themselves. Such a step would consequently lay bare the worst weaknesses of the Greek world. Their right policy was to put Athens in a posture of defence, that she might not be attacked unprepared. They must reorganize their fleet. They must not shrink from personal military service and lean upon foreign mercenaries. They must not rest contentedly on the glorious deeds of their ancestors, but uphold the dignity of their State by themselves imitating their deeds, whatever temporary sacrifices it might cost them. And they should seek to rally round Athens a host of confederates, united to her by the bonds of common interest and mutual confidence." Some of these topics are such as, under

critical circumstances, it must have required much moral courage to urge.

A few passages from the speech will give the reader an idea of Demosthenes' views about Persia, about the difficulty of united action against that power, and the immediate duties of the Athenians themselves:

"I hold the King," he says, "to be the common enemy of all the Greeks. Still I would not for this reason advise you without the rest to undertake a war against him. The Greeks themselves, I observe, are not friends to one another. On the contrary, some have more confidence in the King than in certain of their own people. Such being the case, I deem it expedient and just, that all necessary preparations be made, and that this should be the groundwork of your resolution. Were there any plain proof that the King of Persia was about to attack the Greeks, I think they would join alliance, and be extremely grateful to those who sided with them and defended them against him. But if we rush into a quarrel before his intentions are declared, I am afraid that we shall be driven into a war with both—with the King and with the people whom we are axious to protect. He will suspend his designs, if we really have resolved to attack the Greeks, will give money to some, and promise friendship; while they, in the wish to carry on their own war with better success and intent on similar objects, will disregard the common safety of the Greek world. I beseech you not to betray our country into such embarrassment and folly. You, I perceive, cannot adopt the same policy in regard to the king as the other Greeks can. Many of them, I conceive, may very well pursue their selfish interests, and be utterly indifferent to the national welfare. But for you it would be dishonor-

able, even though you had suffered wrong, so to punish the wrong-doers as to let any of them fall under the power of the barbarian. Under these circumstances we must be careful not to engage in the war on unequal terms, and not to allow him whom we suppose to be planning mischief against the Greeks to get the credit of appearing their friend."

Although Athens is rich, he warns the people that those riches will not be forthcoming on a mere vague rumor of hostilities from Persia. When the danger is seen to be really imminent, then it will be time for the State to put a pressure on its wealthy citizens.

"You invite the Greeks to join you. But if you will not act as they wish, how can you expect they will obey your call, when some of them have no good-will towards you? Because, forsooth, they will hear from you that Persia has designs on them? Pray, do you imagine that they don't foresee it themselves? I am sure they do; but at present the fear outweighs the enmity which some of them bear towards you and towards each other. Athens contains treasures equal to the rest of the Greek states put together. But the owners of wealth are so minded that if all your orators alarmed them with the intelligence that the King was coming, that he was at hand, that the danger was inevitable—if, besides the orators, a number of persons gave oracular warning—so far from contributing, they would not even discover their wealth or acknowledge its possession. But if they knew that what is so terrible in report was really begun, there is not a man so foolish who would not be ready to give and foremost to contribute. I say that we have money against the time of actual need, but not before. And therefore I advise you not to search for it now. Your right course

is to complete your other preparations. Let the rich retain their riches for the present (it cannot be in better hands for the state); and should the crisis come, then take it from them in voluntary contributions."

The speech is thus concluded:

"My advice is, do not be over-alarmed at the war; neither be led to commence it. As far as I see, no other state of Greece has reason to fear it. All the Greeks know that so long as they regarded Persia as their common enemy, they were at peace with one another, and enjoyed much prosperity. But since they have looked on the King as a friend, and quareled about disputes with each other, they have suffered worse calamities than any one could possibly imprecate upon them. Should we fear a man whom both fortune and heaven declare to be an unprofitable friend and a useful enemy? If it were possible with one heart and with united forces to attack him alone, such an injury I could not pronounce to be an injustice. But since this cannot be, I say we must be cautious, and not afford the King a pretence for vindicating the rights of the other Greeks. Do not expose the melancholy condition of Greece by convoking her people when you cannot persuade them, and making war when you cannot carry it on. Only keep quiet, fear nothing, and prepare yourselves. My advice in brief is this: Prepare yourselves against existing enemies; and you ought with the same force to be able to resist the King and all others, if they attempt to injure you. But never begin a wrong in word or deed. Let us look that our actions, and not our speeches on the platform, be worthy of our ancestors. If you pursue this course, you will do service not only to yourselves, but also to those who give the opposite counsel; for you will not

be angry with them afterwards for errors now committed."

In this speech Demosthenes may be said to foreshadow the general character of his foreign policy. He did not wish Athens to be aggressive, but simply to hold her own with a firm hand. This, he thought, she might well be persuaded to do. Grand schemes of Panhellenic union against the empire of Persia, such as floated before the imagination of Isocrates, and were through his influence, fascinating the minds of a certain class of political enthusiasts, he scouted as Quixotic. Above all things, he aimed at being a practical statesman; and of this the speech from which we have just been quoting, delivered by him in the commencement of his public life, is decisive evidence.

In the following year he delivered a speech which is of considerable interest as showing his view of Greek politics at the time. It was important, he thought, for Athens that there should be, as we say, a balance of power in the Greek world, and that neither Sparta nor Thebes should be too strong. I have explained the circumstances under which Megalopolis was founded in 371 B.C., after the great battle of Leuctra, under Theban influence, as the metropolis of Arcadia, and specially as a check on Sparta. The establishment of this city, together with the loss of the Messenian territory, which soon followed, was a terrible blow to that state. Sparta, in fact, for the time, was reduced to a second-rate power. She was hemmed in by enemies on the north and on the west. It was hardly to be expected that she would acquiesce in such humiliation. And so, in the year 353 B.C., her king, Archidamus, began to plan a counter-revolution, which should undo the work of Leuctra by the destruction of Megalopolis

and the reconquest of Messenia. It was, however, necessary for him to have some pretext which should commend itself generally in Greek opinion. He was meditating an entire unsettlement of the affairs of the Peloponnese in the interest of Sparta; and this, he knew, would not be allowed if it were to be openly avowed. Accordingly he put forward the policy of a general restoration of ancient rights to the different states. Athens would thus recover the border town of Oropus, now in the possession of Thebes, the loss of which had much vexed and distressed her. Thus, it was hoped, she might be disposed to favor the Spartan proposals, which, as a matter of course, the anti-Theban party, then very strong, would back up to the utmost of its power. The result which such a policy would have on Megalopolis, as a barrier in Sparta's way, was kept in the background. The new city must have inevitably dwindled down into an insignificant township, and the purpose with which it had been founded would have been frustrated.

Envoys came to Athens both from Sparta and from Megalopolis. There was a warm and angry debate. The bitter hatred Athenians had always felt towards Thebans, coupled with the immediate desire of recovering Oropus, was enough to recommend the Spartan proposals. It seems strange that the memory of what Athens had suffered from the hands of Sparta did not at once decide the question, and open the eyes of the people to the dangers of Sparta's insidious policy. Some there were who saw through it and denounced it. Demosthenes was among the number. He was with the "Opposition;" and it appears that on this occasion he failed. He supported the cause of Megalopolis—the cause, in fact, of Thebes—arguing that it

would be a grave political blunder to assist Sparta in recovering the position which she held in Greece previous to the battle of Leuctra. His speech is subtle and ingenious, and must have been convincing to those who would not let themselves be carried away by an unreasoning antipathy to everything Theban.

"The Lacedæmonians," he says, "are acting a crafty part. They say they cannot retain the gratitude they feel for you for helping them in a time of urgent need unless you now allow them to commit an injustice. However repugnant it may be to the designs of the Spartans that we should adopt the Arcadian alliance" (that is, the alliance of Megalopolis), "surely their gratitude for having been saved by us in a crisis of extreme peril ought to outweigh their resentment for being checked in their aggression now."

As to the bait held out by Sparta to Athens in the prospect of the recovery of Oropus, he says:

"My opinion is, first, that our State, even without sacrificing any Arcadian people to the Lacedæmonians, may recover Oropus, both with their aid, if they are minded to act justly, and that of others who hold Theban usurpation to be intolerable. Secondly, supposing that it were evident to us that, unless we permit the Lacedæmonians to reduce the Peloponnese, we cannot obtain possession of Oropus, allow me to say, I deem it more expedient to let Oropus alone than to abandon Messenia and the Peloponnese to the Lacedæmonians. I imagine the question between us and them would soon be about other matters. . . .

"I am sure, to judge from rational observation—and I think most Athenians will agree with me—that if the Lacedæmonians take Megalopolis, Messenia will be in danger; and if they take Messenia, I predict

that you and the Thebans will be allies. Then it is much better and more honorable for us to receive the Theban confederacy as our friends and resist Lacedæmonian ambition, than, out of reluctance to save the allies of Thebes, to abandon them now, and have afterwards to save Thebes herself and be in fear also for our own safety. I cannot but regard it as perilous to our State should the Lacedæmonians take Megalopolis and again become strong. For I see they have undertaken the war not to defend themselves, but to recover their ancient power. What were their designs when they possessed that power, you perhaps know better than I, and therefore may have reason to be alarmed."

This was plain speaking, and sound, statesmanlike advice. It could not have been the interest of Athens to let Sparta gain her old supremacy, as she was certainly striving to do. It was her interest, as Demosthenes says towards the conclusion of his speech, not to abandon Megolopolis and the Arcadians, and to make them feel (should they survive the struggle) that they had owed their deliverance not to themselves or to any other people but the Athenians. As affairs turned out, the dangers he apprehended never came to pass. He could not persuade his countrymen to support Megalopolis. They simply stood neutral. The Lacedæmonians waged war for two years in Arcadia, and gained some partial successes, but they could not carry out their designs. Thebes, though she had occupation for her soldiers in other quarters, contrived to send an army into the Peloponnese; and after some indecisive engagements, a truce was concluded, which left matters as they were. Megalopolis and the Arcadian confederacy escaped the peril with which Sparta had threatened them. But the result to Athens and to

Greece was unsatisfactory. Subsequently, when they apprehended a similar danger from Sparta, they did not think it worth their while to ask help from Athens. They did not care to be refused a second time, and on this occasion they applied to Philip. He was not the man to miss such an opportunity; and thus Macedonian influence was brought to bear on the affairs of the Peloponnese. This was the unfortunate consequence of the indifference of Athens to the progress of Spartan ambition. She gave the impression to the Greek world that she was not in earnest in wishing to maintain the liberties of the states of the Peloponnese, although it had been her constant profession to do so. This was the inference drawn from her refusal to ally herself with Megalopolis against Sparta. Had she been guided by the counsels of Demosthenes, she would have assumed a dignified political attitude, and, as events turned out, have put a stumbling-block in the way of her future enemy and destroyer. It is true, indeed, that at that time there was no distinct cause of apprehension from Macedon, and there is not even any allusion to Philip in his speech of Demosthenes. We may therefore conclude that as yet he himself feared nothing in that quarter. Still, it is not the less to his credit that he urged Athens to adopt a policy which would have won for her the respect and confidence of many of the Greeks, and might have had the effect of excluding the intrusions of a most dangerous foreign influence into an important part of the Greek world.

CHAPTER VI.

FIRST SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES AGAINST PHILIP—SPEECH FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PEOPLE OF RHODES.

THE year 352 B.C. brought with it the beginnings of great events. In that year, for the first time, the King of Macedon really showed that he might possibly be entertaining designs fraught with peril to the Greek world. He had prominently intervened in Greek politics. He had taken a conspicuous part in the Sacred or Holy War between the Thebans and Phocians. Once, indeed, he had been utterly defeated by the Phocian leader, Onomarchus, and had been driven back into his kingdom with loss and disaster, though report made him say that "he did not fly, but fell back like the battering-ram, to give a more violent shock another time." He speedily again entered Thessaly with a more powerful army; and with the help of his allies in that country and of the admirable Thessalian cavalry, he won at Pagasæ a decisive victory over Onomarchus, who perished in the fight. Now he was completely master of Thessaly, a country which ought to have been under the control of a Greek state, and in which, of late, Theban influence had been supreme. Macedon was thus in effect the principal

land power to the north of the Peloponnese; and her king had both displayed military genius, and had shown that he was in command of an army with which it was already a question whether any single Greek state could cope. The battle just fought was on a very considerable scale, and could not have failed to suggest unpleasant apprehensions to the mind of every thinking politician. Philip might very possibly follow up his success with an instant invasion of northern Greece. He did in fact advance on Thermopylæ; but Athens had forestalled him, and the famous pass was guarded by a force before which he thought prudent to retire. The Athenians exulted in the reflection that they had once again been the deliverers of Greece. But their joys were doomed to be of very brief duration.

For a few months the King of Macedon employed himself in securing a firm hold on Thessaly. Meanwhile his cruisers and privateers, of which he had contrived to raise a formidable number, infested the northern islands and coasts of the Ægean, to the great annoyance and injury of Athenian trade. In the autumn of 352 B.C. he hurried northwards, entered Thrace, and took advantage of its intestine feuds, with a view to getting the country under his control. In November news reached Athens, the serious import of which could not be misunderstood. Philip was besieging Heræum—a place probably on the northern coast of the Propontis, to the west of Perinthus. It was contiguous to the Thracian Chersonese, occupied, as we have seen, by Athenian colonists, and, as it appears, actually garrisoned by an Athenian force. The act was thus one of almost open hostility, and practically equivalent to a declaration of war. But what made it singularly alarming was, that it was a

most dangerous menace to the Athenian interests on the north of the Ægean. It meant, in fact, peril to the corn trade of Athens, and high prices and possibly famine to the citizens. It showed, too, clearly enough, that Philip, if he could, would rob the city of its most valuable outlying possessions. Thus the eyes of the people ought to have been thoroughly opened to the danger which hung over them; but as soon as they knew that Philip was ill, and next heard a report of his death, they fell back into their love of the easy, comfortable life at Athens, with its pleasures and amusements, and flattered themselves with the notion that the crisis was finally past. The peace party, with Eubulus at its head, always strong, was now for the moment stronger than ever; and its best representative, the really patriotic Phocian, was too cynical to believe in the possibility of his countrymen being roused to the degree of effort and endurance which a serious struggle with Macedon would demand from them.

As soon as it was known that Philip had recovered, and was as active and aggressive as ever, there were, it appears, several acrimonious debates in the Assembly, with grievous complaints as to the inefficiency of the generals and of their troops. Athens still clung to her maritime supremacy, and it was felt to be disgraceful that this should be threatened by a barbarian. Still, her public men had not the moral courage to tell the people plainly the only way by which such a disgrace could be ended. It was painful to speak to them of personal service on shipboard, with all its hardships and risks. Demosthenes, in his speech on the war with Persia, had hinted, not obscurely, at this necessity. He did so far more clearly and persistently on the occasion we have been ascribing. At the age of

about thirty he spoke the memorable harangue known as the First Philippic.

The speech shows that he had now quite made up his mind on the subject of the foreign policy of Athens. A year ago he had not, as we may reasonably infer, regarded Macedon as a source of real danger to the freedom of the Greek world. He was now convinced that Philip had designs beyond the mere establishment of a compact and powerful northern kingdom. He takes a broad view of the political situation, and speaks not merely as a citizen of the foremost state of Greece, but as a Greek on behalf of Greek security and independence.

It was assuredly much to the honor of Demosthenes that, as a young politician, he sounded a distinct note of warning, which he must have known would have jarred on the easy-going temper of his countrymen. Their affairs, he plainly tells them, were in a very bad plight; but there was hope, just because they had not as yet really exerted themselves. Therefore there was no reason for despair. Philip's power, indeed, was already great; he had Thessaly at his feet; he had defeated a Greek army under a brave and experienced leader; he was now threatening the Chersonese and the northern coasts of the Ægean, and with his fleet was harassing the commerce of Athens; still, he was not a more formidable foe than Sparta had been; and the fact that he was formidable at all was due to their own voluntary supineness, which, for the sake of Greece and for the glory of Athens, they must shake off once and forever. Otherwise, even if rumor had truly asserted Philip's death, they would soon raise up against themselves another Philip equally terrible.

"You must not despond," he says at the beginning of his speech, "under your present circumstances, wretched as they are; for that which is worst in them as regards the past, is best for the future. My meaning is this—your affairs are amiss because you do nothing which is required. If the result were the same, although you performed your duties, there would be no hope of amendment. Consider, further, what is known to you by hearsay, and what men of experience remember. Not long ago, how vast a power the Lacedæmonians possessed! Yet how nobly and admirably did you consult the dignity of Athens, and undertook the war against them for the rights of Greece! Why do I mention this? To show and convince you that nothing, if you take precaution, is to be feared; nothing, if you are negligent, goes as you desire. Take for examples, the strength of the Lacedæmonians, which you overcame by minding your duty, and the insolent ambition of this Philip now, which utterly confounds us through our neglect of our interest. If any of you think the man a formidable foe, looking at the vastness of his present power and our loss of all our strongholds, that is reasonable enough; only you should reflect that there was a time when we held Pydna, and Potidæa, and Methone, with all the adjacent country, and that many of the nations now in league with Philip were independent and free, and preferred our friendship to his. Had Philip then taken it into his head that, Athens was too formidable a foe to fight, when she had so many fortresses to threaten his country, and he was destitute of allies, nothing that he has accomplished would he have attempted, and never would he have acquired so large a dominion. But he saw clearly enough that such places are the open prizes of war;—

that the possessions of the absent belong to the present, those of the careless to the adventurous who shrink not from toil. Acting on that principle, he has won everything, and keeps it either by way of conquest or by friendly attachment and alliance; for all men will side with and respect those whom they see prepared and willing to make proper exertions. If you will adopt this principle now, though you have not hitherto done so—and if every man, when he can and ought to give his service to the State, be ready to give it without excuse—if the rich will contribute, if the able-bodied will enlist,—in a word, plainly, if you will become your own masters, and cease each expecting to do nothing himself, while his neighbor does everything for him,—then will you, with heaven's permission, recover your own, and get back what has been frittered away, and chastise Philip. Do not imagine that his empire is everlastingly secured to him as to a god. There are who hate and fear and envy him, even among those that seem most friendly; and all feelings natural to other men exist, we may assume, in his confederates. But now they are all cowed, for they have no refuge because of your tardiness and indolence, which I say you must abandon forthwith."

On the subject of the preparations they ought to make, Demosthenes thus advises them:

"First, we must provide fifty war-ships, and hold ourselves prepared in case of emergency to embark and sail. There must, too, be an equipment of transports for half the cavalry, and sufficient boats. This we must have in readiness against his sudden marches from his own country to Thermopylæ, the Chersonese, Olynthus, and anywhere he likes. For he should be made to have the idea that possibly you may rouse

yourselves out of this over-supineness and start off as you did to Eubœa, and very lately to Thermopylæ. Such an armament, I say, ought instantly to be agreed upon and provided."

In the following passage, the want of skill and method with which Athens was carrying on the contest is strikingly exposed:

"You, Athenians, with larger means than any people, have never up to this day made proper use of any of them, and your war with Philip is exactly like the boxing of barbarians. With them, the party struck first is always feeling for the blow; strike him anywhere else, there go his hands again; ward or look you in the face he cannot and will not. So with you. If you hear of Philip in the Chersonese or at Thermopylæ, you vote to send a force there; if you hear of him somewhere else, you run, so to say, after his heels up and down, and are, in fact, commanded by him. No plan have you devised for the war; no circumstance do you see beforehand, but only when you learn that something is done or is about to be done. Formerly, perhaps, this was allowable; now it is come to a crisis to be borne no longer. It seems as if some god, in shame at our proceedings, had put this activity into Philip. For had he been willing to remain quiet in possession of his conquests and prizes, and attempted nothing further, some of you, I think, would be satisfied with a state of things which brands our nation with the shame of cowardice and of the foulest disgrace. But by continually encroaching and grasping after more, he may possibly rouse you, if you have not altogether despaired. I marvel, indeed, that not one of you notices with concern and anger that the begin-

ning of this war was to chastise Philip; the end is to protect ourselves against his attacks."

Towards the conclusion of his speech, Demosthenes reproaches the people with their silly fondness for gossiping about Philip's reported movements, and bids them remember that he now is and long has been their enemy:

"Some among ourselves go about and say that Philip is concerting with the Lacedæmonians the destruction of Thebes and the dissolution of free states; some, that he has sent envoys to the King;* others, that he is fortifying cities in Illyria. So we wander about, each inventing stories. For my part, I quite believe that Philip is thoroughly intoxicated with the magnitude of his exploits, and that he has many such dreams in his imagination. Still, most assuredly his plan of action is not such as to let the greatest fools among us know what his intentions are. For the greatest fools are these newsmongers. Let us dismiss such talk, and remember only that Philip is an enemy who robs us of our own, and has long insulted us; that whenever we have expected aid from any quarter, it has been found hostile; and that the future depends on ourselves; and, unless we are willing to fight him there, we shall perhaps be compelled to fight here. This let us remember, and then we shall have determined wisely, and have done with idle conjectures. You need not pry into the future, but assure yourselves that it will be disastrous, unless you give your mind to your duty, and are willing to act as becomes you."

* The king of Persia.

The only result of this speech was, that a paltry four or five ships were sent to the Chersonese under a mercenary and somewhat disreputable general, Charidemus. The fact was, that there was a numerous party at Athens who never could be persuaded that Philip would some day be a really dangerous enemy. Persia was the power of which they were always thinking as the great source of peril to Greece. There were still rumors flying about as to the gigantic preparations which the King was said to be making against them to revenge the defeats of Marathon and Salamis. Possibly such reports were stimulated by Philip himself. Next there were those who were, in fact, Philip's paid agents, now, no doubt, a considerable class in several Greek states. And, last of all, there was incredulity and apathy among the Athenians themselves. All these adverse influences were too strong for Demosthenes, and his appeal to the patriotism of his countrymen was made in vain.

In the speech we have been describing, Demosthenes dwelt on the duty of Athens to put herself forward as the champion of Greece and of its free states. In a speech delivered some months or perhaps a year afterwards, he reminds her that she ought to be the champion of democracy and of popular government. From this point of view, the oration entitled "On the freedom of the people of Rhodes" has much interest. We rather gather, from the general tone of the speech, that Philip's restlessness had ceased for a time, or at all events that he had something else to do than to threaten the possessions and the commerce of Athens. It was made on the occasion of a deputation from the democratic party in Rhodes, who wished the island to pass again under Athenian control.

Rhodes had more than once been in alliance with Athens—a connection which practically implied a certain degree of subjection and dependence. With the close of the Peloponnesian War and the triumph of Sparta, it was put under an oligarchy, which meant Spartan control. About the year 396 B.C. the Athenian general Conon, who had a powerful fleet in the Ægean, again forced the Rhodians to become the allies of Athens. Four years afterwards a Spartan fleet appeared, and this was the signal for another revolution in the government. There was, it seems, one of those horrible incidents with which Greek history is so often disfigured—a massacre of the democratic leaders and of the adherents of Athens. But the oligarchy now imposed on the island did not last long. The Spartan fleet was defeated, and Rhodes and most of the islands of the Ægean returned to the Athenian alliance. We may take for granted that democracy was re-established. Then came, in 358 B.C., the Social War, the war between Athens and her allies, which broke up the second Athenian empire. Of this, Rhodes was the origin. Chares, the Athenian general, of whom we have already had occasion to speak, provoked and disgusted the Rhodians by plunder and extortion. Cos and Chios had similar grievances; and the three islands threw off their connection with Athens, and began the Social War—Rhodes being the prime mover. They were helped by Mausolus, King of Caria and a vassal prince of the Persian empire. He was a man of considerable ambition, and his idea was to annex Rhodes, which was adjacent to his own territories. It was first necessary to detach it from the Athenian alliance; and Mausolus contrived, by intrigues with the oligarchical party in the island, to introduce a Carian garrison; and

once more the government was revolutionized. The people and their leaders found themselves in a hopeless plight, now that they had renounced their connection with Athens, while the oligarchy was supported by Persian influence through Mausolus. When that king died and his queen Artemisia succeeded, the government became so intolerably oppressive that the popular party ventured to send an embassy to Athens, and humbly to implore relief. It was hardly to be expected that the embassy would be well received. The Athenians felt that Rhodes had inflicted a grievous injury on them by plunging them in a disastrous war, which had ended in dissolving their confederacy. They were in no mood to listen to the present petition. Nevertheless it was supported by Demosthenes.

It is a hard matter to soothe the temper of people when they feel, as the Athenians now did, that they have suffered much from ingratitude. Popular assemblies, under such circumstances, are apt to be peculiarly angry and excited. All that Demosthenes could do was to appeal to the better and more generous sentiments of his countrymen. They ought not, he argued, to brood over the wrongs done to them by these insignificant islanders, but to think only of what was due to Athens and to Greece. It was alike their duty and interest to vindicate the freedom of an oppressed Greek people, and to stand by the policy of supporting popular and democratic government against oligarchs and tyrants. Unless they resolved to act thus, the political constitution of Athens would itself be imperiled. If all democracies were put down, their own would fall at last. Demosthenes, we see, was heartily in sympathy with democracy, and regarded it as the special glory of Athens to be its champion and

upholder. If at times he felt its weak side, and its tendency to vacillation and irresolution, still he never seems to have doubted that it was on the whole the best and most manly type of government.

Such were his reasons for counselling the assembly to listen favorably to the request for aid from the Rhodians. In the following passage these views are clearly expressed:

"Observe, men of Athens, that you have waged many wars both against democracies and against oligarchies. This you know without my telling; but for what causes you have been at war with either, perhaps not one of you considers. What are the causes? Against democratical states your wars have been either for private grievances, when you could not make public satisfaction, or for territory or boundaries, or a point of honor, or for the leadership of Greece. Against oligarchies you fought, not for such things, but for your constitution and for freedom. Therefore I would not hesitate to say that I think it better that all the Greeks should be your enemies with a popular government than your friends under an oligarchical. For with free men I consider you would have no difficulty in making peace when you chose; but with people under an oligarchy, even friendship I hold to be insecure. It is impossible that the few can be attached to the many, the seekers of power to the lovers of constitutional equality. I marvel none of you consider that, when the Rhodians and nearly all people are drawn into this slavery, our constitution must be in the same peril. If all other governments are oligarchical, it is impossible that they will let your democracy alone. They know too well that no other people will bring things back to freedom; therefore

they will wish to destroy a government from which they apprehend mischief to themselves. Ordinary wrong-doers you may regard as enemies to the sufferers; while they who subvert constitutions and transform them into oligarchies must be looked upon as the common enemies of all lovers of freedom."

In the opinion of Demosthenes it thus appears that oligarchy was in fact slavery, and wholly alien to the Greek genius. The memory of the Athens of Pericles was deeply impressed on his mind, But he felt he was now addressing a people singularly prone to be misled. He hints plainly in this spnech at the existence of an unpatriotic faction in the State.

"It is difficult for you," he says, "to adopt right measures. All other men have one battle to fight—namely, against their open and avowed enemies. You have a double contest—that which the rest have, and also a prior and a more arduous one. You must in counsel overcome a faction which acts among you in systematic opposition to the State. Men who desert the politics handed down to them by their ancestors, and support oligarchical measures, should be degraded and deprived of constitutional privileges, and disqualified from being your political advisers."

Again Demosthenes failed. The bitterness of Athenian feeling towards the ungrateful islanders made the people blind to higher considerations, and Rhodes remained in the hands of an oligarchy. It was still subject to Caria, and was thus really a Persian dependency.

CHAPTER VII.

PHILIP AND OLYNTHUS—SPEECHES OF DEMOSTHENES ON BEHALF OF THE OLYNTHIANS.

When Demosthenes, some time in the year 352 B.C., made his first speech against Philip, there were good grounds for an uneasy feeling throughout the Greek world as to the king's possible movements and designs. He had already raised Macedon to a position it had never before held. It had become a distinct power in the politics of Greece. For a while, however, the usually active Philip seemed to be really resting from his labors, and next to nothing was heard of him. Demosthenes does not so much as allude to him in his speech "for the freedom of the people of Rhodes." We may fairly infer from his silence that anything like serious apprehensions at Athens of peril from "the barbarian," as Philip was called, had died away. The peace party, always strong, and able to make out a plausible case for itself, would thus be strengthened; and it would not be easy, even in the face of manifest danger, thoroughly to rouse the Athenians to a sense of the duty which they owed both to themselves and to Greece.

Philip was by this time a powerful prince; but still he was as yet barely a match for Athens, had she

chosen to put forth her full strength. He had an efficient army and a good revenue, and he also had the luck to have other collateral advantages. He had tools and agents in several Greek states; and he had practically on his side at Athens very many of the rich and well-to-do citizens, who shrank from the idea of a war which required personal service and exertion. It was perfectly clear that a contest with him would have been a serious undertaking. At the same time, his position, though strong, was not altogether secure. He had, as we have seen, possessed himself of some of the coast towns, and he had a fleet in the Ægean. Athens should never have allowed him to advance to this point. She had flung away opportunities; but even now it was not too late to check him with the help of a seasonable alliance. As yet he had no hold on the district known as Chalcidice, which juts out with its three peninsulas into the north-west of the Ægean. It was a valuable and commanding strip of country; and it contained thirty Greek towns, of which the chief was the city Olynthus, at the head of the Toronæan gulf. Some of these towns regarded themselves as dependencies of Olynthus, and formed what was known as the Olynthian confederacy. There was a time when even Pella, now the capital of Macedonia, was included in their number. Olynthus, indeed, had been quite the most powerful city in the north of the Ægean, and far too proud to submit to the supremacy of either Sparta or Athens. Sparta with much difficulty forced it, in 379 B.C., into the Lacedæmonian confederacy; and Athens, about ten years later, very much weakened its influence by taking from it some of its territory and of its subject-towns. Still, however, it was prosperous

and flourishing; and it could, at an extremity, bring into the field a considerable military force, especially of cavalry. Although it owed Athens a grudge, it had, as we have seen, proposed alliance when it saw its neighbor, Amphipolis, pass into the hands of Philip. Athens declined the offer, and Philip was clever enough temporarily to conciliate the good will of the Olynthians by a trifling concession of territory,—intending, no doubt, at the first convenient moment, to pick a quarrel with them and annex the whole district. It must have been easy for him, in the case of a city immediately in his own neighborhood, to have his partisans among the citizens; and it was to this that he was indebted for his ultimate success. The towns, too, which were connected with Olynthus by the loose tie of federation, were no doubt singularly open to his intrigues. Still, there was the feeling that he might become a dangerous aggressor; and accordingly Olynthus decided on a change of policy, and, in 352 B.C., withdrew itself from the Macedonian alliance. The next step was to conclude peace with Athens, and even to show a wish for a yet closer union with that state. Athens, too, now saw the advantage of such a union, and, indeed, actually made overtures to that effect; but Olynthus was not quite prepared to commit itself definitely to an Athenian alliance, which it well knew would be equivalent to a declaration of hostility against Philip.

Before long, however,—in the year B.C. 350, as it seems,—Philip left the Olynthians no alternative but that of seeking powerful support. He made them feel that they were in imminent danger by a sudden and unprovoked attack on one of those cities of Chalcidice which would naturally look to Olynthus for sympathy

and protection. Their eyes were now completely opened, and they instantly sent off an embassy to Athens. Philip, indeed, tried to persuade them by envoys that he had no intention of making war on them; but he could not blind them. They felt sure that they might count on a favorable reception for their envoys at Athens, and on the prospect of assistance. Nor were they disappointed. It was impossible for the Athenians to neglect such an opportunity. They had themselves lately proposed such an alliance, and now it was offered them. There could be no mistake as to the critical nature of the situation. Philip had attacked and taken a Greek city, and it was hardly possible to doubt that he was feeling his way to the conquest and annexation of the entire peninsula of Chalcidice, with its thirty towns. Were he to be successful, it was clear that his power would be immensely increased. Equally clear was it that Olynthus, if well supported, might effectually stop his further progress. Indeed, so sanguine were the Athenians, that the general talk now was about punishing Philip for his perfidy. Only one statesman and orator of any note, Demades, who was rarely to be found on the patriotic side, and was subsequently in all probability a mere creature of Philip's, spoke against the proposed alliance.

It was on this occasion that Demosthenes, in the latter half probably of the year 350 B.C., delivered three memorable speeches, commonly known as the "Olynthiacs." He must have felt that the convictions of the people were with him; and yet at the same time he lets us see, by his general tone, that he almost despaired of being able to stir them to decisive action. All that they could be persuaded to do was to send

thirty galleys and 2,000 mercenaries. This poor little force could not stop Philip from continuing his attacks on the Greek towns of Chalcidice. He had not yet entered Olynthian territory, or even declared war against the city; but Olynthus was sufficiently alarmed to send a second embassy to Athens, begging for more effectual help. A large force was now despatched; but it consisted of mercenaries, and, unfortunately for Athens, it was under the command of a man who, though he had some military talent, was so disreputable in his life that he utterly disgusted the Olynthians.

In the speech which was probably first delivered, Demosthenes seeks to encourage his countrymen to take a hopeful view of affairs by pointing out to them how it really was that Philip had risen to power, and how numerous were the elements of weakness in his kingdom and government.

"He has risen by conciliating and cajoling the simplicity of every people which knew him not. When one has grown strong, as he has, by rapacity and artifice, on the first pretext, the slightest reason, all is overturned and broken up. If you will perform your duties properly, not only will it appear that Philip's alliances are weak and precarious, but the poor state of his native empire and power will be revealed. To speak roundly, the Macedonian power is very well as a help, as it was for you in the time of Timotheus against the Olynthians. For them, too, against Potidæa, it was an important alliance. Lately, as you know, it aided the Thessalians in their broils and troubles against the regnant house; and indeed the accession of any power, however small, is undoubtedly useful. But of itself Macedon is feeble, and has num-

berless deficiencies. The very operations which seem to constitute Philip's greatness—his wars and his expeditions—have made it more insecure than it was originally. Do not imagine that Philip and his subjects have the same likings. He craves glory—makes that his passion; is ready for any consequence of adventure and peril—preferring, as he does, to a life of safety, the honor of achieving what no Macedonian king ever did before. They have no share in the glorious result: ever harassed by these excursions, they suffer and toil without ceasing; they have no leisure for their employments or private affairs, and cannot so much as dispose of their hard earnings, the markets of the country being closed on account of the war. We may easily infer from all this what is the general Macedonian feeling towards Philip. His mercenaries and guards, indeed, have the reputation of admirable and well-trained soldiers; but, as I heard from one who had been born in the country, they are no better than others. If some of them are experienced in battles and campaigns, Philip is jealous of such men, and drives them away—so my informant tells me—wishing to keep the glory of all action to himself. Or again, if a man is generally good and virtuous, unable to bear Philip's daily intemperance, drunkenness, and indecency, he is pushed aside and accounted as nobody. The rest about him are brigands and parasites, and men of that character who will get drunk and perform dances which I scruple to name before you. My information is undoubtedly true; for persons whom all scouted here as worse rascals than mountebanks,—Callias, the town-slave, and the like of him—antic-jesters and composers of ribald songs to lampoon their companions,—such persons Philip caresses and keeps about him. Small matters these may

be thought, but to the wise they are strong indications of his character and wrong-headedness. Success perhaps throws a shade over them now; prosperity is a famous hider of such blemishes; but on any miscarriage they will be fully exposed."

Though in the above passage Demosthenes speaks contemptuously of Philip, describing him as little better than a savage and barbarian, he warns his hearers that if they let Olynthus fall into his hands, he will soon carry the war into Attica itself. The third and last of his three speeches was delivered when the Olynthians entreated Athens to send out a force of her own citizens, instead of mercenaries commanded by men of the type of the officer whose misconduct, as we have seen, had given them so much offence. Of all the political orations of Demosthenes, this is perhaps the most stirring and impressive. It is, in the opinion of Mr. Grote, one of the most splendid harangues ever spoken. It seems that people at Athens still talked about punishing Philip; and there were orators, no doubt, who flattered them into the notion that they could do so whenever they chose. "Such talk," says Demosthenes, "is founded on a false basis. The facts of the case teach us a different lesson. They bid us look well to our own security, that we be not ourselves the sufferers, and that we preserve our allies. There *was*, indeed, a time—and that, too, within my own remembrance—when we might have held our own, and punished Philip besides; but now our first care must be to preserve our own allies." In this speech he ventures on a bold proposal, which would be sure to provoke bitter opposition from the peace party of Eubulus. "Repeal such of the existing laws as are injurious at the present crisis—I mean those which regard the public

entertainments fund. I speak this out plainly. The same men who propose such a law ought also to take upon them to propose its repeal." In speaking thus, Demosthenes knew that he was fighting against a most powerful Athenian sentiment. It would cost them a painful struggle to sacrifice the fund in question to the exigencies of a war which also demanded personal service. They could hardly become like the men who won Marathon and Salamis. There was the broadest contrast between them, as Demosthenes elaborately points out in the following passage:

"Mark, Athenians, what a summary contrast may be drawn between the doings in our olden time and in yours. It is a tale brief and familiar to all. Our forefathers for forty-five years took the leadership of Greece by general consent, and brought as much as ten thousand talents into the citadel; and the King of Macedonia was submissive to them, as a barbarian should be to Greeks. Many glorious trophies they erected for victories won by their own fighting on land and sea, and they are the sole people in the world who have bequeathed a renown which envy cannot hurt. Such were their merits in the affairs of Greece; now see what they were at home, both as citizens and men. Their public works are edifices and ornaments of such beauty and grandeur in temples and their consecrated furniture, that posterity has not the power to surpass them. In private they were so modest, and so attached to the principles of our constitution, that whoever knows the style of house which Aristides had or Miltiades, and the illustrious of that day, perceives it to be no grander than those of their neighbors. Their politics were not for money-making; each felt it his duty to exalt the commonwealth. By a conduct

honorable among the Greeks, pious to the gods, brotherlike among themselves, they justly attained a high prosperity.

"So fared matters with them under the statesmen I have named. How fare they with you under the worthies of our time? Is there any likeness or resemblance? I pass over other topics on which I could expatiate. But observe. In the utter absence of competitors (Lacedæmonians depressed, Thebans employed, none of the rest capable of disputing the supremacy with us), when we might hold our own securely and arbitrate the claims of others, we have been deprived of our rightful territory, and spent above 1,500 talents to no purpose. The allies whom we gained in war we have lost in peace, and we have trained up against ourselves an enemy thus formidable. For by whose contrivance but our own has Philip grown strong? This looks bad, you will say, but things at home are better. What proof is there of this? The parapets that are whitewashed, the roads that are repaired, the fountains, and such trumpery things? Look at the men of whose statemanship these are the fruits. They have risen from beggary to opulence, from obscurity to honor. Some have made their private homes more splendid than the public buildings, and as the State has declined, their fortunes have been exalted."

At last Athens roused herself to a real effort, and sent to the relief of her ally a force of more than 2,000 native Athenian citizens. Olynthus might yet have been saved had the Olynthians been on their guard against traitors within, and the history of Greece, perhaps of the world, might have been different. Philip, meanwhile was on the frontier of its territory, after having captured most of the towns in the peninsula.

At the siege of one of them, an arrow from an Olynthian archer deprived him of an eye. But early in the year 348 B.C. he attacked Olynthus itself, after a sudden declaration of war. The Olynthians, he said, must quit their city, or he must quit Macedonia. But he did not overcome them by fair fighting. They were betrayed by a party among their fellow-citizens. It was by bribery, as Horace says,* that "the man of Macedon" opened the gates of Olynthus as of other cities. It was to be expected that he would show no mercy. The fair city was razed to the ground, and its population, with all the women and children, sold into slavery.

This awful calamity sent a shudder through the Greek world. The like of it had never been seen since the great Persian invasion of Xerex. As many as thirty-two free Greek cities had utterly perished in a period of less than two years at the hands of a barbarian. Divided as the Greeks were among themselves, they would have all heartily responded to the sentiment of Demosthenes that "a barbarian should be submissive to Greeks." It must have shocked and shamed them to see with their own eyes troops of poor enslaved creatures, of both sexes and of Greek blood, passing through the streets of their cities. And all this was the work of a Macedonian, a man of inferior race, whom Greeks had thought it almost a condescension to notice and patronize. How could they expect that he would much longer stay his hand from the destruction of the Greek cities on the Hellespont and the Propontis, and from the conquest of the rich corn-producing Chersonese? How could they rest in peace till they saw their way to an

*Odes, iii. 16, 13

alliance of all the states of Greece against him? It is natural for us to reason thus. But even the proximity of manifest danger will not always banish mutual jealousy and distrust. Nor is it in general easy to persuade people that a power they have been accustomed to disregard and despise, though its progress may seem at times alarming, can ever become seriously formidable to themselves. So it appears to have been with the Greeks. After the fall of Olynthus and its confederate cities, they still clung to their false confidence

CHAPTER VIII.

DEMOSTHENES AND MEIDIAS.

An incident about this time in the life of Demosthenes, which gave occasion to one of his well-known speeches, illustrates rather strikingly some of the less agreeable phases of Athenian society. There was, of course, refinement and polish of a high degree, and, on the whole, the tone and temper of the citizens seem to have been humane and generous. But still, even at Athens, the scandal and breaches of good taste and manners, which one would fear are all but inseparable from democracy, now and then made their appearance. Political rancor and party violence reached an outrageous length, and under their shelter the grossest acts of wrong were from time to time committed with impunity. A rich man, if he chose, might have plenty of influence in the State; and along with this he would have at his command many opportunities of injuring and oppressing those whom he personally disliked. It appears that there were several such men at Athens—men who no doubt aspired to imitate the grand airs and fashionable extravagance of Alcibiades, who, clever and accomplished as he was, at last made himself intolerable to the citizens of a free state. Many of these had nothing but riches to recommend them, and were pestilent fellows

whose idea of life was really nothing better than coarse, vulgar rowdyism.

It was the fate of Demosthenes to come into collision with a man of this class. Early in life, at the time when he was engaged in his suit with his guardians, he provoked the enmity of Meidias, a rich, well-born man, and one of the constant supporters of the peace party of Eubulus. The quarrel between them originated in the following singular way. The brother of Meidias, Thrasylochus, offered, according to a practice allowed at Athens in the case of a trierarchy, or the providing a war-ship for the State, to exchange properties with Demosthenes, and, in the event of the offer being accepted, he gave the guardians privately to understand that the lawsuit should be dropped. In this manner he sought to defeat the legal proceedings which Demosthenes was taking, and, in fact, to get his just claims set aside. The two brothers, it appears, on one occasion actually rushed into his house, behaved with excessive violence, and used coarse and ribald language in the presence of his sister, then a mere girl. For this outrage Demosthenes sued Meidias, and recovered damages; but he had not been able to obtain payment. From that time the man became his bitter enemy, and worried and persecuted him in every possible way. His animosity was all the more virulent as he was also politically opposed to Demosthenes. In the year 351 B.C. both served in a military expedition to Eubœa—Meidias in the cavalry, Demosthenes as a foot soldier. Neither of them was for any length of time with the army. Demosthenes went back to Athens, on the pretext that he had to undertake the important public duty of choragus or choir-director for his tribe. It seems that he undertook this quite voluntarily, but his

enemy hinted that he had merely done so to escape the hardships of campaigning. And he followed up the taunt with gross insult and outrage. The choir-director, as we have seen, usually appeared, when the ceremony was celebrated, in a special dress, and wore a crown; and Demosthenes had ordered for the occasion a particularly magnificent robe and a crown of gold. Meidias contrived to break into the embroiderer's shop where the dress had been prepared, and spoilt the finery in which Demosthenes was to show himself. He went further; he struck him on the face before the assembled audience, and, according to Demosthenes' own account, was the means of losing him the prize, which his chorus would have won. The spectators were indignant; and Meidias was convicted of the crime of sacrilege, as it would seem, on the very same day by an assembly held in the theatre. But the affair could not rest here. It was for a court of justice to decide how he was to be punished. Clearly, it was right that Demosthenes should prosecute him, and this he did. He was thirty-two years of age at the time. Meidias tried to defeat the persecution by indicting Demosthenes on the charge of desertion of military service, on the ground that he had left the army in Eubœa and returned to Athens. The indictment came to nothing; but Demosthenes, it appears, was not decisively successful in his proceedings against Meidias. He was reproached by his rival, Æschines, with having compromised the affair. At all events, it is not certain whether the case was ever brought to trial. But the tone of the extant speech certainly implies this; and it is really difficult to suppose, looking at some passages in which he takes credit to himself for having rejected a compromise and having

brought the defendant to trial, that it was merely written and never delivered. This is, we know, a very general opinion, and there are reasons for it; but in the face of the speech as it has come down to us, it seems a question whether it can be sustained.

The tone of the speech is savage and violent. It is full of furious invective. But at least it is interesting as giving us a glimpse into some of the abuses arisidg out of wealth and insolence even in a democratical community like Athens. We have an amusing picture of Meidias himself; and though perhaps it is a caricature, it was no doubt typical of a really existing class. He had, it is said, got himself elected a cavalry officer on the strength of being a rich man, and yet he could not so much as ride through the market-place. His single act of munificence was giving the State a war-ship, when he knew he was not likely to incur any personal danger. He delighted in making a vulgar parade of his wealth. He had built a house at Eleusis, one of the suburbs of Athens, so big that it darkened all the houses in the place. He used to take his wife to the Mysteries, or to any place she had a fancy for visiting, in a carriage and pair. He would push through the market-place and the leading thoroughfares, talking of his dinners and his drinking-horns so loud that all the passers-by could hear. "Do not," says Demosthenes in his speech, "honor and admire things of this kind—do not judge of liberality by these tests, whether a man builds splendid houses or has many female servants, or handsome furniture; but look who is spirited and liberal in those things which the bulk of you share the enjoyment of. Meidias, you will find, has nothing of that kind about him."

"Will you," he asks, "let Meidias escape because he is rich? This is pretty much the cause of his insolence. Therefore you should rather take away the means which enable him to be insolent than pardon him in consideration of them. To allow an audacious blackguard like him to have wealth at his command is to put arms in his hands against yourselves."

"I take it you all know his disposition, his offensive and overbearing behavior; and some of you, I daresay, have been wondering about things which they know themselves, but have not heard from me now. Many of the injured parties do not even like to tell all that they have suffered, dreading this man's litigiousness, and the fortune which makes such a despicable fellow strong and terrible. For when a rogue and a bully is supported by wealth and power, it is a wall of defence against any attack. Let Meidias be stripped of his possessions, and most likely he will not play the bully. If he should, he will be less regarded than the humblest man among you; he will rail and bawl to no purpose then, and be punished for any misbehavior like the rest of us. Now, it seems, Polyeuctus and Timocrates and the ragamuffin Euctemon are his body-guard; these are a sort of mercenaries that he keeps about him, and others also besides them a confederate band of witnesses, who never trouble you openly, but by simply nodding their heads affirm and lie with perfect ease. By the powers, I do not believe they get any good from him; but they are wonderful people for making up to the rich, and attending on them, and giving evidence. All this, I take it, is a danger to any of you that live quietly by yourselves as well as you can; and therefore it is that you assemble together, in order that, though taken separately you are over-

matched by any one either in friends or riches, or in anything else, you may collectively be more than a match for him and put a stop to his insolence."

Meidias, according to Demosthenes, was at heart a coward, and would be sure to make an abject appeal to the people's pity. The following passage is towards the end of the speech:

"I know he will have his children in court and whine; he will talk very humbly, shedding tears and making himself as piteous as he can. Yet the more he humbles himself, the more ought you to detest him. Why? Because if the outrageousness and violence of his conduct arose out of his inability to be humble, it would have been fair to make some allowance for his temper, and the accident which made him what he is. But if he knows how to behave himself properly when he likes, and has adopted a different line of conduct by choice, surely it is quite evident that if he eludes justice now, he will again become the same Meidias that you know him for. You must not listen to him, then; you must not let the present occasion, when he is playing the hypocrite have more weight and influence with you than the whole past of which you have had experience.

"Perhaps he will say of me, This man is an orator. Well; if one who advises what he thinks for your good, without being troublesome or intrusive, is an orator, I would not deny or refuse the name. But if an orator be what (to my knowledge and to your knowledge) certain of our speakers are—impudent fellows, enriched at your expense—I can hardly be that; for I have received nothing from you, but spent all my substance upon you, except a mere trifle. Probably, also, Meidias will say that all my speech is prepared.

I admit that I have got it up as well as I possibly could. I were a complete simpleton indeed, if, having suffered and still suffering such injuries, I took no pains about the mode of stating them to you. I maintain that Meidias has composed my speech; he who has supplied the facts which the speech is about, may most fairly be deemed its author, not he who has merely prepared it or studied how to lay an honest case before you."

The speech is not, we think, one of Demosthenes' best; but it is often ingenious, and it certainly shows singular power of invective. It suggests that what we should call very loose practice on the part of an advocate was tolerated in an Athenian court. Demosthenes by no means confines himself to the outrage committed on him by Meidias, but speaks of the injuries he had inflicted on others, and indeed attacks generally the man's whole life and character. The attack may have been deserved; still, the manner of it, and the circumstances under which it was made, point to the existence of dangers at Athens to which any citizen might suddenly find himself exposed.

CHAPTER IX.

PHILIP MASTER OF THERMOPYLÆ AND OF PHOCIS—PEACE BETWEEN HIM AND ATHENS—COUNSEL OF DEMOSTHENES.

WE now enter on a period of melancholy disgrace and humiliation for the Greek race. Within two years the barbarian destroyer of Olynthus becomes master of the key to Greece, the famous pass of Thermopylæ, and of the whole of Phocis, the country in which stood the mountains of Parnassus, and the old and venerable temple of Delphi. Events more terrific and momentous, says Demosthenes in one of his speeches, had never occurred either in his own time or that of any of his predecessors. Athens was forced into a miserably ignominous peace, and many of her citizens had stooped to the infamy of being the mere tools and paid agents of the "man of Macedon." Even Isocrates, true Greek as he was in all his sympathies, as well as thoroughly upright and high-minded, was now convinced that the best wisdom for Greece was to put itself under the leadership of this wonderfully successful prince, and allow him to conduct its united armies to the conquest of Persia.

The history of these five years is somewhat intricate. It will be enough for the present purpose to summarize

the general course of events. The period was mainly occupied in negotiations on the part of Athens with Philip. These were ill-managed, and had a most disastrous conclusion. One motive which no doubt prompted them was the very natural desire of recovering those Athenian citizens who had been captured with the Olynthians. Towards Athens Philip had usually shown himself gracious and conciliatory. So, when the relatives of two of the captives, both men of high position, presented themselves as suppliants before the Assembly, it was decided to communicate with Philip. A favorable answer was received; and we have reason to believe that now there was an inclination in favor of peace. At first it was otherwise. Even Eubulus and his party, who held war the worst of all evils, were constrained to speak of Philip as an enemy. They went further; they attempted, by embassies into the Peloponnese, to raise some sort of coalition against him. Among other places they visited Megalopolis, where, however, their overtures met with but a cold reception. Athens as we have had occasion to notice, had made a blunder some years before in not following the counsel of Demosthenes when he advised that the Megalopolitans should be supported against Sparta. Now she found that they were not to be roused into action by what no doubt seemed to them a comparatively remote danger. There would, too, have been some political inconvenience in an alliance with them. Such an alliance would have meant a rupture with Sparta, and a friendly attitude towards Thebes, a state against which Athenian feeling was peculiarly bitter. As soon as it seemed clear that there was no prospect of organizing a combination throughout Greece against Philip, the wish for peace grew in strength, and the people were

not averse to opening negotiations with their powerful enemy.

It is at this juncture that the name of Demosthenes' famous rival Æschines first comes before us. He rose to be one of the foremost Athenian orators and statesmen from a very lowly origin. His father kept what we should call a preparatory school, and he himself began life as an inferior actor and a government clerk. He was a man of immense industry and ability, and was naturally endowed with all the qualities which go to make an orator. He was one of the envoys sent on the mission to the Peloponnese, which had for its purpose the stirring up of the Greeks against Macedonian aggression. It appears that he addressed a very powerful appeal to the Arcadian Assembly at Megalopolis, fiercely denouncing all traitors to the liberties of Greece, and stigmatizing Philip as a "blood stained barbarian." Such was the beginning of the political life of a man who subsequently allowed himself to become the means of furthering that "barbarian's" most dangerous designs upon Greece and her liberties.

In the negotiations of this period between Athens and Philip, Æschines took a leading part as an envoy. So, too, did Demosthenes himself; and the hostile relations between them, which subsequently gave occasion to their memorable oratorical contest, date from this time. We have for the most part to depend on the conflicting statements of the two orators for our knowledge of the circumstances by which Athens, two years after the ruin of Olynthus, was drawn into a shameful peace. It almost seems as if she wilfully allowed herself to make one stupid blunder after another. But this is not a true view of the case.

Athens, no doubt, might have done much better under the guidance of really firm and very skillful statesmanship; but it must be remembered that the situation was extremely complicated, and it was barely possible to foresee even approximately the course and tendency of events. After the destruction of Olynthus it must have seemed clear that Philip was the enemy of Greece; and that, consequently, it was the duty and policy of Athens to regard him in this light, and decline all negotiations with him. But as we have seen, Athens was not able to organize a confederacy of the Greek states against him; and if she had decided to fight him, she must have felt that she would have to fight single-handed. When to this consideration was added the desire to recover some of her own citizens, now prisoners in Philip's hands—when, too, she found that he was still courteous and conciliatory—we cannot be surprised that she shrank from a struggle which would have tasked her resources to the uttermost. It might, perhaps, have been better and safer for her to have made any sacrifice, and have at once decided on war against the destroyer of thirty Greek cities; but it was not easy for her to see her way to such a step alone and unsupported.

The relations, too, of the states of Greece to each other and to Athens presented many difficulties. Never had there been a time when it was harder to unite them. Sparta, the leading state of the Peloponnese, could under no circumstances be easily stimulated into exertions in the Greek cause. Her statesmen were apt to take a narrow and selfish view of the politics of Greece. The other states of the Peloponnese were more afraid of being oppressed by Spartan ascendancy, of which they had had actual experience, than of danger

from Macedon, of which they knew next to nothing. Here, therefore, there was but a poor prospect of coalition. Thebes and Phocis, the two remaining states, were themselves engaged in the Sacred War. Phocis had appropriated to itself the treasures of the temple of Delphi, and had thus put itself in a false position before the Greek world, as being guilty of sacrilege. And as for Thebes, it had no really great and far-sighted statesmen; nor had it, to the extent which Athens still had, a sense of its duty to Greece. Its policy was often particularly selfish; and even under the most favorable circumstances, it would have been most difficult to have persuaded Thebans to co-operate heartily with Athenians. So anxious was it to crush its Phocian neighbors, with whom it had long been involved in a troublesome war, and when Philip undertook to crush them it welcomed the offer. The bait he held out was tempting; but the Thebans ought to have had enough Greek sentiment not to listen to his proposals, the acceptance of which would probably lead to the conquest and destruction of a Greek people by a barbarian. Philip, of course, could justify himself by saying that he was attacking those who were, in fact, the enemies of Greece, inasmuch as by the pillage of the sacred treasures of Delphi they had outraged the best and truest Greek feeling. But to conquer Phocis he must be master of Thermopylæ; and if he once gained this position, it could hardly be doubted that he would be able to do as he pleased, and that Thebes, if he chose to pick a quarrel with her, would be in the utmost jeopardy.

All this was recognized by Demosthenes, and, as it seems, by the Athenians generally. They were quite alive to the importance of garrisoning Thermopylæ, and they sent a force there. But the Phocian leader,

Phalæcus, from some sort of jealousy towards Athens, and a fear that political intrigues would be set on foot against him to deprive him of his influence with his countrymen, refused to admit the Athenian troops into possession of the important pass. It was now difficult for the Athenians to know how to act. For anything they knew to the contrary, Phalæcus might have some understanding with Philip, and be willing to surrender the pass to him. This position was perplexing and disheartening, while to Philip it was a grand opportunity. If he could contrive to conclude peace with Athens, and to get the Phocians excluded from it, he would be able, with some sort of excuse, to occupy Thermopylæ and invade Phocis. And in doing this he would have Thebes on his side.

After much negotiation, this was the result which he managed to accomplish. Peace was concluded between Philip and Athens, their respective allies being included. While the negotiations were pending, and the Athenian envoys were waiting at Pella for an interview with the King, he was in Thrace, and gained some important successes over the chief of the country, Cersobleptes, at this time an ally of Athens. The effect of this was to weaken and endanger the hold which Athens had on the Thracian Chersonese,—a specially valuable possession. Indeed, peace was made ultimately on terms which the Athenians had not originally contemplated. This, Domosthenes maintained, was due to the treachous connivanace of Æschines and some of the other envoys, who loitered at Pella when they ought to have at once made their way to Philip in Thrace, and settled matters with him on the basis which had been mutually agreed on. But the most terrible mistake was the exclusion of the

Phocians from the treaty. The Athenians were somehow cajoled into believing that Philip meant them well; and even Demosthenes did not at the time protest against the abandonment of Phocis. The error was irretrievable, for it amounted to nothing less than letting Philip become master of Thermopylæ. The Phocians could not hold the pass without support. When they found themselves isolated, their leader, Phalæcus, after being summoned by Philip to give up possession of it, consented to do so under a convention, and withdrew his forces. The surrender of Phocis to Philip followed as a matter of course. He dealt with the country and its towns as he had dealt two years before with Chalcidice and its towns. Phocis was utterly ruined. Another Greek state had now fallen before the Macedonian destroyer, and the prospects of Greece generally might well seem gloomy.

The calamity, however, was not so shocking to the Greek world as one might have supposed it would have been. The Phocians, as has been explained, had been offenders against the common law and traditions of Greece, and their destruction might be regarded as a divine judgment. Even the man who executed it, though a barbarian according to Greek notions, might have some claim to be considered as the representative of a sacred cause. In one sense he had been doing the very thing which the voice of Greece had been calling for. The Thebans were especially grateful to him, and forgot in their blindness the mischief which by this last stroke he had inflicted on Greece. Now that the Phocians had ceased to exist as a Greek people, their place in the Amphictyonic Council was, when the great Pythian festival came round after a four years' interval, conferred on Philip. He was even nominated

peesident of the august ceremony. In all this Thebes heartily concurred, as also did several smaller states. Athens and Sparta, indeed, held aloof. But when Philip's envoys announced to the Athenians the new position he had acquired with the consent of so many Greek states, they did not like to refuse concurrence in what a large part of Greece seemed to approve.

Strong as Philip was before, he was now immensely strengthened, and fresh chances were open to him for interfering actively in Greek politics. Membership of the Amphictyonic Council was, in fact, equivalent to naturalization. Philip was now, in theory at least, a Greek, and no longer a barbarian. The Athenian Isocrates could, with a show of reason, address a letter to him, inviting him to reconcile under his leadership the great states of Greece, and invade Asia with a view to the overthrow of the Persian empire and the liberation of the Asiatic Greeks. But the Athenians generally felt deep anger and vexation at the issue of events, and could hardly make up their minds to sit still under the disgrace of the surrender of Thermopylæ and the intrusion of a foreign prince into the heart of Greece.

Demosthenes, as has been said, had no sympathy with the ideas of Isocrates. He still clung to the belief in a general independent Greek world, of which his own state ought to be the most perfect representative. Yet on this occasion he spoke in favor of the inglorious peace just concluded. Miserable as it was, he argued that to break it would be to give Philip a pretext for uniting other Greek states in war against them. The tone of his speech is confident and decided. The peace was bad and dishonorable, no doubt, but to repudiate it would be simply madness. It would be

putting themselves gratuitously in the wrong. "The shadow at Delphi," as he calls the subject of the Sacred war which had been waged between Thebes and Phocis, was not worth fighting for, more especially when they would have to fight a Greek confederacy. It could not have been altogether pleasant to Demosthenes to advise acquiescence in a peace which he and his countrymen generally felt to be humiliating. But as they had drifted into it, all they could now do was to make the best of it, and guard themselves from new aggressions.

CHAPTER X.

DEMOSTHENES CONTINUES HIS SPEEECHES AGAINST PHILIP.

From the peace of 346 B.C. we may date a revolution in the Greek world. Philip had acquired a new position, and it was acknowleged that he had henceforth a right to take a part in Greek politics. Even Demosthenes had to recognize the fact of a change of sentiment towards him. Isocrates could argue more plausibly than ever that everything pointed to him as the true head and champion of Greece, and, consequently, as the predestined conqueror of Asia, the old antagonist of Greece.

The peace just concluded was soon seen to be a thoroughly hollow one. Philip, it was evident, had no intention of being really bound by it, any longer than it answered his purpose. This the Athenians could hardly fail to understand, however much they might try to deceive themselves; and their feeling towards him was made up of fear and anger. We might have thought that he could have at once organized a Greek confederacy against Persia with almost a certainty of success, but he seems to have been too cautious and astute to expose himself to any serious risks. His policy was to secure a yet firmer footing in the Greek

world. Athens, he knew, was his only formidable enemy. There was still a possibility that she might rouse Greece against him, and overpower him by a coalition of which she would be the head. He must therefore endeavor to isolate her by political intrigues, and, by driving her out of the Chersonese, strike a fatal blow at the commerce on which her prosperity largely depended.

With these views he began to meddle with the politics of the Peloponnese. There circumstances favored his designs. He had the opportunity of playing the part of champion and deliverer to the oppressed. Sparta was the great object of dread to the people of Argos, of Megalopolis, and of Messene. They could not imagine that they had any other enemy to fear. Thebes had hitherto been their protector, but Thebes was no longer in a condition to command their confidence. It was to Philip that they now not unnaturally looked. It was hardly to be expected that they would abstain from invoking his aid against a pressing and immediate danger, because it may have been suggested to them that they were thereby imperiling the best interests of Greece. What they wanted was help against Sparta, and this Philip promised them. He would, he said, soon be with them in person; and meanwhile he sent them some troops, and bade Sparta refrain from any attempt on Messene.

This was a clever movement on Philip's part, and Athens could not very well protest against it or seek to thwart it. All that could be said was that, judging from the past, it was an interference which ultimately meant mischief. Demosthenes succeeded in bringing the Athenians to this point of view. He induced them to send an embassy, himself being at the head of it,

into the Peloponnese, the express object of which was to defeat Philip's diplomacy. He visited several of the cities, and addressed warnings to them based on the bad faith of Philip generally, and on his treatment of Olynthus particularly. He told them plainly that in their fear and hatred of Sparta they were allowing themselves to become his accomplices in enslaving and ruining Greece. It seems that one of the chief arguments on which he insisted was the utter impossibility of a sincere and hearty union between free states and a despot. This would be sure to impress the democratic party—always a powerful element in a Greek state. He was heard—so he tells us himself in one of his subsequent speeches—with approbation and applause, but he failed to convince. There were, as he says in another speech, those in every state who were willing to be controlled by a foreign power, if only they could get the upper hand of their fellow-citizens. The old love of freedom and of legal government, which had been the great glory of Greece, seemed to be on the wane. Still Demosthenes accomplished something. Philip thought it necessary to send envoys to Athens with some sort of apology for himself and his general policy; and an embassy also came, perhaps at his suggestion, from some of the states of the Peloponnese. Athens was in a perplexing position. Philip could plausibly say that the Athenians were unreasonably suspicious towards him, and even, in fact, disregarding the spirit of the peace recently concluded. The envoys from Argos and Messene might fairly complain of the seeming connection between Athens and Sparta, and argue that it was a menace to the liberties of the Peloponnese. It was a great and critical occasion, and called for able statesmanship. It was an opportunity

to raise yet higher the character of Demosthenes as a public adviser, and he availed himself of it. In the speech which he delivered in B.C. 344, known as the second Philippic, he spoke out in the plainest language both against Philip's insinuations and against the ill-timed complaints of the Peloponnesian envoys. He vindicated at the same time his own policy, and denounced the Philippizing faction, in which his rival Æschines was now a conspicuous figure.

Philip, he declares, was the great aggressor of the age; he was a plotter against the whole of Greece. He repeats what he had said as ambassador to the people of Messene by the way of warning from the past:

"Ye men of Messene, how do you think the Olynthians would have looked to hear anything against Philip at those times when he surrendered to them Anthemus, which all former kings of Macedonia claimed, when he cast out the Athenian colonists and gave them Potidæa, thereby incurring your enmity, and giving them the land to enjoy? Think you that they expected such treatment as they got, or would they have believed it if they had been told? Nevertheless, after enjoying for a brief space the possessions of others, they are for a long period deprived by Philip of their own, shamefully expelled—not only vanquished, but betrayed by one another and sold. In truth, these too close connections with despots are not safe for free states. There are manifold contrivances for the guarding and defending of cities—as ramparts, walls, trenches, and the like; these are all made with hands and demand an outlay. But there is one common safeguard in the nature of wise men which is a good security for all, but especially for democracies against despots. What do I mean? Mistrust. Keep this; hold to this: pre-

serve this only, and you can never be injured. What do ye desire? Freedom. Then do you not see that with this Philip's very titles are at variance? Every king and despot is a foe to freedom, an antagonist to laws. Will ye not beware, lest in seeking to be delivered from war you find a master?"

Yet in a speech delivered three years afterwards, which we shall shortly notice, Demosthenes suggests that they might entertain the thought of seeking aid even from Persia. The suggestion, perhaps, was only made in desperation, and must not be taken as representing anything like a change of political sentiments. To the last Demosthenes was a believer in free and popular governments as opposed to tyrannies and despotisms. Still, as he has to admit, such governments are liable to be out-manœuvred by cunning diplomacy. So it had been with themselves, as he reminds them in the present speech. They had been persuaded to believe that Philip, if he became master of Thermopylæ, would humble their old enemy Thebes, and give them Oropus and Eubœa in exchange for Amphipolis.

"All these declarations on the hustings," he says, with the Philippizing party in his eye, "I am sure you remember, though you are not famous for remembering injuries. While the mischief is only coming and preparing, whilst we hear one another speak, I wish every man, though he know it well, to be reminded who it was persuaded you to abandon Phocis and Thermopylæ, by the possession of which Philip commands the road to Attica and Peloponnese, and has brought it to this, that you have now to deliberate, not about claims and interests abroad, but about the defence of your home and a war in Attica, which will be a grievous shock to every citizen when it comes; and

indeed it commenced from that day of your infatuation. Had you not been then deceived, there would be nothing now to distress the State."

One point insisted on in this speech is, that the struggle in the Greek states was no longer, as it had hitherto been, one between aristocracy and democracy, but between Philip's party and its opponents.

The following year witnessed a memorable contest between Demosthenes and Æschines. It arose out of the embassies to Philip and the various negotiations with him, which ended, as we have seen, so unfortunately for Athens and Greece. Æschines, it will be remembered, was an adherent of the peace party of Eubulus, and Demosthenes now made a great effort to discredit him, as being, in fact, corruptly responsible for Philip's occupation of Thermopylæ, the destruction of Phocis, and the new and powerful position which he had been able to assume in Greece. The pleadings of both the orators in this great cause have come down to us, and they are specially valuable as supplying us with materials for the history of an intricate period. Demosthenes presses his attack with great vehemence, and resorts, as he well knew how, to the most savage invective. To our minds it is, as a work of art, one of the least pleasing and satisfactory of his speeches. There is a coarseness and vulgarity about the vituperation—and that too, under circumstances in which very strong condemnation of his rival must have been felt to have been a mistake. He taunts Æschines with having been all along the conscious tool of Philip's cunning policy, when it was perfectly well known that he had himself, from want of clear foresight perhaps, not steadily opposed that policy at more than one critical point. He was not successful; but the victory won

by his rival was a very poor one. Æschines was acquitted only by thirty votes. This implies that, on the whole, public opinion was against him, though it may have been felt that distinct and positive evidence was wanting. We may infer that Demosthenes' political influence was very great. He failed probably because, as Dr. Thirlwall remarks, he had an extremely intricate case, and could not attack Æschines effectively without having from time to time to defend himself and explain certain ambiguities in his own share in the negotiations.

Athens, as has been said, was now particularly vulnerable in the Thracian Chersonese and the north of the Ægean. To these points the restless Philip directed his attention in 342–341 B.C. It could not be doubted that he was meditating the annexation of this important district, and the conquest of the Greek cities on the northern shore of the Propontis—Perinthus, Selymbria, and above all Byzantium. If he could achieve this, Athens would be completely paralyzed. Her maritime supremacy would be at an end, and her supplies of corn would be cut off. She would cease to exist as a commercial power. Philip's designs on Athens in Thrace were not unlike those of Napoleon I. on England in his attacks on Egypt and Spain. It was argued in Parliament at the time, that in carrying on war with France in these countries, we were practically standing on our own defence. Demosthenes took the same line of argument against Philip. A force had been sent out from Athens to the Chersonese as an army of observation on Philip's movements. The general, Diopeithes, was an able, energetic man; and it is interesting to us to know that he was the father of the poet Menander. There were some disputes between

the Athenian colonists and the Cardians to the north of the Chersonese. Philip seemed disposed to favor the latter, upon which Diopeithes at once retaliated by invading Macedonian territory. He gained some successes, and for a while even deprived Philip of some of his recent conquests. Considering that the peace of 346 B.C. was still in force, Athens may be said to have been put in the wrong by her over-zealous general, and Philip sent the people a despatch in which he formally complained of these encroachments. All his political adherents at Athens clamored for the instant recall of Diopeithes. Like other Athenian generals, Diopeithes, who commanded some mercenaries, was almost compelled to provide for them by expeditions which could not be strictly justified. Still, it might be truly argued in his favor that he was really repelling a dangerous aggressor. And on this ground Demosthenes pleaded his cause, and argued that he should be continued in his command. The speech he delivered on this occasion —"On behalf of the Chersonese," as it has been entitled—contains the clear and powerful reasonings of a sagacious statesman.

The people, he maintains, ought to deal with their enemies before they call their own servants to account. It was very well for Philip to complain of an infringement of the peace in this particular instance; but was it not notorious that he had himself deprived Athens of her own possessions? It was a mere blind to say, as some said, that they must make up their minds to have either war or peace. "If it appears that from the very first Philip has robbed us of our territories, and has been all along incessantly gathering the spoil of other nations, Greek and barbarian, for the materials

of an attack upon you, what do they mean by saying we must have war or peace?"

"Consider what is actually going on. Philip is staying with a large army in Thrace, and sending for reinforcements, as eye-witnesses report, from Macedonia and Thessaly. Now, should he wait for the trade-winds, and then march to the siege of Byzantium, think ye that the Byzantines would persist in their present folly, and would not invite and implore your aid? I do not believe it. No; they will receive any people, even those they distrust more than us, sooner than surrender their city to Philip—unless, indeed, he is beforehand with them and captures it. If, then, we are unable to sail northward, and there be no help at hand, nothing can prevent their destruction. Well; let us say the Bysantines are infatuated and besotted. Very likely; yet they must be rescued, because it is good for Athens. Nor is it clear that he will not attack the Chersonese; nay, if we may judge from the letter he sent us, he says he will chastise the people in the Chersonese. If the present army be kept on foot, it will be able to defend that country, and attack some of Philip's dominions. But if it become disbanded, what shall we do if he march against the Chersonese? With such facts and arguments before you, so far from disbanding this army which Diopeithes is endeavoring to organize for Athens, you ought yourselves to provide an additional one, to support him with funds, and with other friendly co-operation."

In the following passage he inveighs against his political opponents, and the extreme license of speech allowed to them in practically advocating the interests of Philip:

"This, you must be convinced, is a struggle for existence. You cannot overcome your enemies abroad till you have punished your enemies, his ministers, at home. They will be the stumbling-blocks which prevent you reaching the others. Why, do you suppose, Philip now insults you? To other people he at least renders services though he deceives them, while he is already threatening you. Look, for instance, at the Thessalians. It was by many benefits conferred on them that he seduced them into their present bondage. And then the Olynthians, again,—how he cheated them, first giving them Potidæa and several other places, is really beyond description. Now he is enticing the Thebans by giving up to them Bœotia, and delivering them from a toilsome and vexatious war. Each of these people did get a certain advantage; but some of them have suffered what all the world knows; others will suffer whatever may hereafter befall them. As for you, I recount not all that has been taken from you, but how shamefully have you been treated and despoiled! Why is it that Philip deals so differently with you and with others? Because yours is the only state in Greece in which the privilege is allowed of speaking for the enemy, and a citizen taking a bribe may safely address the Assembly, though you have been robbed of your dominions. It was not safe at Olynthus to be Philip's advocate unless the Olynthian commonalty had shared the advantage by possession of Potidæa. It was not safe in Thessaly to be Philip's advocate unless the people of Thessaly had secured the advantage by Philip's expelling their tyrants and restoring the synod at Pylæ. It was not safe in Thebes, until he gave up Bœotia to them and destroyed the Phocians. Yet at Athens, though Philip has deprived

you of Amphipolis and the territory round Cardia—nay, is making Eubœa a fortress as a check upon us, and is advancing to attack Byzantium—it is safe to speak in Philip's behalf."

He thus concludes the speech:

"I will sum up my advice and sit down. You must contribute money, and maintain the existing troops, rectifying any abuse you may discover, but not, on any accusation which somebody may bring, disbanding the force. Send out ambassadors everywhere to instruct, to warn, to accomplish what they can for Athens. Further, I say, punish your corrupt statesmen, execrate them at all times and places, and thereby prove that men of virtue and honorable conduct have consulted wisely both for others and for themselves."

It is satisfactory to learn that this speech was successful, and that Diopeithes, who certainly deserved well of his country, was continued in his command, and the Chersonese saved for Athens.

Demosthenes was now the leading Athenian statesman. He had shaken the influence of the peace party, and he seems to have still further strengthened his political position by a speech delivered about three months after that which we have just been considering. The speech in question has always been regarded as one of singular power. As far as we know, nothing new had occurred; but Philip was still in Thrace, threatening the Chersonese and the northern shores of the Propontis, and clearly had designs on Perinthus and Byzantium. Demosthenes repeats in substance the arguments he had recently urged. Greece, he says, is in the utmost peril from its miserable divisions and apathy, and from the unique position which it has allowed Philip to attain. As for Athens, "her affairs

had been brought so low by carelessness and negligence, I fear it is a hard truth to say that if all the orators had sought to suggest, and you to pass, resolutions for the utter ruining of the commonwealth, we could not, methinks, be worse off than we are." It had been said at Athens in the speeches of some of the orators, "Wait till Philip declares war, and then it will be time to discuss how we shall resist him." Demosthenes' reply is:

"If we wait till Philip avows that he is at war with us, we are the simplest of mortals; for he would not declare war, though he marched even against Athens and Piræus—at least, if we may judge from his conduct to others. When he sends his mercenaries into the Chersonese, which the king of Persia and all the Greeks acknowledge to be yours, what can be the meaning of such proceedings? He says he is not at war. But I cannot admit such conduct to be an observance of the peace. Far otherwise. I say that by his present advance into Thrace, by his intrigues in the Peloponnese, by the whole course of his operations with his army, he has been breaking the peace and making war upon you, —unless, indeed, you will say that those who establish military engines are not at war until they apply them to the walls. But that you will not say; for whoever prepares and contrives the means for my conquest, is at war with me before he hurls the dart or draws the bow. Should anything happen, what is the risk you run? The alienation of the Hellespont, the subjection of Megara and Eubœa to your enemy, the siding of the Peloponnese with him. Then, can I allow that one who sets such an engine at work against Athens is at peace with her? Quite the contrary. From the day that he destroyed Phocis I date his commence-

ment of hostilities. So widely do I differ from your other advisers that I deem any discussion about the Chersonese or Byzantium out of place. Succor them —I advise that; watch that no harm befalls them; send all necessary supplies to your troops in that quarter; but let your deliberations be for the safety of all Greece, as being in the most extreme jeopardy."

The Greeks, he declares, must have utterly forgotten themselves in allowing a foreigner and a barbarian a license in dealing with their affairs which they had never thought of according to such states as Athens or Sparta. This was monstrous, and implied a fatal degeneracy.

"I observe," says the orator, "that all people beginning from yourselves have conceded to Philip a right which in former days was the subject of contest in every Greek war. What is this? The right of doing what he pleases, openly fleecing and pillaging the Greeks one after another, attacking and enslaving their cities. You were at the head of the Greeks for seventy-three years, the Lacedæmonians for twenty-nine, and the Thebans had some power in these latter days after the battle of Leuctra. Yet neither you nor Lacedæmonian nor Thebans were ever licensed to act as you pleased. Far otherwise. When you, or rather the Athenians of that time, appeared to be dealing harshly with certain people, all the rest, even such as had no complaint against Athens, thought proper to side with the injured parties in a war against her. So, when the Lacedæmonians became masters and succeeded to your empire, on their attempting to encroach and make oppressive innovations, a general war was declared against them even by such as had no cause of complaint. But why mention other people? We

ourselves and the Lacedæmonians, although at the outset we could not allege any mutual injuries, thought proper to make war for the injustice that we saw done to our neighbors. Yet all the faults committed by the Spartans in those thirty years, and by our ancestors in the seventy, are less than the wrongs which in thirteen incomplete years, while Philip has been uppermost, he has inflicted on the Greeks. Nay, they are scarcely a fraction of them, as I may easily and briefly show. Olynthus and Methone, and Apollonia and thirty-two cities on the borders of Thrace, I pass over —all which he has so cruelly destroyed that a visitor could scarcely tell if they were ever inhabited. And of Phocis, so considerable a people exterminated, I say nothing. But what is the condition of Thessaly? Has he not taken away her constitutions and her cities, and established tetrarchies, to parcel her out, not only by cities, but by provinces, for subjection? Are not the states of Eubœa now governed by despots, and Eubœa is an island near to Thebes and to Athens? Does he not expressly write in his epistles, "I am at peace with those who are willing to obey me?" Neither Greek nor barbaric land contains the man's ambition. And we, the Greek community, seeing and hearing this, instead of sending embassies to one another about it and expressing our indignation, are in such a miserable state, so intrenched in our separate towns, that to this day we can attempt nothing that interest or necessity requires; we cannot combine for succor and alliance; we look unconcernedly on the man's growing power, each resolving to enjoy the interval in which another is destroyed, not caring nor striving for the salvation of Greece. Whatever wrong the Greeks sustained from Lacedæmonians or from us, was at least inflicted

by a genuine Greek people. It might be felt in the same manner as if a lawful son, born to a large fortune, committed some fault or error in the management of it. On that ground, one would consider him open to censure and to reproach: yet it could not be said he was an alien and not an heir to the property which he so dealt with. But if a slave or a spurious child wasted and spoilt that in which he had no interest, how much more heinous and hateful would all have pronounced it!"

On the decay of patriotism and the venality of public men throughout Greece, he speaks thus:

"There must be some cause, some good reason, why the Greeks were so eager for liberty then, and now are so eager for servitude. There was something in the hearts of the multitude then which there is not now, which overcame the wealth of Persia, and maintained the freedom of Greece, and quailed not under any battle by sea or land, the loss whereof has ruined all and thrown the Greek world into confusion. What was this? No subtlety or cleverness; simply this, that whoever took a bribe from the aspirants to power or the corrupters of Greece was universally abhorred. It was a fearful thing to be convicted of bribery; the severest punishment was inflicted on the guilty, and there was no intercession or pardon. The favorable moments for enterprise which fortune frequently offers to the careless against the vigilant, to them that will do nothing against those that discharge their entire duty, could not be bought from orators or generals; no more could mutual concord, nor distrust of tyrants and barbarians, nor anything of the kind. But now all such principles have been sold as in open market, and principles imported in exchange by which Greece is ruined and diseased.

What are they? Envy, when a man gets a bribe; laughter, if he confesses it; mercy to the convicted; hatred of those who denounce the crime,—all the usual accompaniments of corruption. For as to ships and men, and revenues and abundance of other material—all, in fact, that may be reckoned as constituting national strength, assuredly the Greeks of our day are more fully and perfectly supplied with such advantages than Greeks of the olden times. But they are all rendered useless, unavailable, unprofitable by the agency of these traffickers."

This is indeed a powerful denunciation of a state of things which we know to be very possible, in which the corruption of public men is treated as a joke, and when exposed and detected, is hardly thought to deserve reprobation and punishment. If all that was best in Greece had really so utterly died out, it would seem that Demosthenes was wasting his breath in idle declamation. But we may well believe that he clung to the old Athenian ideal, and could not bring himself to despair of his country. And it is certain that this and the preceding speech produced an effect, and Athens made efforts which were temporarily successful. "The work of saving Greece," he told them before he sat down, "belongs to you; this privilege your ancestors bequeathed to you as the prize of many perilous exertions."

As one might expect, there were those who sought to persuade the Athenians that Philip's power for aggression had been greatly exaggerated, and that he was by no means so formidable as Sparta had once been, when she led the Peloponnesian confederacy. Demosthenes points out that Philip had introduced what was really a new method of warfare. Athens

and Sparta, in the height of their power, had only been able to command a citizen militia from the states in league with them. Such a force was prepared only for a summer campaign, and could not always follow up its blows effectively. Philip, on the other hand, could take the field in winter as well as in summer. His troops were never disbanded, and they were under his sole direction. He was, in fact, to the Greeks what Napoleon was to the Austrians. An able and restless despot, at the head of a well-trained standing army, will often, for a time at least, have a decided advantage in war over a free and constitutional state.

The next year, 340 B.C., events occurred which completely justified the warnings of Demosthenes. Philip attempted the conquest of the cities on the Propontis, Perinthus and Byzantium. He was foiled by prompt intervention from Athens. There was for a brief space a doubt whether Byzantium would accept Athenian aid, so thoroughly had the city become estranged from Athens in consequence of the Social War. Demosthenes went thither at the head of an embassy, and the result was, that an alliance was concluded. Shortly afterwards, the conscientious and much-respected Phocion, though he differed politically from Demosthenes, sailed thither with a powerful armament and a force of Athenian citizens. Through the influence of Leon, one of the leading citizens of Byzantium, who had been Phocion's fellow-student at Athens in the Academy, they were admitted into the city, and charmed the Byzantines by their quiet and admirable behavior. Succors also arrived from some of the islands of the Ægean—from Cos, Chios, Rhodes. Byzantium was now all but impregnable, and Philip was obliged to abandon the siege both of it and of Perinthus. Even

his own territory was invaded by Phocion, and many of the Macedonian cruisers were captured. For Philip it was a year of reverses, as for Athens it was one of success and glory. The two cities on the Propontis decreed her a vote of thanks, and displayed their gratitude by erecting three colossal statues, representing Athens receiving a wreath at their hands in testimony of their deliverance. Demosthenes, too, had his reward. No one could question that to his counsels and energy they owed in great measure the preservation of the Chersonese and their supremacy at sea. Corn cheap and abundant was for the present assured to them. The Athenian people were in a pleased and grateful mood, and the Assembly passed a vote of thanks to Demosthenes, which none of his many political enemies dared to oppose.

CHAPTER XI.

CHÆRONEIA—FALL OF GREECE.

We must now hurry on to the decisive catastrophe which sealed the fate of Greece and of its political independence. Its glory had been to have been represented by an aggregate of free states, of which Athens was immeasurably the first in culture and civilization. Its weakness and curse had been perpetual and all but irremediable rivalries and jealousies, which went far to neutralize its collective strength in the face of a real peril. It was now on the eve of a revolution which the Greek mind, in spite of many a warning from Demosthenes, had never been able to bring itself to comtemplate as possible. He had done his best, as we have seen, to retard it amid endless discouragements, and to the last we shall find him faithful to the cause of which he never once seems to have allowed himself to despair. In the train of events which culminated in Chæroneia we find him bearing a conspicuous and honorable part.

Philip's career, as we have just seen, had been temporarily checked; and at the close of the year 340 B.C. Athens might almost congratulate herself on all danger having passed away. In the spring of 339 B.C. the King met with another disaster. He had plunged

into the wilds of Scythia, north of the Danube, and had carried off a vast booty of flocks and herds from the barbarous people; but on his return through Thrace he was attacked by the Triballi, one of the fiercest and most warlike of the tribes of that dangerous region. We know what it is for a regular and well-equipped army to have to march through an intricate and hostile country. The King of Macedon, encumbered as he was with spoil, was taken at a disadvantage, and if not actually defeated, he was at least worsted, lost his plunder, and was himself badly wounded. Thus the year 339 B.C. seemed one of good omen for Athens and for Greece. And thanks to the vigorous efforts of Demosthenes in the way of naval reform, the Athenian fleet was now supreme in the Ægean.

Meanwhile a new sacred war in behalf of the god and temple of Delphi was unfortunately breaking out. It arose out of incidents which may seem to us comparatively trifling. An Amphictyonic Council had assembled at Delphi in the autumn of 340 B.C., and Athens was represented by Æschines. The fruitful plain of Crisa, stretching inland from the Gulf of Corinth to the town of Amphissa, under the mountains of Parnassus, was the consecrated possession of the Delphic god. It was holy ground, and to till or to plant it had been forbidden with a tremendous curse. Part of it, however, adjacent to the town and port of Cirrha, had, almost with the sanction of Greek opinion, been occupied and brought into cultivation for a long period by the Locrians. Between them and the Phocians there had been a long-standing feud, which reached a climax in the recent Sacred War. The Locrians in that war had sided with Philip and the Thebans against their sacrilegious neighbors. Consequently,

after the destruction of Phocis, they had a sore feeling towards Athens as the ally of the Phocians. One of their deputies, on the occasion of which we are speaking, rudely gave expression to this feeling, and went so far as to revile the Athenians, and to imply that an alliance with such people was in itself equivalent to the guilt of sacrilege. Possibly the man may have wished to curry favor with the Thebans, to whose disgust some golden shields had just been set up by the Athenians in a new chapel at Delphi, with an inscription commemorating the victory of Athens over Persia and Thebes at Platæ a century and a half ago. This small incident was dwelt upon by the Locrian orator in violent and intemperate language. "Do not," said he, "permit the name of the Athenian people to be pronounced among you at this holy season. Turn them out of the sacred ground like men under a curse."

Æschines, the Athenian representative (he describes the affair himself in his great speech against Ctesiphon, or, we may say, against Demosthenes), savagely retorted. He pointed to the plain of Crisa, visible from the spot where they were assembled. "You see," he said, "that plain cultivated by the Locrians, of Amphissa, covered with their farm-buildings. You have under your eyes the port of Cirrha, consecrated by your forefathers' oath, now occupied and fortified." Then he caused the ancient oracle, the oath with its dreadful curse, to be read out before the Council. "Here am I," he went on to say, "ready to defend the property of the god according to your forefathers' oath. I stand prepared to clear my own city of her obligations. Do you take counsel for yourselves. You are here to pray for blessings to the gods, publicly and individually. Where will you find voice or heart

or courage to offer such a prayer if you let these accursed Locrians of Amphissa remain unpunished?"

The appeal of Æschines produced an instantaneous effect. The excitement was prodigious; and the Council in a moment of fury passed a resolution that on the morrow all the population of Delphi were to assemble with spades and pickaxes, and sweep away from the sacred plain every trace of the impious tillage and cultivation. Next day this mad proposal was actually carried into effect. The furious mob rushed across the plain into the town of Cirrha, and pillaged and fired the place. On their return, however, they were met by the Locrians of Amphissa with an armed force, and obliged to take refuge in Delphi. There was no bloodshed, even under these circumstances of provocation, as the aggrieved owners of the destroyed poperty were restrained by a sentiment of reverence for the Amphictyonic Council. Here is, indeed, a striking evidence of the respect felt for the traditions of the god of Delphi and his ancient temple, the centre of the religious life of Greece. Again, on the following day, the Council met, and after warm praise had been bestowed on Athens as the avenger of Apollo's rights, the people of Amphissa were denounced as having incurred the gilt of sacrilege; and it was finally decided that the Amphictyonic deputies should shortly assemble at Thermopylæ to consider how they were to be punished.

A new sacred war was thus in effect begun six years after the disastrous termination of the previous war in 346 B. C. That had ended in the destruction of a member of the Greek community; this was to end in the ruin and fall of Greece. The danger was not at once perceived at Athens. We cannot wonder at this.

Æschines' vindication of his countrymen at the Council might well seem spirited and patriotic. Athens, through him, had stood forward as the champion of the god of Delphi. It was easy for him to argue that those who took a different view, and regretted the rash act to which the Amphictyons had been prompted by his oratory, were little better than the paid agents of those sacrilegious Locrians, who had allowed one of their speakers openly to insult Athens. Demosthenes, however—so he tells us—at once declared in the Assembly, "You are bringing war into Attica, Æschines—an Amphictyonic war." The popular sentiment at the time was in favor of Æschines, and this his political rival must have known and felt. Still, Demosthenes was able—a proof this of the high respect in which he was held—to persuade the people not to send any deputies to the special congress at Thermopylæ, which was to deliberate on the punishment of the Locrians. Thebes, too, allowed herself to be unrepresented. War was decided on; the Locrian territory was invaded, and a fine imposed on the Locrians, the payment of which, however, the army was not sufficiently powerful to compel.

The congress of which we have just spoken was not the regular Amphictyonic meeting. This was held in the autumn of 339 B.C. Philip by that time had returned to his kingdom. The meeting was now at Delphi; and Athens, as might be expected, took part in it. Æschines again was one of her representatives. It was on this occasion that the fatal step was taken of invoking the aid of Philip. It is not very difficult to understand how such a vote was carried. Macedon itself was a member of the Council; and so, too, were several states like Thessaly and Phthiotis, which now

were simply Macedonian dependencies. Æschines, it may be from really corrupt motives, supported the vote. Accordingly Philip was elected general of the Amphictyonic army; and a request was forwarded to him that "he would march to the aid of Apollo and the Amphictyons, and not suffer the rights of the god to be invaded by the impious Locrians of Amphissa."

The die was now cast. The peril to Greece might possibly even yet have been warded off; but it was great and imminent. And Thebes and Athens, on whom all now depended, were still notoriously unreconciled. Philip, of course, instantly accepted the Council's invitation. He would enter Greece as the representative of a holy cause, as well as the head of a very powerful army. From Thermopylæ he marched straight through Phocis to Elateia, the chief Phocian town and the key to southern Greece. It was not sixty miles from the Athenian frontier. Here he halted and began to establish a regular camp. This was in itself alarming. His next step was to send a message to Thebes inviting the co-operation of the Thebans in an attack on Attica.

In a graphic passage in the most famous of his speeches, Demosthenes describes the impression made at Athens by the news that Philip was at Elateia.

"It was evening," he says, "when a messenger arrived with tidings for the Presidents that Elateia was taken. They rose instantly from the public supper-table; some drove the people from the stalls in the Forum, and set fire to the wicker-work in order to clear the space; others sent for the generals, and called the trumpeter. The whole city was in commotion. Next morning, at break of day, the Presidents convoked the Senate in the Senate House, and you repaired to the Assembly,

and before the Senate could enter upon business, or draw up the decree to be submitted to you, all the people had taken their seats in the Pnyx. When the Senate had entered—when the Presidents had communicated the intelligence which had been brought to them—when the messenger had been introduced, and related his tidings,—the herald made proclamation, 'Who desires to speak?' But no one came forward. Again and again did the herald repeat the proclamation; our country's voice called out for a man to speak and save her; for the voice of the herald raised at the law's command should be regarded as the voice of our common country. Still not a man came forward."

In this crisis Demosthenes gave his counsel. It was to the following effect:

"I said," he tells us, "that the dismay of those who supposed that Philip could still count on the Thebans must proceed from an ignorance of the real state of the case. If that were so, it would not be at Elateia—it would be on our own frontier—that we should hear of Philip. That he had come to make things ready for him in Thebes I knew well. But mark, I said, how the matter stands. Every man in Thebes whom money can buy, every man whom flattery can gain, has long ago been secured. But he is totally unable to prevail upon those who have withstood him from the beginning, and who are opposing him still. What then has brought Philip to Elateia? He hopes, by a military demonstration in your neighborhood, and by bringing up his army, to raise the courage and confidence of his friends, and to strike terror into his enemies, so that they may be frightened or coerced into surrendering what hitherto they had been unwilling to concede. If, then, I said,

we choose at this crisis to remember every ill turn which the Thebans have done us, and to distrust them and treat them as enemies, in the first place we shall be doing the very thing which Philip most desires; and next, I fear that, his present adversaries embracing his cause, they will all fall on Attica together. If you will be advised by me, and regard what I am about to say as matter for reflection rather than for disputation, I believe that my counsel will obtain your approbation, and be the means of averting the peril which now threatens the State. What, then, do I advise? First, shake off this panic—or rather change the direction of your fears from yourselves to the Thebans, for they are far nearer ruin than ourselves. The danger is theirs before it is ours. Next, let all citizens of military age and all your cavalry march to Eleusis, and show yourselves to the world in arms, that the Thebans who are on your side may be as bold as their adversaries, and speak out in the cause of right, with the assurance that, if there is at Elateia a force at hand to support the party who have sold their country to Philip, your forces are no less at the disposal of those who would fight for freedom, and ready to succor them in case of attack. Make no conditions with the Thebans. It would be unworthy on such an occasion. Simply declare your readiness to succor them, on the assumption that their peril is imminent, and that you are in a better position than they to forecast the future. If they accept our offer and adopt our views, we shall have attained our object, and pursued a policy worthy of our country. If anything should mar the project, they will have only themselves to blame, and we shall have nothing to blush for in our part of the transaction."

Such was the counsel of Demosthenes in this great crisis. It was instantly adopted by the Assembly without a dissentient voice. The matter did not stop here. "Not only did I make a speech," Demosthenes tells us, "but I proposed a decree. Not only did I propose the decree, but I went upon the embassy. Not only went I on the embassy, but I prevailed on the Thebans." At Thebes the orator had to confront the envoys of Philip, backed up by the Philippizing party and by the old Theban animosity towards Athens. Each embassy was heard, according to Greek custom, before the Theban Assembly. Philip had eloquent advocates who suggested plausible reasons why he should be allowed to march through Bœotia and to humble the old enemy of Thebes. Unfortunately, we have not the reply of Demosthenes. We know, however, from the historian of the time, Theopompus, that he rose to the occasion, and convinced the wavering Thebans, by an impressive appeal to every Greek and patriotic sentiment, that it was their duty and interest to accept the offered alliance. It was a signal triumph —one, too, achieved under extreme difficulties.

It must, indeed, have been a proud moment for Demosthenes when he saw his country's army march across the Attic frontier and enter Bœotia at the Theban invitation. All distrust and jealousy had now passed away; and the two states, between whom there had been long and bitter rivalry, had at last made up their mind to co-operate in a common cause. As it had been at Byzantium, so was it now at Thebes. The Athenian soldiers received a hearty welcome, and were hospitably entertained in the houses of the city.

"With such cordiality," says Demosthenes in his speech on the crown, "did they welcome you, that while

their own infantry and cavalry were quartered outside the walls, they received your army within their city and their homes, among their wives and all that they held most precious. On that day the Thebans gave you, in the face of all mankind, three of the highest testimonials —the first of your valor, the second of your justice, and the third of your good conduct. For in choosing to fight with you rather than against you, they judged that you were better soldiers, and engaged in a better cause than Philip; and by intrusting to you that which they in common with all mankind regard with the most jealous watchfulness, their children and their wives, they manifested their confidence in your good conduct. The result showed that they were well warranted in their trust; for after the army entered their city, not a single complaint, well or ill founded, was made against you, so orderly was your behavior. And when your soldiers stood side by side with their hosts in two successive engagements, their disipline, their equipments, their courage, were such as not only to challenge criticism, but to command admiration."

Two slight successes, indeed, were won by the united armies of Thebes and Athens. Of the campaign we have no detailed narrative, and of the final battle we have but an imperfect and unsatisfactory description. It would have been most interesting to have had such an account of it as Xenophon has given us of Leuctra and Mantineia. It was fought near Chæroneia, close to the borders of Phocis,—a town of little importance, but memorable from its historical associations. More than two centuries afterwards, a great victory was won there by Sulla over an army of Mithridates. It was too, the birthplace of Plutarch, and to it he retired from Rome in his old age. On this occasion it would

seem that as to numbers the forces were evenly matched. But the Greek army was without a general of any marked ability. Phocion, by far the best Athenian officer, was absent with the fleet in the Ægean. A commander of the first order—a man, for example, of the calibre of Epameinondas—might have turned the scale, and no doubt would have done so had there been a powerful contingent from Sparta and the Peloponnese. United Greece, it is probable, could even yet have crushed Philip. As it was, all may be said to have depended on Athens and Thebes, though a few other States furnished some soldiers. The Macedonian army was both skillfully commanded, and was very formidable in itself. It was led by Philip and by his young son Alexander; and he it was, it appears, to whom the victory was mainly due. He was opposed to the Theban phalanx—the Sacred band, as it was called—which fell fighting to a man. It is certain that the battle was obstinately contested, and almost equally certain that it was decided by superiority of generalship. The Athenians, after their wont, dashed upon the enemy with furious impetuosity; but a citizen militia, however brave and enthusiastic, unless they were victorious at the first onset, could hardly be expected to stand long against such troops as Philip's trained veterans. They did, according to one account, put the enemy to flight, and their general exclaimed, "Let us pursue them even to Macedonia." But the end was complete defeat for the Greek army, and the year 338 B.C. witnessed the fall of Greek independence.

To Thebes the result was immediate ruin. Its citadel was at once occupied by a Macedonian garrison, and its government put under Macedonian control.

Athens, 1,000 of whose citizens had fallen, and 2,000 been taken prisoners, was in an agony of distress; but she did not allow herself to despair. Isocrates, still alive in his 99th year, though he had been politically opposed to Demosthenes and had cherished the idea of a united Greece under the leadership of the King of Macedon, was heart-broken, and refused to live any longer. He was a true patriot; and

> "That dishonest victory
> At Chæroneia fatal to liberty
> Killed with report that old man eloquent."

Demosthenes had fought in his countrymen's ranks, and had fled with the rest; but though his enemies taunted him with cowardice, he had the honor of pronouncing the funeral panegyric over the fallen. His counsels had been followed; the result had been disastrous; yet he still evidently retained the confidence and esteem of the people. Athens recovered her captured citizens without ransom, for the conqueror chose to be generous; but the cause for which she had fought was a thing of the past. Demosthenes must have felt after Chæroneia as Pitt felt after Austerlitz when he closed the map of Europe. His efforts had been rewarded with the gratitude of his countrymen, but they had not been rewarded with success.

CHAPTER XII.

CONTEST BETWEEN DEMOSTHENES AND ÆSCHINES.

PHILIP was now the acknowledged head of the Greek world. Phocion, Athens' best soldier, as well as a highly honorable citizen, told the Athenians that they must acquiesce in this result. Demosthenes had not a word left to say on foreign policy. The subject was, in fact, closed. He was continually and virulently attacked by his political opponents, but he was too strong for them. He spoke the funeral eulogy at the obsequies of the slain in the great battle—an honor to which he was chosen in preference to Æschines, as well as to Demades, who had negotiated the peace. He held, too, more than one important office. He was treasurer of the Theoric fund, which provided Athens with her grand dramatic entertainments; and in this capacity he had a considerable control over the finances generally. He was also superintendent of the city walls and fortifications. He must thus have had the character of an able and upright man of business. And he continued to follow the profession of the bar, and found abundant employment.

In 336 B.C. Philip was assassinated. It seems that Demosthenes, though at the time he was mourning the death of an only daughter, showed an excessive joy by

appearing in public in a white dress with a garland on his head, and performing a solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving. Could he have indulged in the dream that all was now to be reversed, and Greece was again to be free? Macedon, no doubt, with its sudden growth of power, might have collapsed, had Philip's son and successor been an imbecile. And it appears that Demosthenes thought meanly of the young Alexander. He compared him to Margites, the hero of a comic poem which tradition attributed to Homer. Margites was a man who "knew many things but knew them all badly;" he was a sort of "Jack of all trades and master of none." Alexander was famous for the variety of his studies and pursuits; and it was this, it may be supposed, which gave point to the comparison. Demosthenes' idea of him was, that he was a studious, bookish young man, of whom the world would never hear much. The fact that he was only twenty years of age at the time of his father's death may have reasonably encouraged Demosthenes to believe that Greece had some chance of throwing off the yoke imposed on her by her defeat at Chæroneia. He did not think it wrong to correspond with Persia, and to avail himself of Persian gold, with the view of frustrating Philip's designs on Asia. We can hardly censure him for this, when we remember that it was done for the patriotic purpose of freeing Greece from its present position of a Macedonian dependency. If he used questionable means, he at least had the merit of standing by the old cause. But, of course, it was easy for his enemies to represent his conduct in an odious light.

Three years after Chæroneia, Alexander, after a successful expedition into Thrace, and a victory over the

barbarous and warlike Getæ on the further bank of the Danube, hurried with marvelous rapidity southwards to crush a movement of revolt in Thebes. There was, as we have seen, a Macedonian garrison in the city. There was, too, a powerful political party which urged prompt submission. Alexander himself was particularly anxious not to drive matters to extremities. But the party which had instigated the movement knew that they could not hope for mercy; and, by appealing to the cause of Greek freedom, persuaded the people to reject all offers of peace. The unhappy city was captured by assault, and every house but that of the poet Pindar and those of his descendants was razed to the ground.

> "The great Emathian conqueror bade spare
> The house of Pindarus, when temple and tower
> Went to the ground."

It was a terrible doom, but it was approved by the towns of Bœotia; and but for the brief grandeur to which Thebes rose under Epameinondas, and her share in the battle of Chæroneia, we may almost say it was deserved. She had been a traitor to the common cause in the great struggle with Persia; and afterwards, with a peculiar baseness, she had urged Sparta to slaughter, in cold blood, the brave Platæans, whose only crime was, that they had sided with Athens in the Peloponnesian War. Thebes was now blotted out of existence. Again Athens trembled. Alexander, there was reason to believe, was magnanimous; but it was impossible to say how he might deal with a city which had been so persistently hostile to his father. At the suggestion of Demades, an embassy of congratulation was sent to him. The people were to express their joy not only on

his safe return from the Danube, but on the extinction of Thebes. It was as Dr. Thirlwall happily calls it, "impudent obsequiousness." Alexander's answer was a demand for the surrender of the nine chief anti-Macedonian orators,—Demosthenes, of course included. But the demand was waived, chiefly, it seems, through the opportune intervention of Phocion, whom Alexander highly respected.

The next year he crossed the Hellespont into Asia. Four years from that time sufficed for the overthrow of the Persian empire. Darius, the last king of Persia was murdered in 330 B. C. That same year witnessed an abortive attempt in Greece against Macedonian supremacy. It was bravely led by a king of Sparta, who fell in a hard fought battle near Megalopolis with Antipater, to whom Alexander had intrusted his kingdom during his absence. Greece could now no longer even dream of independence. Anything like an anti-Macedonian policy would be preposterous; and there was thus an opportunity at Athens of attempting to rouse popular feeling against any statesman who had advocated that policy, the end of which had been so fatal to Greece.

It was under these circumstances that Æschines made a great effort to crush his old rival. It had been proposed by Ctesiphon, in the year after Chæroneia, that a public testimonial to the worth of Demosthenes should be given him in the form of a golden crown; and that the honor should be proclaimed on the occasion of one of those great dramatic festivals, when the city was crowded with visitors from every part of Greece. The proposal had been approved by the Athenian Senate, but it had yet to be submitted to the popular assembly. Æschines at the time denounced

it as unconstitutional, and opposed it by one of the recognized modes of legal procedure. Technically, indeed, the motion of Ctesiphon was illegal. Demosthenes, as we have stated, was holding two offices; he was superintendent of fortifications and treasurer of the Theoric fund. It was contrary to Athenian law to bestow the honor of a crown on an officer before his accounts had been audited; it was also forbidden that such an honor should be proclaimed anywhere else than in the Pnyx, the regular place of the people's assembly. According to the motion of the proposer, it would have been proclaimed in the theatre. Æschines could, therefore, argue that it was in two points illegal. But he wished to win a decisive victory; and he accordingly waited for some years, and finally rested his case on the argument that Demosthenes, as a public man, was undeserving of the honor. It is this which gives interest to his extant speech. He labored to convince the Athenians that his rival could not have been thoroughly sincere in his anti-Macedonian professions, because he had let slip three important opportunities. Demosthenes had done nothing, so he argued, when Alexander first crossed into Asia; or when he was supposed to be in great jeopardy just before the battle of Issus in 333 B.C.; or lastly, when Sparta, as has been stated, made an attempt at resistance. It was in the year of this unsuccessful attempt—the year 330 B.C., when Macedon was triumphant both in Asia and Greece—that this memorable cause between the two rival orators was heard before the Athenian assembly. As might have been expected, there was a numerous gathering both of citizens and strangers, very many of whom were well qualified to be keen critics of the great contest.

The question really to be decided—and this was the issue which Æschines was anxious to raise—was, Had Demosthenes been a good or bad citizen? Had he honestly at all times and seasons stood by the cause in which he so earnestly professed to believe? Demosthenes' reply to this question is the vindication of his political life. The cause for which he had exerted himself, though finally unsuccessful, was, he maintains, the true and the right cause. Had he foreseen the end from the beginning, he would have spoken and acted as he did. He reviews his policy from the peace of 346 B.C., concluded just after Philip's destruction of Phocis, down to the king's death ten years afterwards. To all this he looks back with satisfaction and pride. In defending himself he attacks his rival, and denounces him as really the author of the calamities which had fallen on the Greek world. It was through the diplomacy of Æschines, he declares, that Philip was admitted to Thermopylæ, the beginning of all the subsequent mischief. If it was dreadful to think of Greece being under a foreign master, it was a glorious fact that Athens had done her best to avert such a disgrace.

This is the drift and purport of the great speech on the Crown, as it is usually called. It has been well described by Mr. Grote as a "funeral oration on extinct Athenian and Grecian freedom." "It breathes," says Dr. Thirlwall, "the spirit of that high philosophy which, whether learnt in the schools or from life, has consoled the noblest of our kind in prisons and on scaffolds, and under every persecution of adverse fortune, but in the tone necessary to impress a mixed multitude with a like feeling, and to elevate it for a while into a sphere above its own."

Some passages from this oration have already been quoted in the preceding chapter; and it is due to the reader to give him some further specimens of, perhaps, the greatest of all the oratorical efforts of Demosthenes.

Here is a passage in which the speaker dwells on the generous and magnanimous temper of his countrymen in their best days:

"Let me for a moment bring before your eyes one or two of the brightest passages in the history of our times. Lacedæmon was paramount by sea and land; she had a belt of garrisons about the frontiers of our territory; Eubœa, Tanagra, all Bœotia, Megara, Ægina, Cleonæ, every island on the coast. We had neither ships nor walls; we were in no want (had we chosen to remember the Decelean war) of grievances either against Corinth or Thebes. And yet the arms of Athens were seen at Haliartus, and in a few days after at Corinth. You had something better to do than to recall the injuries of the past. . . .

"The sacrifice in either case was not made for a benefactor, neither was it made without risk. You held that no reason for abandoning to their fate men who had thrown themselves on your compassion. Honor and renown were a sufficient motive to lead you into danger, and who shall say you were wrong? Life must cease; death must come at some time, though one should steal into a cellar to avoid him. The brave are ever ready to set forth on the path of glory, armed with high hope and courage, prepared to accept without a murmur the fate which heaven may ordain. Thus did your forefathers; thus did the elders among yourselves, who interposed and frustrated the attempts of the Thebans after their victory at Leuctra to destroy Sparta, though from Sparta you had experienced neither

friendship nor good offices, but many grievious wrongs. You neither quailed before the power and renown which Thebes then possessed, nor were you deterred by any thought of your past treatment by Sparta. Thus did you proclaim to all the Greeks, that how much soever any of them may offend against you, you reserve your resentment for other occasions; but that if danger threaten their existence or their liberties, you will take no account of—you will not even remember—your wrongs."

This is his answer to those who persisted in saying that it was Philip—Philip alone—who had brought all their troubles on them:

"Do not go about repeating that Greece owes all her misfortunes to one man. No, not to one man, but to many abandoned men distributed throughout the different States, of whom, by earth and heaven, Æschines is one. If the truth were to be spoken without reserve, I should not hesitate to call him the common scourge of all the men, the districts, and the cities which have perished; for the sower of the seed is answerable for the crop. I am astonished you did not turn your faces from him the moment you beheld him; but thick darkness would seem to veil your eyes."

He maintains that the action of the State had been right and honorable, though it had failed.

"I affirm that if the future had been apparent to us all—if you, Æschines, had foretold it and proclaimed it at the top of your voice instead of preserving total silence,—nevertheless the State ought not to have deviated from her course, if she had regard to her own honor, the traditions of the past, or the judgment of posterity. As it is, she is looked upon as having failed in her policy,—the common lot of all mankind when such is

the will of heaven; but if, claiming to be the foremost state of Greece, she had deserted her post, she would have incurred the reproach of betraying Greece to Philip. If we had abandoned without a struggle all which our forefathers braved every danger to win, who would not have spurned you, Æschines? God forbid that I should so speak of the State as of myself. How could we have looked in the face the strangers who flock to our city, if things had reached their present pass—Philip the chosen leader and lord of all—while others without our assistance had borne the struggle to avert this consummation? We! who have never in times past preferred inglorious safety to peril in the path of honor. Is there a Greek or a barbarian who does not know that Thebes at the height of her power, and Sparta before her—ay, and even the King of Persia himself—would have been only glad to compromise with us, and that we might have had what we chose, and possessed our own in peace, had we been willing to obey orders and to suffer another to put himself at the head of Greece? But it was not possible,—it was not a thing which the Athenians of those days could do. It was against their nature, their genius, and their traditions; and no human persuasion could induce them to side with a wrong-doer because he was powerful, and to embrace subjection because it was safe. No; to the last our country has fought and jeopardized herself for honor and glory and pre-eminence. A noble choice, in harmony with your national character, as you testify by your respect for the memories of your ancestors who have so acted. And you are in the right; for who can withhold admiration from the heroism of the men who shrank not from leaving their city and their fatherland and embarking in their war-ships,

rather than submit to foreign dictation? Why, Themistocles, who counseled this step, was elected general; and the man who counseled submission was stoned to death—and not he only, for his wife was stoned by your wives, as he was by you. The Athenians of those days went not in quest of an orator or a general who could help them to prosperous slavery; but they scorned life itself, if it were not the life of freedom. Each of them regarded himself as the child not only of his father and of his mother, but of his country; and what is the difference? He who looks on himself as merely the child of his parents, awaits death in the ordinary course of nature; while he who looks on himself as the child also of his country, will be ready to lay down his life rather than see her enslaved, and will hold death itself less terrible than the insults and indignities which the citizens of a state in slavery to the foreigner must endure. . . .

"Do I take credit to myself for having inspired you with sentiments worthy of your ancestors? Such presumption would expose me to the just rebuke of every man who hears me. What I maintain is, that these very sentiments are your own; that the spirit of Athens was the same before my time,—though I do claim to have had a share in the application of these principles to each successive crisis. Æschines, therefore, when he impeaches our whole policy, and seeks to exasperate you against me as the author of all your alarms and perils, in his anxiety to deprive me of present credit, is really laboring to rob you of your everlasting renown. If by your vote against Ctesiphon you condemn my policy, you will pronounce yourselves to have been in the wrong, instead of having suffered what has befallen you through the cruel injustice of fortune. But it cannot be: you have not been in the

wrong, men of Athens, in doing battle for the freedom and salvation of all; I swear it by your forefathers, who bore the battle's brunt at Marathon; by those who stood in arms at Platæa; by those who fought the sea-fight at Salamis; by the heroes of Artemisium, and many more whose resting place in our national monuments attests that, that as our country buried, so she honored, all alike—victors and vanquished. She was right; for what brave men could do, all did, though a higher power was master of their fate."

This, perhaps, is the most striking of the many striking passages in this great speech. Demosthenes carried his audience with him. His rival did not obtain a fifth of the votes. His position as an orator and statesman was destroyed. His discomfiture had been witnessed by the whole Greek world. In his mortification he left his native city for Rhodes, where he set up a school of rhetoric. The story was told that he once declaimed to his pupils the speech which had driven him into exile; and in reply to the applause with which it was greeted, exclaimed, "What if you had heard the beast himself speak it?"

CHAPTER XIII.

LAST DAYS OF DEMOSTHENES.

DEMOSTHENES had won a splendid triumph, which he survived eight years. But they were years by no means unclouded. They were darkened by an unfortunate incident, which we proceed briefly to narrate.

From 330 to 324 B.C., we hear nothing of the great orator. Athens, in fact, had no politics for him to discuss. He could have had nothing to do but to advise private clients. By the year 324 Alexander had returned from that long expedition in which he had carried his army through the heart of Asia to the banks of the Indus. He had left behind him one of his old Macedonian friends in the government of the rich satrapy of Babylonia. Harpalus (this was the man's name) was greedy and extravagant, and wasted the resources of his province in a luxury which he had learnt during his residence in the East. It was said that he loaded his table with the most costly delicacies, and filled his gardens with exotic plants of every variety. He had found it convenient to please the people of Athens by splendid presents, and particularly by very liberal gifts of wheat for free and general distribution. For all this he had received votes of thanks and been made an Athenian citizen. He was afraid however, to face Alexander, who, he well knew,

showed no mercy to delinquent satraps. So he fled from Asia to Europe with an immense treasure of 5,000 talents (about a million and a quarter pounds sterling), and landed at Cape Sunium, in Attica. He might reasonably flatter himself that he would not be an unwelcome visitor at Athens, but in this he was disappointed. There was the fear of the wrath of Alexander; and the fear, too, that Harpalus might possibly intend to assume the position of a tyrant or despot. His offers, whatever they were, were rejected; but there was a debate in the Assembly, and a rumor reached Alexander that Athens had received him and his armament. This was at the time untrue; but when he sent away his ships and asked leave to be admitted into the city with a few personal attendants, the people, remembering his past favors, no longer refused. Having gained his point, he tried to persuade them that they might defy Alexander with a prospect of success, and that he was himself able and willing to furnish them with the necessary funds. Some of the orators supported his views. But he could do nothing with Phocion or with Demosthenes. This was fatal to his project. Soon there came envoys from Antipater, Alexander's deputy in Macedonia, requiring his surrender. But this both Phocion and Demosthenes, notwithstanding the danger of the crisis, opposed. So alarmed, however, were the people at the thought of Alexander's probable vengeance, that they decided on arresting Harpalus and sequestrating his treasure till they could learn what view Alexander took of the matter; and this much they did on the motion of Demosthenes himself. It seems possible, as has been suggested, that Demosthenes proposed this motion with an *arrière-pensée*, and may have wished to detain Harpalus and his treasure, and to wait the

course of events. Harpalus contrived to escape; but his treasure—that part of it at least which he had brought to Athens after dismissing his fleet, and which amounted, according to statements made by Demosthenes on his authority, to about 720 talents—remained behind. This, of course, ought to have been returned—and the people were, it seems, prepared to do so; but when the money was counted it was found that there was no more than 350 talents, barely half the original sum. How was the deficiency to be explained? There was a great stir and outcry. People said that it must have been used in bribery, and that the missing money must have stuck to the fingers of the orators and public men. There was a general feeling that somebody ought to be punished, but there was not a scrap of evidence against any one, and no means of procuring it.

Demosthenes proposed to have the affair investigated by the court of Areopagus. It was not easy to see what better course could have been taken. At the same time, the members of that court must have felt that they could hardly hope, under the circumstances, to arrive at a perfectly satisfactory result. No doubt they commanded the public confidence, as they were all men of age and experience, and were from their position above the motives which occasionally swayed other courts. Great latitude was allowed them; and practically they often decided cases not simply on the evidence before them, but on hearsay, and on that personal knowledge which men in their rank would be sure to possess. They took the utmost pains with the present inquiry, and were engaged on it for six months. They went so far as to search the houses of the principal public men, with the exception of one who had been lately married—an exception perhaps to be attributed to a sense of

delicacy. At last they published their report, with a list of the names of persons whom they considered chargeable with having improperly possessed themselves of the missing money.

In this list appeared the name of Demosthenes as a debtor to the amount of twenty talents. The next step was to give the accused parties the choice of taking their trial or of paying the sum with which the Areopagus had debited them. Of those brought to trial, Demosthenes was the first. He was tried before a jury of 1,500 of his fellow-citizens, was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of fifty talents (about £12,000). It is very possible that among the jury which condemned him there may have been many who wished to please Alexander, and many, too, of the friends of Harpalus. It must, however, be remembered that the decision of the Areopagus could not fail to influence their verdict. Demosthenes would not or could not pay the fine. He was imprisoned, but in a few days was able to escape to Trœzen, in the territory of Argos. It was but a few months that he remained there.

We can hardly bring ourselves to believe that he was really guilty. Of course we can judge only by probabilities; and it is certain that the court of Areopagus must have had grounds for their suspicion. We must bear in mind that they merely drew up a list of persons whose case in their opinion required further judicial inquiry. There is no reason for assuming that they regarded the guilt of Demosthenes as certain. The inquiry was long and difficult; and the decision ultimately arrived at could have been hardly meant to express confident assurance. If Demosthenes publicly stated, on Harpalus' authority, the amount of the treasure, it seems strange that he should have made

himself a party to the disappearance of a portion of it. It may be that the statement he made had not been verified by him, and it may have been altogether erroneous. It is pleasant to find that both Dr. Thirlwall and Mr. Grote incline to acquit him of this mean dishonesty.

It may be worth while to mention a story told by Plutarch about this painful passage in the life of Demosthenes. Like many of his stories, it is probably a pure fiction, but it is at least amusing. Harpalus, he tells us, won over the orator to his side by sending him a singularly beautiful golden cup, his admiration of which he had noted. Along with the cup were twenty talents, the sum with which the Areopagus had debited him. Shortly afterwards, when the proposals of Harpalus were being discussed in the assembly, Demosthenes, who had previously opposed them, appeared with a woolen bandage round his throat, and pretended that he could not speak, from an attack of the quinsy. Some wag remarked that it must be the silver quinsy. The people laughed, but were angry. Such is the story. But, as a fact, Demosthenes did not drop his opposition to Harpalus. It was on his motion, as we have seen, that Harpalus was arrested and his treasure sequestrated.

We left the great orator in exile at Trœzen. He was recalled soon after the death of Alexander in 323 B.C. An attempt was then made once more to rid Greece of the Macedonian ascendancy. It was finally crushed by Antipater in the battle of Crannon in 322 B.C. The conqueror demanded the surrender of the leading anti-Macedonian orators—Demosthenes, of course, among them. Athens from this moment ceased to exist as a free state. A Macedonian garrison was introduced; there was a wholesale disfranchisement of citizens, and a new political constitution was imposed

on the city. Demosthenes did not remain to be a witness of this degradation. He had been welcomed back to his native Athens with joyful enthusiasm; now he must leave her forever. He took refuge in the little island of Calauria, off the coast of Argolis. It was here that he chose to die rather than fall into the hands of the "exile-hunters," as the emissaries of Antipater were called. Within the precincts of an ancient temple of Neptune, regarded of old as an inviolable sanctuary, he swallowed poison, retaining in his last moments sufficient presence of mind to expire outside the sacred enclosure, to which, in Greek belief, death would have been a pollution.

CHAPTER XIV.

DEMOSTHENES AT THE BAR.

It has seemed most convenient not to interrupt our sketch of the political career of Demosthenes with any allusions to his purely forensic engagements. He became, comparatively early in life—that is to say, when he was probably under thirty years of age—a very successful pleader in large practice. It may be as well now to give the reader some idea of the work with which he was occupied, and of the speeches which in this capacity he was called on to deliver.

At Athens there was no separate and distinct class answering to our bar. But there were professional orators and rhetoricians in abundance, who made it their business to compose speeches for plaintiffs and defendants. They did not, however, as a rule, make the speeches themselves; they merely prepared them and put them in the hands of their clients, who committed them to memory and then addressed the court. Of course it would often happen that a man felt himself quite unequal to such an ordeal, and would get an experienced speaker to plead for him. Most, however, of the forensic speeches of Demosthenes which have come down to us, were written for delivery by the plaintiff or the defendant in person. Part of the orator's art consisted in adopting them to the style and

manner of man his client happened to be. This circumstance often gives piquancy to these speeches. They abound in amusing passages illustrative of many varieties of Athenian life. We have descriptive touches of the peculiar ways of the commercial rogue, of the money-lender, of the fraudulent trustee. Fortune has been kind in preserving for us something like thirty orations of Demosthenes, in which these and kindred figures present themselves to our notice. We thus peep into the banking house and the factory, and see the Athenian citizen bargaining with merchants and ship-owners, or busy with his farm, or making his last will and testament.

Athens was a city in which lawsuits could not fail to be plentiful. It was a centre of trade, and a resort to foreigners from all parts. Then, too, there were the mines of Laurium along the coast; there were quarries of marble; and the adjacent seas were famous for their fisheries. Athenian manufactures, too, were highly prized. From the shores of the Black Sea and the islands of the Ægean there was a good trade in corn, timber, wine, and wool. Here were all the materials of commerce and consequently of litigation. Many an Athenian citizen was himself in business; and the city seems to have swarmed with bustling, enterprising foreigners who found it convenient to make it their home. The law courts had plenty of work to do—so much so, indeed, that the "law's delay" appears to have been as familiar to Athenians as to ourselves. "Some people," says Xenophon, if he really wrote the treatise attributed to him on the Athenian republic, "complain that a man often waits a twelvemonth at Athens before he can obtain an audience of the Senate or of the popular assembly. The fact is, they have so much to do there that it is impossible to attend to every

man's application; some, therefore, are compelled to go away unheard." Ill-natured persons, it seems, hinted that anybody could obtain a hearing by means of a bribe. Xenophon admits that there may be some truth in this; but he adds, speaking from his own knowledge, "that for no amount of gold and silver which could be offered would it be possible for the Athenians to transact all the business that is brought before them." Athens, in fact, was the place to which nearly all causes from the islands of the Ægean were brought for trial; and to which, too, it was probably best and safest that they should be brought. Athenian trials were conducted in a way which to us seems singular, and which at first sight might appear very unfavorable to the administration of justice. Causes were heard, as with us, before juries; but at Athens a jury commonly numbered 500, and might number 1,000 or even more. It was, in fact, trial before a popular assembly. There was a president, but he was not armed with the controlling powers of an English judge. Everything was left to the jury; the law of the case as well as the facts was for them to decide. To us this may seem the height of absurdity; but still at Athens it worked moderately well, and in a majority of cases we may believe that it secured at least substantial justice. The Athenian juror, it is true, had not received what we call a legal education; but he was naturally critical and sharp witted, and he was well practiced in the hearing of causes. It is quite possible that the average decisions of an Athenian jury may have been as good and satisfactory as those of an English. There was, of course, a danger of their being swayed too much at times by political considerations. But to this we know that an English jury is also liable. There was another and a worse danger. The population

of Athens was comparatively small; and so it would often happen that plaintiff and defendant, and the case at issue between them, would be well known to the jurors. The Athenian pleader was continually appealing to the personal knowledge of the jury, and would in this manner supplement deficiencies in the evidence. "He is a scoundrel; you all know him to be one."—this was the sort of language commonly addressed to a jury at Athens. Æschines, in prosecuting one Timarchus, dwells on the notoriety of the man's guilt and wickedness—"Such," he says, "is the testimony of the whole people of Athens, and it is not right that they should be convicted of perjury." This strikes us as a very loose method of procedure. Yet we find it repeatedly in the speeches of Demosthenes. And it is what we must expect where the judicial system is made thoroughly democratic. We must not be surprised at the savage invective with which the greatest Athenian orators thought it seemly to interlard their speeches. Even with us and all our restrictions, advocates contrive occasionally to indulge in considerable license, and did so formerly to a much greater extent; and it is, perhaps, a question whether some of the most offensive passages in Demosthenes and Æschines might not be paralleled from English pleadings.

Another evil of the Athenian judicial system was the division of responsibility. One out of 500 or 1,000 jurors might very well shelter himself under the excuse, that if he decided wrongly from carelessness or partiality, the result would not be much affected. On the other hand, there were advantages which will occur to the minds of those who are acquainted with the history of free institutions. Corruption and bribery cannot have been particularly easy. Nor again, could anything like intimidation be well practiced,

The fact, too, that rich and poor were brought together to discharge an important public function, would have a salutary effect. It would make them feel that they were members of one commonwealth, and inspire them with a respect for its laws. It would call out many of their best sentiments as well as sharpen their intellects. Their decisions may have sometimes been such as we with our modern ideas cannot approve; but, on the whole, it may be assumed that they commanded the confidence of the people. The Athenian may have had a perverse fondness for listening to the wranglings of rival pleaders; but he did his best generally to hear both sides fairly and to decide rightly. The jury system, with all its accompaniments of trained oratory and carefully composed speeches, was contemporaneous with the marvelous development of Athenian literature in the age of Pericles. To it we are certainly indebted for some of the most splendid monuments of human genius.

Such numerous juries could hardly have been fit to deal with cases involving a multitude of intricate details connected with money accounts or valuations of property. Matters of this kind were usually referred, as with us, to a court of arbitration—public arbitrators being annually appointed. Of these we hear continually in the forensic speeches of the Athenian orators, and we may take it for granted that much of the law business was disposed of by them. Indeed, it was the regular practice to submit ordinary private disputes to arbitrators in the first instance; but, as might have been expected in a democratic state, there was always an appeal from their decisions to a jury.

On the whole it was not unlikely that justice was fairly well administered in the Athenian courts.

Such, at all events, seems to have been the opinion of the Greek world; and we can hardly suppose that that opinion was without foundation. Some of the drawbacks of the system have been already noted, and they were no doubt considerable. A clever and unscrupulous advocate might have had a better chance at Athens than he would have with us. It is, of course, an immense advantage that a trained lawyer should preside over a court, and sum up the case, and point out to the jury the general principles by which they should be guided. It is probable that the want of this was often felt at Athens, and led occasionally to unfortunate results. Still, we may be sure that the average Athenian was a man of intelligence, and perfectly open to reason. Practice, too, made him tolerably well acquainted with his country's laws. It is the greatest mistake to conceive of Athens as "a fierce democracy." Her citizens were for the most part moderately-cultivated persons, of a tolerant temper, and willing to obey the laws and the constitution. A successful Athenian advocate must have come up to a rather high standard; and if his invective was sometimes coarse and offensively personal, it must have been set off by a certain amount of wit, and have been accompanied with acute reasoning.

Much of the litigation at Athens arose out of bottomry cases—that is, loans of money on the security of a ship or of its cargo. Business of this kind was transacted on a great scale; and as the risk was considerable, the interest charged was high—as much sometimes as thirty per cent. There seem to have been endless trickeries connected with it. One of Demosthenes' speeches, for instance, was on behalf of two joint lenders who had advanced some money on the security of a wine cargo. Two brothers, mer-

chants of Phaselis in Pamphylia, were the borrowers. Phaselis, it appears, had a very bad commercial reputation; and there were said to be more actions brought against its traders at Athens than against all the other traders put together. In this case Demosthenes' client stated that the borrowers of his money had broken their agreement "that they had not shipped the stipulated quantity of wine; that they had raised a further loan on the same security; that they had not purchased a sufficient return cargo; that, on their return, they had not entered the regular port of Athens, but had put into a little obscure harbor known as 'Smugglers' Creek;' and that, when the payment of the loan was demanded, they falsely represented that the vessel had been wrecked." Before the matter was settled, one of the borrowers died, and his property went to his brother, Lacritus, who, according to the lenders' statement, had verbally engaged to see that the loan should be repaid. So Lacritus was sued for the amount, although very possibly he was not legally liable, and may merely have been a "referee" for his brother, and have stated, as such, that to the best of his belief they were solvent. He was a man of some note, having been a pupil of Isocrates, and being himself a rather celebrated teacher of rhetoric. He was, in fact, what the Greeks called a "sophist." On this he seems to have presumed; and he went about bragging of his connection with "the great Isocrates." Demosthenes makes his client say: "These sophists are a 'bad lot.' It is no affair of mine if a man chooses to be a sophist, and to pay fees to Isocrates; but they must not, because they think themselves clever, be allowed to swindle other people out of their money. Lacritus does not trust to the justice of his

case; but he thinks that, as he has learnt oratory, he shall be able to make you think exactly what he pleases. Perhaps, as he is so clever, he will undertake to prove that black is white—that the money was never borrowed at all—or that it has been paid—or that the bond is waste paper—or that the borrowers had a right to use our money as they liked." It is possible, as has been supposed, that Demosthenes is really hitting at Isocrates in his abuse of Lacritus.

In one of his speeches he argues against the right of a man to take a name already borne by one of his brothers. The case is a rather singular one. Mantitheus, the son of Mantias, brings an action against his half-brother Bœotus for having got himself registered as Mantitheus. Bœotus was the son Mantias by a mistress, herself an Athenian citizen, and so capable, according to Athenian law, of transmitting citizenship to her offspring. Every citizen's child was enrolled or registered on the citizen-list at an early age, and then again subsequently on reaching manhood. Bœotus received his name on the first of these occasions. Before the second registration had taken place, his father died. Disliking the name, which suggested a familiar Greek proverb, "like a Bœotian hog," he contrived on this second occasion to get himself enrolled under his brother's name of Mantitheus. In this manner the legal designation of the two brothers became the same. It should be noted that at Athens a citizen was described by his own name, by that of his father, and that of his parish or township—Attica being divided into so many townships, or *demes*, as they were called. In a comparatively small community this might not be inconvenient. What, however, Bœotus had done, could hardly

fail to lead to confusion. His half-brother, in the speech composed for him by Demosthenes, hints that matters would be all the worse, as Bœotus kept rather questionable company. Unpleasant mistakes, too, as he points out, would probably arise out of unpaid debts and appearances in the law courts. In fact, the son of the lawful wife would often be credited with the scrapes into which the son of the mistress was likely to get himself.

"You tiresome Bœotus," says Demosthenes' client, who really seems to have been a much-injured man, "I would wish you, if possible, to renounce all your bad ways; but if that is too much to hope, pray oblige me to this extent: cease to give yourself trouble; cease to harass me with litigation; be content that you have gained a franchise, a property, a father. No one seeks to dispossess you; nor do I. If, as you pretend to be a brother, you act like a brother, people will believe that you are my kinsman. But if you plot against me, go to law with me, envy me, slander me, it will be thought that you have intruded into a strange family, and treat the members as if they were alien to you. As to me personally, however wrong my father may have been in refusing to acknowledge you, I certainly am innocent. It was not my business to know who were his sons; it was for him to show me whom I was to regard as brothers. As long as he forebore to acknowledge you, I held you no kinsman; ever since he acknowledged you, I have regarded you as he did. You have had your portion of the inheritance after my father's death; you participate in our religious worship, in our civil rights—no one excludes you from these. What would you have? Whoever hears the name will have to ask

which of us two are meant; then, if the person means you, he will reply, 'The one whom Mantias was compelled to adopt.' Do you wish for this?"

We pass to quite a different case. It is a dispute between two neighboring Attic farmers.* Their holdings were in a hilly part of Attica, and were separated by a public road. It is an action for damages which the plaintiff, Callicles, alleged that he had sustained through the obstruction of a water-course, which carried off the drainage from the surrounding hills. The defendant's father had built a wall on his land, with the view of diverting the water into the road. It seems that in Attica a proprietor might turn off his drainage into a public way, to the great detriment, as may well be supposed, of the country roads, which, in hilly districts, must at times have been almost impassable. The effect of the wall in this case was, that after heavy rains the plaintiff's farm was overflowed, as well as the road. For this the plaintiff brought his action. The defendant, Demosthenes' client, pleaded in justification that the wall in question had been lawfully erected by his father fifteen years ago; that no objection was then raised by the plaintiff's family; that the so-called water-course was not really a water-course, but was part of his own land, as it was planted with fruit-trees, and contained an old family burial ground. The stream, too, which caused the mischief, did not come to the defendant from a neighbor's farm; it flowed down the road both above and below him: the flood which it occasioned in wet weather was a natural misfortune, from which others had suffered as well as the plain-

* Speech against Callicles.

tiff—only, they had never thought of going to law about it. The defendant broadly hints that the plaintiff has an eye to his property, and is trying to oust him from it by a vexatious action. The matter in dispute was trifling enough, and the jury must have been inclined to laugh at the solemnity with which they were implored to give their best attention to all the details of the case. "There is no greater nuisance" (so the defendant begins his pleading) "than a covetous neighbor, which it has been my lot to meet with. Callicles has set his heart on my land, and worries me with litigation. First he got his cousin to claim it from me, but I defeated that claim. I beseech you all to hear me with attention—not because I am any speaker, but that you may learn by the facts how groundless the action is." After he has explained the facts, he asks pathetically what he is to do with the water, if he may not drain it off either into the public road or into private ground. "Surely," he adds, with a touch of bucolic humor, "the plaintiff won't force me to drink it up?" The damage done could not have been very ruinous, if we may judge from a single specimen. It appears that the mothers of the two litigants used to visit each other, as country neighbors; and on one occasion, when the defendant's mother was calling at the plaintiff's house, she found the family plunged in the deepest distress, and apparently crushed by some more than ordinary calamity. It would seem that the rustic mind then, as now, was peculiarly sensitive to the most ludicrously trifling loss, and delighted in describing it with the most violent exaggeration. The injured farmer's wife, on this occasion, pointed with tears to four bushels of barley which had got wet and

were being dried, and to a jar of oil, which had indeed fallen down, but which was not damaged. For this they wanted to claim, according to the defendant, 1,000 drachms, or about £40, by way of compensation. An Attic farmer, it would seem (like his English representative), was not likely to suffer from asking too little. There is something very characteristic in the following remark, which Demosthenes' client makes about his opponent: "In going to law with me," he says, "I hold the plaintiff to be thoroughly wicked and infatuated."

In another* somewhat interesting case, Demosthenes pleads for an unfortunate man who had been ejected from his township, and was thereby in danger of ceasing to be an Athenian citizen. At Athens citizenship was the subject of the strictest scrutiny; and the registers of the townships were kept with the utmost care. Every citizen, as has been already noted, had to be twice registered; and to insure accuracy, and to exclude questionable persons, the lists were from time to time revised. Even with all these precautions, cases of disputed citizenship not unfrequently occurred. In the case which we are about to consider, Demosthenes' client had been struck off the register of his township on the occasion of a revision. The man's father had been taken a prisoner during the latter part of the Peloponnesian War; and having lived some years "in foreign parts," he spoke Attic rather indifferently. However, on his return to Athens, he had resumed his citizenship; and transmitted it, without question, as it is alleged, to his son. He was very poor, and he and his wife had to

* Speech against Eubulides.

eke out a livelihood by the humblest of occupations. His son, it seems, had made enemies in his parish, and among them one Eubulides, against whom he had given evidence in a court of justice. Eubulides, when he became mayor of the township, had the registers revised, and contrived to get the man's name struck off. He managed this by a sort of trick. The revision of the register took place at Athens, from which the township was about five miles distant. A good deal of time was wasted in making speeches and drawing up resolutions; and the case of Demosthenes' client was taken last of all. It was now dark, and all but about thirty members of the township had gone home—and these, it is said, were in the interest of Eubulides. When the poor man's name was called, Eubulides started to his feet, assailed him with a volley of abuse, and insisted on a vote of expulsion. It was useless to ask for an adjournment; the business was hurried through, and sixty ballot-balls were found in the box against him, though it seems that only thirty townsmen were present. The result was utter ruin to the man. Loss of citizenship meant social death, and probably slavery. He makes through his counsel a piteous appeal to the jury, and says that if their verdict is adverse he shall commit suicide, that he may at least have the satisfaction of being buried by his relatives in his native country. "I have been shamefully treated by this Eubulides"—so he begins; "and I pray you, considering the great importance of the present trial, and the disgrace and ruin which attend conviction, to hear me, as you have my opponent in silence." Further on in his speech he touches on his poverty, and the humble way in which his family maintain themselves.

"We confess that we sell ribbons, and live not in the way we could wish. We are so low down in the world that our opponent may go out of his way to abuse us. It seems to me that our trafficking in the market-place is the strongest proof of the falsity of this man's charges. My mother, he says, sold ribbons in the market-place. Well, if she was an alien, they should have inspected the market tolls, and shown whether she paid the alien's toll, and to what country she belonged. If she was a slave, the person who bought her or the person who sold her, should have been called to give evidence. Then he has said she was a nurse. We do not deny she was, in those evil days* when all our people were badly off. But you will find many women who are citizens taking children to nurse. Of course, if we had been rich, we should not have sold ribbons, or have been at all in distress. But what has that to do with my descent? Pray do not scorn the poor (their poverty is a sufficient misfortune for them), much less those who try to get an honest livelihood. Poverty compels free men to do many mean and servile acts, for which they deserve to be pitied rather than to be ruined. They tell me that many women, citizens by birth, have become both nurses and wool-dressers and vintagers, owing to the misfortunes of our country at that period. I have confidence in my case, and I come as an appellant to your tribunal for protection. I know that the courts of law are more powerful not only than my fellow-townsmen, but even than the Council of the popular Assembly; and justly so—for your verdicts are in every respect most righteous."

* The last years of the Peloponnesian War.

He concludes his address to the jury with the threat of suicide already mentioned.

One more of these cases must suffice. It is an amusing one—an action, as we should say, for assault and battery. There were, it seems, occasional outbursts of rowdyism even at refined Athens, and the police were not always "on the spot" to repress them. Some of the "fast" young men about town formed themselves into clubs—like the "Mohock Club" of the last century, whose lawless proceedings are the subject of one of the numbers of the 'Spectator.'* "An outrageous ambition (as the 'Spectator' says) of doing all possible hurt to their fellow-creatures was the great cement of their assemblies, and the only qualification required in the members." There was a club at Athens which called itself the Triballi, the name of one of the wildest and most savage tribes of Thrace. The members of this delightful fraternity used to commit all manner of horrid and indecent outrages on inoffensive citizens as they were taking the evening air or returning home from parties. One Conon and his sons specially distinguished themselves. Their victim on one occasion retained Demosthenes for his counsel. They had all been on foreign military service together, and it was then that the practical jokes and annoyances were begun of which Demosthenes' client complains. Conon and his set would drink all day after lunch; and so by dinner-time they were only fit for drunken frolics. "At first," the plaintiff says; "they played tricks on his servants; at last on himself and his party. They would pretend that our servants annoyed them with smoke in cooking, and were

* No. 324.

saucy; then they beat them, and played all sorts of dirty, brutal jokes on them. We expressed our disgust; and when they insulted us, we all went in a body to the general, who gave them a severe reprimand." In this manner a very sore feeling grew up; and when they all returned to Athens, the assault took place which was the ground for the action.

"When I had got back to Athens," the plaintiff says, "I was taking a walk one evening in the market-place with a friend of my own age, when Ctesias, Conon's son, passed us very much intoxicated. Seeing us, he made an exclamation like a drunken man muttering something indistinctly to himself, and went on his way. There was a drinking-party near, at the house of Pamphilus, the fuller. Conon and many others were there. Ctesias got them to leave the party and go with him to the market-place. We were near Leocorium" (a small temple) "when we encountered them. As we came up, one of them rushed on my friend and held him. Conon and another tripped up my heels, and threw me into the mud, and jumped on me, and kicked me with such violence that my lip was cut through and my eye closed up. In this plight they left me, unable to rise or speak. As I lay I heard them use dreadful language, some of which I should be sorry to repeat to you. One thing you shall hear. It proves Conon's malice, and that he was the ringleader in the affair. He crowed, mimicking fighting-cocks when they have won a battle; and his companions bade him clap his elbow against his sides, like wings. I was afterwards found by some persons who came that way, and carried home without my cloak, which these men had carried off. When they got to the door, my mother and the maid-servants began crying

and bewailing. I was carried with some difficulty to a bath; they washed me all over, and then showed me to the doctor."

It seems to have struck Demosthenes that possibly some of the jury would be inclined to laugh at this somewhat ludicrously pathetic picture.

"Will you laugh," he makes his client say, "and let Conon off, because he says we are a band of merry fellows who, in our adventures and amours, strike and break the neck of any one we please? I trust not. None of you would have laughed if you had been present when I was dragged and stripped and kicked, and carried to the home which I had left strong and well; and my mother rushed out, and the women cried and wailed as if a man had died in the house, so that some of the neighbors sent to ask what was the matter."

Conon and his associates may well have been a terror to peaceable citizens, if we may trust the following little sketch of their proceedings:

"Many of you know the set. There's the grey-headed man, who all day long has a solemn frown on his brows, and wears a coarse mantle and single-soled shoes. But when they get together, they stick at no wickedness or disgraceful conduct. These are their fine and spirited sayings: 'Shan't we bear witness for one another?' 'Dosen't it become friends and comrades?' 'What will he bring against you that you're afraid of?' 'Some men say they saw him beaten?' We'll say, 'You never touched him.' 'Stripped of his coat?' We'll say, 'They began.' 'His lip was sewed up?' We'll say, 'Your head was broken.' Remember," solemnly adds the plaintiff, "I produce medical evidence; they do not—for they can get

no evidence against me but what is furnished by themselves."

It is to be hoped that the jury did not laugh, but were persuaded by Demosthenes to make an example of such offenders. Blackguardism could hardly go further than to rob a man of his cloak, in addition to beating and kicking him. The Athenian rowdy, if Conon and his set were fair and average types of the class, certainly deserved little mercy.

CONCLUSION.

DEMOSTHENES is one of those men concerning whom, both as a statesman and an orator, there cannot be much difference of opinion. As a statesman, he is unanimously eulogized by modern historians of the first rank—such as Thirwall, Grote, and Curtius. Every one who sees anything to esteem and admire in old Greek life, must esteem and admire Demosthenes. His political career was a consistent one. He clung to and worked for one idea. That idea was a free and independent Greece, of which his own Athens had, morally and intellectually, the right to be head. It was not, as we have seen, the view of Isocrates; nor was it afterwards that of the historian Polybius. Both these men refused to believe that Greece could any longer be what she had been. Both were honest and conscientious thinkers; but we can never have quite the same feeling towards the man who is inclined to despair of a great cause as we have towards him who will persist in hoping against hope. It was this which Demosthenes did through life amid many discouragements; and this gives him a moral greatness which we believe posterity will always recognize. Such a man would be sure in his public speeches to appeal to conscience, to the moral sense, and to a lofty patriotism.

The appeals may have often fallen dead; but he could not help believing that there was still a spirit in his countrymen which, if rightly invoked, might yet be roused, and stir them to the deeds of their forefathers. This was the faith of Demosthenes. This it was which made him dislike and distrust even the noble speculations and philosophy of Plato. These, he felt—as many an Englisman might have felt—would tend to carry Athenians away from the practical sphere of politics into a shadowy realm of ideas. Athens, he thought, ought still to assert her greatness and dignity, and he had something in regard to her of the feeling which Virgil has expressed in the well-known line:

"Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento."*

As an orator he has, almost without question, been unrivaled. Lord Brougham, in his dissertation on the oratory of the ancients confidently pronounces this opinion, and we are not aware that there is or has been any dissent from it. His eloquence was the joint product of natural genius and elaborate study. Quintilian says, on the whole truly, that Cicero owed more to study, and Demosthenes to nature. Still, as we have seen, Demosthenes did his best to perfect his great natural gifts by the most assiduous application. His industry was prodigious. He left behind him a collection of *exordia*, or introductions to speeches, which it seems that Cicero had by him. He was continually revising his words and phrases. All his speeches, as far as we know, were the result of careful preparation. His speaking exhibited great varieties. His opponent is often scathed with an eloquence not unlike that of the

* "Thine, Roman, be the claim to rule the world."

late Lord Derby, when his words were inspired by a strong moral indignation. Some of his speeches remind us of the subtle and ingenious reasoning of Mr. Gladstone. Such is the speech we have noticed, in which he argues for the repeal of the law of Leptines. In others, again—the Olynthiac orations especially, and that for the Crown against Æschines—we have passages which recall to our memories the impassioned fervor of some of the most eloquent speeches of Mr. Bright. There is the same impressive appeal to the human conscience, and to the worth and grandeur of freedom. At the same time, he was a most dexterous master of his art. James Mill used to point out to his famous son "how, first, Demosthenes said everything important to his purpose at the exact moment when he had brought the minds of his hearers into the state most fitted to receive it; second, how he insinuated, gradually and indirectly, ideas which would have roused opposition if directly presented." Generally, he was a thoroughly successful speaker, winning many a triumph in the Assembly and the law court, and finally discomfiting his able rival. And it must indeed have been an inspiriting recollection to him when he looked back to Chæroneia, where, thanks to his eloquence, Athenians and Thebans fought side by side in the cause of Greece.

END OF DEMOSTHENES.

ARISTOTLE

BY

SIR ALEXANDER GRANT, BART., LL.D.

PRINCIPAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

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ARISTOTLE.

CHAPTER I.

THE LIFE OF ARISTOTLE.

THE dates of the chief events in the life of Aristotle, extracted from the "Chronology" of Apollodorus (140 B.C.), have been handed down to us by Diogenes Laertius in his "Lives of the Philosophers;" and from various other sources it is possible to fill in the outline thus afforded, if not with certain facts, at all events with reasonable probabilities. Aristotle's own writings are almost entirely devoid of personal references, yet in them we can trace, to some extent, the progress and development of his mind. On the whole, we know quite as much about him, personally, as about most of the ancient Greek writers.

Aristotle was born in the year 384 B C., at Stageira, a Grecian colony and seaport town on the Strymonic Gulf in Thrace, not far from Mount Athos—and, what is more important, not far from the frontier of Macedonia, and from Pella, the residence of the Macedonian King Amyntas. To Stageira, his birthplace, he owed the world-famous appellation of "the Stagirite," given to him by scholiasts and schoolmen in later days. It was fancied by Wilhelm von Humboldt that Aristotle exhibits certain un-Greek characteristics in his neglect of form

and grace in writing, and that this is attributable to his having been born and brought up in Thrace. But, on the other hand, Aristotle's family were purely Hellenic, and probably the colonists of Stageira lived in strict conformity with Greek ideas, and not without contempt for the surrounding "barbarians." Even the court of Macedonia, in the neighborhood, were phil-Hellenic in their tastes, and entertained Greek artists and men of letters. And Aristotle shows no trace in his writings of ever having known any language beside Greek. Probably the mere locality of his birth produced but little influence upon him, except so far as it led to his subsequent connection with the court of Macedon. His father, Nicomachus, was physician to King Amyntas, and it is possible that the youthful Aristotle was taken at times to the court, and thus made the acquaintance of his future patron, Philip of Macedon, who was about his own age. But all through the time of Aristotle's boyhood affairs in Macedonia were troubled and unprosperous. Amyntas was an unsuccessful ruler, and brought his country to the verge of extinction in a war with the Illyrians. Aristotle, as a youth, cannot have had any inducement to take an interest in Macedonian politics. Up to the time when he left his native city there had appeared no indication of that which afterwards occurred—that Macedonia would conquer the East, and become the mistress of the entire liberties of Greece

But there is one significant tradition about Aristotle which suggests circumstances likely to have produced in early life a considerable influence upon his habits and pursuits. His father is said to have been an "Asclepiad"—that is, he belonged to that distinguished caste who claimed to be the descendants of Esculapius.

Now we have it, on the authority of Galen,* that "it was the custom in Asclepiad families for the boys to be trained by their father in the practice of dissection, just as regularly as boys in other families learn to read and write." If Aristotle had really been trained from boyhood in the manner thus described, we can understand how great an impulse he would have received to those physiological researches which formed so important a part of his subsequent achievements. But in one place of his writings ("On the Parts of Animals," I. v. 7), he speaks of the "extreme repugnance" with which one necessarily sees "veins, and flesh, and other such-like parts," in the human subject. This does not show the hardihood of a practiced dissector. But Aristotle's youthful dissections, if made at all, were doubtless made on the lower animals. At all events, we may perhaps safely conclude about him, that he received from his father an hereditary tendency towards physiological study. But in addition to this tendency, Aristotle must doubtless have early manifested an interest in, and capacity for, abstract philosophy.

We now come to the second epoch in his life. About the year 367 B.C., when he was seventeen years old, his father having recently died, he was sent by his guardian, Proxenus of Atarneus, to complete his studies, at Athens, "the metropolis of wisdom."† There he continued to reside for twenty years, during the greater part of which time he attended the school of philosophy which Plato had founded in the olive-groves of Academus, on the banks of the Cephisus. He had probably inherited from his father means sufficient for

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* Quoted by Grote, "Aristotle," i. 4.

† Plato, "Protagoras," p. 337. Professor Jowett's translation.

his support, so that he could live without care for the acquirement of anything save knowledge. But in the acquisition of this he manifested a zeal unsurpassed in the annals of study. Among his fellow pupils in the Academe he is said to have got the *sobriquet* of "the Reader;" while Plato himself called him "the Mind of the School," in recognition of his quick and powerful intelligence. In order to win time even from sleep Aristotle is said to have invented a plan of sleeping with a ball in his hand, so held over a brazen dish that whenever his grasp relaxed the ball would descend with a clang, and arouse him to the resumption of his labors.

Plato's philosophy was absolutely pre-eminent in Greece at this time. It embodied within itself all that was best in the doctrine and the spirit of Socrates, and beyond it there was nothing, except the mystical theories of the Pythagoreans (the best elements in which Plato had assimilated), and the materialistic theories of the Atomists, which Plato, and afterwards Aristotle, controverted. The writings of Aristotle are quite consistent with the tradition that he was for twenty years a pupil of the Academic school. They show a long list of thoughts and expressions borrowed from the works of Plato, and also not unfrequently refer to the oral teaching of Plato. They contain a logical, ethical, political, and metaphysical philosophy, which is evidently, with some modifications, the organization and development of rich materials often rather suggested than worked out in the Platonic dialogues. Aristotle thus, in constructing a system of knowledge which was destined immensely to influence the thoughts of mankind, became, in the first place, the disciple of Plato and the intellectual heir of Socrates; and summed up

all the best that had been arrived at by the previous philosophers of Greece.

The personal relationships which arose between Aristotle and his master Plato have furnished matter for uncertain traditions and for much discussion. There seems, however, to be no ground for sustaining the charge of "ingratitude" against Aristotle. The truth was probably somewhat as follows: Aristotle, while engaged in imbibing deeply the philosophical thoughts of Plato, gradually developed also his own individuality and independence of mind. And the natural bias of his intellect was certainly in a different direction from that of Plato. It has been said that "every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian;" and it would be very fortunate if that were literally true, for then every man would be born with a noble type of intellect. But it is no doubt correct to say that the Platonic and the Aristotelian type of intellect are distinct and divergent. They have in common the keen and unwearied pressure after truth, but they seek the truth under different aspects. Plato was ever aspiring to intuitions of a truth which in this world could never be wholly revealed,—a truth of which glimpses only could be obtained, partly by the most abstract powers of thought, partly by the imagination. While richly endowed with humor and the dramatic faculty, and the most trenchant insight into the fallacies of mankind, Plato was not content with aiming at those demonstrations which could be stated once for all, but he rather sought analogies and hints of a truth which can never be definitely expressed. Eternity, the life of the gods, the supra-sensible world of "pure ideas," were of more reality and importance to him than the affairs of this life. While he was the greatest and most original of meta-

physical philosophers, he never ceased to be a poet, and, to some extent, a mystic.

The intellectual characteristics of Aristotle, as known to us from his works, present a great contrast to all this. He was too much in earnest, and at the same time too matter-of-fact, to allow poetry and the imagination any share in the quest for truth. He had no taste for half-lights; and with regard to such great questions as the immortality of the soul, the nature of God, the operation of Providence, and the like, it is evident that so far from preferring these, he rather kept aloof from them, and only gave cautious and grudging utterances upon them. His passion was for definite knowledge, especially knowledge so methodized that it could be stated in the form of a general principle, or law. He thought that to obtain a general principle in which knowledge was summed up, on any subject, was of the utmost importance;* that such a principle was a possession for all future time, that future generations would apply to it and work it out in detail, and thus that it would form the nucleus of a science. And this was the daring aim of Aristotle—no less than the foundation of all the sciences. We shall have occasion to point out subsequently the imperfections of Aristotle's method in physical science when compared with that of modern times. But for all that, his spirit was essentially scientific, and for the sake of science and the naked truth he discarded all beauty and grace of style. Plato on the other hand was an artist, and clothed all his thoughts in beauty; and if there be (as there surely is) † a truth which is above the truth of scientific knowl-

* See Soph. "Elench." xxxii. 13; "Eth." I. vii. 17-21.

† See Lotze's "Microcosmus," Einleitung.

edge, that was the truth after which Plato aspired. Aristotle's aspirations were for methodized experience and the definite.

It is easy to understand, or imagine, how two great minds with such divergent tendencies would be unable to continue forever to stand to each other in the relation of pupil to teacher. For a time, no doubt, the divergence would not be discovered. Aristotle at first would appear only as "the mind" of Plato's school. And his first attempts at philosophical writing appear to have been made in the form of dialogues in somewhat feeble imitation of the masterpieces of Plato. We shall speak hereafter of this early and lighter class of Aristotle's writings. He may have adhered for several years to this mode of composition. But all the while his powers, his knowledge, and his methods of thought were maturing, and he was working his way to the conception of a quite different mode of setting forth philosophy. Gradually, as he grasped, or thought he had grasped, all that Plato had to impart, his mind would tend to dwell more on those aspects of Plato's thought with which he did not sympathize. He would especially feel a sort of impatience at the license allowed to the imagination to intrude itself into the treatment of philosophic questions,—at the substitution of gorgeous myths and symbolical figures for plain exact answers of the understanding. This feeling of impatience broke out in a polemic against that doctrine of the eternal "Ideas" or Forms of Things, which appears somewhat variously set forth in Plato's dialogues, especially in "Timæus," "Phædrus," and "Republic," and which doubtless formed a prominent topic in Plato's discourses to his school. We are told

by Proclus* that Aristotle "proclaimed loudly in his dialogues that he was unable to sympathize with the doctrine of Ideas, even though his opposition to it should be attributed to a factious spirit." The import of that doctrine was to disparage the world of sensible objects. It represented that when we, by means of our senses, apprehend, or think that we apprehend, particular objects, we are like men sitting in a dimly-lighted subterraneous cavern, and staring at shadows on the wall; that the world of sense is a world of shadows, but that a true world exists,—a world of Ideas; that nothing is really good or beautiful in the world of sense, but what we call good or beautiful things are those which have a faint semblance to the Idea of the good or the beautiful, and thus bring back to our souls the remembrance of those Ideas, which we once saw in our ante-natal condition; that the Ideas or Forms are archetypes, in accordance with which the Creator framed this world; that they are not only the cause of qualities and attributes in things, such as goodness, justice, equality, and the like, but also they are heads of classes or universals, and that they alone have complete reality, while the individuals, constituting the classes at the head of which they stand, only "participate" to a certain extent in real existence. Such were some of the features of Plato's celebrated doctrine of Ideas. That he did not himself hold very strongly or dogmatically to its details may be judged from the fact that in two of his dialogues ("Parmenides" and "Sophist") he himself points out, and does not remove, many difficulties which attach to them. But the main gist of the doctrine was to assert what is called Realism; and this, under one form

* Quoted by Philoponus, ii. 2.

or another, Plato always maintained. When Aristotle attacked the doctrine of Ideas, there was the first beginning of that controversy between the Realists and the Nominalists, which so much excited the minds of men in the middle ages. Realism, making reason independent of the senses, asserts that the universal is more real than the particular,—that, for instance, the universal idea of "man" in general is more real, and can be grasped by the mind with greater certainty, than the conception of any individual man. Nominalism, on the contrary, asserts the superior reality of individual objects, and turns the universal into a mere name. Now it was quite natural for Aristotle, with his tendency towards physical science and experiment, and the amassing of particular facts, to take the Nominalist view, so far as to assert the reality of individual objects. But there is reason for doubting that he ever became a thorough and consistent Nominalist. For the present it is sufficient to note that at the outset of his philosophical career he appears to have made an onslaught, in several dialogues which he wrote for the purpose, on Plato's doctrine of Ideas. In three passages of his extant works ("Eth." I. vi.; "Met." I. vi., XII. iv.), he gives summaries of his arguments on the subject. He couches those arguments in courteous language, and in one place introduces them with words which have been Latinized into the well-known phrase—*Amicus Plato, sed magis amica Veritas.* Yet the arguments themselves appear somewhat captious. And there may have been a youthful vehemence in the mode in which he first urged them. Here probably first appeared "the little rift within the lute;" this was the beginning of that divergence of mind and attitude which, growing wider, rendered it ultimately impossible that Aristotle should

be chosen to succeed Plato as inheritor of his method and head of the Academic school.

In another set of circumstances tradition affords us indications of the independence and self-confidence of Aristotle having been manifested during the lifetime of Plato. In his extant writings Plato speaks so disparagingly of the art of Rhetoric, that we can hardly fancy his giving any encouragement to the study of it among his disciples. But none the less Aristotle appears to have diligently labored in this, as in every other intellectual province that he found open. Plato would not separate Rhetoric from the rhetorical spirit; he regarded the whole thing as a procedure for tickling the ears, for flattering crowds, for subordinating truth to effect. Aristotle, in the analytical way which became one of his chief characteristics, separated the method of Rhetoric from the uses to which it might be applied. He saw that success in Rhetoric depended on general principles and laws of the human mind, and that it would be worth while to draw these out and frame them into a science, especially as many of his countrymen had already essayed to do the same, though imperfectly. He maintained that the study of the methods of Rhetoric was desirable and even necessary to a free citizen, for self-defense, for the exposure of sophistry, and in the interests of truth itself. Now, the greatest school of Rhetoric in all Greece was at this period held in Athens by the renowned Isocrates, who, when Aristotle arrived at Athens, was at the zenith of his reputation. He was now nearly seventy years old, but continued to teach and to compose with almost unabated vigor for twenty-eight years more. Isocrates had been the follower of Socrates, and several leading Sophists of the latter part of the fifth century B.C.—Protagoras, Prodicus, Gor-

gias, and Theramenes—are named as having been his teachers.* He was a dignified old man, full of the most elevated sentiments. The style of his oratory had been formed after the florid Sicilian school of Gorgias, but was more severe and artistic than the earlier models of that school. He professed to inculcate what he called "philosophy," but which was really a kind of thought standing half-way between pure speculative search for truth, like that of Plato, and the merely worldly and practical aims of the Sophists. It was a manly wisdom dealing with politics and morality, analogous to the reflections on such subjects in which Cicero afterwards indulged. The rhetorical school of Isocrates drew pupils from all parts of Greece, from Sicily, and even from Pontus. In it, says Cicero, "the eloquence of all Greece was trained and perfected." The pupils remained in it sometimes three or four years; they paid a fee of 1000 drachmæ each (=1000 francs, or £40); and thus in his long life the master became one of the most opulent citizens of Athens. "Isocrates," says Dionysus, "had the educating of the best of the youth of Greece," and so many of his scholars became afterwards distinguished in various ways—as orators, statesmen, generals, historians, or philosophers—that a list of them was drawn up by Hermippus. Among the number was Speusippus, nephew to Plato, and afterwards his successor in the headship of the Academy. And yet it may readily be believed that there was small sympathy between the Academy and the school of Isocrates, the aims of the two being so very different. Plato and his followers looked down with more or less contempt

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* See Professor Jebb's "Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isæos," ii. 5.

on the half-philosophizing of Isocrates. And at last the youthful Aristotle came forward as a champion, challenging and attacking the highly-reputed veteran. Aristotle is said to have parodied on this occasion a line of Euripides—

> "What! must I
> In silence leave barbarians to speak?
> Never!"

and to have taken for his motto the words

> "What! must I
> In silence leave Isocrates to speak?"

The acrimony of the allusion suggests to us the spirit in which he opened the controversy. He seems to have assailed the matter of the discourses of Isocrates, as being of a superficial and merely oratorical character, and also his theory of the art of rhetoric, and his mode of teaching it. The strictures of Aristotle were answered by Cephisodorus, one of the pupils of Isocrates, who wrote a defense of his master in four books. Both attack and reply have completely perished. Aristotle appears to have followed up his theoretical denunciation of Isocrates by the practical step of opening a school of Rhetoric in rivalry to his. What the success of this enterprise may have been is not recorded. There is no reason for supposing that the young Stagirite at all succeeded in impressing the Athenians at that time with his superior insight into the laws of Rhetoric. The real value and scientific pre-eminence of his views came out in the immortal treatise on Rhetoric, which many years later he composed. But it is remarkable that that treatise, while full of references to Isocrates, bears no traces of any ill feeling towards him. In fact, it would seem that time must have worked a certain change in the character of Aristotle, for almost the only

glimpses which we have of him during his earlier residence at Athens show him somewhat petulantly attacking both Plato and Isocrates; whereas his works which we possess, and which were written later, are calmly impersonal and devoid of all petulance of spirit.

Plato died in the year 347 B.C., and we find that in that year Aristotle, together with his fellow-disciple Xenocrates, left Athens, and went to reside at Atarneus, a town of Asia Minor. This migration was doubtless caused by the choice of Speusippus, Plato's nephew, to be Leader of the Academy. However natural it may have been that Aristotle should be held disqualified by incompatibility of opinions for becoming the representative of Plato, still it may have been unpleasant to him to see another preferred to himself, and especially one so inferior to himself in intellect as Speusippus. And Xenocrates may have felt something of the same kind on his own account. Accordingly the two left Athens together. Aristotle had more than one reason for selecting Atarneus as his new place of abode. It was the home of Proxenus, his guardian, of whom mention has already been made; and it was ruled over by Hermeias, an enlightened prince, with whom both Aristotle and Xenocrates had had the opportunity of forming a philosophic friendship. The history of Hermeias was remarkable: he had been the slave of Eubulus, the former despot of Atarneus. As happens not uncommonly in the East, he had sprung from being slave to be vizier, and thence to be ruler himself. He governed beneficently; and, his mind not being devoid of philosophical impulses, he had come to Athens and attended the lectures of Plato. He now hospitably received the two emigrants from Plato's school, and entertained them at his court for three years, during

which time he bestowed the hand of Pythias, his niece, upon Aristotle in marriage. This may be conceived to have been a happy period of Aristotle's life, but it was cut short by the death of his benefactor, who was treacherously kidnapped by a Greek officer in the service of the Persians, and put to death. Aristotle afterwards recorded his admiration for Hermeias, in a hymn or pæan which he wrote in his honor, and in which he likened him to Hercules and the Dioscuri, and other heroes of noble endurance. He also perhaps alludes to him in a well-known passage* in which he says that "a good man does not become a friend to one who is in a superior station to himself, unless that superiority of station be justified by superiority of merit." If Aristotle had Hermeias, his own former friend, in his mind when he wrote this passage, he must have generously attributed to him moral qualities superior to his own.

On flying from Atarneus, as they were now obliged to do, Xenocrates returned to Athens, and Aristotle took up his abode with his wife at Mitylene, where he lived two or three years, until he was invited by Philip of Macedon to become the tutor of Alexander, then a boy of the age of thirteen. That Aristotle, the prince of philosophers and supreme master of the sphere of knowledge, should be called upon to train the mind of Alexander, the conqueror of the world, seems a combination so romantic, that it has come to be thought that it must have been the mere invention of some sophist or rhetorician. This, however, is an unnecessary skepticism, for antiquity is unanimous in accepting the tradition, and there are no circumstances that we

* "Ethics," VIII. vi. 6.

know of which are inconsistent with it. Aristotle's family connection with the royal family of Macedon made it natural that now, when he had acquired a certain reputation in Greece, he should be offered this charge. Unfortunately no information has been handed down to us as to the way in which he performed its duties. History is silent on the subject, and we cannot even gather from any of Aristotle's own writings his views as to the education of a prince; the treatise on education, which was to have formed part of his "Politics," has reached us as an incomplete or mutilated fragment. Nothing that is recorded of Alexander tends to throw any light on his early training, except, perhaps, his interest in Homer and in the Attic tragedians, and his power of addressing audiences in Greek, which was, of course, to a Macedonian an acquired language. It is reasonable to suppose that Aristotle instructed him in rhetoric, and imbued him with Greek literature, and took him through a course of mathematics. Whether he attempted anything beyond this "secondary instruction" we know not. But it would be vain to look for traces of a personal and intellectual influence having been produced by the teacher on the mind of his pupil. Alexander's was a genius of that first-rate order that grows independently of, or soon outgrows, all education. His mind was not framed to be greatly interested in science or philosophy; he was, as the First Napoleon said of himself, *tout à fait un être politique;* and even during part of the period of Aristotle's tutelage, he was associated with his father in the business of the State. On the whole, we might almost imagine that Aristotle's functions at the court of Macedonia were light, and that he was allowed considerable leisure for the quiet prosecution of his own

great undertakings. He seems, however, to have enjoyed the full confidence and favor of his patrons,* and to have retained his appointment altogether about five years, until Philip was assassinated in the year 336 B.C., and Alexander became King of Macedonia.

For a year after the death of Philip, Aristotle still remained, residing either at Pella or at Stageira; but of course no longer as preceptor to Alexander, whose mind was now totally absorbed by imperial business and plans for the subjugation of all the peoples of the East,—while his own mind was meditating plans different in kind, but no less vast, for the subjugation of all the various realms of knowledge. In 335 B.C. the preparations for Alexander's oriental campaigns were commenced in earnest, and Aristotle then again betook himself, after a twelve years' absence, to Athens, whither he returned with all the prestige which could be derived from the most marked indications of the favor of Alexander, who ordered a statue of him to be set up at Athens, and who is said also to have furnished him with ample funds for the prosecution of physical and zoological investigations. Athenæus computes the total sum given to Aristotle in that way at 800 talents (nearly £200,000); and, if this had been the actual fact, it would have been, perhaps, the greatest instance on record of the "endowment of research." But we can only treat the statement as

* Aristotle at this time obtained the permission of Philip to rebuild and resettle his native city, Stageira, which had been sacked and ruined in the Olynthian war (349-347 B.C.). He collected the citizens, who had been scattered abroad, invited new comers, and made laws for the community. In memory of these services an annual festival was afterwards held in his honor at Stageira.

at best mere hearsay. We know how amounts of this kind are invariably exaggerated; and, indeed, the whole story may have arisen from the imagination of later Greek writers dwelling on the relationship between the philosopher and the king. The same may be said of Pliny's assertion, that "thousands of men" in Alexander's army were put at the orders of Aristotle for the purposes of scientific inquiry and collection. Had this been true, Aristotle, though far from being able to make the use which now would be made of such an opportunity, would have been in a position which many a biologist of the present day might envy. Even discounting all such statements as uncertain and questionable, we must still admit that Aristotle, in his fiftieth year, was enabled, under the most favorable auspices, to commence building up the great fabric of philosophy and science for which he had been, all his life long, making the plans and gathering the materials.

Aristotle, on his return, found Speusippus dead, and Xenocrates installed as leader of the Platonic school of Philosophy, which was held, as we have said, in the groves of Academe, on the west of the city of Athens. He immediately opened a rival school on the eastern side, in the grounds attached to the Temple of the Lyceian Apollo. From his using the covered walks (*peripatoi*) in these grounds for lecturing to, and intercourse with, his pupils, the name of "Peripatetics" came to be given to his scholars, and to the Aristotelian sect in general. His object being research, and the bringing into methodized form the results of investigations,—it may be asked why he should have opened a school? Partly, this was necessitated by a regard for his own reputation and fame,—it was a method of publication suitable before the days of printing. And

also in many ways it could be made to further his views. Teaching a philosophical school was a very different thing from teaching the rudiments. It was more like the work of a German professor, who often does not condescend to impart anything to his class except his own latest discoveries. The very practice of imparting to an auditory reasoned-out conclusions is a stimulus to their production, and at the same time a test of their correctness. Thus, Aristotle, in his writings, frequently uses the term "teaching" merely to indicate "demonstration;" and as there is reason to believe that all his great works were written at this time, we may conceive, with great likelihood, that all the "demonstrations" they contain had at one time the form of "teachings"—that is to say, that they went through the process of being read to his school. But there was another special way in which Aristotle was able not only to benefit his scholars, but also to make use of them as subordinate laborers in his work. We must remember what he was aiming at: it was to produce what we should call an encyclopedia of all the sciences. Such a book, nowadays, is done by many different hands, and the different articles in it do not aim at being original, but at compiling the latest results of the best authorities in each department. But Aristotle sought to construct an encyclopedia with his own hand, in which each science should appear brand-new, originally created or quite reconstructed by himself. He began from the very beginning, and framed his own philosophical or scientific nomenclature; he traced out the laws on which human reasoning proceeds, and was the first to reduce these to science, and to produce a Logic. He wrote anew "Metaphysics," "Ethics," "Politics," "Rhetoric," and "The Art of Po-

etry," and while these were still on the stocks, he was engaged in founding, on the largest scale, the physical and natural sciences, especially natural philosophy, physiology under various aspects (such as histology and anatomy, embryology, psychology, the philosophy of the senses, etc.), and, above all, natural history. Much of this work, especially its more abstract part, was the slowly-ripened fruit of his entire previous life. But though he had great stores ready that only required to be arranged and put forth, he never ceased pushing out inquiries in all directions, and collecting fresh materials. He had quite the Baconian zeal for *experientia tabulata*, for lists and memoranda of all kinds of facts, historical, political, psychological, or naturalistic. He loved to note problems to be solved and difficulties to be answered. Thus a boundless field of subordinate labor was opened, in which his pupils might be employed. The absence of any effort after artistic beauty in his writings made it easier to incorporate here and there the contributions of his apprentices. And his works, as we have them, exhibit some traces of co-operative work. The Peripatetic school, after his death, followed the direction which Aristotle had given them, and were noted for their monographs on small particular points.

Aristotle was not a citizen of Athens, but only a "metic," or foreign resident, so he took no part in public affairs. His whole time during the thirteen years of his second residence in the city—a period coeval with the astonishing career of Alexander in the East—must have been devoted to labors within his school, especially in connection with the composition of his works. From the enthusiastic passages in which he speaks of the joys of the philosopher, we may conceive how highly the privileges of this period—so calm and yet so

intensely active—were appreciated by him. But few traditions bearing upon this part of his life have been handed down. These chiefly point to his relations with Alexander, with whom, as well as with Antipater, who was acting as viceroy in Macedonia, he is represented as having maintained a friendly correspondence. Cassander, the son of Antipater, appears to have attended his school. As time went on, the character of Alexander became corrupted * by unchecked success, Asiatic influences, and the all but universal servility which he encountered. His mind became alienated from those Greek citizens around him who showed any independence of spirit. He quarreled with Antipater, who was faithfully acting for him at home. On a frivolous charge he cruelly put to death Callisthenes, a young orator whom, on the recommendation of Aristotle, he had taken in his retinue. On this and other occasions he is said to have broken out into bitter expressions against "the sophistries" of Aristotle—that is to say, his free and reasonable political principles. The East, conquered physically by Alexander, had conquered and changed the mind of its conqueror. And he had now fallen quite out of sympathy with his ancient preceptor and friend. But the Athenians seem to have been unconscious of any such change. Aristotle had come to Athens as the avowed favorite and *protégé* of Alexander, and that, too, at a moment when Alexander (335 B.C.), by sacking the city of Thebes, and by compelling Athens with the threat of a similar fate to exile some of her anti-Macedonian statesmen, had made himself the object of sullen dread and covert dislike to the majority of the Athenian citizens. Some

* See Grote's "History of Greece," xii. 291, 301, 341.

portion of this feeling was doubtless reflected upon Aristotle, but during the life of Alexander any manifestation of it was checked, the affairs of Athens being administered for the time by the "Macedonian" party. Of this party Aristotle was naturally regarded as a pronounced adherent, and he came even to be identified with those arbitrary and tyrannical acts of Alexander which must in reality have been most repugnant to him. This was especially the case in 324 B.C., when Alexander thought fit to insult the Hellenic cities, by sending a proclamation to be read by a herald at the Olympic Games, ordering them to recall all citizens who were under sentence of banishment, and threatening with instant invasion any city which should hesitate to obey this command. The officer charged with bearing this offensive proclamation, so galling to the self-respect of the Grecian communities, turned out to be none other than Nicanor of Stageira, son of Proxenus the guardian of Aristotle, and now the ward and destined son-in-law of Aristotle himself. This unfortunate circumstance could not fail to draw upon the philosopher, without any fault of his own, the animosity of the Athenian people. In the summer of the next year (323 B.C.), the eyes of all Greece were still anxiously fixed upon the movements of Alexander, when of a sudden the startling news thrilled through every city that the life of the great conqueror had been cut short by a violent fever at Babylon. The news caused a sensation throughout the states of Greece analogous to what would have been felt throughout Europe had Napoleon been suddenly cut off, say in the year 1810.

By the death of Alexander the position of Aristotle at Athens was profoundly affected. The anti-Macedonian party at once, for the moment, regained power;

the statesmen who had hitherto protected him were forced to fly from the city, and the spirit of reaction included him also in its attacks. It now became clear that Aristotle had a host of enemies in Athens. There were three classes of persons from whom especially these hostile ranks would naturally be recruited: 1st, The numerous friends of the orator Isocrates, with whom Aristotle in earlier life had put himself in competition; 2d, The Platonists, who resented Aristotle's divergence from their master and his polemic against certain points of the Platonic system; 3d, The anti-Macedonian party, who indiscriminately visited on Aristotle the political acts of Alexander. Feelings that had been long repressed and kept concealed, while Aristotle was strong in political support, were now licensed by the changed circumstances to come forth into act. His enemies seized on the moment to do him a mischief. An indictment, charging him with "impiety," was drawn up by Eurymedon, the chief priest of the Eleusinian Ceres, aided by a son of Ephorus, the historian, who had been one of the pupils of Isocrates. Matter for this accusation was obtained partly from Aristotle's poem written in honor of Hermeias, and which equaled him to the demi-gods, partly from the fact that Aristotle had placed a statue of Hermeias in the temple at Delphi, partly also from some passages in his published writings which were pointed to as inconsistent with the national religion. A philosopher's view must necessarily differ from the popular view of the topics of religion. Yet in his extant works Aristotle is always tender and reverent in dealing with popular beliefs; indeed, in modern times, these works have been regarded as a bulwark of ecclesiastical feeling. The whole charge, if taken on its real

merits, must be considered utterly frivolous; yet those who would have to try the case—a large jury taken from the general mass of the citizens—could not be depended on for discrimination in such a question. They would be too subject to the currents of envy, political, personal, and anti-philosophical, setting in from various quarters; they would be too readily imbued with the *odium theologicum*. Nothing but a very general popularity would have been an effectual protection at such a moment, and this it is not likely that Aristotle ever possessed in Athens. While capable of devoted and generous friendship, he may easily have been cold and reserved towards general society. He was absorbed in study, and probably lived confined within the narrow scientific circle of his own school. He may even have exhibited some of those proud characteristics which he attributes in his "Ethics" to the "great-souled" man, "who claims great things for himself because he is worthy of them," and "who cannot bear to associate with any one except a friend." However this may have been, he was probably right on the present occasion to decline submitting his life and opinions to the judgment of the populace of Athens. He availed himself of the law which gave to any accused person the option of quitting the city before the day of trial, and he retired to Chalcis in Eubœa, "in order," as he is reported to have said, "that the Athenians might not have another opportunity of sinning against philosophy, as they had already done once in the person of Socrates."

Chalcis was the original home of the ancestry of Aristotle, and he appears to have had some property there; but it was especially a safe place of refuge for him, as being occupied at this time by a Macedonian

garrison. He probably intended only to make a short sojourn there, till circumstances should be changed. He must have fully foreseen that in a short space of time the Macedonian arms would prevail, and restore at Athens the government which had hitherto protected him. He left his school and library in charge of Theophrastus, doubtless looking forward to a speedy return to them and to the resumption of those labors which had already consummated so much. And all this would have happened but that, within a year's time, in 322 B.C., he was seized with illness, and died somewhat suddenly at Chalcis, in the sixty-third year of his age. The story that he had taken poison may be dismissed as fabulous. A more trustworthy account speaks of his having suffered from impaired digestion, the natural result of his habits of application, and this may very likely have been the cause of his death.

The will of Aristotle, or what professes to be such, has been preserved amongst a heap of very questionable traditions, by Diogenes Laertius. If not genuine it is cleverly invented, and is the work of a romancer who wished to credit the Stagirite with evidences of a generous and just disposition. The property to be disposed of seems considerable, analogous perhaps to an estate of £50,000 in the present day. The chief beneficiary under the will is Nicanor (before mentioned), whom Aristotle appoints to marry Pythias—his daughter by the niece of Hermeias—so soon as she shall be of marriageable age. Aristotle's first wife had died, and he had subsequently married Herpyllis of Stageira, who became the mother of his son Nicomachus. The will places Nicomachus under the care of Nicanor, and makes liberal provision for Herpyllis, who is mentioned in terms of affection and gratitude. Several of the

slaves are thought of, and are to be presented with money and set at liberty; all the young slaves are to be freed, "if they deserve it," as soon as they are grown up. Nicanor is charged to transfer the bones of Aristotle's first wife Pythias to his own place of interment, to provide and dedicate suitable busts of various members of Aristotle's family, and to fulfill a vow formerly made by himself of four marble figures of animals to Zeus the Preserver and Athene the Preserver. This last clause throws suspicion on the genuineness of the document, for it looks like a mere imitation of the dying injunction of Socrates: "We owe a cock to Æsculapius; pay the debt and do not fail." Other points also suggest doubt: for instance, Antipater is named as chief executor, and this detail has the appearance of being the work of a forger availing himself of a well-known name; again, there is a difficulty about Pythias the daughter of Aristotle being too young for marriage at the time of her father's death—he had married her mother some twenty-three years previously, and had been subsequently married. The terms of the will would imply that Nicomachus was a mere child when his father died, which is inconsistent with other considerations. These and other points of criticism which might be urged do not absolutely prove the will te have been a forgery; they only leave us in doubt about it. And, as has been said, even if regarded as a mere fabrication, it is still a tribute of antiquity to the virtue of Aristotle.

On the other hand, this great name did not escape without incurring its full share of carping and detractation. And the gossip-mongers of the later Roman empire, including Fathers of the Church, have handed on some of the hearsay reports, smart sayings of epigram-

matists, and attacks of hostile schools of philosophy, which had been leveled against Aristotle. After all they come to very little:—that he had small eyes, and thin legs, and a lisping utterance; that he passed a wild and spendthrift youth; that he was showy and affected in his attire, and habitually luxurious in his table; that he chose to live at the Macedonian court for the sake of the flesh-pots to be obtained by so doing; and that he was ungrateful to Plato,—these make up the sum of the charges against him. Perhaps if we knew all the facts, we might find that a contradictory, or at all events a different, statement would be more correct under each of the several heads. As it is, we may fairly deal with these imputations as we should with similar aspersions on the personal history of any great man, if they could neither be proved nor disproved, and set them aside as beneath consideration. We cannot expect to know more than the outline of Aristotle's life, but all we know gives us the impression of a life that, morally speaking, was singularly honorable and blameless. And it was the life of one who by his intellectual achievements placed himself at the very head of ancient thought, and won the admiration and allegiance of many centuries. What those intellectual achievements were we have now to endeavor to set forth.

CHAPTER II.

THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE.

A CATALOGUE of the works of Aristotle has been handed down to us, which was made by the librarian of the great Library at Alexandria about the year 220

B.C.—that is to say, a century after the death of the philosopher—and which gives the titles of all the books, contained in the Library, which were attributed to the authorship of Aristotle. These titles amount to 146 in number, but it is at first sight a most astonishing circumstance that they do not in the least answer to the writings which we now possess under the name of the "works of Aristotle." All the books mentioned in the Alexandrian catalogue are now lost; only a few fragments of them have been preserved in the shape of extracts and quotations from them made by other writers; but everything tends to show that they were quite a different set, and different altogether in character, from the forty treatises which stand collectively on our bookshelves labeled "Aristotelis Opera." Under the circumstances it would be natural to conjecture that so (comparatively speaking) short a time after the death of Aristotle, the learned keepers of the Alexandrian Library must have known what he really wrote, and therefore that in losing the books mentioned in the Alexandrian catalogue we have lost the true works of Aristotle, as they existed 100 years after his death, and that what has come down to us under his name, be it what it may, cannot be the genuine article. Other facts, however, and criticism of the whole question, show that this natural supposition is incorrect, and that something like the contradictory of it is true. It is a curious story, and needs some little explanation.

The life of Aristotle after his boyhood fell, as we have seen, into three broad divisions—namely, his first residence at Athens, from his eighteenth to his thirty-eighth year; his residence away from Athens, at Atarneus, Mitylene, Pella, and Stageira, from his thirty-eighth to his fiftieth year; and his second resi

dence at Athens, from his fiftieth to his sixty-third year. During the first period, after studying under Plato, he commenced authorship by writing dialogues, which appear to have been published at the time. They differed from the Platonic dialogues in not being dramatic, but merely expository, like the dialogues of Bishop Berkeley, the principal *rôle* in each being assigned to Aristotle himself. They were somewhat rhetorical in style, and quite adapted for popular reading. In them Aristotle attacked Plato's doctrine of Ideas, and set forth views on philosophy, the chief good, the arts of government, moral virtue, and other topics. Then came the second period of his life, when he had definitely broken with the school of Plato, and was away from all the schools of Athens, enjoying much leisure and positions of dignity. In this period it is probable that he not only prosecuted his researches and independent speculations in many branches of thought and science, but that he learned to know his own mission in the world, which was to stick to the matter of knowledge, abandoning all regard for the artistic adornment of truth. During this period we may believe that he thoroughly doveloped the individual character of his own mind in relation to philosophy so that when he came back to Athens he had quite established his own peculiar style of writing, crabbed indeed and inelegant, but full of an exact phraseology which he had himself constructed, and on the whole not unsuited as a vehicle for the exposition of science. We are not able, however, to say for certain whether in his second period he actually composed any works, though he must constantly have been compiling notes and memoranda, to serve either as the materials or the ground-plans for future treatises. The third period of

Aristotle's life was the rich fruit-time of his genius. We have already mentioned how he set himself to the construction of an entire encyclopedia of science and philosophy. What we possess as his works contain the unfinished, but much advanced, working out of that project. There is every reason to believe that the great bulk of this series of writings was composed by Aristotle during the last thirteen years of his life. He was doubtless assisted by his school, and he must have had many treatises on hand at one time, or rather he had them all in his head, and when anything caused him to drop one for a time he could go on with another. Hardly any of the treatises are finished, still less is there any trace of careful revision and "the last hand." It is certain that many of these works were never published during Aristotle's lifetime, and it is even a question whether any of them were so published.

When Aristotle died, all the MSS. of his later compositions, together with the considerable library of other men's writings which he had got together, were under charge of his chief disciple Theophrastus at the school in the Lyceum. After his decease, the Peripatetics appear to have worked to some extent at editing the uncompleted treatises, and at patching together those which existed as yet only in disjointed fragments. But there does not seem to have been any multiplication of copies, or what we should call "publication." On the death of Theophrastus (which took place thirty-five years later than that of Aristotle), the whole Peripatetic school-library went by his bequest to a favorite pupil named Neleus, who took all the rolls away with him to his home at a place called Scepsis, in the Troad. Included among them were the MSS., many of them

unique, of Aristotle's most important works, which were thus removed from Europe. Not only was this the case, but a few years later the kings of Pergamus began seizing the books of private individuals in order to fill their own royal library, and the family of Neleus, afraid of losing the treasures they possessed—which, however, they could little appreciate—hid away the Peripatetic rolls and the precious MSS. of Aristotle in a subterranean vault, where they remained for 150 years forgotten by the world. At the end of that interval, the dynasty of the kings of Pergamus having passed away, the books were brought out of their hiding-place and sold to one Apellicon, a wealthy Peripatetic and book-collector, who resided at Athens. They were said to have been by this time a good deal damaged by worms and damp; yet still it was a great thing that, after 187 years' absence, the best productions of Aristotle should be restored, about 100 B.C., to the West.

The termination of this "strange eventful history" was that in 86 B.C. Athens was taken by Sylla, and the library of Apellicon was seized and brought to Rome, where it was placed under the custody of a librarian, and several literary Greeks, resident in Rome, had access to it. Tyrannion, the learned friend of Cicero, got permission to arrange the MSS., and Andronicus of Rhodes, applying himself with earnestness to the task of obtaining a correct text and furnishing a complete edition of the philosophical works of Aristotle, arranged the different treatises and scattered fragments under their proper heads, and getting numerous transcripts made, gave publicity to a generally received text of Aristotle. There seems to be good reason for believing that "*Our* Aristotle," as Grote calls it, in contradistinction to the Aristotle of the Alexandrian Library, is

none other than this recension of Andronicus. And this being the case, we may well reflect how great was the risk which these works incurred of being consigned to perpetual oblivion. A few more years in the cellar at Scepsis, or any one of a hundred other accidents which might have prevented these writings from getting into the appreciative and competent hands of Tyrannion and Andronicus, would in all probability have made them as if they had never been. And thus that which was actually the chief intellectual food of men in the middle ages would have been withheld. Whether for better or worse, men's thoughts would have had a different exercise and taken a different direction. Much of ecclesiastical history would have been changed. And many of the modes in which we habitually think and speak at the present day would have been different from what they are.

But we must return to the Alexandrian catalogue. If the MSS. of all Aristotle's most important works were carried off in the year 287 B.C., to be buried in Asia Minor for a century and a half, what means this list of 146 books bearing the name of Aristotle, which in 220 B.C. were stored up in the Alexandrian Library? Were these also all really written by Aristotle? Was he so voluminous a composer as this would imply, as well as a profound thinker and an original explorer of nature in many departments? Or were the books supplied to the Alexandrian collection, as the works of Aristotle, mere forgeries, got up for the market, to supply the place of the genuine writings, which for the time had been lost to the world? The only answer that can be given to these questions must be a conjectural one, and probability seems to dictate an answer lying between the two extreme hypotheses. Several of the names ap-

pearing in the catalogue remind us of the titles of Plato's dialogues,—for instance "Nerinthus," "Gryllus; or, On Rhetoric," "Sophist," "Menexenus," "Symposium," "The Lover," "Alexander; or, On Colonies," etc. And the natural supposition is that these books, or some of them, were none other than these early dialogues which Aristotle composed during his first residence in Athens. Strabo says distinctly that when, by the bequest of Theophrastus, the Aristotelian MSS. were taken away, the Peripatetic school had none of his works left except a few of the more popular ones. His dialogues had been published, and were available, and no doubt copies of them formed the nucleus of the books professing to be his in the Alexandrian Library. Others of the collection may have been excerpts from his greater works which had been made by his scholars, and were so kept before the world when the entire works themselves were hidden in Asia Minor. Many others were probably monographs and papers by members of the Peripatetic school, drawn up in Aristotle's manner, perhaps containing his ideas, and from a sort of reverential feeling attributed to him and inscribed with his name. The residue must have been forgeries pure and simple: imitations of his dialogues, and of such parts of his treatises as were known. All the books in the Alexandrian list, though they were numerous, appear to have been short, treating generally of isolated questions, and quite unlike the long methodical setting forth of entire sciences, such as we find in the writings of Aristotle that have come down to us.

The "fate of Aristotle's works" is a romantic episode in the history of literature. But we must observe that what in the first place rendered this train of circumstances possible was the rapid decay of genius in Greece.

When Aristotle died, none of his scholars was worthy to succeed him and carry on his work. His school do not seem to have appreciated what was great and valuable in his philosophy. They went off either into rhetorical sermonizing on moral questions, or else into isolated inquiries, the solution of problems, or the drawing up of "papers" like those read before the Royal Society. It was perhaps a feeling of contempt for the Peripatetic school which induced Theophrastus, a generation after the death of Aristotle, to give away their whole library, including the great works of their master, to a foreign student. But for their apathy those great works would never have been left in unique copies, and ultimately exposed to such extreme peril. There must, however, have been a corresponding apathy in the external public, else curiosity would have demanded, and the love of science would have preserved, the results of Aristotle's later years. But the reading world of the third century B.C. seems to have been quite content to be put off with that which was really un-Aristotelian, though it bore the name of Aristotle—with immature, rhetorical dialogues, the work of his youth, or spurious imitations of that work, with excerpts, epitomes, "papers," and the sweepings of the Peripatetic school.

We may take Cicero, though living two centuries later, as a good specimen of the attitude towards Aristotle of a cultivated man of literature, not devoid of a certain taste for philosophy, of those times. Cicero often mentions, praises, and quotes Aristotle, but it is not, "*our* Aristotle," but the Aristotle of Alexandria, the writer of dialogues. Several passages of these dialogues have been translated and preserved by Cicero, who extols the "golden flow of their language," using

terms which are as far as possible from being applicable to the harsh, compressed, and difficult style of Aristotle's scientific treatises. The latter were, indeed, too difficult and too repulsive for Cicero, as is plain from the story which he himself relates: Cicero had in his Tusculan villa some of the works of Aristotle, as we at present possess them, probably copies of the recension of Andronicus; when asked by his friend Trebatius what the "Topics" of Aristotle were about, he advised him "for his own interest" to study the book for himself, or else to consult a certain learned rhetorician. Trebatius, however, was repelled by the obscurity of the writing, and the rhetorician, when consulted, confessed his total ignorance of Aristotle. Cicero thinks this no wonder, since even the philosophers know hardly anything about him, though they "ought to have been attracted by the incredible flow and sweetness of the diction." He then proceeds to give Trebatius a summary of the first few pages of the "Topics" of Aristotle, which he had apparently read up for the occasion. From facts like this, it may be concluded that in the two last centuries before the Christian era, it was only the lighter and less valuable compositions of Aristotle that were generally known and admired. His more serious and really valuable contributions to thought and knowledge were left out of sight, ignored, and forgotten. For the moment it seemed as if the favorite dictum of Lord Bacon had come to pass—that "Time, like a river, bringing down to us things which are lighter and more inflated, lets what is more weighty and solid sink." But the result of that concatenation of accidents which we have narrated, was completely to reverse this sentence; so that now it may be said that all the lighter part of Aristotle's work has been swept

away by the stream of Time, while only that which was weighty and solid has been suffered to remain in existence. Owing to the wealth of the Roman empire, it is likely that numerous copies were made of the entire works of Aristotle, as edited by Andronicus—both for public libraries and for individuals. This gave him a better chance of survival in a collective form during the wreck and destruction of the barbarian invasions; and afterwards he was early taken into the protection of the Church. The dialogues, in the meantime, and other shorter productions, which had figured in the Alexandrian catalogue, had no coherence with each other, and thus were not reproduced by the copyists and librarians, as a whole. Again, they did not attract, as the greater works of Aristotle did, the attention of successive scholiasts and commentators. In short, they fell into the neglect which, comparatively speaking, they deserved, and disappeared, all but a few scattered quotations. But now we can thank the Providence of history that we possess a large portion of the best of all that Aristotle thought and wrote. We possess it, indeed, incomplete as he left it, and not only so, but also edited and re-edited, transposed occasionally, interpolated, and eked out, by the earlier Peripatetics, by Andronicus, and perhaps by subsequent hands. Yet still the individuality of the Stagirite shines out through the greater part of these remains, and in studying them we feel that we are brought into contact with his mind.

If the supposition be correct that what we now possess is substantially the edition of Andronicus, it is clear in the first place that he did not mean this to be what we should call a "complete edition of the collective works of Aristotle," else he would have included

in it the dialogues that Cicero quotes, the hymn in honor of Hermeias, and we know not what beside. His object appears to have been to give to the world the philosophy of Aristotle, hitherto virtually unknown, as he found it in the documents contained in the library of Apellicon. He dealt, it must be remembered, not only with that collection of rolls which had been buried in the Troad, but also with all the books which had been got together by a wealthy bibliophilist. The edition of Andronicus, if it corresponds with ours, contained a body of Aristotelian science and all Aristotle's greatest works; but on the one hand it excluded his less important writings, and on the other hand it admitted works which Aristotle certainly never wrote, though they are full of his ideas. Andronicus may have doubted as to the authorship of these treatises, which modern criticism pronounces to be by later Peripatetic hands;* or he may have thought that they represented or explained Aristotle, and might advantageously be preseved as part of his system. However it came about, we find included within the Aristotelian canon a treatise "On the Universe," neatly epitomizing his views, but quite later than his time; one "On the Motion of Animals" of which the same may be said; two treatises on morals, the "Eudemian Ethics" and the "Great Ethics," which are mere paraphrases of the "Ethics" of Aristotle; a large book of "Problems," with their solutions, evidently of mixed authorship; a set of "Opuscula," or minor works, which belong to the class of Peripatetic monographs—*e.g.* "On Colors,"

* One of the doubtful treatises—the "Rhetoric dedicated to Alexander"—is supposed to be the work of Anaximenes, a writer contemporary with Aristotle.

"On Invisible Lines," "Strange Stories," "Physiognomics," etc.; a treatise on "Rhetoric," quite different in principle, from that of Aristotle's, and only suggested to be his by a fictitious dedication to Alexander, which has been stuck on to it. One or two other suspicious books might be mentioned, but even if everything were deducted against which the most skeptical criticism can make objection, less than one-fourth would be taken away from the entire mass which is in use to be labeled "Aristotle." The whole works in Bekker's octavo edition fill 3786 pages, and out of these the books, about whose genuineness any question has been raised, occupy only 925 pages. A solid residue remains, which may now be briefly characterized, merely in regard to its external form, a few remarks being added as to the chronological order in which it seems probable that Aristotle composed the various parts.

The remains of Aristotle come before us as a torso —an incomplete and somewhat mutilated group from antiquity. Yet they constitute a whole, and the different treatises have an organic connection with each other. On the one hand, these works constitute an encyclopædia, for they contain a *résumé* and reconstruction of the sciences so far as was possible in the fourth century B.C. But on the other hand, they are more than an encyclopædia, because they are a philosophy, in which the universe is explained from the point of view and according to the system of one individual thinker. In them thought and knowledge are mapped out in broad and lucid outlines, with the details sometimes very fully worked in, sometimes barely indicated and left to be supplied by subsequent workers. The key to their arrangement is to be sought from Aristotle himself. From him we learn that science is divided into Practi-

cal, Constructive, and Theoretical. Practical science deals with man and human action, and this branch is copiously developed by Aristotle in his "Ethics" and "Politics." Constructive science treats of art and the laws by which it is to be governed. Towards this branch Aristotle has made but a brief, though valuable, contribution, in his unfinished or mutilated treatise "On Poetry." Theoretical science has three great subdivisions, Physics, Mathematics, and Theology, otherwise called First Philosophy or Metaphysics. For the section of Mathematics nothing appears done in these remains. Aristotle speaks often of Mathematics as a great and interesting science, capable of affording high mental delight; but he seems to have regarded it as something tolerably finished and settled in his own time, and therefore less requiring his attention than other departments. Had his life been prolonged to the age attained by Plato or Alexander von Humboldt, he might possibly have undertaken the setting forth of the philosophy of Mathematics. Physics, on the other hand—that is to say, the Physical and Natural Sciences—occupy 1447 pages, or fully one half, of the writings which are undoubtedly Aristotle's. In his physical treatises one mind may be seen grappling, at first hand, with the provinces of almost all the different "Sections" of the British Association. Natural Philosophy, Astronomy, Physiology, and Natural History are all marvelously founded in these treatises, by masterly analysis and classification of existing knowledge on the different subjects, and by the arrangement of facts, or supposed facts, under leading scientific ideas. Twelve books on Metaphysics occupy about one tenth of the genuine remains of Aristotle. These books are obviously patched together out of the fragments of two or

three unfinished treatises. How far this was done by the earlier Peripatetics, and how far by Andronicus, we cannot tell. But we here possess probably some of Aristotle's latest thoughts. And the name "Metaphysics," or "the things which follow after "Physics," was given to these books when they were put together, after Aristotle's death, to indicate both chronological sequence in the order of composition, and also that the subject treated of lay beyond and above all physical inquiry.

In briefly grouping out the works of Aristotle, we have hitherto omitted to mention a class of writings, very important, and amounting to one seventh of the whole mass, and yet which do not belong to either Practical, Constructive, or Theoretic science,—which are not part of Philosophy, but treat of the method of thought and the laws of reasoning, and which thus constitute the instrument or "organ" of Philosophy—that is to say, the logical writings, which were collectively named by the Peripatetic school "the Organon" or instrument. These books stand first in modern editions of Aristotle, and, speaking generally, they appear to have been written first of all his extant works.

The chronological sequence of composition among Aristotle's treatises is determined by critics, conjecturally and approximately, entirely on internal evidence. There are frequent references from one treatise to another, but these cannot always be relied on. Often they are mere interpolations, not having been made by the original writer, but stuck in by the meddlesomeness of some editor or copyist; in other cases they are genuine, and indicate truly the order of composition. Another piece of evidence, more strictly internal and more to be depended on, is the greater or less development of doctrine contained in the different works

respectively. Aristotle in the earlier, and still more in the second period of his life, had doubtless made great preparation for the writing of all his great works. Still, as he successively took up each subject and concentrated his attention upon it, he did not fail to develop and push further his previous thought upon it. Thus, for instance, the "Rhetoric" is full of ethical remarks and ethical doctrine, but when we come to read the "Ethics" we find the same ethical questions repeated and treated with far greater depth and precision; and we may reasonably conclude that the "Ethics" was the later-written treatise of the two.

Following out indications of this kind, we arrive at the conclusion that Aristotle first took in hand the science of method, and that, of all his extant works, the "Topics" (or Logic of Probability), were first written, all but the eighth book; next the "Analytics" (or Logic of Demonstration); next the eighth book of the "Topics;" next Books I. and II. of the "Rhetoric" (which has to do with the setting forth of truth); and then the "Sophistical Refutations" (or treatise on Fallacies), which belongs to logic, yet still has a connection with the art of rhetoric. After thus far treating of the method of knowledge and expression, Aristotle appears to have gone on to treat of the matter of knowledge, and to have commenced with the practical sciences. First he wrote his "Ethics," though these were not quite finished, and afterwards his "Politics," and then he was led on to take up constructive science, and to write his small work "On Poetry," after which he reverted to his "Rhetoric," which was a cognate subject, and added a third book to that treatise. He now proceeded, though leaving much that was unfinished behind him, to the composition of his great series of physical treatises. The

first of these to be written was probably the "Physical Discourse," which unfolded the general notions of natural philosophy, and gave an account of what Aristotle conceived under the terms "Nature," "Motion," "Time," "Space," "Causation," and the like. After these *prolegomena* to physics, he went on to treat of the universe in orderly sequence, beginning with the divinest part, the circumference of the whole, or outer heaven, which, according to his views, bounded the world, being composed of ether, a substance distinct from that of the four elements. This region was the sphere of the stars; and below it, in the Aristotelian system, was the planetary sphere, with the seven planets (the sun and moon being reckoned among the number) moving in it. Both stars and planets he seems to have regarded as conscious, happy beings, moving in fixed orbits, and inhabiting regions free from all change and chance; and these regions formed the subject of his treatise "On the Heavens." Next to this he is thought to have composed his work "On Generation and Corruption," in order to expound those principles of physical change (dependent on the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry), which in the higher parts of the universe had no existence. This treatise formed the transition to the sublunary sphere, immediately round the earth, in which the meteors and comets moved, and which was characterized by incessant change, and by the passing of things into and out of existence, and which became the subject of his next treatise—the "Meteorologics." The last book of this work brings us down to the earth itself, and indeed beneath its surface, for it discusses, in a curious theory, the formation of rocks and metals.

From this point Aristotle would seem to have started afresh with his array of physiological treatises, the first

written of which may very likely have been that "On the Parts of Animals," as containing general principles of anatomy and physiology. Next it seems probable that the work "On the Soul" was produced, which was a physiological account of the vital principle as manifested in plants, animals, and men. A set of Appendices, as we should now call them, on various functions connected with life in general, such as sensation, memory, sleep, dreaming, longevity, death, etc., were added by Aristotle to his work "On the Soul." Afterwards, the ten books of "Researches on Animals," and the five books "On the Generation of Animals," together with the minor treatise "On the Progression of Animals," and with a collection of "Problems" which Aristotle probably kept by him, and added to from time to time, made up the series of his physical and physiological writings, so far as he lived to complete them. Treatises "On the Physiology of Plants," and "On Health and Disease," had been promised by him, but were never achieved. Simultaneously with some of the works now mentioned, but in idea last of his writings, and intended to be the crown of them all, the "Metaphysics" were probably in course of composition when the death of Aristotle occurred.

It has been generally fancied that Aristotle was a very voluminous writer, and Diogenes Laertius, in transcribing the "Alexandrian Catalogue," remarks of him that "he wrote exceedingly many books." *We*, however, have no reason for joining in this opinion. His genuine works that have come down to us, fill altogether less than 3000 pages, and this amount in mere point of quantity is not anything unusual or surprising. Even if these works were composed, as we suppose them for the most part to have been, during

the last thirteen years of his life, still, so far as quantity alone is concerned, that does not imply more than the exercise of a persistent industry. Many another man besides Aristotle has written as much as 200 pages a year for thirteen years successively. Nor is it necessary to credit Aristotle with any great bulk of writings beyond what we possess, The writings of his early life, the dialogues, sketches, memoranda, and first efforts of his philosophic pen, which got to Alexandria, need not be highly estimated, even as to mass. They were probably eked out, as we have seen, by Peripatetic imitators, and were thus made to assume larger proportions. One important piece of Aristotle's labor has perished, namely, his "Collection of the Constitutions of Greek Cities." This would have been of the utmost interest as contributing to our knowledge of ancient history; but it was merely a compilation of facts, and probably would not have filled more than 400 or 500 pages. On the whole, it is not for voluminousness that Aristotle is to be wondered at. The marvel begins when we come to contemplate the solid and compressed contents of his writings, their vast and various scope, and the amount of original thought given through them to the world. It would have been enough for any one man's lasting reputation to have created the science of Logic, as Aristotle did; but in addition to this he wrote as a specialist, a discoverer, and an organizer, on at least a dozen other of the greatest subjects, and on each of them he was for many centuries accepted as the one authority. Such a position it is of course impossible for any modern to attain, but it was given to the powerful mind of Aristotle to attain it, owing to the peculiar circumstances of his epoch, and to the course of succeeding history.

CHAPTER III.

THE "ORGANON" OF ARISTOTLE.

"ORGANON," or "the instrument," was, as we have said, the name given by Aristotle's ancient editors to his collective works on Logic. And from this of course Bacon took the title of "Novum Organum," or "the new instrument," for his own work, in which the principles and method of modern science were to be developed. We find the "Organon" of Aristotle, as it stands in our editions, to consist of six treatises, respectively entitled "Categories," "On Interpretation," First Series of Analytics," "Second Series of Analytics," "Topics," and "Fallacies" The two first of these are quite short, both together filling less than 60 pages, but they have been more read and commented on, especially in the middle ages, than all the rest of Aristotle put together. Thousands of scholars, who considered themselves stanch Aristotelians, and as such fought the battle of Nominalism against the Platonists, knew not a word of Aristotle beyond these two treatises. And yet, unfortunately, it is open to considerable doubt whether either of the two was actually written by Aristotle himself.

During the first periods of his life, Aristotle had gradually forged the chief doctrines of his philosophy, and a peculiar set of terms in which they were embodied. When he came to write continuously, in his third period, he often assumed these doctrines and terms as already known, having doubtless given them considerable publicity in oral discourse, if not in essays and short treatises which have now been lost. And thus it frequently happens that we meet with terms and doctrines the meaning of which has to be gathered

by implication, as it is never explicitly stated. This is the case with Aristotle's celebrated doctrine of "the Categories," to which he repeatedly refers, without ever telling us clearly what position in his system it is meant to hold. Perhaps the simplest account of this doctrine is to say that it sprang from an analysis and classification, made by Aristotle, of the things which men speak of. "Category," in Greek, meant "speaking of" something. Now, when we speak of anything, we shall find (so Aristotle implies) that we are either speaking of "a substance"—as, for instance, of a particular man; or else that we are asserting something to be the case about something else. And what we can assert about anything else must be either (1) some "quality" it possesses; (2) its "quantity;" (3) some "relation" in which it stands; (4) the "place" of its existence; (5) the "time" of its existence; (6) its "action," or what it does; (7) its "passion," or what is done to it; (8) its "attitude;" or (9) its "habit" or dress. "Substance" and the above nine modes of speaking of it make up the list of the Ten Categories, as enumerated by Aristotle in his "Topics" (I. 9), and also in the little treatise which professes to treat especially of this subject.

A complete classification of the things which we can speak of must include everything that we can think of, and therefore all the world. But the "Ten Categories" of Aristotle cannot fail to strike us as a curious summary of all things in heaven and earth. Attitude and Habit, or Dress, the 9th and 10th "Categories," are so exclusively human that we are surprised to find them introduced among genera of far wider application. Some critics say that the list is both redundant in one way and deficient in another. They say that it is

redundant because the whole thing might be cut down to two heads—Substance and Relation; and deficient because to none of the "Categories" could mental states and feelings be appropriately assigned. However, Aristotle might perhaps have said that they came under Quality, Action, or Passion, as the case might be. In other parts of his works he gives enumerations of the "Categories," naming 8, 6, or 4, instead of 10. In one place ("Met." VI. iv.) he names the first five "Categories," with "Motion" added as a sixth. This last would certainly, according to his view, include the various operations of the mind. On the whole, Aristotle does not appear to have laid much stress on his table of "Categories" as containing an exhaustive division of all things. Probably at first this table was the result of a study in language, made at a time when logical and even grammatical distinctions were in their infancy. Aristotle took the idea of a particular man—say Callias—and called this "Substance," and then tried how many different kinds of assertions could be made about him; and when he had reduced these to 9, he was perhaps pleased, because "Substance," and the 9 kinds of assertion made about it, made up 10 "Categories," and 10 is a perfect number. He afterwards dropped this particular number, and the "Categories" which had been brought in at the end of the list to eke it out. He seems always to have thought a classification of the ways in which we speak of things to be useful for obtaining clear notions. But he was far too sensible to apply his original table of "Ten Categories" as a Procrustean bed for measuring everything in the universe. At the same time it must be confessed that it has been prevalently thought that he did so. Thus Bacon contemptuously accused him of "constructing the world out of

his 'Categories.'" But this arose very much from the fact that the first book of the "Organon" was read out of all proportion more than Aristotle's great philosophical treatises, and so it came about that the Aristotelian schoolmen attached an exaggerated importance to the table of which it treats, and their sins have been imputed to the Stagirite himself.

The little book before us, which has exercised so much influence, might be described as a logical monograph on the characteristics of some of the "Categories." After naming the ten, without any account of the manner in which they are arrived at, it discusses to a certain extent the first four only. Then some chapters are appended, which may or may not have been originally a separate paper, on the different ways in which things are called "opposite," etc. There are two or three hypotheses possible about the book entitled "Categories." Either it was an early essay written by Aristotle himself, and preserved among his MSS.; or it consists of notes from his school, made by some scholar during his lifetime; or else it is the work of some Peripatetic, drawn up after his death, when the making of such tracts had become a fashion. Style is not a sufficient guide in such a question, because the Peripatetics closely imitated the manner of their master. The chief reason for thinking that this book cannot have been his is on account of the extreme nominalism of its doctrine. Aristotle in the "Metaphysics" (VI. vii. 4) asserts that the universal is the "first substance," while the individual has a secondary and derivative existence; but it is asserted in the "Categories" that the individual is the first substance, and that if individuals were swept away universals would cease to exist. Aristotle may have said this in the early days of his antag

onism against Plato; if so, he seems to have reverted in maturer life to something nearer approaching, though distinguishable from, Plato's view. There are, however, unphilosophical and un-Aristotelian things in the book—as, for instance, the saying ("Cat." vii. 21) that "if knowledge ceased to exist, the thing known might still remain." All this looks like the work of a clever but somewhat materialistic follower of the Peripatetic school.

The book which we find standing second in the "Organon" is the little treatise "On Interpretation," or, as it might be called, "On Language as the Interpreter of Thought." Its subject is that which in Logic is called the "proposition"—that is to say, it treats of sentences which affirm or deny something. Modern Logic is divided into three parts, treating respectively of terms, propositions, and syllogisms; and it might for a moment be supposed that the three works, "Categories," "On Interpretation," and "Analytics," correspond to these three divisions. But this is only superficially the case; for the "Categories" does not treat generally of simple terms, it only touches on some characteristics of the names of Substances, Qualities, Quantities, and Relations. And the book "On Interpretation" is not a prelude to the "Analytics;" it is a separate logical monograph on some of the characteristics of propositions, containing, at the same time, some remarks on words, as fit or unfit to become terms —on indefinite words, "syn-categorematic" words, etc. The great merit of this little treatise is undeniable, especially when considered as containing matter which though now long accepted and perfectly trite, was in a great measure new in the time of Aristotle, and which served towards the clearing up of many a confusion.

All those clear statements about the nature of the proposition; on what is meant by "contrariety" and "contradiction;" on "modal propositions," or propositions in which the amount of certainty is expressed by the words "necessarily" or "probably;" and other points which the reader will find in the second part of Whately's "Logic," are taken almost *verbatim* from this treatise. There is one point of which Whately was especially fond—namely, that "truth" is the attribute of a proposition or assertion and of nothing else, except in a metaphorical way. This comes from the work before us, where it is laid down as the first characteristic of a proposition that it must be either true or false. A distinction, however, is here drawn, for propositions admit the idea of time. Now, it is the case with regard to propositions of past and present time—for instance, "it is raining," or "it rained yesterday"—that they must either be true or false; but with regard to future propositions this is not the case; for suppose we say "there will be a battle to-morrow between the Turks and Servians"—this may be probable or improbable, but it is neither true nor false. Obviously, there is no existing fact with which to compare such propositions, and thus to pronounce on their truth or falsehood. But it is argued here that if future propositions, or prophecies, could be pronounced to be certainly true, it would do away with human agency and free-will. This may seem hardly worth enunciating, but it was new at the time when this book was written.

The writer, in considering "modal propositions," which assert things as necessary, probable, or possible, introduces some discussion on "possibility," and mentions three heads of the possible. Ordinarily, things in this world are first possible, and then become realized,

or actual; but there is another class of things which are always actual, and the possibility in them is only latent or implied—such are the "first substances" which have existed from all eternity; and thirdly, there is a class of things which always seem possible, and yet can never be realized—for instance, the greatest number or the least quantity, which, while we speak of them, no one can ever say that he has reached. In this passage we find ourselves rather in the region of Metaphysics than of Logic, and it is remarkable that here the phrase "first substances" is used, not, as in the "Categories," to denote ordinary individual existences on the earth, but as a term to denote the eternal, primeval substances which have never not been, such as, in Aristotle's view, were the stars, and sun, and planets.

The treatise "On Interpretation" was evidently not written at the same time with the "Categories," or is by a different author, and on a different plane of thought. It is more philosophical and more Aristotelian; it quotes both the "Analytics" and the work "On the Soul," and therefore cannot be an early production of the Stagirite's. There is a tradition that Andronicus of Rhodes held that this treatise was not written by Aristotle at all, while Ammonius, a great commentator, argued in favor of its genuineness. Their arguments, which have been preserved, do not seem conclusive one way or the other. Perhaps the only reason against considering this to have been the writing of Aristotle himself is, that while it obviously is as late as the period of his great treatises, it is not in the manner of those treatises. On the whole, it seems safest to conclude that this little book must consist of the notes of Aristotle's oral teaching upon the elementary bases of Logic, faithfully recording his ideas, and often the very words which he had used

We may set aside, then, the "Categories" and the "Interpretation" as of doubtful origin, and as at all events not having been originally intended for the place which they have so long held in the forefront of the writings of Aristotle. We turn to that which was, so far as we know, in reality the opening treatise of the Aristotelian Encyclopædia—namely, the "Topics;" and there is some peculiarity to be remarked in the very fact that the subject with which it deals should have been the first to be taken in hand. We know that Aristotle founded, and all but completed, the science of Logic; but we are apt to forget that, when he began to write, the very idea that there was, or could be, such a science had never come into anybody's head. What philosophers then knew about, and practiced, and formulated, was not Logic, or the science of the laws of reasoning, but Dialectic, or the art of discussion. This art was by no means confined to philosophers, but it was the fashion of the day, and was widely and constantly in use in Athenian society, as an intellectual game or fencing-match. The dialogues of Plato give us dramatic specimens of the encounter of wits which might be seen exhibited in numerous Athenian circles from the middle of the fifth century B.C. down to the time of Aristotle. That restless and intellectual people who, three and a half centuries later, were described as "spending their time in nothing else but either to tell or to hear some new thing," were at an earlier period possessed by an insatiate appetite for discussion and controversy, whether with a view to truth or to mere victory over an opponent. Dialectic then, as an art, was thoroughly recognized, and all but universally practiced, yet still the fundamental principles on which it must rest had never yet been properly drawn out, and

Aristotle seems to have felt it to be the first task for one who would build up the entire fabric of knowledge, to lay down the laws of Dialectic as the art and science of method. "Dialectic," he says, "is useful for three things: for exercise of the mind, for converse with other men, and for knowing how to question and handle the principles of philosophy." And the object of his "Topics" is, as he tells us, "to discover a method by which we shall be able to reason from probabilities on any given question, and to defend a position without being driven to contradict our own assertions."

Properly speaking, Dialectic, as defined by Aristotle, ought not to come first in the order of sciences, for it is a kind of applied reasoning; it is reasoning applied to that which is not certain, but only probable. Therefore the general principles of reasoning should be drawn out first, and then these should be shown in application to the certainties of science, after which a subordinate branch might be added on reasoning upon probabilities. Aristotle, however, as we have said, did not set out with the conception of Logic, or the science of reasoning, as existing by itself. This only gradually dawned upon him, and it was out of his researches in Dialectic that he was led to develop the idea of Logic. It was in thinking out the rules of Dialectic that Aristotle discovered the principles of the Syllogism, and he was justly proud of the discovery. There are only two passages in all his extant writings in which he speaks of himself: one is that in which he apologizes for differing from Plato, "because truth must be preferred to one's friend;" the other is the passage at the end of the "Fallacies" (which is a sort of appendix to the "Topics"), where he refers to his services to Dialectic. "In regard to the process of syllogizing," he says, "I

found positively nothing said before me: I had to work it out for myself by long and laborious research." The discovery of the structure of the syllogism—that is to say, of the forms in which men do, and must, reason about a great many things in life, was of course very useful for dialectical purposes, both for exposing fallacy in others and for keeping one's self straight in controversy. But Aristotle, while in the course of writing his treatise on Dialectic, seems to have been impressed with the independent importance of the theory of the Syllogism, and of the necessity for a simple, unapplied Logic. So, after completing seven books of his "Topics," he dropped the subject, and went on to write his first and second series of "Analytics;" and it was only after he had finished these two great works that he returned to complete the "Topics," by the addition of an eighth book.

The "Topics," as their name implies, are the books "treating of places," and "places" are seats of arguments, or matters in which arguments may be found. Aristotle in a long course of observation and analysis had apparently noted down the heads of reasonings most likely to be available for either attack or defence in dialectical controversy, and he here sets these forth in seven books. His object is to educate the reader to be a skillful dialectician in Athenian arenas. He names the four chief instruments for this purpose: 1st, To make a large collection of propositions—*i.e.*, authoritative sayings, whether of great men or of the many; 2d, To study the different senses in which terms are used; 3d, To detect differences; 4th, To note resemblances. The last three out of these four suggestions are expanded at great length, and Aristotle tells us how to use various logical distinctions, here brought forward

for the first time, in pulling to pieces the arguments of an opponent—for instance, how to use the heads of predicables (*genus*, *differentia*, *proprium*, and *accidens*), or the categories, or the several kinds of logical opposition, for this purpose. The first seven books of the "Topics" scarcely touch at all upon dialectical method, they are quite taken up with a wearisome and seemingly endless list of heads of argumentation. The eighth book, written later, adds some counsel upon the arrangement and marshalling of your arguments, whether you be the respondent defending a thesis, or the interrogator who attacks it. Some of these pieces of advice might be characterized as "dodges;" for instance, when we are told how to conceal from our adversary what we want to prove, till we have got him to admit something which would really imply the point we are aiming at. In Dialectic, as in love and war, almost everything was fair. And yet Aristotle concludes his treatise by saying, "You must, however, take care not to carry on this exercise with every one, especially with a vulgar-minded man. With some persons the dispute cannot fail to take a discreditable turn. When the respondent tries to make a show of escaping by unworthy maneuvers, the questioner on his part must be unscrupulous also in syllogizing; but this is a disgraceful scene. To keep clear of such abusive discourse, you must be cautious not to discourse with commonplace, unprepared respondents."

Athenian Dialectic has passed away, though it had a faint and clumsy revival in the "Disputations" of the middle ages. Even as a preparation for ordinary controversy and debate, it is questionable whether a study of Aristotle's "Topics" would nowadays be found useful, except so far as the logical distinctions which it

contains might sharpen the intellect. But this latter result might equally well be attained by studying the ordinary logics into which all those distinctions have been transplanted. The "Topics," at the time when it was written, was a work of original penetration, and of vast accumulative labor. Aristotle perhaps ought to have foreseen that it would not be worth his while to reduce Athenian Dialectic to a methodized system, but he did not; and much of what he accumulated for one purpose, came to have great value for another. The chief merit of the "Topics" of Aristotle is, that while intended to be the permanent regulator of Dialectic, it became in reality the cradle of Logic.

Aristotle himself did not use the word "Logic," which was probably invented afterwards by the Stoics; he spoke of "Analytic," by which he meant the science of analyzing the forms of reasoning. We come now to his "Prior and Posterior" (or First and Second Series of) "Analytics." In these works he has produced nothing temporary, or of merely antiquarian interest, but an addition to human knowledge as complete in itself, as permanent, and as irrefragable, as the Geometry of Euclid. It is true that Aristotle did not cover and exhaust the entire field in reasoning, just as Euclid did not exhaust the theory of all the properties of space. But so far as he went Aristotle was perfect. His work took its origin out of the examination of dialectical controversies, which, at the time when he wrote, much predominated over all that we should think worthy of the name of physical science, and therefore his aim was limited to the analysis of deductive reasonings. But men still reason deductively, and will always do so; during a great part of life we are employed, not in finding out new laws of nature, but in applying what we

knew before, in appealing to general beliefs, or supposed classes of facts, and in drawing our positive or negative conclusions accordingly. To all this process, whenever it occurs, the "Analytics" of Aristotle are as applicable as the principles of Geometry are to every fresh mensuration.

Aristotle invented the word "Syllogism," for the process of putting two assertions together and out of them deducing a third. This word indeed existed before in Greek literature, but in a general sense, meaning "computation," "reckoning" or "consideration." But Aristotle stamped it with the technical meaning which it has ever since borne. In introducing the word, however, it must not be supposed that he introduced, or invented, the process of reasoning to which he applied it, or that he ever pretended to do so. Yet he has been ridiculed, as if this had been the case—as for instance by Locke, who says that it would be strange if God had made men two-legged, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational! The grammarian who first distinguished nouns from verbs and gave them their names, did not invent nouns and verbs, but only called attention to their existence in language; and he who first made rules of syntax was only recording the ways in which men naturally speak and write, not making innovations in language; and so Aristotle with his "Syllogism" only clearly pointed out a process which had always, though unconsciously, been carried on. There is no doubt that, ever since they have possessed reason at all, men have made syllogisms, though, like M. Jourdain making prose, they have for the most part been unaware of it.

The "First Series of Analytics" is entirely devoted to the theory of the Syllogism, with a few collateral dis-

cussions. It has no connection with the treatise "On Interpretation," from which, in phraseology and some points of doctrine, it differs. It is a work which must excite our wonder if we consider the serried mass of observations which it contains, and the absolutely complete way in which it constructs a science and provides for it an appropriate nomenclature. Though countless generations of commentators and schoolmen have been busy with the "Analytics," and many modern philosophers have independently treated of Logic, none of them have been able to add a single point of any importance to Aristotle's theory of deductive reasoning. The "Analytics" are of course not light reading. The style is severely scientific, and concisely expository; not a single grace of ornament, not a superfluous word, is admitted. As Aristotle introduced into these treatises a copious use of the letters A, B, C, to denote the three terms of the syllogism, many parts read like Euclid with the diagrams omitted. It is not necessary to attempt any further description of the contents, or to give here an account of the figures and moods of syllogisms, of conversion of propositions, reduction of syllogisms to the first figure, and the rest, because all these things have found their way into modern compendiums. Are they not written in Aldrich, and Mansel, and Whately, many other books?

Yet there is one passage of the "Prior Analytics" which we must quote in bare justice to Aristotle. Owing to the too exclusive study of his logical works in the middle ages, and owing to modern writers identifying him with the absurdities of his followers, an idea arose that he, like the least judicious of the schoolmen, thought that all reasoning should be through syllogisms, that nature could be expounded by means of

syllogisms, and that syllogisms were a source of knowledge. Hence came protests like that of Bacon, that "the syllogism is unequal to the subtlety of nature." But nothing could be further from the truth than the whole idea. The reader may be assured that on a point of this kind Aristotle was as sensible as Lord Bacon or John Stuart Mill. After showing that syllogisms are constantly used, and after analyzing their form, and showing on what their validity depends, he proceeds to make some remarks on the way in which the major premise, or general statement in the syllogism, is to be obtained. He says ("Prior Anal." I. xxx.): "There is the same course to be pursued in philosophy, and in every science or branch of knowledge. *You must study facts.* Experience alone can give you general principles on any subject. This is the case in astronomy, which is based on the observation of astronomical phenomena; and it is the case with every branch of science or art. When the facts in each branch are brought together, it will be the province of the logician to set out the demonstrations in a manner clear and fit for use. When the investigation into nature is complete, you will be able in some cases to exhibit a demonstration; in other cases you will have to say that demonstration is not attainable." Bacon knew very little Aristotle at first hand; and he cannot have known this passage, else its overwhelming good sense must have stopped many of his remarks. And Aristotle in practice was quite true to the principles here announced. In his "Ethics," "Politics," and "Physics," he does not pedantically drag in the syllogism, but masses facts together, and makes penetrating remarks upon them, and discusses freely, by means of analogy, comparison,

and intuition, very much as the ablest writers of the present day would do.

At the same time it must be admitted that, after fully explaining the deductive process, he left the theory of the inductive process, by which general laws are ascertained, almost entirely unexplored. He briefly observes ("Prior Anal." II. xxiii.) that "induction, or the syllogism that arises from it, consists in proving the major term of the middle by means of the minor." In other words, suppose that we are proving that animals without a gall are long-lived, we do so through our knowledge that man, the horse, and the mule have no gall. Now, in a natural deductive syllogism, we should say—

> All animals without a gall are long-lived;
> Man, the horse, and the mule, have no gall;
> Therefore they are long-lived.

"Long-lived" is here the major term; but in the inductive process we prove it of the middle term, "animals without a gall," by means of the minor term, "man, the horse, and the mule." So we require to state the inductive syllogism thus:

> Man, the horse, and the mule are long-lived;
> Man, the horse, and the mule are animals without a gall;
> Therefore (all) animals without a gall are long-lived.

Aristotle adds that, for the validity of this reasoning, you require to have an intuition in your reason that "man, the horse, and the mule" are, or adequately represent, the whole class of animals without a gall. This is, in fact, the crucial question in the inductive process—Do the instances you have got adequately represent the whole class of similar instances, so as to give you the key to a law of nature? For instance, if it is found that in two or three cases a particular treat-

ment cures the cholera, how can you tell whether the induction is adequate, and that you are justified in asserting, as a general principle, that "such and such a treatment cures the cholera"? Modern logic tells us that a statement of the kind requires verification; and modern writers, such as Bacon, Whewell, and Mill, are at great pains to point out the best methods of verification—which after all consist in observing and experimenting further; in eliminating all accidental circumstances; in recording, and, if possible, accounting for, the facts which go against your principle; and, finally, in either rejecting it as unproven, or bringing it out as completely established after passing through the ordeal of thorough examination. But the minute and cautious methods of experiment and observation which have gradually come into use among scientific men in modern times were unknown in the days of Aristotle; so it is not to be wondered at that, having so much else to think of, he did not enter upon this field of inquiry. He tells us repeatedly that we must draw our general principles from familiarity with particular facts; but instead of suggesting methods of verification for the validity of those principles, he merely says that they must have the sanction of our reason. It seems to have been his idea that, after gathering facts up to a certain point, a flash of intuition would supervene, telling us, "This is a law." Such, no doubt, has often been the case, as in Newton's famous discovery of the law of gravitation from seeing an apple fall. Yet still, in the ordinary course of science, verification ought always to be at hand. And Aristotle, in omitting to provide for this, left a blank in his theory of the acquirement of knowledge.

Aristotle, like Plato, drew a strong line of demarka-

tion between matters in which you can have, and those in which you cannot have, certainty; in other words, between the region of opinion and the region of science. Syllogistic reasoning is applicable both to certainties and probabilities, and as such it had been formally drawn out in the "First Analytics." Its application by means of Dialectic to matters of opinion had been set forth (in anticipation of the natural order of treatment) in the "Topics;" and now Aristotle proceeded in his "Second Series of Analytics" to write the logic of science, and to exhibit the syllogism as the organ of demonstration.

The attitude of Science is of course different from that of Dialectic. In Dialectic two disputants are required, one of whom is to maintain a thesis, while the other by questioning is to endeavor to draw from him some admission which shall be repugnant to that thesis. In Science, on the other hand, we are not to suppose two disputants, but a teacher and a learner. Thus the "Second Analytics" begin with the words—"All teaching and all intellectual learning arises out of previously existing knowledge." This points at once to a characteristic of Aristotle's view of Science. In modern times we associate Science most commonly with the idea of the inductive accumulation of knowledge; and thus we talk of "scientific inquiry;" but Aristotle thinks of Science as deductive and expository, and identifies it with "teaching." If we look at the specimens of scientific reasoning which he gives us in this book, we shall find that a large proportion of them are taken from Geometry. Next to this, the science most frequently appealed to is Astronomy. But he also mentions Arithmetic, Optics, Mechanics, Stereometry, Harmonics, and Medicine. Sometimes he refers to ques-

tions of Natural History, and at other times to questions of Botany. He even applies his scientific method to Ethics, and shows how we are to obtain a definition of the virtue of magnanimity, by observing the leading characteristics of those who are called magnanimous. The Sciences are not classified here, but a comparative scale of perfection among them is indicated; and those are generally laid down to be the most perfect Sciences which are the most elementary and abstract. But with all this leaning towards an ideal of pure and abstract science, it is remarkable how much the Sciences of Observation are considered in this book, and what an enlightened and modern atmosphere breathes through many parts of it.

In developing his idea of Science, Aristotle takes occasion to controvert several opinions which had found vogue in his day. One of these was that everything in Science could be proved. Some men had a notion that you could go back *ad infinitum* in proving the principles from which your science was deduced: "This principle was true because of that, and that because of something else, and so on forever." Others fancied that by a kind of circular reasoning the propositions of Science might all be made to prove each other. "No," says Aristotle, "Science must commence from something that is not proved at all." Science must start from *im-mediate* principles—*i.e.*, principles that cannot be established by any middle term, or, in other words, by any syllogistic reasoning. The axioms of Euclid may give us a specimen of such principles, but, according to Aristotle, each science had its own "primary universal, and immediate principles;" these principles, we are distinctly told, are not innate, but the source of them is the Nous or Reason, which (as we have seen)

attains them intuitively, when sufficiently advised, so to speak, by a course of inductive observation. Again, Aristotle brings out here his opposition to Plato's theory of Ideas: he says, that it is not necessary for Science that the Ideas of things should have a separate existence, but only that universal ideas, or genera, should be capable of being predicated of many individuals. This view seems to correspond with what, in modern times, has been called Conceptualism, and which is a compromise between Nominalism and Realism.

These, however, are metaphysical distinctions. Another point more closely belonging to the Logic of Science is brought out against Plato—namely, the separateness of the Sciences, which follows from each Science having its own appropriate principles. Plato conceived, or appeared to do so, that from the principles of Philosophy (*i.e.*, Metaphysics) right doctrines of Ethics and Politics could be deduced. Hence he said, "It will never be well with the State till the kings are philosophers, or the philosophers kings." Aristotle, on the other hand, considered the speculative conception of the good, as entertained by a metaphysician, to be quite distinct from the practical conception of the good which occupies the statesman or the moralist. In many ways this demarkation by Aristotle of the separate spheres of different Sciences gave rise to great clearness of view.

The Logic of Science deals, as might be expected, with the method of defining things—that is, of saying what they are. But we do not here find the scholastic idea of definition, *per genus et differentiam*, by stating the class to which a thing belongs, and the characteristic which separates it from the rest of that class. Aristotle takes the more real and thorough position

that, to define a thing adequately, you must state its cause. "Science itself," he says, "is knowledge of a cause." But what is cause? There are four kinds: the "formal," which is the whole nature of a thing, being the sum of the other three causes; the "material," or the antecedents out of which the thing arises; the "efficient," or motive power; and the "final," or object aimed at. Speaking generally, the causes most in use for scientific definitions are the efficient and the final. We define an eclipse of the moon by its efficient cause—the interposition of the earth. We define a house by its final cause—a structure for the sake of shelter.

One quotation, as a specimen, may conclude these glimpses of the "Later Analytics," or Aristotle's Logic of Science: "Nature," he says, "presents a perpetual cycle of occurrences. When the earth is wet with rain, an exhalation rises; when an exhalation rises, a cloud forms; when a cloud forms, rain follows, and the earth is saturated: so that the same term recurs after a cycle of transformations. Every occurrence has another for its consequent, and this consequent another, and so on, till we are brought round to the primary occurrence."

After finishing his "Later Analytics," Aristotle seems to have taken up Rhetoric, and to have written the main part of his treatise on that subject. He then reverted to Dialectic, and completed his exposition of it by writing his book on "Sophistical Confutations," which now stands as the conclusion of the "Organon." The matter treated of in this book has a close connection with that treated of in the "Topics." The practice of Dialectic at Athens had given scope to a class, which gradually arose, of professional and paid disputants,

or professors and teachers of the art of controversy. This professional class, who were called the "Sophists," got a bad name in antiquity; and Aristotle treats them disparagingly as mere charlatans. Thus while Contentiousness is arguing for victory, he describes Sophistry as arguing for gain. The Sophist, according to Aristotle, tried to confute people and make them look foolish, employing for this purpose, not fair arguments, but quibbles and fallacies; and all this was done in order to be thought clever and to get pupils. An amusing picture of this sort of process is given in Plato's dialogue called "Euthydemus," where two professionals are represented as bamboozling with verbal tricks an ingenuous youth, until Socrates by his dialectical acumen and superior wit rescues the victim from his tormentors, and turns the tables upon them. The following is a specimen of the "sophistical confutations" in "Euthydemus:" Who learn, "the wise or the unwise?" "The wise," is the reply, given with blushing and hesitation. "And yet when you learned you did not know and were not wise." Who are they who learn the dictation of the grammar-master, the wise boys or the foolish boys?" "The wise." "Then after all the wise learn." "And do they learn what they know or what they do not know?" "The latter." "And dictation is a dictation of letters?" "Yes." "And you know letters?" "Yes." "Then you learn what you know.' "But is not learning acquiring knowledge?" "Yes." "And you acquire that which you have not got already?" "Yes." "Then you learn that which you did not know."*

Plato's picture is, doubtless, a caricature, exaggerat-

* See Professor Jowett's Introduction to "Euthydemus" in his "Dialogues of Plato," i. p. 184, 2d ed.

ing the fallacious practice of the lower sort of professional disputants to be met with in those days at Athens. But the dialogue "Euthydemus" seems to have suggested to the scientific mind of Aristotle the idea of classifying all the fallacies that had been or could be employed in argument, and the "Sophistical Confutations" is the result. To the value of this book it makes no difference how far the quibbles and deceptive reasonings adduced had been actually used by certain definite individuals for mercenary purposes, or whether, historically speaking, the professional "Sophists" of Greece were as bad as Plato had represented them. Putting the "Sophists" of Greece quite out of consideration, fallacy, whether voluntery or involuntary, will still remain, and is still always incident to human reasoning. And this it is which Aristotle undertakes to classify. It might be thought that errors in reasoning were infinite in number, and incapable of being reduced to definite species; but this is not the case, because every unsound reasoning is the counterfeit of some sound reasoning, and only gains credence as such. But the forms of sound reasoning are strictly limited in number, and therefore the forms of fallacy must be limited also. Ambiguity in language is, of course, one main source of fallacy; and fallacy arises whenever either the major, the minor, or the middle term of a syllogism is used with a double meaning. It will be seen above that the quibblers in "Euthydemus" employ the terms "wise," "learn," and "know" in double senses so as to cause confusion.

Aristotle's account of the fallacies attaching to syllogistic or deductive reasoning is complete and exhaustive, and has been the source of all that has subsequently been writen on the subject. The fallacies of *amphibolia, accidens, a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter,*

ignoratio elenchi, petitio principii, consequens, non causa pro causa, and *plures interrogationes* have become the property of modern times, with names Latinized from those by which Aristotle first distinguished them; and in Whately's and other compendiums, they may be found duly explained. It is true that Aristotle does not investigate the sources of error attaching to the inductive process; the "idols of the tribe" and "of the den" he left for Bacon to denounce; and the fallacies of "inspection," colligation and the rest to be supplied by Whewell and Mill. But with regard to this, it must be observed that he treats of the doctrine of Fallacies as supplementary, not to the Logic of Science, but to Dialectic. All through the "Sophistical Confutations" we have a background of Hellenic disputation,—the questioner and the answerer are hotly engaged, and the bystanders keenly interested,—Aristotle in analyzing fallacy is primarily contributing artistic rules for the conduct of the game. The local and temporary object has passed away, and much of the original importance of the book has accordingly been lost; but the distinctions which were here for the first time drawn out have passed over into Logic, and have doubtless contributed somewhat to clear up the thought and language of Europe.

CHAPTER IV.

ARISTOTLE'S "RHETORIC" AND "ART OF POETRY."

We have seen how Aristotle, when a young man, during his first residence at Athens, opened a school of Rhetoric, in rivalry to the veteran Isocrates. During his second residence, he presided over a school, not of Rhetoric alone, but of Philosophy and of all knowl-

edge. Yet it is said that in the Peripatetic school "Rhetoric was both scientifically and assiduously taught."* Rhetoric had now, however, become for Aristotle merely one in that wide range of sciences, each of which he had set himself, as far as possible, to bring to perfection. He turned to it, in due course, from his achievements in Logic, and produced his great treatise on this subject. Goethe said of his "Faust" that "he had carried it for twenty years in his head, till it had become pure gold." The first part of the "Rhetoric" of Aristotle bears marks of having gone through a similar process. The outlines of its arrangement are characterized by luminous simplicity, the result of long analytic reflection; the scientific exposition is made in a style which is, for Aristotle, remarkably easy and flowing; and each part of the subject is adorned with a wealth of illustration which indicates the accumulation of a lifetime.

Several treatises on Rhetoric had appeared in Greece before Aristotle sat down to write about it. Only one of these, but perhaps the best of them, has come down to us. Curiously enough it has been preserved among the works of Aristotle, as if it had been written by him, and it goes by the name of the "Rhetoric addressed to Alexander," having a spurious dedication to Alexander the Great tacked on to it. It is believed by scholars to be the work of Anaximenes of Lampsacus, an eminent historian and rhetorician contemporary with Aristotle. It is entirely practical in its aim, but it bears traces of the sophistical leaven, and deals overmuch in those tricks of argument and disputation which got the

* Professor Jebb's "Attic Orators," ii. 431. See Diog Laert., V. 1. 3.

Sophists their bad name. The other lost systems of Rhetoric by Corax, Tisias, Antiphon, Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and others, appear to have been all strictly practical. Aristotle complains* that they confined themselves too much to treating of forensic oratory, and to expounding the methods best adapted for working on the feelings of a jury. His own aim is broader and more philosophical: while he defines Rhetoric as "the art of seeing what elements of persuasion attach to any subject," he traces out these "elements of persuasion" to their root in the principles of human nature.

The "sources of persuasion" Aristotle reduces to three heads: *first*, the personal character which the orator is able to exhibit or assume; *second*, the mood into which he is able to bring his hearers; *third*, the arguments or apparent arguments which he can adduce. That this is a correct division, we can see in a moment by applying it to any great piece of oratory in ancient or modern times. For instance, take the speech of Antony over the body of Julius Cæsar, as imagined by Shakespeare,—here the orator's first object evidently is to inspire belief in himself as "a plain, blunt man," with no ulterior purposes, merely devoted to his friend, bewildered by the death of that friend, unable to understand how confessedly "honorable" men should have brought it about. Accordingly, in the first pause of the speech the citizens say to each other:

"2*d Cit.* Poor soul! his eyes are red as fire with weeping.
3*d Cit.* There's not a nobler man in Rome than Antony."

* There was another system of Rhetoric, which, perhaps, should not be included in this number—namely, the "Rhetoric of Theodectes" which Aristotle refers to in his third book (III. ix. 10), as containing a classification of prose periods. There was a tradition that Aristotle contributed an introduction to the "Rhetoric of Theodectes."

The second object is to produce in the hearers a frame of mind favorable to the designs of the orator, who accordingly awakens in them the passions of gratitude and love towards the memory of Cæsar by the recital of his good deeds, then leads them on to pity and indignation at the thought of the injustice done to him, and finally rouses them to horror and rage by the actual sight of his wounded corpse. Besides this assumption of a particular character, and these appeals to the passions, there are intellectual arguments running through the speech, to the effect that Cæsar was unjustly accused of ambition, and unjustly put to death. And the practical conclusion is urged on the hearers by all these various means—that they should rise in revolt and avenge the death of Cæsar upon his murderers.

This imaginary speech belongs, of course, to the class of deliberative oratory, the object of which is to recommend some course of action. This kind, says Aristotle, deals with the furure; while judicial oratory, in criminal or civil cases, endeavors to give a certain complexion to the transactions of the past. And there is a third kind, the oratory of display, which, in proposing toasts and the like, deals chiefly in descriptions of the present. In each of the three kinds of oratory, the three "sources of persuasion" above noted, must be employed. But in order to exhibit the features of a particular character the orator must know the moral nature of man in its various phases; and, in order to work upon the feelings, he must know, so to speak, the inner anatomy of the feelings. A knowledge of human nature is, of course, essential for producing persuasion in the minds of men, and Aristotle thus says that Rhetoric is a compound of Logic and Moral Philosophy. In this treatise he supplies a rich fund of psychological remarks on

the various passions and characteristics of men. In the condensed knowledge of the world which it displays the "Rhetoric" might be compared with Bacon's "Essays." It might be compared also with them in this respect—that a bad and Machiavellian use might certainly be made of some of the suggestions which it contains, though Aristotle professes to give them solely to be used in the cause of truth and justice.

With regard to the third "source of persuasion"—the arguments used by an orator must not be scientific demonstrations, nor even dialectical syllogisms, but rhetorical arguments, such as the conditions and circumstances of oratory will admit. For the orator is not like the scientific demonstrator before his pupils, nor is he like the dialectician with his respondent, who will grant him the premises of his argument. The orator has to address a crowd of listeners, with whom as yet he is not in relation; he has to catch, without fatiguing, their attention, and to suggest conclusions without going through every step of the inference. All reasoning, however, must be either inductive or deductive, and the arguments of Rhetoric must each belong to one of these two forms. Aristotle, adapting special names for the purpose, says that the *enthymeme* of Rhetoric answers to the syllogism of Logic, and that the *example* of Rhetoric answers to the induction of Logic.

The word "enthymeme" seems to mean etymologically "a putting into one's mind," or "a suggestion." It is a rhetorical syllogism with premises constructed out of "likelihoods," or "signs." Some critics consider that it was essential to the "enthymeme" to have one of its premises suppressed; but Aristotle only says ("Rhet." I. ii. 13) that this was frequently the case. The real characteristic of the "enthymeme" was its suggestive,

but non-conclusive, character; for the premises, even if expressed in full, would not be sufficient to enforce the conclusion which is pointed at. The "enthymeme" argues either from a "likelihood," that is—a cause which might produce a given effect, though it is not certain to do so; or else from a "sign," that is—an effect which might have been produced by a given cause, though it might also have been produced by something else. To prove that A murdered B, you may argue from the "likelihood" that he would do so, because he was known to have been at feud with him; or from the "sign" that A had blood upon him. Let us observe some of the "enthymemes" in the speech of Antony:

(1.) "He hath brought many captives home to Rome,
Whose ransoms did the general coffers fill:
Did this in Cæsar seem ambitious?
(2.) When that the poor have cried, Cæsar hath wept;
Ambition should be made of sterner stuff.
(3.) You all did see, that on the Lupercal
I thrice presented him a kingly crown,
Which he did thrice refuse. Was this ambition?"

These three arguments are based on "signs;" acts of Cæsar are adduced as showing in him a disinterestedness, a tenderness of heart, and a modesty which would be incompatible with selfish ambition. But the reasoning is not conclusive, since the acts mentioned might have flowed from other sources than good qualities of the heart—they might have been done "with a motive." However, there is fully as much cogency here as can ordinarily be expected to be found in the deductions of an orator. The only inductive reasoning of which oratory is capable is the "example," or historical instance. Instead of gathering sufficient instances to establish a law, which would be the scientific method, the orator

quotes one instance pointing in the direction of a law. Thus "Dionysius, in asking to be allowed a body-guard, aims at establishing a tyranny;—did not Pisistratus do just the same?" The "example" is, of course, an arguing by analogy, and the question must always be whether the cases compared with each other are really analogous, or whether there is any essential difference in the circumstances. Aristotle says that some orators deal more in examples, others more in enthymemes. He is inclined to think that in obtaining applause the enthymemes are the more successful.

After thus setting forth the general framework of oratory, Aristotle proceeds to make suggestions with regard to the matter of speeches. This will naturally be different in kind for the three different kinds of oratory. Him who is to practice deliberative oratory, Aristotle advises to study and make himself well acquainted with five points relative to the State to which he belongs: its finance; its foreign relations; the state of its defenses; its imports and exports; and its system of law.* In reference to the last of these, Aristotle recommends the comparative study of political constitutions, and for that end that the accounts of travelers should be read. He adds that for political debate in general a knowledge of the works of historians is a valuable preparation.

These, however, are mere hints, directing the student to funds of information which lie outside of the art of Rhetoric. Aristotle proceeds to furnish the orator with definitions and theories which he considered (at all events when he was writing this treatise) to belong to

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* The same points are specified in the advice given by Socrates to a young politician—Xenophon "Memorab." iii. 6.

Rhetoric itself, though it would have perhaps been a better classification of science if he had merely indicated that a knowledge of these matters was necessary, and had referred the student to Moral Philosophy for full particulars with regard to them. The result is that he gives a brilliant summary by anticipation of a considerable portion of his "Ethics." As in the "Topics" he thought it necessary to make long lists of commonplaces for the use of the dialectician, so here he gives lists of heads to be borne in mind by the deliberative orator. It is not necessary for us to follow Aristotle in anticipating his theory of morals. It need only be mentioned that, after premising that the idea of obtaining personal good, or happiness, is what actuates men in deliberation, he proceeds to give what may be called a provisional theory of happiness and its component parts; he then specifies thirty different grounds on which a thing might be recommended as good, and forty other grounds upon which a thing might be shown to be comparatively good, or better than something else. He winds up his instructions for the deliberate orator with brief remarks on the scope and character of different forms of government, which are afterwards fully expanded in the "Politics."

The oratory of display deals especially with praise and eulogy, as we know from the specimens of it most familiar to us—the funeral oration, and the post-prandial speech. The orator in this kind must have before him a clear idea of what constitutes virtue, and of what is, or is considered, most honorable among men. And for his benefit Aristotle inserts a chapter on these subjects, though they more properly belong to moral science. He adds, however, some hints on the rhetorical device of amplification in laudatory, or other,

statements. He appends the remark that a knowledge of the theory of virtue is necessary for the deliberative orator also, for the purposes of exhortation and advice. He thus would evidently class hortative addresses, like the modern sermon, under the head of deliberative oratory.

For the use of the forensic orator, who has to argue in accusation or defense, the following equipment of knowledge is provided by Aristotle: 1st, A brief summary of the motives of human action; 2d, An analytical account of pleasure and things pleasurable—for these figure most prominently among human motives; 3d, An analysis of the moods of mind in which men commit injustice; 4th, A distinction between different kinds of law and right; 5th, Remarks on degrees of guilt; and, 6th, Hints for dealing with statutes, documents, and the evidence of witnesses whether these be for or against the orator. Under the 4th head, Aristotle has some fine remarks on the universal law of nature, and on equity.* As a specimen the latter may be quoted:

"It is equity to pardon human feelings, and to look to the lawgiver, and not to the law; to the spirit, and not to the letter; to the intention, and not to the action; to the whole, and not to the part; to the character of the actor in the long-run, and not in the present moment;—to remember good rather than evil, and good that one has received rather than good that one has done; to bear being injured; to wish to settle a matter by words rather than by deeds; lastly, to prefer arbitration to judgment, for the arbitrator sees what is equitable, but the judge only the law, and for this

* *Epieikeia*—that quality which Mr Matthew Arnold defines as "a sweet reasonableness."

an arbitrator was first appointed, in order that equity might flourish."

So much for the materials of oratory. In making use of them it will be further necessary for the orator to be acquainted with the leading passions and dispositions of men, in order that he may successfully appeal to the feelings of his hearers. Accordingly, the second book of the "Rhetoric" supplies him with a treatise on the characteristics of Anger, Placability, Friendliness, Hatred, Fear, Shame, Gratitude, Pity, Indignation, Envy, and Emulation; of the three stages of human life—Youth, Maturity, and Old Age; and of the three social conditions—Rank, Wealth, and Power. In these disquisitions there is, probably, embodied much of the collective wisdom of Greece; but there is, doubtless, also a great deal of original analysis, worked out by Aristotle himself once for all, and which has remained valid ever since. Such, for instance, are his six points of contrast between Anger and Hatred ("Rhet." II. iv. 30):

1st, Anger rises out of something personal to ourselves; Hatred is independent of this. We may hate a man merely because we conceive him to be of a certain description. 2d, Anger is invariably against individuals; Hatred may embrace whole classes. 3d, Anger is to be remedied by time; Hatred is incurable. 4th, Anger wishes to inflict pain, so that its operation may be felt and acknowledged, and thus satisfaction obtained; Hatred wishes nothing of the kind—it merely wishes that a mischief may be done, without caring that the source of it be known. 5th, Anger is a painful feeling; but Hatred not. 6th, Anger, when a certain amount of pain has been inflicted upon its

object, may easily turn into pity; Hatred, under all circumstances, is incapable of this—it desires nothing less than the absolute destruction and non-existence of its object."

With all his subtlety and knowledge of the world Aristotle does not exhibit any of the cynicism of Hobbes or Rochefoucauld. He is far from denying the existence of disinterested and noble feelings. Thus, for instance, he defines friendly feeling to consist in "the wishing a person what we think good, for his sake and not for our own, and as far as is in our power, the exerting ourselves to procure it." Pity he defines to be "a sort of pain occasioned by the appearance of a hurtful or destructive ill (such as one's self or one's connections might possibly have to endure) happening to one who does not deserve it." Here fellow-feeling is mentioned as necessary for realizing the ills which excite our pity, but that by no means reduces pity to a mere selfish apprehension on our own account. "The essence of pity," says Aristotle elsewhere ("Poet." xxv.), "is that it is caused by the sight of *undeserved* calamity." Thus it proceeds from a sense of moral justice arising in the heart. Aristotle does not regard men as the natural enemies of each other; on the contrary, he thinks benevolent feelings to be natural, and to play a considerable part in the organization of society. He defines "kindness" * to be "that quality

* *Charis*, a word which can hardly be translated, as it means not only kindness, grace, or favor, but also the reciprocal feeling of gratitude for kindness. The *Charites* or Graces were the Greek personifications of reciprocal feelings of kindness. Hence the temple of the Graces symbolized the mutual services of men to each other, on which society depends (see "Eth." V. v. 7).

by which one does a service to him who needs it, not in return for anything, nor in order that one may get anything one's self, but simply to benefit the recipient." He considers human nature to be capable of great moral elevation in the persons of the wise and good; at the same time he regarded the majority of mankind as poor creatures, though rather weak than wicked. Thus ("Rhet." II. v. 7), he says, "the majority of men are timid and corruptible," and in "Eth." VII. vii. 1, it is said that "most men are in a state between continence and incontinence, but rather verging towards the worst side."

We may conclude our extracts from the second book of the "Rhetoric" with Aristotle's remark on the prime of life, which Dr. Arnold of Rugby used to be fond of quoting: "The body," says Aristotle, "is in its prime from the age of thirty to thirty-five, and the mind about the age of forty-nine." It has been observed that university undergraduates are apt to consider these ages as set too high, while senior tutors have been known to complain of them as only applicable to precocious southern nations.

From what we have indicated it will be seen that the first two books of the "Rhetoric" consist mainly of observations on human nature. Towards the close of them Aristotle fell upon the subject of fallacious "enthymemes," and this led him to suspend the work he had in hand, and to write that treatise on "Sophistical Confutations," or "Fallacies," of which we have already given an account. After which he wrote his "Ethics," until the subject of "Justice" turned up, and he then went on to discuss the bases of this quality in his "Politics." The subject of "Education" seems to have led Aristotle from the compilation of the last-

named treatise to write his "Art of Poetry," which naturally involved the discussion of rules of style; and this, by an equally natural transition, suggested the completion of the "Rhetoric," by the addition of a third book on Style and Arrangement.

This book has of course not quite so universal an interest as the former ones. The interest attaching to it is necessarily to some extent antiquarian—as, for instance, when Aristotle details the five points on which an idiomatic style in Greek depends—viz., a proper use of connective particles; and of specially appropriate instead of general words; constructing the sentence so as to avoid ambiguity; using right genders; and right numbers. The specification of the latter points (as well as similar injunctions in the "Art of Poetry") show in how infantile a condition the science of Grammar was in Aristotle's time. He lays down here some of the things which "every schoolboy knows."

The book is not only a good deal limited to the instruction of Greek readers belonging to the fourth century B.C., but it also deals a good deal in allusions which such readers would perfectly understand, but which are obscure for us. Instead of quoting at some length the beauties of oratory, it frequently indicates passages by merely mentioning a single word out of them. There is generally speaking an air of scientific dryness in its treatment even of the most poetical metaphors. For instance, we are told that it is far better to call Aurora the "rosy-fingered" than the "purple-fingered," and still more so than to call her the "red-fingered." But charms of style from the Greek writers appear in this book like moths and butterflies pinned on to corks in the collection of an entomologist. Aristotle's fondness for classification seems carried too far

here; he incessantly analyzes and enumerates, as for instance when he tells us that there are four ways by which "flatness" in a speech is produced. The principles laid down are of course sound and sensible—as, for example, that "the chief merit of style is clearness," that the orator must not use poetical language, and that his sentences must be rhythmical, without falling into meter. Aristotle objects to having a sentence ended with a short syllable, because the voice cannot rest on it so as to mark a stop; he thinks that the end of each sentence should be marked out by the rhythm, so as not to need punctuation. He recommends the use of the *pæon*, a foot consisting of three short syllables and one long syllable (as ănăchrŏnism), for the rhythmical finish of sentences. The point, however, is not gone into with any exactness; and we are left in doubt as to the proportion which accent bore to "quantity" in ancient Greek oratory. On the one hand we know that accent has had such a firm hold on the Greek language as in the course of time utterly to overpower and eliminate quantity. Thus modern Greek is spoken entirely according to accent without regard to quantity. On the other hand ancient Greek poetry must have been read almost entirely in reference to the quantity of the syllables, without regard to accent. How it stood with ancient Greek rhythmical prose, is a question which Aristotle does not help us to solve. In fact there is a certain matter-of-fact bluntness, and a want of the delicacy and humor of genius, pervading his criticisms. And it is remarkable that his illustrations are more drawn from poetry than from prose—apparently more from books than from living sources—and that he never mentions with appreciation the oratory of Demosthenes. Some of the greatest speeches of Demosthenes,

especially his Olynthiac orations, had been spoken at Athens when Aristotle was little more than thirty years of age, just about the time when he was attempting to rival Isocrates in the teaching of Rhetoric. It would be extraordinary if these splendid harangues made no impression upon him. But it must be observed that he does not pass any general criticism upon Pericles, or any other orator. And it is possible also that a fear of offending the Macedonian royal family may have prevented Aristotle from praising the anti-Macedonian statesman, though he was the greatest orator among the ancients.

After treating of style, Aristotle briefly discusses arrangement. He divides a speech into exordium, statement, proof, and peroration, and says something on the points to be aimed at in each. He adds some shrewd advice on the use that may be made of putting adroit questions to an opponent; and he mentions with approval the maxim of Gorgias that "when your adversary is earnest you should silence him with ridicule, and when he tries ridicule you should silence him with earnestness." He neatly winds up his "Rhetoric" with the specimen of a peroration: "I have spoken—you have heard. You have the matter before you—judge of it."

Aristotle's little treatise called "Poetic," or the "Art of Poetry," is very interesting, but it does not take the modern or romantic view of Poetry. Aristotle does not seek to find here—

> "The light that never was, on sea or land,
> The consecration, and the Poet's dream."

He simply defines poetry as one of the imitative arts, "such as dancing, flute-playing, painting, etc.:

these different arts, he says, have each their own instrument of imitation, and poetry uses words and meter. However, not all metrical composition is poetry; the verses of Empedocles are philosophy rather than poetry—they lack the quality of being imitative—that is to say, it is not their chief object to depict. Aristotle attributes the *genesis* of poetry, not to any divine impulse, but to those imitative instincts of man, which are exhibited from earliest childhood, and to the intellectual pleasure which we feel in seeing a good imitation even of a painful subject, and in recognizing that "*this* is *that*." Poetry then is imitation, and according to this theory the merit of a good poem would be the same as the merit of a good photograph—exact and mechanical resemblance. Aristotle, however, is not consistent to this view; he evidently admits the idea of some creativeness in the poet—for instance, he says that some poets represent men as better than they really are; and he applauds the practice of Zeuxis, who, in painting his Helen, combined the beauties out of several fair faces. He seems to approach the modern point of view when he says (xvii. 2) that "Poetry is the province of a genius or a madman;" for the one can feign and the other feels stormy passions. But it must be observed that the word for "a genius" here, is merely "well-natured"—a word elsewhere used for one who has a good moral disposition, and generally for one who has natural gifts. In fact, the philosophy of the imagination was a part of psychology not at all worked out in the time of Aristotle; there was as yet no word to express what we mean by "imagination." When Aristotle uses the word *phantasia*, he means by it, not the creative faculty, but an image before the mind's eye. While the Greeks were the most imaginative of peoples,

they had not as yet analyzed the processes of imagination. And the want of a terminology connected with this subject is felt throughout the "Poetic" of Aristotle.

Poetry consists in imitation, mainly of the actions of men; and there are three great species of it—Epic poetry, Tragedy and Comedy. Of these three kinds Aristotle undertakes to treat; but the promise is only fulfilled with regard to the two first; the treatise breaks off at the point where a disquisition on Comedy might have been expected. Comedy, according to modern views, would hardly be reckoned to be poetry at all. Aristotle, in stating what Comedy is, gives his famous definition of the "ludicrous." Tragedy, he says, aims at representing men who are above the average; comedy, men who are below it. But the characters in comedy are not so much morally bad, as ugly. There is a certain pleasure derivable from ugliness, and that is the sense of the ludicrous. "The ludicrous is some fault or blemish not suggesting the idea of pain or death; as, for instance, an ugly twisted face is ludicrous, if there is no idea that the owner of it is in pain." This saying has been the foundation of all subsequent philosophy of laughter. Elsewhere Aristotle defines the ludicrous as "harmless incongruity." We laugh from a pleasurable sense of contrast and surprise when a thing is out of place but no serious evil seems likely to result.

Aristotle's account of Tragedy is a profound piece of æsthetic philosophy. By implication he defends Tragedy against Plato, who had wished to banish the drama from his ideal republic, as tending to make men unmanly. Aristotle defines Tragedy as the "imitation of some noble action, great and complete in itself; in melodious diction; with different measures to suit the

different parts; by men acting, and not by narration; effecting through pity and fear the purging of such feelings." The latter words contain the office and the justification of Tragedy. Men's minds are prone to be haunted by the feelings of pity and fear, and these are apt to degenerate into sentimentality. Tragedy offers noble objects whereon these feelings may be exercised; and by that exercise the feelings not only receive a right direction, but also are relieved, being removed, so to speak, for the time from the system. After much discussion * on the subject in Germany, there is now no doubt that in using the term "purging" in the above passage Aristotle was employing a medical metaphor. This is borne out by two passages of the "Politics" (II. vii. 11; VIII. vii. 5), which both refer in similar terms to the relief of the passions procured by indulging them. He promised a fuller explanation of his theory on this subject, but unfortunately has never given it. However, we are perhaps safe in understanding that, while Plato objected to Tragedy as tending to make men soft by the excitement of their sympathetic feelings, Aristotle said "No—those feelings will be purged and carried off from the system by the operation of Tragedy."

As to the means by which Tragedy is to excite pity and terror, Aristotle says that it will not do to exhibit a purely good man falling into adversity—that would be rather horrible than tragic; nor, in the other hand, would the representation of a villain receiving the retribution due to his crimes be a tragical story, however moral it might be. We require the element of un-

* See "Aristotle über Kunst, besonders über Tragödie," von Dr. Reinkens) Vienna, 1870), p. 70–167.

deserved calamity; and yet there must be some justice, too, in the course of events, so that while we feel sorrow for what occurs, we shall feel also that things could not have been otherwise. The tale of Œdipus is often mentioned by Aristotle as a perfect subject for Tragedy. We may add that Mr. Tennyson's "Harold" exhibits in this respect the same qualities; we see in it a noble character borne along to an undeserved and calamitous doom; and yet there is a sense that this is, partly at all events, the result of his own doing. Aristotle is not in favor of a tragedy ending happily. He says that poets sometimes make happy endings out of concession to the weakness of the spectators, but that this is quite a mistake, and that such endings are more suitable to comedy. He praises Euripides as the "most tragic of the poets," on account of the doleful terminations of his plays, "though in other respects he did not manage well."

Much stress has been laid, especially by the French, on "the unities" of the drama, as supposed to be prescribed by Aristotle's "Poetic." But in reality he attaches no importance to the external unities of time and place. In enumerating the differences between tragedy and epic poetry, he says (v. 8) that "the one generally tries to limit its action to a period of twenty-four hours, or not much to exceed that, while the other is unlimited in point of time." But he does not lay this down as a law for Tragedy. The peculiarity of the Greek drama, in which a chorus remained constantly present and the curtain never fell, almost necessitated "the unities;" but Aristotle only concerns himself with internal unity, which he says (viii. 4) that Tragedy must have, in common with every other work of art, and which consists in making every part bear an organic re-

lation to the whole, so that no part could be altered or omitted without the whole suffering. This principle, far more valuable than that of "the unities," would seem to need re-assertion, for we might almost say that it is habitually violated by writers of fiction in the present day—at all events by all but the very few who may be placed in the first class.

The "Poetic" gives many notices of the rise and progress of the Greek drama, and the modifications which tragedy and comedy went through, and much information as to the technical divisions of a play, and other such matters; but all these points have become the property of manuals of "Greek Antiquities." Aristotle notes a decadence of the drama in his own day: he complains of authors spoiling their plays by introducing episodes merely to suit particular actors: he considers that *spectacle* is carried too far, and that it is a mistake to aim at producing tragical effect by elaborate and expensive scenery and apparatus: he also thinks that acting is overdone. Aristotle shows an extensive acquaintance with dramatic literature; and, by mentioning it, he makes us regret the loss of "The Flower," a play by Agathon, which seems to have been entirely original, and not based on any traditional story.

The remarks here made on Epic poetry are comparatively brief. Aristotle considers it of less importance than Tragedy. He says that every merit which the Epic possesses is to be found in Tragedy. Like Tragedy, the Epic must possess unity of plot, but it may indulge to a greater extent in episodes. Aristotle never loses an opportunity of praising Homer, whom he considers to be the author, not only of the "Iliad" and "Odyssey," but also of a comic poem called "Margites." He especially commends the art of Homer in making the action

of the "Iliad" and "Odyssey" respectively circle round definite central events. Although it is a narrative, Epic poetry will always be distinct from history: the one has an artistic unity which is wanting to the other; the one describes what might have been, the other what has been; the one deals in universal, the other in particular, truth. The result of this whole comparison is, that "Poetry is more philosophical and more earnest than History."

The "Poetic" branches off, towards its close, into an immature disquisition on style, which led Aristotle to go back to his "Rhetoric," and write the third book thereof. Here he even lays down some of the elements of grammar, and enumerates the parts of speech. He adds a curious chapter (xxv.) on Criticisms, and how to answer them, in which the spirit of the dialectician is very apparent. All this shows that Aristotle was only gradually feeling his way to the division of sciences. He wrote, as it were, under pressure, on one great subject after another, and the light only dawned on him as he went along. Could he have rewritten his works, probably all would have been brought into lucid order. But it is clear that the little treatise called "Poetic" not only was never rewritten, but was never finished as its author intended it to be.

CHAPTER V.

ARISTOTLE'S "ETHICS."

ARISTOTLE'S treatise on Morals has come down to us entitled "Nicomachean Ethics." This label was probably affixed to the work on account of Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, having had some subordinate connec-

tion with it, either as scribe or editor; and in order to distinguish it in the Peripatetic library from the "Eudemian Ethics," which is a sort of paraphrase of Aristotle's treatise by his disciple Eudemus—and from the "Great Ethics," which is a restatement of the same matter by some later Peripatetic hand. Among the Works of Aristotle there is also included a little tract "On Virtues and Vices." This is a mere paper, such as the Peripatetic school used to produce, noting characteristics of some of the Aristotelian good qualities and their opposites, and with no pretensions to be considered genuine.

After going through, under the guidance of Aristotle, the theory of the reasonings by which knowledge is obtained, and the theory of the statement by which knowledge may be best set forth, we now enter, in the "Nicomachean Ethics," upon some of the matter of knowledge—namely, Aristotle's theory of human life. But what strikes us on reading the early chapters of this treatise is that, when he began to write it, Aristotle had no clear conception of the existence of Moral Philosophy as a separate science. The question which he proposes is, What is the end, or supreme good, aimed at by human action? He adds that the science which will have to settle this will be a branch of Politics—that is, of State-philosophy—for the chief good of the State and of the individual are identical, only the one is on a grander scale than the other. In this exordium we may notice two especially Greek features: *first*, the cardinal question proposed for the philosophy of human life is not, What is the duty of man? but, What is the chief good for man? *Secondly*, the individual is so far subordinated to and identified with the State, that the *summum bonum* for the latter includes that of the

former. In Aristotle's "Politics" (VII. iii. 8), the chief good for a State is portrayed as consisting in the development and play of speculative thought, all fit conditions thereto having been provided. The idea is—a Greek city, with a slave population doing the hard work, wherein the citizens for the most part can live as gentlemen, and a large proportion of them may devote their lives to intellectual pursuits. Aristotle thought that the highest aim for a State was to turn out philosophers, and that the highest aim for an individual was to be a philosopher. Thus there is a seeming identity of aims; yet still in writing his "Ethics" Aristotle confines himself to inquiring after "the good" for the individual. As he goes on, it dawns upon him more and more (see "Eth." v. 5–11), that "the man" has an independent status distinct from that of "the citizen," and that in his capacity of human being each citizen has needs, aims, and virtues of his own, irrespective of the State. Thus by composing this work he established the separation of Ethics from Politics—these two sciences having been previously mixed up together by Socrates and Plato, who were the great founders of both.

What constitutes the chief good for an individual, or in other words, happiness? Aristotle is somewhat abstract and metaphysical in arguing upon this question. He says, happiness must be an end in itself, and not a means to anything else; it must lie within the proper sphere or function of man—that function being a rational and moral life; it must be, not a merely dormant state, but a state of conscious vitality; and lastly, it must be in accordance with the law of excellence proper to the function of man. Thus we arrive at the general idea that the highest happiness consists in the harmonious

exercise of man's highest powers; and the treatise ends by declaring particularly that the speculative reason is man's highest endowment, and that the truest happiness consists in philosophic thought.

"This," he exclaims ("Eth." X. vii. 7), "would be perfect human happiness, if prolonged through a life of full duration. Such a life, however, would be superhuman; for it is not as being man that one will live thus, but by virtue of a certain divine element subsisting within us. Just as this element far excels our composite nature, so does its operation excel action according to the moral virtues. Reason in comparison with man is something divine, and so is the life of Reason divine in comparison with the routine of man's life. One must not, however, obey those who bid us "think humbly as being mortal men," nay rather we should indulge immortal longings, and strive to live up to that divine particle within us, which, though it be small in proportionate bulk, yet in power and dignity far surpasses all the other parts of our nature, and which is indeed each man's proper self. By living in accordance with it our true individuality will be developed. And such a life cannot fail to be happy above all other kinds of life."

This, then, is the "mark" which Aristotle sets before men to "shoot at" ("Eth." I. ii. 2)—namely, the attainment of a state in which one should live above the world, occupied with philosophic thought. It is an ideal picture, to which, however, approximations may doubtless be made. To attain it completely would be, according to Aristotle, to attain the life of the blessed existences, such as the sun and the fixed stars, and of God Himself, whose essence is Reason, and His life "a thinking upon thought" ("Met." XI. ix. 4). This, he

admits, is impossible for us; but yet, he says, we should aim at it. "Secondary to this," he says, "in point of happiness, is the life of moral virtue." And here we must notice the peculiar way in which the idea of "virtue" is introduced into the "Ethics." Instead of at once recognizing the law of moral obligation as the deepest thing in man, Aristotle, as we have seen above, introduces the idea of virtue and morality in a dry logical way, saying that the chief good for man must consist in the realization of his powers "according to their own proper law of excellence." Having in this colorless and neutral way brought in the term "excellence" or virtue, Aristotle divides it, in relation to man, into moral and intellectual. Of the former he proceeded immediately to treat at length; of the latter he promised to give an account, but only an imperfect realization of that promise, furnished by the "Eudemian" paraphrase, has come down to us.

Both by the way in which it is introduced, and the terms in which it is finally dismissed ("Eth." X. viii. 1), the moral nature of man is made to hold a subsidiary place in Aristotle's "Ethics." Yet still we find that almost all the treatise is taken up with discussions directly or indirectly concerning the practical and moral nature. And thus Aristotle, groping his way in a science which had as yet no distinct landmarks, contributed much towards the subsequent deeper conception of ethical questions. One service which he performed was to distinguish will from reason. Socrates and Plato had been content to describe virtue as knowledge, or an enlightened state of the reason; but Aristotle, like Kant in modern times, defined it as a state of the will. Secondly, he analyzed the formation of this state, and explained it by his doctrine of

"habits." By observing the various arts—as, for instance, harp-playing, and the like—he saw that "practice makes perfect;" and concluded that as by playing the harp a man became a harp-player, so by doing just things a man would become just, by doing brave things he would become brave; and, in short, that actions have a tendency to reproduce themselves, and thus to produce habits or states of the will. All this is trite enough now, but it was formulated for the first time by Aristotle.

In laying down his famous doctrine that it is the characteristic of virtue to preserve "the mean," Aristotle was not entirely original. In this, as in many other cases, he only fixed into scientific form a conception which had been previously floating in the mind of Greece. Hesiod, the Seven Sages, the unknown authors of "Maxims," the Gnomic poets, Pindar, and the Tragedians, had all preached the doctrine of moderation—a doctrine most congenial to the natural good taste of the Hellenic people, who instinctively despised excess in any form as unintellectual and barbarous. What had hitherto been a universal popular *dictum*, Plato raised into philosophy, by pointing out ("Philebus," p. 23–27) that in all things the law of "limit" is the cause of good, while the unlimited, the unregulated, the chaotic, is evil. Thus, in the human body, the unlimited is the tendency to extremes, to disorder, to disease; but the introduction of the limit produces a balance of the constitution and good health. In sounds you have the infinite degrees of deep and high, quick and slow; but the limit gives rise to modulation and harmony, and all that is delightful in music. In climate and temperature, where the limit has been introduced, excessive heats and violent storms subside, and

the mild and genial seasons in their order follow. In the human mind "the goddess of the limit" checks into submission the wild and wanton passions, and gives rise to all that is good. Thus, in contemplating all things, whether physical or moral, there was present to the mind of Plato the same train of associations—the same ideas of measure, proportion, balance, harmony, moderation, and the like. Elsewhere ("Republic," p. 400) he dwells especially on the common characteristics of art and morality, pointing out that measure and symmetry are the causes of excellence in both alike. Aristotle took over these thoroughly Greek ideas from Plato, and adapted them to his own purpose. He slightly changed the mode of expression: instead of "moderation" he introduced a mathematical term, "the mean" (for instance, 2 is the mean between 4 and 6); he used this term as the chief feature in a regular formal definition of moral virtue; and he drew out a table of the virtues showing that each of them was a mean between two extremes. Thus the virtue Courage lies between the vice Cowardice, which is fearing too much, and the vice Rashness, which is fearing too little. And virtue generally is a balance between too much and too little. It is produced by the introduction of the law of the mean into the passions, which in themselves are unlimited. But what is this "mean"—this *juste milieu*—and how is it ascertained? Aristotle tells us that it is not merely the mid-point between two external quantities, but it is the mid-point relatively to the moral agent. What is too much for one man—say, of danger, expense, indulgence, or self-valuation—may be by no means too much for another man. The moral mean is thus a fluctuating quantity, dependent on considerations of the person and the moment. To hit

upon it exactly requires a fine tact, for "virtue is more nice and delicate than the finest of the fine arts" ("Eth." II. vi. 9). This tact, or sense of moral beauty, we have by nature ("Politics," I. ii. 12); but it only exists in perfection, after cultivation by experience, in the mind of the wise man, and to him in all cases must be the ultimate appeal.

Objection has been raised in modern times to the theory of Aristotle, on the ground that it makes only a quantitative difference between virtue and vice. A little more or a little less does not seem to us to constitute the whole difference which subsists between "right" and "wrong." But we must remember that the Greeks did not speak of actions as "right" or "wrong," but as "beautiful" and "ugly." From this point of view each action was looked upon as a work of art; and as in art and literature, so in morals, the great aim was to avoid the "too much" and the "too little," and thus to attain perfection. This idea of beauty and grace in action pervaded the Hellenic life, and good taste seemed to stand in the place of conscience. To attain "the beautiful" is considered by Aristotle, if inferior to the joys of philosophy, still as a source of very high gratification; and he describes the brave man ("Eth." III. ix. 4) as consciously meeting death in a good cause, and consciously sacrificing a happy life, full of objects which he holds dear, because by so doing he attains "the beautiful." If we ask, however, what constituted the beauty of this act, Aristotle's doctrine can only tell us that the brave man dared and feared neither too much nor too little, but in the proper degree and manner, considering the circumstances of the moment. These *formulæ*, however, do not appear to explain what we should consider the

moral beauty of the act in question. We should rather point to the self-sacrifice of the act—the spectacle of an individual preferring to his own life the good of others, the defense of his country, the maintenance of some noble cause—as what was beautiful and touching. "The mean" may serve as a general expression for the law of artistic beauty, but it seems not deep enough to express what we prize most in human action.

Aristotle's table of the virtues does not, of course, comprise the Christian qualities of humility, charity, chastity, self-devotion, and the like. It even falls short of the summary of human excellence given by Plato in his enumeration of the five cardinal virtues ("Protag.," p. 349)—courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, and holiness. Aristotle separates ethics from religion, and thus leaves out all consideration of "holiness," or man's conduct in relation to God. "Wisdom" and "Justice" he reserves to be made the subject of separate discussions: the one as being an excellence of the intellect, and not a "mean state" of the passions; the other as being dependent on, and mixed up with, all the institutions of the State. The table, then, thus restricted, contains the names of nine or ten good qualities, such as would adorn the character of a perfect Grecian gentleman. They are Courage, Temperance, Liberality, Magnificence (liberality on a larger scale); Magnanimity, or Great-souledness; Self-respect (the same on a smaller scale), Mildness, Wit, Truthfulness of manner, and Friendliness. And the pairs of extremes which respectively environ each of these "mean states" are specified, in some cases names being invented for them. The most moral of the virtues here named, from a modern point of view, is Courage, on account of the self-sacrifice, the endurance of danger, pain, and death, which

it implies. Temperance is far from being represented by Aristotle as an utter self-abnegation; he says (III. xi. 8) that the temperate man, with due regard to his health, and to the means at his disposal, and acting under the law of the beautiful, will preserve a balance in regard to the pleasures of sense. Aristotle loves the virtues of Liberality and Magnificence (the latter meaning tasteful outlay on great objects) on account of their brilliancy. He undervalues the virtue of saving, and erroneously considers that parsimony does more harm than spendthrift waste. He describes Magnanimity by drawing a fancy portrait of the "Great-souled man." Such a man has all the Aristotelian virtues; he is great and superior to other men, and has a corresponding loftiness of soul. He will not compete for the common objects of ambition; he will only attempt great and important matters, and otherwise will seem inactive; he will be open in friendship and hatred, really straightforward and deeply truthful, but reserved and ironical in manner to common people. He will live for his friend alone, will wonder at nothing, will bear no malice, will be no gossip, will not be anxious about trifles, will care more to possess that which is beautiful than that which is profitable. His movements are slow, his voice is deep, and his diction is stately.

The four last virtues in the table are qualities to adorn the external man in society, and as such seem more worthy of a place in Lord Chesterfield's Letters than in a treatise of Moral Philosophy. To be mild without being spiritless; to be friendly without servility; to have a simple manner without either assumption or mock-humility; and to be witty without buffoonery—these achievements constitute the minor excellences with which Aristotle concludes his list. He was proceeding

to show that the law of the mean is exemplified in the instinctive feelings of modesty and virtuous indignation—when, through some unknown cause, his MS. broke off ("Eth." IV. ix.8) in the middle of a sentence.

What should have followed here was, *first*, a dissertation on the nature of Justice; and, *secondly*, an account of the Intellectual excellences. And it was very important that this part of the work should be adequately executed. Under the head of Justice fell to be considered ("Eth." IV. vii. 7) the relation of the individual to truth of word and deed. And an adequate account of Justice and of Wisdom might have redeemed Aristotle's previous account of moral virtue from that superficial appearance which it must be said to present. But unfortunately we do not appear to possess at first hand Aristotle's execution of this part of his task. What happened may perhaps have been this: when Aristotle arrived at this point, he put aside the subject of Justice, to be treated after he had written his "Politics" and had cleared his views on the foundations of Justice in the State. At the same time he put aside the subject of the Intellectual excellences, perhaps till he should have written his "Metaphysics." It must be remembered that he kept many parts of his Encyclopædia in course of construction at once, and he would drop one part and take up another, as suited his train of thought. In the present case he did not entirely abandon his "Ethics," but went on to write the three last books, merely leaving the center part to be filled in subsequently. Doubtless the matter for that center part was expounded to and discussed in the Peripatetic school, but Aristotle probably never himself expressed it in literary form. When, however, Eudemus came to write his paraphrase of the "Ethics,"

he was enabled to fill in the gap which still existed in them by supplying a portion, the matter of which partly came from school notes and partly from Aristotle's other writings, while the language was that of Eudemus himself, continuous with the rest of the paraphrase. Afterwards Nicomachus, or some other editor, took this supplementary piece from the "Eudemian Ethics" and stuck it in as Books V., VI., VII. of the "Ethics" of Aristotle.

The theory of Justice which has thus come down to us as Aristotle's, is indistinctly stated in Book V. It seems to be borrowed a good deal from the "Politics;" it expounds the principles of Justice which exist in the State, and merely defines Justice in the individual as the will to conform to these principles. Thus really no contribution to ethical science is made. It is shown how Justice is manifested (1) in distributions by the State (2) in correcting wrongs done between man and man, (3) in the ordinary course of commerce. Some first steps in political economy, being remarks on the nature of money, on value, and on price, given in chap. v., are perhaps the most interesting points in this book.

Book VI. appears to be a good deal borrowed from Aristotle's "Organon" and treatise "On the Soul." It is confusedly written, and two questions appear to be mixed up in it: (1) What is the Moral Standard? (2) What are the Intellectual excellences? The former question receives no definite answer; with regard to the latter we are informed that there are two distinct and supremely good modes of the intellect—"Wisdom," which is the culmination of the philosophic reason, and "Thought," which is the perfection of the practical reason. This latter quality forms the main subject of

the book. It is described as being developed in combination with the development of the moral will. It is an ideal attribute, and we are told that "he who has 'thought' possesses all the virtues" ("Eth." VI. xiii. 6). The distinction here indicated between the practical and philosophic reason was undoubtedly a contribution to psychology first made by Aristotle. It was an improvement upon the views of Plato, and a step towards those of Kant.

Book VII. supplies, in the words of Eudemus, a valuable complement to Aristotle's moral system. It discusses the intermediate states between virtue and vice, and especially analyzes the state called "incontinence," or "weakness," as exhibited in the process of yielding to temptation. By aid of the forms of the syllogism it is shown how, while having good principles in our mind, we may fail under temptation to act upon them. On the other hand, the idea is introduced of an ideally vicious man, who has no conscience or remorse, but all his mind is in harmony with the dictates of vice; a conception with which we may compare the character drawn by Shelley in his portrait of Count Cenci. The whole of this book is marked by a phraseology different from and later than that of the genuine parts of the 'Ethics.' It deals much in physiological considerations, and it winds up with a modified paraphrase of Aristotle's treatise on Pleasure, given in Book X.

Books VIII. and IX. treat of Friendship, which "is either a virtue, or is closely connected with virtue;" and no part of the whole treatise is more pleasing or admirable. The idea of friendship has probably always found a place among civilized nations, but it obtained peculiar prominence among the Greeks, partly owing to

the subordinate position assigned to women, and the consequent rarity of sympathetic marriages. Among the Dorians, from early times, there had subsisted a custom by which each warrior had attached to him, as his squire a boy whom he was expected to inspire with becoming thoughts. The one member in this pair was called "the inbreather," the other "the listener." Out of this custom sentimental relationships arose, which Plato approving wrote his famous descriptions of those pure and passionate attachments between persons of the same sex, known as "Platonic love." With this sentimentality Aristotle did not sympathize, but yet there is no coldness in his picture of friendship. He asserts enthusiastically the glow of the heart which is caused by contemplating the actions of a virtuous friend (IX. ix. 5), and declares that without this element in life no one can be called truly happy. Lord Bacon's splendid essay "Of Friendship" may be compared with these pages; but Bacon's account of the advantages of a friend is on a lower level and less philosophical than that given by Aristotle, who goes to the root of the matter in saying that what a friend really does for you is, by the joint operation of sympathy and contrast, of *quasi* identity and yet diversity—to intensify the sense of your personal existence, and to give you that vividness of vitality on which happiness depends (IX. ix. 7). In this proposition the two books culminate, but they are full of lucid distinctions, and also of high morality. Friendship (as has been seen above, p. 77) is represented by Aristotle as an utterly disinterested feeling, often calling for great self-sacrifice. Sometimes, he says, the good man may be called upon to die for his friends (IX. viii. 9); and as a delicate form of disinterestedness he inquires whether in some cases one ought not to give

up to one's friend, instead of seizing for one's self, the opportunity of doing noble actions.

Almost the only matter of any importance in the "Ethics" of Aristotle which we have not already summarized is his disquisition on Pleasure in Book X. There was a good deal of abstract questioning in the time of Aristotle as to whether Pleasure could be "the chief good," or whether it could be considered a good at all. The Platonists were disposed to be hard upon Pleasure. But all this turned a good deal upon the prior question, "What Pleasure is?" Aristotle showed that an erroneous definition had been taken up by the Platonic school, who considered pleasure to be a sense of restoration—a sense of our powers, after exhaustion, being brought up to their normal state. Kant has given a very similar definition, saying that "pleasure is the sense of that which promotes life, pain of that which hinders it." Aristotle says that this is wrong; that it applies only to eating and drinking, and such things, and that Pleasure is not "the sense of what promotes life," but the sense of life itself; the sense of the vital powers, the sense that any faculty whatsoever has met its proper object. Pleasure, then, according to the Platonists, was the accompaniment of an imperfect condition, like recovery after illness. According to Aristotle it was, except in the case of certain spurious pleasures, the play and action of that which is healthy in us. From this point of view it is obvious that Pleasure must in itself be a good, and that when it consists in the exercise of the highest faculties (see above, p. 89) it becomes identical with the highest happiness. Lest it be thought that this exultation of Pleasure might have dangerous results from a moral point of view, we will mention one safeguard which accompanies the

Aristotelian doctrine. He tells us that for anything to be "good" in life, it must be an end-in-itself: that is—something desirable for its own sake, and not as a mere means to something else; something thoroughly worthy, in which the mind can rest satisfied. Thus all mere amusements are excluded from being good, because they are not ends-in-themselves. And this maxim may be deduced from Aristotle: "Act as far as possible so that at any moment you may be able to say to yourself, 'What I am now doing is an end-in-itself.'"

CHAPTER VI.

ARISTOTLE'S "POLITICS."

THE "Ethics" of Aristotle end with the words, "Let us then commence our 'Politics.'" He had described virtue and happiness, but neither of these, he says,* is attainable by any human being apart from society. Moral development and the full enjoyment of the exercise of our powers equally demand certain external conditions; they cannot exist save by the aid of a settled community, social habits, the restraint and protection of laws, and even a wisely regulated system of public education. Man is by nature a social creature; he cannot isolate himself without becoming either more or less than man—"either a god or a beast." The State is, therefore, a prime necessity for the "well-doing and well-being" of the individual. In fact, says Aristotle,† you cannot form any conception of man in his normal condition—that is to say, in a civilized condition—except as a member of a State. On these grounds Aristotle

* "Eth." X. x. 8—23. † "Pol." I. ii. 13, 14.

proposed to go on to the writing of his "Politics" as the complement and conclusion of his ethical treatise. But some time probably elapsed before the design was carried out;* and in the interval it is not unreasonable to suppose that Aristotle, seeking, as usual, to base theory upon experience, was engaged in making that remarkable collection called the "Constitutions" (see above, p. 43), which contained a history and description of no less than 158 States, and of which numerous fragments remain.

However this may be, the "Politics" forms a rich repertory of facts relating to the history of Greece. And it abounds, too, in the knowledge of human nature, and in wise and penetrating observations on the conduct and motives of mankind, many of which are applicable to all times and countries. The treatise is not entire; it breaks off in the middle of one of the most interesting parts of all, namely, Aristotle's theory of education. Perhaps this was one of the cases in which Aristotle, finding that his mind was not fully made up on a particular subject, dropped that subject for the time, meaning to revert to it, but never actually doing so. Besides its unfinished condition, the "Politics" also shows indications of a certain amount of disarrangement in the order of its books. If rearranged according to their natural order, the books in Bekker's edition would stand thus:

Book I. On the Family as a constituent element in the State.

Book II. Containing a criticism of some previous theories about the State, and of some remarkable actual constitutions.

* Spengel, one of the most judicious of German critics, says that "the 'Politics' was written long after the 'Ethics.'"

Books III., VII., VIII. Giving Aristotle's own conception of an Ideal State,—unfortunately not concluded.

Books IV., VI., V. Forming a return from the ideal point of view to practical statesmanship, and suggesting remedies for different evils apparent in the contemporary Governments of Greece.

It has been well pointed out * that in Aristotle's treatment of the above-mentioned subjects three incongruous elements may be detected: "really scientific inquiry, aristocratic prejudice, and the dreams of a metaphysical philosophy which soars to heaven and listens for the eternal harmonies of nature." The scientific spirit shows itself in the vast apparatus of history which Aristotle employs, his researches into the customs of barbarous tribes, and his careful recognition of the immense variety to be found in constitutions coming under the same general name (such as Democracy, Aristocracy, etc.) when studied according to the peculiar circumstances of each case. All this would constitute his work a contribution to the science of "Comparative Politics."

But another spirit, alien from that of free and inductive inquiry, occasionally manifests itself, especially when Aristotle appeals to "nature" either in defending or attacking any institution. "Nature" is, of course, a rather slippery word: it may mean either of two things —either "primitive condition," in which sense a savage is in a state of nature; or "normal condition," in which sense the most perfectly civilized man has attained his natural state. The latter sense is the one which Aris-

* Mr. A. Lang's Essays on Aristotle's "Politics," p. 15 (Longmans, 1877).

totle generally has in his mind; he generally means by "nature" the normal and perfect state of things, or a power in the world working towards that normal state. But the question arises, How do we know what is the perfect and normal state of things? Philosophers are too apt to dignify by the name of "nature" any arrangement for which they may have a predilection. And Aristotle cannot be entirely exonerated from having done so. He sometimes attributes a sort of divine right to things as they are, calling them "natural." Thus he treats of the family as "naturally" constituted of man, wife, child, and slave. Certain reformers of the 4th century B.C. had already lifted up their voices against the institution of slavery. They had argued that the slave was of the same flesh and blood as his master, and might be as good as he: and that, in short, slavery was merely an unjust and oppressive custom which mankind could and should alter. But to the mind of Aristotle slavery was a necessary institution in order to provide citizens with that amount of leisure which would enable them to live ideal lives in the pursuit of the true and the beautiful (see above, p. 88). Therefore with unconscious bias he proceeded to argue that slavery was "natural," on the ground that some races of men were by "nature" born to serve, being deficient in that "large discourse" of reason which other men possessed, and which gave them a "natural" right to command. He seeks for external indications of this great difference between man and man, and says that slaves are "barbarians" (*i.e.*, ignorant of the Greek language and Greek manners), and again, that they have not the upright bearing of freemen trained in the gymnasia. But he admits that "nature" has failed in outwardly mark-

ing with sufficient distinctness the inward difference between the slave and his master. Yet still he is not shaken in his doctrine, but even asserts that it is lawful to make war on races which were intended by "nature" to be slaves, and to reduce them to slavery. These views may seem shocking; but yet they admit of some palliation. Christian theologians and divines, till within a very recent time, have defended slavery, appealing in its behalf to the sanction of the Bible; and even the virtuous Bishop Berkeley, while sojourning at Rhode Island, became the owner of slaves. The lot of a slave in Attica seems, generally speaking, not to have been a bad one. And Aristotle, in wishing the "naturally" dependent races of mankind to be brought into bondage, seems as to have had some idea of the benefit they would derive from being, as it were, sent to school.

In another matter Aristotle appealed to "nature" not in defending, but in attacking, one of the institutions of society—namely, the putting out money at interest. Aristotle had many of the prejudices of a "gentleman;" we have seen before (p. 96) how he admired a brilliant liberality, and thought little of the virtue of saving. He acknowledged that means must be forthcoming for the maintenance of the family, but, if possible, he would have these means come from the produce of the soil,* crops, animals, or minerals, for these sources of support are "natural." With trade and traffic he had no sympathy, but he admitted that practically they must go on; and he said that people who valued success in such things might try and imitate the philosopher Thales, who foresaw, by his astrology, on one oc-

* "Pol." I. x. 3.

casion, that there would be a great olive harvest, and while it was still winter hired all the olive presses in the country, and when the demand for these set in, was able to get his own terms and realize a large sum, "thus showing that it is easy for philosophers to be rich, if they only cared about it." These contemptuous expressions in regard to commerce clearly indicate that Aristotle did not take a calm intellectual view of the subject; he did not see that it was a subject worthy of being reduced to a science, else he would not have left the doing of this to Adam Smith. Yet still in a book full of the shrewdest remarks on social arrangements we cannot fail to be struck by the antiquated look of the announcement that "lending money on interest is justly abominated, and is the most unnatural of all forms of gain, for it diverts money from its proper purpose (which was to be a mere instrument of exchange) and forces it unnaturally to breed."* This saying of Aristotle's doubtless did something to foster the prejudice against "usury" and Jews, in the latter part of the Middle Ages. The notion is apparently based upon the first-mentioned conception of "nature"—as the primitive state of things. "Interest is not a primitive institution, and therefore it is unnatural." The very opposite of this conclusion would be thought true nowadays. We feel now that money unspent "naturally" acquires interest and compound interest, and that in a civilized community nothing is more unnatural than the "talent laid up in a napkin."

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* Compare Shakespeare, "Merchant of Venice," Act i. scene 3:—

Antonio. Or is your gold and silver ewes and rams?
Shylock. I cannot tell; I make it breed as fast.

An enthusiastic and almost mystical spirit exhibits itself in Aristotle when he discourses on the Ideal State. Having laid it down that Happiness for the State and for the individual is one and the same ("Pol." VII. ii. 1), he seems for a moment to waver and hesitate as to whether he should not retract the doctrine expressed in the "Ethics" (see above, p. 89), that the happiness to be found in a life of thought is incomparably superior to that to be found in a life of action. Could this be said of a State—that is, of a whole community? If a whole community is engaged in the fruition of philosophical thought, must they not be isolated from international relations and cut off from the world? But Aristotle does not flinch ultimately from the results of his doctrine. He says ("Pol." VII. ii. 16) that "it is quite possible that a State may be situated in some isolated position," enjoying good laws and knowing nothing of war or foreign relations, and that in such a state (VII. iii. 8) the community may be engaged in contemplations and thoughts which have their own end in themselves, and do not aim at any external results. As is the life of God or of the conscious universe (each brooding over their own perfections), such will be the life of the Ideal State!

This announcement of the highest end to be aimed at by Politics is as if some modern writer, in treating of the State, should seek to identify it with the Invisible Church of God. Or, again, it may remind us of the saying that the supreme and ultimate product of civilization is "two or three gentlemen talking together in a room." This paradox is true and quite Aristotelian: mental activities are the highest things of all; enactments, and police, and wars, and treaties exist for the sake of order, of which the best fruit is the mutual play

of intelligence and the glow of friendship. But one peculiarity of Aristotle's ideal politics is the comparative smallness of their scale. Like a true Greek, he does not think of nations and empires, but of city-states. It has been said that the city-state was something like the University of modern times. Aristotle regarded it as an organism of limited size, in which every citizen should have his function, and in which every one should be personally known to the rulers. He said ("Eth." IX. x. iii.) that 100,000 citizens would be far too many to constitute a State. Some of the peculiarities of his Ideal State may be specified as follows:—Every full citizen was to be a land-owner, with slaves to cultivate his soil, but no great accumulation of property in any one man's hands was to be allowed. The citizens were to constitute a warrior caste, and were each to be admitted in turn, when of mature age, to a share in the government. No artisan or tradesman was to be a citizen: the city was to have a harbor, but not too near, so as not to be flooded with strangers; the navy was to be manned by slaves; the city itself was, for salubrity, to slope towards the east and to catch the winds of morning. Lastly, the State itself was to be a perfect Sparta in point of discipline, though aiming at something higher than mere gymnastic and military drill. There was to be a common primary instruction for all the citizens from the age of seven to fourteen, and a common secondary instruction from fourteen to twenty-one. The "branches" were to be gymnastic, letters, drawing, and music. Everything was to be taught with a view to culture, rather than to utility. Thus the object of learning drawing was "to make one observant of beauty." In regard to gymnastic, Aristotle wisely

warns against a premature strain of the powers, and says that it is very rare for the same person to have won a prize, as a boy, and as a man, at the Olympic games. He lays great stress on the moral and educational influence of music, and its efficacy in "purging" the emotions (see above, p. 84). He disparages pipe-playing, which, he says, was adopted by the Athenians in the glorious period of license succeeding their victories over the Persians; and adds that "pipe-playing not only disfigures the face, but has nothing intellectual in it." It is difficult for us to enter into many of the feelings of the ancients about music Aristotle lauds the "Dorian mood;" and here his treatise breaks off, without his having given us his theory as to instruction in literature, or as to the secondary instruction in general of his ideal citizens.

In constructing a Utopia, Aristotle was, of course, following the example of the celebrated "Republic" of Plato; but his object was to improve upon the conceptions of his master, whom he criticised with courtesy, but in a prosaic spirit. Plato's "city" avowedly existed in dreamland, but Aristotle applied to it the tests of historical experience and everyday possibility. While accepting the idea of a city of contemplation, Aristotle determined that its institutions should be such as to approve themselves to practical commonsense. The contrast between the two philosophers in this matter is very striking—the one daring, creative, and full of the play of fancy; the other laborious, matter-of-fact, and scientific. It is not certain that Plato's wild suggestions for a community of wives and property were meant to be taken seriously; but Aristotle takes them so, and gives us the first arguments on record against Communism. He defends the institution of

property as "natural," and says that "it makes an unspeakable difference in the enjoyment of a thing to feel that it is your own." All his remarks on this point are sagacious; but there is a singular spirit of conservatism shown in his saying ("Pol." II. v. 16) that "if Plato's notions had been good they would have been adopted long ago." Instead of looking forward to a future of discovery and progress, Aristotle rather looked back, thinking that all perfection had been attained in the past.

In Books IV., VI., V. of his "Politics" (see above, p. 104), Aristotle turns from the ideal to the actual, and lays down a theory of the different forms of government which are possible, the causes which give rise to these different forms, their respective merits and disadvantages, and the practical means for obviating the evils to which they are respectively exposed. Greek society was very unstable; Athens and many other cities were, like Paris during the last half-century, in chronic expectation of a revolution. Therefore a theory of seditions and revolutions became an essential part of Greek political science, and Aristotle furnishes one accordingly, containing the wise remark that "small things are never the cause, though they are often the occasion, of popular revolt." He shows that there are three normal forms of government—the Monarchy, or government by one wise ruler; the Aristocracy, or government by a select number of the wisest and best; and the "Constitution," or mixed government, in which democratic, monarchic, and aristocratical elements are balanced against each other. Each of these normal and perfect forms, wherever they have existed, has followed a tendency to diverge into a corruption of itself—the monarchy degenerates into Tyranny, the aristocracy into Oligarchy,

and the "Constitution" into Democracy. These lower forms are the kinds of government which Aristotle practically finds in the world. He shows how each of them is constantly menaced by revolution, and from what special causes, namely, the peculiar jealousies which each is apt to engender. He says that it is not the desire of gain, so much as tenacity of rights or fancied ights, that causes revolution. He gives various pieces of advice to those who administer the different forms of government—one of which is that each government should avoid emphatically asserting its own special character. The democracy should be as little democratic, the tyrant as little tyrannous, the oligarchy as little exclusive and overbearing as possible—so that in each case some approach might be made to the golden "mean," which is the true cause of political stability.

In his high appreciation of the "Constitution," or well-mixed government, Aristotle may be thought to have had an unconscious anticipation of the guarded liberties, and of the combination of order with progress, which are the blessing and the pride of England. But in one respect he totally fails to come up to the grandeur of the modern conception; for, as said before, he thinks of arrangements for a city and not for a nation, and he has no idea of those representative institutions by which political freedom of action on a large scale may be provided. As his views for each State were limited, so also he did not take sufficient thought of international relations. For one moment he seemed to have caught a glimpse of possibilities which he might have followed out into important conclusions; for he says ("Pol." VII. vii. 3) that "owing to the happy moderation of the climate of Greece, the Hellenic race possess a combination of the best qualities which fall to

the lot of the human species, being both high-spirited and intellectual; and if they could all together form one political State, the Greeks might govern the world." He drops out this isolated thought, but does not pursue it. At the moment when he was writing, the Hellenic race was in the utmost danger; it was, in fact, doomed to fall from its high position into political extinction, and all for the want of "solidarity," all from these jealousies which kept each Greek city apart from the rest. Aristotle's peculiar relations to the court of Macedon may have hindered him from freely entering upon this subject, or may have biased his views; but the real fact seems rather to have been that, while he was a great philosopher, he was no statesman, and that, absorbed in the researches of science and in the dreams of an ideal State, he did not see the actual dangers of his country so clearly as his patriotic contemporary Demosthenes saw them. His contribution to politics was abstract and scientific, and as such remains valid for all time; his analysis of the pathology (so to speak) of oligarchies and democracies was found to be often strikingly verified in the history of the Italian republics. And however much the views of Aristotle fall short of the requirements of modern times, the "Politics" will always form a valuable study for one who is likely to take part in the public affairs of his country.

CHAPTER VII.

THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE.

ARISTOTLE has now done with Practical and Constructive Science.* He turns from Man with his dis-

* See above, p. 38.

putations, reasonings, oratory, poetry, moral and social life, to the subjects of Speculative Science—to Nature, the Universe, and God. In glancing at the series of great treatises in which the results of his thoughts and researches upon these subjects are embodied, it will be convenient to divide them under the three heads of Natural Philosophy, Biology, and Metaphysics. First, then, the "Physical Discourse," the treatise "On the Heavens," that "On Generation and Destruction," and the "Meteorologics," form together a distinct whole,* and contain the Natural Philosophy of Aristotle, of which let us now notice some of the salient points, leaving his Biology and Metaphysics to form the subject of future chapters.

Natural Philosophy, as conceived by Aristotle, was far more metaphysical than the science which is called by that name in the present day—a science based on mathematics, and starting, we might perhaps say, with the doctrines of Newton's "Principia," anything which lies beyond these doctrines being taken for granted. But in Aristotle's Natural Philosophy nothing is taken for granted. He commences by inquiring into the nature of "Existence;" and sets himself to answer some of the puzzles with which his predecessors, the philosophers of Greece, had racked their own and other people's brains. They had said, "How is it possible for anything to come into existence? Out of what can it come? It must come either out of the existent or the non-existent. But it cannot come out of the existent, else it would have existed already; nor can it come out of the non-existent, for out of nothing nothing can

* On the connection of these works see some general remarks above, p. 41.

come." Aristotle solves this dilemma ("Phys." I. viii.) by introducing what now seems a simple enough distinction—that between the "possible" and the "actual;" things come into existence, that is, into actuality, out of the state of the possible. Now the possible, or potential, is in one sense non-existent, as it is nothing actual; but, on the other hand, it is not mere nonentity, as it is by hypothesis a possibility of existence. All this may appear to be a mere matter of words; and it may be asked what we gain by having the words "possibility" and "actuality" added to our vocabulary. But, in fact, men think by means of words; and if a new formula can clear up the notions connected with such often-occurring terms as "is" or "became," it is a gain, the reality of which is shown by the perplexities to which thinkers had been reduced to for the want of it.

Aristotle, pursuing his general reflections about Existence, says that in everything that exists you can trace three principles: the Matter out of which the thing arose, and which contained the possibility of its existence; the Form or actual nature which the thing possesses; and the Negation or Privation of all other natures. That is to say—a thing is what it is by not being what it is not. And thus all existence has a negative, as well as a positive, side ("Phys." I. ix.). These remarks form a metaphysical basis to Natural Philosophy.

In the second book of his "Physical Discourse," Aristotle quits the region of pure abstractions, and states, in interesting terms, his views of "Nature." He speaks of "Nature" as "a principle of motion and rest essentially inherent in things, whether that motion be locomotion, increase, decay, or alteration." "It is absurd to try to prove the existence of Nature; its existence is self-evident." Nature may be said in one way

to be the simplest substratum of matter in things possessing their own principle of motion and change; in another way it may be called the form or law of such things." In other words, Nature is both matter or potentiality, and form or actuality; both the simple elements of a thing and its existence in perfection. It is also the transition from the one to the other. "Nature," says Aristotle, "spoken of as the creation of anything, is the path to nature."

Paley's "Natural Theology" opens with the celebrated argument which compares the world to a watch. "If one were to find a watch," says Paley, "he would surely conclude that there must have been a watchmaker; and so from the marks of design in creation, which are like the adaptations to special purposes of each part in the watch, we must conclude that an intelligent Creator made the world." Aristotle, quite as strongly as Paley, admits the marks of design in nature. He says ("Phys." II. viii. 14): "The adaptation of means to ends which we see in the procedure of the animals makes some men doubt whether the spider, for instance, and the ant, do not work by the light of reason or an analogous faculty. In plants, moreover, manifest traces of a fit and wisely-planned organization appear. The swallow makes its nest and the spider its web by nature, and yet with a design and an end; and the roots of the plant grow downward for the sake of providing it with nourishment in the best way. It is plain, then, that the origin of natural things must be attributed to design." He repudiates the notion that "the heavens and the divinest of visible things" ("Phys." II. iv. 6) can have been the result of the workings of blind chance. Nor will he accept the theory of Empedocles (which was like the Darwinian theory of Natural Selection in

its extremest form) that blind chance hit upon the production of life, and that whole races of monsters and imperfect beings perished before the moment came when —by mere accident and coincidence—a creature was attained sufficiently perfect to survive ("Phys." II. viii. 4). So far from chance having been the chief force in producing the framework of the Universe, Aristotle considers chance to be a mere exception, a mere irregularity, thwarting the reason and the wisdom which guides, and has ever guided, the operations of nature.

But, while utterly denying what Mr. Darwin would seem to point to—that Reason is a result of the functions of matter, and is a comparatively recent development in the history of this globe—Aristotle would equally deny the thesis of Paley, that Reason, in the form of an intelligent Creator, existed separately before this world, and constructed the world as a watch-maker constructs a watch. While he considered Reason to have existed from all eternity, he thought that the Universe, pervaded in all its parts by Reason, had also existed from all eternity. Thus all idea of the world having been created was quite eliminated from the thoughts of Aristotle. He said the world *must* have been eternal, for everything which is created, or comes into existence, comes into the "actual" out of the "possible." The egg and the seed are instances of the "possible," the fowl and the flower of the "actual." But there must always have been a fowl before there was an egg, and a flower before there was a seed. Therefore the actual must always have been first; and if this be the case with particular classes of things, we cannot conceive that the whole world was ever non-existent, and a mere possibility waiting to be called into existence ("Metaphys." VIII. viii.).

Philosophers always acknowledge the difficulty which there is in conceiving a *beginning*. Aristotle escapes this difficulty by asserting that the Universe has existed eternally the same as it appears to us now. He says that there is only one Cosmos or Universe, and that outside of this there is "neither space, nor vacuum, nor time." One would expect these words to mean that the Universe extends to infinity in all directions; but, on the other hand, Aristotle attributes a definite circular shape to the "outside" of the Universe, which would be incompatible with the idea of infinite extension. In fact, his arguments to prove the above untenable position are curious abstract quibbles, which may be quoted to show how oddly a philosopher of the 4th century B.C. could reason on the physical construction of the Universe. He says ("On the Heavens," I. ix.) that there can be neither space nor vacuum outside the circumference of the Cosmos, for, if there were, then body might be placed therein; but this is impossible, because every physical body is naturally endowed with one of three motions: it is either naturally centripetal, or naturally centrifugal, or naturally revolving round the earth. Now each of these three kinds of body has its natural place within the Universe; the stone being centripetal has its natural place on or in the earth; fire being centrifugal has its natural place above the air; the stars which revolve have their natural place in the revolving Heaven. Thus there is no kind of body which can naturally exist outside the Universe, and therefore there can be no space, for space is that in which bodies exist! That there is no Time beyond the limits of the Universe, Aristotle proves by the more legitimate argument that "if there is no motion there can be no Time, since Time is the measure of motion." But his concep

tion of the "natural" motions inherent in different classes of bodies, and his appeal to his own preconceived ideas of "nature" to prove what exists, or does not exist, outside the circumference of Heaven, are very characteristic.

Time and Space, then, according to Aristotle, end with the circumference of Heaven, though it is difficult to understand how space can be conceived to come to an end at any particular point. But the Stagirite here becomes mystical, for he says that "the things outside," existing in neither space nor time, enjoy for all eternity a perfect life of absolute joy and peace ("Heavens," I. ix.). This is the region of the divine, in which there is life and consciousness, though perhaps no personality; it is increate, immutable, and indestructible.

Descending from this region—if that can be called *region* which is out of space altogether—we come in the Aristotelian system to the "First Heaven," the place of the fixed stars, which ever revolves with great velocity from the left to the right. In a lower sphere, revolving in the contrary direction, are the sun, moon, and planets; and we are told that we must not suppose that either stars or planets are composed of fire. Their substance is ether, that fifth element, or *quinta essentia*, which enters also into the composition of the human soul. They only seem bright, like fire, because the friction caused by the rapidity with which they are carried round makes them red-hot. The reason why the stars twinkle, but the planets do not, is merely that the former are so far off that our sight reaches them in a weak and trembling condition; hence their light seems to us to quiver, while really it is our eyesight which is quivering. Sun, moon, and stars alike are

living beings, unwearied, and in the enjoyment of perfect happiness.

It has often been said that if an ancient Greek temple be compared with a Gothic cathedral, the one suggests the idea of the finite, the other of the infinite. The same thing might be said of Aristotle's Cosmology when compared with the views of modern science. Aristotle figured to himself a perfectly limited universe, with the earth in the center, and the fixed stars all round the circumference. In a circle, or globe, it may be questioned which is the place of honor—the center or the circumference. The Pythagoreans, accordingly, after the abstract method of those times, declared that the center must be the most honorable position, and that, as the element fire is more honorable than the element earth, the center of the Universe must be occupied by some Central Fire, and that the earth must revolve round this like the other stars. Aristotle, unconscious how much nearer to the truth this guess was than his own, laughs at it as, the production of men "who try to square facts to their own fancies, and who wish to have a share in the arrangement of the Universe." He also repudiates ("Heavens," II. xiv. 1) the theory of Plato that the earth is packed round the axis of the entire Universe and revolves with it, thus causing day and night.* He maintains that the earth is the motionless center, but the least honorable member, of the Universe, the all-embracing circumference being the most noble, and the heavenly bodies having a dignity in inverse ratio to their approach towards the center. The guesses, or intuitions, of the ancient Greeks in Aristotle's

* There is some doubt as to what Plato's theory actually was. See "Minor Works of George Grote," vol. i. pp. 239–275, and Professor Jowett's Introduction to the "Timæus" of Plato.

time, or soon afterwards, hit upon something very like an anticipation of the Copernican system. And this was especially the case with Aristarchus of Samos, who announced the double movement of the earth, round its own axis and round the sun. But Aristotle certainly contributed nothing towards the adoption of such ideas. He unfortunately committed himself, on fancied grounds of symmetry, to an opposite view.

Aristotle argued that if the earth were to move it could only do so "unnaturally," by the application of external force in contradiction to its own natural tendency to rest round the center, and that no such forced movement could be kept up forever, whereas the arrangement of the Cosmos must be for all eternity. Therefore the earth must be at rest! As to its shape, Aristotle was more correct: he proved it to be spherical —(1) by the consideration that all heavy bodies are by nature alway tending to the center, and that this process must result in the production of a spherical mass; (2) by the fact that the earth's shadow cast on the moon in an eclipse is circular. He considered the bulk of the earth to be small when compared with that of "the other stars;" he accepts the calculations of the geometers of his time that its circumference was 400,000 stades; and he says that "we must not treat with incredulity the opinion of those who say that the regions near the Pillars of Hercules (or Straits of Gibraltar) join on to India, and that the ocean to the east of India and that to the west of Europe are one and the same." In support of this proposition he adduces the fact that elephants are to be found on each side, *i.e.*, in India and in Africa ("Heavens," II. xiv. 15). The passage of Aristotle here quoted had a large share in inflaming the imagination of Christopher Columbus,

and in sending him forth from the coasts of Spain in search of the coasts of India; and it was the cause of the islands of Central America being named the "West Indies," and the *aborigines* of North America being called "Red Indians." As an approximative guess at the size and figure of the earth, the passage in question was not a bad one, considering the time when it was written; but curiously enough it contains two errors, the first of which would imply the earth to be a great deal larger, and the second a great deal smaller, than it really is. The mean geographical stade of the Greeks is computed at 168 yards 1 foot and 6 inches, and thus if 400,000 stades be assigned to the circumference of the earth, we get a measurement of above 38,000 miles, whereas the latest calculations would only give about 24,857 miles for a mean circumference of the earth. Thus evidently the geometers of the time of Aristotle were too liberal in their ideas of the earth's size. But, on the other hand, those who identified the Atlantic with the Pacific Ocean, and brought India opposite to Spain, had evidently too contracted a notion of the contents of our globe.

Owing to the absence of astronomical instruments, and the generally infantile condition of physical science in the 4th century B.C., it was only natural that the *a priori* method, or *guessing*, should greatly predominate in the cosmical theories of that time. But Aristotle's strength did not lie in his imagination. In this faculty he was inferior to other philosophers whom in analytical power he far surpassed. Thus Alexander von Humboldt says of him ("Cosmos," vol. i. note 48), "the great influence which the writings of Aristotle exercised on the whole of the Middle Ages, renders it a cause of extreme regret that he should have been so op-

posed to the grander and juster views of the fabric of the universe entertained by the more ancient Pythagorean school." There was, in fact, a want of sublimity in the fancy of Aristotle, and it so happened that he sometimes contemptuously rejected hypotheses which were not only more beautiful, but more true, than his own. We have seen that this was the case with regard to the earth's position in the cosmical system. And the same thing occurred as to the nature of comets. The Pythagoreans had declared comets to be "planets of long revolution;" but Aristotle, rejecting this supposition, affirmed them to be transient meteors of our atmosphere, formed out of luminous or incandescent matter which had been thrown off by the stars. And to explain the reason why comets are so rare, he said that the matter out of which they are composed is constantly used up in forming the Milky Way. ("Meteorol." I. viii.) "The nebulous belt, then, which traverses the vault of the heavens, is regarded by the Stagirite as an immense comet incessantly reproducing itself."

Clearly, Aristotle's contribution to Natural Philosophy did not consist in suggesting or leading the way to true views as to the nature and arrangement of the heavenly bodies. He not only was in advance of his age in this respect, but was even behind it, in so far as he refused to adopt theories, which have since turned out to have been anticipations of the results of modern science. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that those theories were incapable of verification at the time, and had no force in themselves to command the attention of the world. They were like the "false dawn" in tropical countries, which appears for a few minutes and then fades away, allowing the darkness

again to reign supreme, till the true sunrise takes place. Unconvinced by the speculations of the Pythagorean school and of Aristarchus of Samos, the great Alexandrian astronomer, Ptolemy, in the second century of our era, reaffirmed the Aristotelian views as to the spherical form and motion of the heavens, as to the earth's position in the centre of the heavens, and as to its being devoid of any motion of translation. And the Ptolemaic system satisfied men's minds until, with Copernicus and Galileo, modern astronomy began.

We must allow that Aristotle's cosmical ideas were erroneous and misleading. Still we must take them as constituting a mere fraction of his encyclopædia of philosophy, and we must recollect that they are put forth in works which laid out and constituted new sciences. This was the Stagirite's achievement,—the clear analytic separation of the different sciences, and the statement, in outline at all events, of the questions which each science had to answer. Aristotle generally attempted to furnish his own answer to these questions, and often gave wrong answers; yet to have posited the questions at all was a great matter, and cleared the way for the thoughts of subsequent generations. There is no one to whose work the saying is more appropriate than to that of the Stagirite—*prudens quæstio dimidium scientiæ est*—"It is half-way to knowledge when you know what you have to inquire."

The leading questions started in the Natural Philosophy of Aristotle are as to the nature of causation, time, space, and motion. On the subject of motion he went astray by taking up the idea that celestial and terrestrial motions were different in kind—that the heavenly bodies "naturally" revolved, while bodies on earth had each a natural motion in them, either down-

ward or upward. This belief in the absolute levity of certain bodies—as, for instance, fire—was, of course, a mistake. "Truth is the daughter of Time;" and a few of the great discoveries of modern ages, which appear so simple, though they were so hardly and so late achieved,—such as the Copernican system, and the law of gravitation, — have shattered the Cosmos of Aristotle. Still it required at least fifteen centuries before anything like a demonstration was brought against the reality of that Cosmos and its arrangements. Thus, if Aristotle be censured for the incorrectness of his theories, succeeding generations of thinkers for so long a period must also be held responsible for their undoubting acceptance of them.

Aristotle's method in Physics, as in most other subjects, consisted in this: he first endeavored to state clearly to himself what was the problem which he had before him, then he collected all the solutions of that problem which had been proposed by his predecessors, and all popular "sayings" and "notions" in regard to it, and then he examined existing opinions by the light of such facts as occurred to him, or which had been previously collected by him, or else he applied logical reasonings and general philosophical considerations in pronouncing upon the validity of the theories of others. A main part of the process consisted in starting ingenious difficulties to the theories in question, so that they seldom came through the ordeal without being wholly exploded or considerably modified. The residuum left, or the new result arrived at, constituted the theory of Aristotle. Such is not the procedure by which discoveries are made, knowledge increased, and the boundaries of science extended, in modern times. But after all, it was not a bad procedure for a man who was

writing an encyclopædia. Aristotle had undertaken to set forth every department of knowledge revised and perfected, so far as possible, by the aid of stores of information and thought which he had laid up. In some departments he was much stronger than others: in Politics, Sociology, Psychology, and Natural History, he had a far better array of facts than in Astronomy and Mechanics. No one could be keener than he was to make facts the basis of every theory; but he was obliged to do the best he could in each case with his materials. He set out all that was known or believed on each subject, and added to the knowledge or criticised the beliefs as well as he could. The real aids for the advance and verification of science which exist in modern times—instruments, such as the telescope, the microscope, the barometer, the thermometer, the spectroscope, and countless others; the knowledge of many great laws of nature; and the practice of accurately observing and carefully recording—were all wanting in the days of Aristotle. Therefore it is absurd to treat him as if he had been a modern man of science, with a vicious method. It may be called a mistake that he attempted so much; still what he accomplished was wonderful if we merely regard it as a map of the Sciences belonging to the 4th century B.C., full of his own additions and improvements.

There is one great science of modern days which Aristotle failed to separate off, or sketch out, or in any way to foreshadow—and that is the science of Chemistry. Some erroneously spell this word "chymistry" as though it were derived from the Greek *chymos*,* a juice,

* Aristotle, in treating of the sense of Taste, gives an enumeration of different flavors, and then says, "The other properties of juices form a proper subject for inquiry in connection with

and as though it had been known to the Greeks. But of course "chemistry" comes from the Semitic word *chem* (which is the same as "Ham," the son of Noah), meaning "black," and then "Egyptian." And thus Chemistry is the black or Egyptian art, having taken its rise out of the searches made by the Alchemists to discover the philosopher's stone. Aristotle had no notion whatever of the rich field of knowledge and power which lay in the analysis of substances. He had no idea of the composition of water or air. The crucible and the retort had never been worked in Athens; the most superficial guesswork, as to what we should call the chemical properties of bodies, contented the philosophers of the day. Aristotle's work "On Generation and Corruption" would have been the appropriate place for enunciating some of the laws of Chemistry; but he does not go beyond a resolution of the "Four Elements" into the ultimate principles of the Hot, the Cold, the Wet, and the Dry—the first pair being "active" and the second "passive" principles. Hot and Wet, we are told, form Air; Hot and Dry, Fire; Cold and Wet, Water; Cold and Dry, Earth. From these principles Aristotle deduces the generation and destruction of physical bodies; but on the details of a theory which now seems puerile we need not dwell.

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the physiology of plants." Thus by "juices" he means vegetable fluids, to be treated of from the point of view of Botany or of *Materia Medica*.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE BIOLOGY OF ARISTOTLE.

THE word "Biology" is perhaps only about fifty years old, having first come into prominent use in the "Positive Philosophy" of Auguste Comte. It is now quite naturalized in the vocabulary of science; and there is an article on "Biology," by Professor Huxley, in the recently published edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," which begins, "The Biological sciences are those which deal with the phenomena manifested by living matter." Yet still, in the eyes of a scholar this modern compound is an unfortunate one. The Greeks had two words for life, *Zōé* and *Bios:* the former expressed life viewed from the inside, as it were—the vital principle, the functions of life, the sense of living; the latter expressed the external form and manner of living, such as a man's profession or career. *Zōé* was applicable to the whole animated kingdom; *Bios* was restricted to man, except so far as, half-metaphorically, it was applied to the habits of beasts or birds. Thus Aristotle divided *Zōé* into the species "vegetable," "animal," and "human;" but *Bios* into the species "life of pleasure," "life of ambition," and "life of thought." From all this, it will be seen that "Biology" could not be used to denote a science of the phenomena of living matter in general, without a sacrifice of ancient Greek associations. "Biology," in short, is more appropriate to express what we generally call Sociology; and, on the other hand, "Zoölogy" should have been used to express what is now called "Biology." But the fact was, that the word "Zoölogy" (derived from *Zōon*, an

animal, not from *Zōé*, life) had been already appropriated as a name for natural history. Hence, without regard to classical propriety, the word "Biology" was forced into service to meet a want, and to express, what had never been expressed before, the science of life in all its manifestations from the lowest ascidian up to the highest development of humanity, so far as that development can be considered to be a natural evolution out of the physiological laws of life.

Aristotle had no word to express this comprehensive idea, but assuredly he had the idea itself. He regards the whole of nature as a continuous chain, even beginning with inorganic substances and passing by imperceptible gradations on to organisms, to the vegetable, and to the zoophyte, and then to the animal and the various ranks in the animal kingdom, and lastly to man ("Researches about Animals," VIII. i. 4), "whose soul in childhood, you might say, differs not from the soul of the lower animals." This broad comprehensive sweep of the philosophic eye through the realms of nature, this finding of unity in such endless diversity, this tracing of a continuous thread throughout the ascending scale of life, may seem quite a matter of course to educated persons of the present day. But it was creditable to Aristotle to have so fully arrived at and entertained this conception, and to have set it forth in such firmly-drawn scientific outlines. Above all, it was creditable to one who, though born of the race of Esculapius (see above, p. 2), had been trained as a dialectician and an orator, and had devoted so much time and labor to the sciences connected with words and thoughts, that he should have had the force and versatility to act also as pioneer into a totally different range of inquiries, and to collect such a mass

of facts wherewith to fill in his general sketch of animated nature. It is probable that at all periods of his life his studies, observations, and notes upon matters of physical and natural science, ran on side by side with his development of mental and moral philosophy. Some have thought that the period of his residence at the Court of Macedonia, when acting as tutor to Alexander, afforded him peculiar facilities, in the shape of royal menageries and hunters and fowlers under his command, for the collection of materials for his great work on animals. However this may be, there seems no sufficient reason for taking that work itself out of the list of those which were on the stocks and more or less completed during the last thirteen years of his life.

Aristotle's biological treatises, as briefly specified above (p. 42), consist (1) of the work "On the Parts of Animals," which contains a distinction still valid in physiology between "tissues" and "organs," or as Aristotle calls them, "homogeneous" and "unhomogeneous" substances. He traces here, according to his own ideas, the ascent from the inorganic to the organic world: out of heat, cold, wetness, and dryness the four elements are compounded; out of the four elements are formed the homogeneous substances or tissues; out of these are formed the organs, and out of the organs the organized being. All this served as a provisional theory, until superseded by the discoveries of chemistry. Aristotle laid it down as a principle of method ("Parts of An.," I. i. 4), that all which was common to the various species of living beings should be discussed before entering upon their specific differences. Therefore (2) the treatise "On the Soul" followed next in order, and traced out the vital principle through its successive

ascending manifestations. To this was appended (3) the "Parva Naturalia" or "Physiological Tracts," which dealt with some of the functions of living creatures, whether common or special, such as sensation, memory, dreaming, and also with the following pairs of opposites: waking and sleeping, youth and old age, inspiration and expiration, life and death. It was added that there is another pair still to be treated of —namely, health and sickness. The Stagirite, as was natural from his family traditions, always appears to have looked forward to composing a philosophical work on Medicine. But there is no trace of this ever having been achieved.

The 4th book on the list kept still to generalities. This was the short treatise "On the Locomotion of Animals," which showed how various organs in the various creatures are adapted by nature for this purpose. Next (5) the elaborate treatise "On the Generation of Animals" worked out this subject, illustrating it with a wonderfully copious collection of facts, or supposed facts, and of the opinions of the day; and, lastly (6), the great treatise entitled "Researches about Animals," formed, as it were, the conclusion of the whole, by giving detailed observations upon many of the various living creatures which are the products of the working of nature's general laws.

Aristotle justly drew a distinction between the way in which any phenomenon of nature would be considered and defined by a dialectician and by a physicist. Thus he says ("On the Soul," I. i. 16): "Anger would be defined by a dialectician to be 'a desire for retaliation,' or something of the kind,—by a physical philosopher it would be defined as 'a boiling up of the hot blood about the heart.'" It is needless to say that the

Stagirite himself was great and unrivalled in his dialectical definitions,—those definitions which depended on grasping the essence of facts which are patent to all ages alike; while in his physical definitions, being destitute of facts which only later ages have brought to light, he was very imperfect and occasionally almost absurd. As a specimen of this we may mention his account of the vital principle or life, from the two points of view. He defines the vital principle ("Soul," II. i. 6) to be "the essential actuality of an organism;" and this definition has met with high praise from modern physiologists, some of whom, indeed, appear simply to have repeated it in slightly different words. Thus Duges defines life as "the special activity of organized bodies;" and Beclard calls it "organization in action."* The merit of Aristotle's definition, as coming from an ancient Greek philosopher, consists in its avoiding the view which would have been natural in those times—namely, that life, the vital principle or the physical soul, was a separate entity, dwelling in the body, *hospes comesque corporis*, "the body's guest and friend," as the Emperor Hadrian called it in his dying verses. Aristotle said that life, or the soul, is not a chance guest, but a function; it is to the body as sight is to the eye; it is the perfect action of all the conditions of the bodily organization. Thus the Pythagoreans spoke vainly when they talked of the "transmigration of souls," as if the soul of a man could migrate into the body of a beast. "You might as well," said Aristotle, "speak of the carpenter's art (which is the result of the

* These definitions are quoted in Bennett's "Text-book of Physiology," p. 184. See also Mr. G. H. Lewes's "Aristotle, a Page from the History of Science," p. 230.

carpenter's tools) migrating into flutes, which are the tools of the musician."

So much for his dialectical, or speculative, views of life. The following are some of his opinions in detail on the same subject, from a physical point of view, taken from the "Physiological Tracts:"—The primary condition of life is the "natural fire" which resides in the heart of each living creature. This fire may be extinguished by contrary forces, or smothered by excess of heat. Respiration is the process of cooling, which prevents the smothering of the vital fire. Animals require two things for existence—food and cooling. The mouth serves for both purposes, except in the case of fishes,* who get their cooling not by air through the lungs, but by water through the gills. The heart is placed in the middle region of the body, and is not only the seat of life, but also of intelligence; it is the first formed of all the parts. The brain is the coldest and wettest part of the body, and serves conjointly with the respiration in cooling down the fire of life. Three of the senses—sight, sound, and smell—are located in the brain; touch and taste reside in the heart, which also contains the "common sensorium," or faculty of complex perceptions, such as figure, size, motion, and number. The heart makes the blood and sends it out by the "veins" to all parts of the body (of course Aristotle was unaware of the return of the blood to the heart, and therefore made no distinction between veins and arteries). Adequate warmth being the condition of life, the inhabitants of hot countries are longer-

* Aristotle rejects the (true) opinion of Anaxagoras and Diogenes that fishes get air out of the water which they draw through their gills, and that they are suffocated when out of the water because the air comes to them in too large quantities.

lived than those of cold countries; and men are longer-lived than women. But as cooling also is required, people with large heads, as a rule, live long.

It is hardly necessary to say that every opinion above mentioned is mistaken, and almost every statement of fact erroneous. Aristotle, however, is not solely responsible for the doctrines, for he doubtless inherited his ideas of anatomy and physiology from Hippocrates and his father Nicomachus, and, in short, from his Greek predecessors. He neither did, nor could, create the whole of physiology afresh, as he created the whole science of logic. This shows the difference between a science that is simple and abstract, being dependent on a few laws of the human mind, and a science which is infinitely complex, being dependent on facts which have only gradually been discovered up to a certain point during the long lapse of centuries, with the aid of instruments which were unknown to the ancients. But Aristotle had distinctly the idea of the advance of physiology and medicine by means of the study of nature. He said, "Physical philosophy leads to medical deductions, the best doctors seek grounds for their art in nature." Perhaps from this sentence, at all events from the notion contained in it, the word "physician" has come to be appropriated in modern times by the practitioners of medicine.

Unfortunately, Aristotle not unfrequently applied dialectical reasonings to questions of physiology when they were quite inappropriate. For instance, arguing against Plato's theory of respiration—namely, that breathing results from the impact upon us of the external atmosphere following upon the disturbance which is caused by the expiration of warm air—he says that this would imply expiration to be the first of the

two operations; but they alternate, and expiration is the last, *therefore* inspiration must be the first! Again, he mentions the opinion of those who said that the senses correspond with the four elements, and that sight is fire, trying to prove it by the fact that if the eye be struck sparks are seen. Aristotle, however, says that this fact is to be explained in another way: the iris of the eye shines like a phosphorescent substance; when the eye is struck, the sudden shock of the blow causes the eye as an object of vision to become separate from the eye as the organ of vision, and thus the eye for an instant sees itself! Again, he says that the "white" of the eye is unctuous, which prevents the watery vehicle that conveys the sight from getting frozen; the eye is less liable to freeze than any part of the body!

Turning from these curiosities of an old-world physiology, let us glance at the natural history of Aristotle. There is something peculiar and Aristotelian about the very terms "Natural History." They arise out of a mistranslation of the title of Aristotle's work, "Histories about Animals," where "Histories" is used in its primitive sense of "investigations" or "researches." But the title has been translated *Historia Animalium*, or "History of Animals," and from this the modern phrase "Natural History" has doubtless got crystallized into its present signification. Looking to the contents of the treatise in question, we perceive that to a great part of it the shorter form of the word "Histories" would have been applicable, as consisting rather of "Stories about Animals" than of any very profound investigations with regard to them. It is probable that a large proportion of what is here recorded came to Aristotle orally; and that, too, not from *savants*, but from uneducated classes of people whose occupations had

put them in the way of observing the habits of certain species—such people as fishermen, sailors, sponge-divers, fowlers, hunters, herdsmen, bee-keepers, and the like. We know how difficult it is to get pure fact, unalloyed by fancy, from informants of this kind; and therefore it is no wonder that Aristotle, in compiling the first treatise on Natural History that was ever written, and in collecting his materials by inquiry made at first or second hand from the working classes, should have admitted many a "yarn" and many a "traveller's tale" into his pages. The subject was too new to admit of his being able by instinctive sagacity to reject the improbable; a judgment of that kind is only attained by one who possesses a vast stock of well-ascertained facts, and by unconscious analogy can argue from the known to the unknown. In many cases Aristotle shows himself almost as simple as old Herodotus, with his tales of the phœnix and other marvels.

The following may be quoted as one instance out of many of the *naïveté* of the Stagirite ("Animals," IX. xlviii.): "Among marine animals there are many instances recorded of the mild, gentle disposition of the dolphin, and of its love of its children, and its affection, in the neighborhood of Tarentum, Caria, and other places. It is said that when a dolphin was captured and wounded on the coast of Caria, a great multitude of dolphins came into the harbor, until the fishermen let him go, when they all went away together. And one large dolphin always follows the little ones to take care of them. And sometimes a shoal of large and small dolphins has been seen together, and two of these having been left behind have appeared soon after supporting and carrying on their back a small dead dolphin that was on the point of sinking, as if in pity for it, that

it might not be devoured by any other creature. Incredible things are told of the swiftness of the dolphin, which appears to be the swiftest of all animals whether marine or terrestrial. They even leap over the masts of large ships. This is especially the case when they pursue a fish for the sake of food; for if it flies from them they will pursue it, from hunger, into the depths of the sea. And when they have to return from a great depth they hold in their breath, as if calculating the distance, and gathering themselves up they shoot forward like an arrow, wishing with all speed to accomplish the distance to their breathing-place. And if a ship happen to be in the way, they will leap over its masts. The males and females live in pairs with each other. There is some doubt why they cast themselves on shore, for it is said that they do this at times without any apparent reason."

The freshness of spirit which breathes through this passage characterizes the whole of Aristotle's treatise, which, in spite of its sometimes reminding us of the "showman" of modern times, has excited the enthusiastic admiration of several great authorities. Cuvier says, "I cannot read this work without being ravished with astonishment. Indeed it is impossible to conceive how a single man was able to collect and compare the multitude of particular facts implied in the numerous rules and aphorisms which are contained in this book." Buffon, De Blainville, St. Hilaire, and others,* have used similar terms of eulogy. One modern zoologist, Professor Sundevall of Stockholm, has reckoned up the number of species with which Aristotle showed himself to be more or less acquainted, and he

* Quoted by Mr. G. H. Lewes in his "Aristotle," p. 270.

finds them to amount to nearly 500,—the total number of mammals described or indicated being about 70; of birds 150; of reptiles 20; and of fishes 116—making altogether 356 species of vertebrate animals. Of the invertebrate classes about 60 species of insects and arachnids seem to have been known to Aristotle; some 24 crustaceans and annelids; and about 40 molluscs and radiates.* At the same time, it must be remembered that Aristotle had no idea of the scientific system of classification which appears in Professor Sundevall's list. He does not seem to have labored much at the arrangement of living creatures into natural orders; indeed he could not have succeeded in such an attempt, for want of a sufficient knowledge of anatomy. He was content with the superficial, universally-received, grouping of animals, as walking, creeping, flying, or swimming; as oviparous or viviparous; aquatic or terrestrial; and the like. His book contains a mass of materials, but without much methodic arrangement or trace of system. It pointed the way, however, for his successors to a science of zoology.

The facts given by him of course vary extremely in correctness and in value. In his account of sponges, for instance, Aristotle is thought to have shown sound information, probably derived from the reports of the professional divers. But his statements about bees, though obtained, as he tells us, from bee-keepers, and though "made beautiful forever" in the charming verses of Virgil's fourth Georgic, have been quite overturned by the microscopic discoveries of Reaumur, Hunter, Huber, Keys, Vicat, and Dunbar. On one cardinal point the ancients were all wrong: they did not under-

* See "The Natural History Review" for 1864, p. 494.

stand the sex and the functions of either the queen-bee, the worker, or the drone.

The following account of the lion is considered to be fairly correct ("An.," IX. xliv.): "When feeding, the lion is extremely savage; but when he is not hungry and is full fed, he is quite gentle. He is not either jealous or suspicious. He is playful and affectionate towards those animals which have been brought up with him, and to which he is accustomed. When hunted, so long as he is in view he never flies or cowers; and if compelled to give way by the number of his hunters, he retreats leisurely, at a walk, turning himself round at short intervals. But if he reaches a covert he flies rapidly, until he is in the open again, and then he again retreats at a walk. If compelled to fly when on the open plains, he runs at full stretch, but does not leap. His manner of running is continuous, like that of a dog at full stretch; when pursuing his prey, however, he throws himself upon it when he comes within reach. It is true what they say about the lion being very much afraid of fire (as Homer wrote, "the blazing fagots, that his courage daunt"), and about his watching and singling out for attack the person who has struck him. But when any one misses hitting him and only annoys him, if in his rush he succeeds in catching that person, he does not harm him nor wound him with his claws, but shakes and frightens him and then leaves him. Lions are more disposed to enter towns and attack mankind when they have grown old, because old age renders them unable to hunt, and because of the decay of their teeth. They live many years; and in the case of a lame lion who was captured, he had many of his teeth worn down, which some considered a sign that lions live long,

for this could not have happened to an animal who was not aged."

The "Researches about Animals," like many other of Aristotle's great treatises, appears to have been left in an unfinished state. The tenth book seems merely to be a sort of fragmentary continuation of the seventh book—both treating of the reproduction of the human species. In the ten books as they have come down to us, no one can pretend to find a finished whole. It is a question, therefore, whether the work was ever published in Aristotle's lifetime, or whether it ever got, in its present form, to the Alexandrian Library. In the Alexandrian Catalogue, indeed, there is mention of a work entitled "Animals" in nine books. But this may have been a set of excerpts by some Peripatetic scholar; we cannot tell what its exact relation to "*Our* Aristotle" may have been. There is some little interest in the question, on account of the influence that Aristotle is supposed to have exercised on the Septuagint version of the Old Testament, which was begun at Alexandria 285 B.C.—that is to say, just after Aristotle's MSS. had been carried off to Asia Minor. It has been conjectured that the Septuagint translators, in rendering the Hebrew word *arnebeth*, or "hare," by the Greek word *dasypus* (hairy-foot), instead of by the word *lagos*, which had been usual in earlier classical Greek, were following a new fashion set by Aristotle in his "Researches about Animals," in which work "the modern word *dasypus* had almost entirely superseded the older."* And it is added that "there was an even yet more striking example of Aristotle's influence on the

* Dean Stanley's "Lectures on the History of the Jewish Church," iii. 261.

passage" (Leviticus, xi. 6): for whereas in the original Hebrew text the hare was said to chew the cud, the translators, having been enlightened by the natural history of Aristotle, "boldly interpolated the word NOT into the sacred text." The facts of the case are—that Aristotle uses *lagos* for "hare" indifferently with, and nearly as often as, *dasypus;* and that in one passage ("An.," III. xxi. 1) he cursorily contrasts the hare with the class of ruminants. On the whole, then, it seems most natural to believe that the Septuagint translators used the word *dasypus* because it had become the fashion in speaking Greek to use it, and that Aristotle himself had obeyed and not created this fashion. With regard to the other point, it is quite possible that the translators may have seen that passage of Aristotle's above referred to; at all events, as educated men, they were doubtless influenced by the spread of the study of natural history, to which Aristotle, who had died only thirty-seven years before, had given great impetus.

CHAPTER IX.

THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE.

SOME of Aristotle's earliest attempts at writing were on a strictly metaphysical subject, when he attacked the Platonic doctrine of "Ideas." He doubtless went on from this beginning, and thought of metaphysical questions all his life, till he had framed for himself a more or less complete metaphysical system, traces of which show themselves in many forms of expression and leading thoughts in all his various scientific works. But it seems as if he had put off to the last the under-

taking of a direct and complete exposition of that system; and hence arose the name "Metaphysics," which is a mere title signifying "the things which follow after physics"—a title given by Aristotle's school to a mass of papers which they edited after his death, and with regard to which they wished to indicate that chronologically these papers were composed *after* the physical treatises, and also, perhaps, that the subject of which they treated was *above** and *beyond* the mere physical conditions of *things*. The word "Metaphysics," starting from this fortuitous origin, has come to be generally understood in modern times as denoting the most abstract of the sciences—the science of the forms of thought and the forms of things, the science of knowing and being, the science that answers the questions, How can we know anything? how can anything exist? Aristotle, who, of course, was himself unconscious of the word "Metaphysics," had three names which he used indifferently for this science. Sometimes he called it simply "Wisdom;" sometimes "First Philosophy," as treating of primary substances and the origin of things; sometimes "Theology," because all things have their root in the divine nature.

We have already had some specimens of Aristotle's metaphysical doctrines, put forward as a foundation for natural philosophy (see above, p. 115). In his biological treatises, also, especially in that "On the Soul," Aristotle does not confine himself to the physical principle of life and the functions of the animal soul, but enters upon the mode of our acquiring knowledge, on perception, memory, reason, and the relation of the mind

* Thus Shakespeare speaks of "Fate and *metaphysical* aid," meaning "supernatural."

to external objects—all being questions which encroach upon the province of metaphysical inquiry. The substantive treatise, bearing the name "Metaphysics," has come down to us in the shape of a posthumous fragment, which has been edited and eked out by the addition of other papers. The whole work, as it stands, consists of thirteen books. Of these, seven books were written by Aristotle as the setting forth of his ontology, or science of existence; Books IX., XII., and XIII. (on the Pythagorean and Platonic systems of numbers and ideas) seem to have been intended to come in as part of the same treatise, but to have been left by Aristotle in the condition of mere notes or materials; Book XI. is thought to be a separate, though very valuable and interesting essay on the nature of the Deity; while Books IV. and X., and the appendix to Book I., are un-Aristotelian,* and should never have had a place assigned to them in the "Metaphysics."

To turn to this work from the "Researches about Animals" is like turning from White's "Selborne" to Kant's "Critic of the Pure Reason." Metaphysical questions are necessarily abstruse, dry, and difficult; but the attempt has sometimes been made—as, for instance, by Plato, Berkeley, Hume, and Ferrier—to discuss them in clear, pointed language, as little as possible removed from the ordinary language of literature. Aristotle, on the other hand, at all events in later life, aimed only at scientific precision; and his "Metaphysics" is the forerunner of those German

* Book IV. consists of a list of philosophical terms and their definitions, perhaps jotted down by some scholar. Book X. is a paraphrase of part of the "Physical Discourse." The appendix to Book I. is a little essay on First Principles, of which tradition attributes the authorship to one Pasides.

philosophies which from beginning to end exhibit a jargon of technical phraseology. In another respect, also, Aristotle here sets an example which has been much followed by the Germans during the present century; for in Book I. he gives a "history of philosophy" from Thales down to himself. This is a very interesting little sketch, disclosing for the first time the fact that human thought has a history, and that there was a time when the word "cause," for instance, had never been heard, and pointing to the conclusion that every abstract word which we use is the result of the theories, and perhaps the controversies, of former ages. Aristotle traces the thoughts of successive Grecian thinkers, advancing under a law, while each stage at which they arrived forced them on to the next (see "Met.," I. iii. 11), from about 600 B.C. to about 330 B.C. And this task had never been again so well accomplished until Hegel gave his first set of lectures on the History of Philosophy, at Jena, in 1805. Hegel was followed in the same field by Brandis, Schwegler, Ueberweg, Cousin, Renouvier, Ferrier, Zeller, and many others, to whose works we must refer for information, as to the Greek philosophers. Suffice it to say, that Aristotle's method of procedure is to take his own doctrine of the Four Causes (see above, p. 64), and to show how at first philosophers only got hold of the idea of a Material Cause, and that afterwards they gradually arrived at the idea of Motive Power, Form, and End, or Final Cause. On the whole, his brief and masterly sketch, while full of points of light, is open to the charge of not doing sufficient justice to the views of his predecessors. Among them all, he seems most highly to appreciate Anaxagoras, of whom he says that, by introducing the

idea of Reason among the causes of the existence of the world, he was "like a sober man beginning to speak amidst a party of drunkards." Aristotle repeats here his old polemic against what he calls the system of Plato, though it is doubtful whether Plato would himself have acknowledged it. One would almost say that Aristotle misstated Plato in order to refute him.

The same fate, as if by way of reprisal, has often in modern times befallen the Stagirite, who has repeatedly been misstated, and then censured for what he never had maintained. At the risk, however, of committing fresh injustices of this sort, we will endeavor briefly to sum up his views upon some of the greatest questions which have occupied modern philosophers. First, then, we may ask how would Aristotle have dealt with those problems concerning the existence of Matter, and the reality of the External World, which have been a "shibboleth" in the philosophic world from Bishop Berkeley, through the days of Hume and the Scotch psychologists, down to Kant and Hegel and the extreme idealists of Germany? His utterances on this subject are perhaps chiefly to be found in the third book of his treatise "On the Soul," beginning with the fourth chapter. On turning to them we see that he never separates existence from knowledge. "A thing in actual existence," he says, "is identical with the knowledge of that thing." Again—"The possible existence of a thing is identical with the possibility in us of perceiving or knowing it." Thus, until a thing is perceived or known, it can only be said to have a potential or possible existence. And from this a doctrine very similar to that of Ferrier might be deduced, that "nothing exists except *plus* me"—that is to say, in relation to some mind perceiving it. Aris-

totle indicates, without fully explaining, his doctrine of the relation of the mind to external things in a celebrated passage ("Soul," iii. v.), where he says that there are two kinds of Reason in the soul—the one passive, the other constructive. "The passive Reason *becomes* all things by receiving their impress; the constructive Reason *creates* all things, just as light brings colors into actual existence, while without light they would have remained mere possibilities." Aristotle, then, appears to be removed from the "common sense" doctrine of "natural realism," which believes that the world would be just what we perceive to be, even if there were no one to perceive it; for, by his analogy, the mind contributes as much to the existence of things as light does to color; and he is equally removed from that extreme idealism which would represent things to be merely the thoughts of a mind, for he evidently considers that there is a "not-me"—a factor in all existence and knowledge—which is outside of the mind, and which may be taken to be symbolized by all the constituents of color, except light: the mind, according to him, contributes only what light does to color; all else is external to the mind, though without the mind nothing could attain to actuality. The external world, then, according to Aristotle, is a perfectly rea. existence, but it is the product of two sets of factors—the one being the rich and varied constituents of the universe, the other being Reason manifested in perceiving minds; and, without the presence and co-operation of this perceptive Reason, all things would be at once condemned to virtual annihilation.

As to Matter, Aristotle called it "timber," or "the underlying," to indicate that it is to existence as wood is to a table, and that it is something which is implied

in all existence. Nothing can exist without Matter, which is one of the four causes of the existence of everything; but, on the other hand, it may be said that Matter itself has no existence. Things can only be realized by the mind, and so come into actual existence, if they be endowed with Form; pure Matter denuded of form cannot be perceived or known, and therefore cannot be actual. Suppose we take marble as the matter or material of which a statue is composed,—if we think of the marble we attribute to it qualities—color, brilliancy, hardness, and so on, and these qualities constitute Form, and the marble is no longer pure Matter. We have to ask, then, what is the matter "underlying" the marble? and again, if we figure to ourselves anything possessing definite qualities—as, for instance, any of the simple substances of chemistry—we at once have not only matter, but form. Matter, thus, in the theory of Aristotle, is something which must always be presupposed, and which yet always eludes us, and flies back from the region of the actual into that of the possible. Ultimate matter, or "first timber," necessarily exists as the condition of all thing, but it remains as one of those possibilities which can never be realized (see above, p. 49), and thus forms the antithesis to God, the ever-actual. From all this it may be inferred that Aristotle would have considered it very unphilosophical to represent Matter, as some philosophers of the present day appear to do, as having had an independent existence, and as having contained the germs, not only of all other things, but even of Reason itself, so that out of Matter Reason was developed. According to Aristotle, it is impossible to conceive Matter at all as actually existing, far less as the one independent antecedent cause of all things; and it is equally impossible to think of Reason

as non-existent, or as having had a late and derivative origin.

Subsidiary to his theory of knowledge, Aristotle discourses at some length, both in his treatise "On the Soul" and in his "Physiological Tracts," on the Five Senses. He affirms that the sentient soul of man is able to discriminate between the properties of things, "because it is itself a mean or middle term between the two sensible extremes of which it takes cognizance—hot and cold, hard and soft, wet and dry, white and black, acute and grave, bitter and sweet, light and darkness, etc. We feel no sensation at all when the object touched is exactly of the same temperature with ourselves, neither hotter nor colder." * This doctrine, which is obviously true, points to the relativity of the qualities of things; it shows that all qualities—*e.g.*, "great" and "small," and all the rest—are named from the human stand-point, and that, in short, "Man is the measure of all things." Protagoras, indeed, had used this *dictum* in order to throw doubt on all knowledge and truth, for he said that everything was relative to the individual percipient, and that what appeared sweet to one man might seem bitter to another man; thus, that there could be no truth beyond "what any one troweth;" any assertion might be true for the individual who made it, and not for any one besides. Aristotle argues against this skeptical theory, ("Metaphys." III. iv.); in spite of minor fluctuations in the subjective perceptions of individuals he finds ground for truth and certainty in the *consensus* of the human race, and in science which deals with universal prop-

* Grote's "Aristotle," vol. ii. p. 197. See "On the Soul," II. x.

ositions obtained by reason out of particular perceptions.

As usual, there is a great contrast between the correctness of his general philosophy of the senses and that of his particular scientific theory of the operation of each sense. While the world has made no advance upon the one—which was arrived at by mere force of thought—the other, lacking the aid of instruments and accumulated experience, has been wholly left behind, and appears infantile when compared with the discoveries of a Helmholtz. The following is a specimen of Aristotle's physiology of the senses: "Do sensations travel to us?" he asks. "Certainly," is the reply; "the nearest person will catch an odor first. Sound is perceived *after* the blow which caused it. The letters of which words are composed get disarranged by being carried in the air (!), and hence people fail to hear what has been said at a distance. Each sense has its own proper vehicle. Water is the vehicle of sight, air of sound, fire of smell, earth of touch and taste. Sensations are not bodies, but motions or affections of the vehicle or medium along which they travel to us. Light,* however, is an exception to this rule; it is an existence, not a motion; it produces alteration, and alteration of a whole mass may be instantaneous and simultaneous, as in a mass of water freezing. Thus Empedocles was mistaken (!) when he said that light travels from the sun to the earth, and that there is a moment when each ray is not yet seen, but is being borne midway."—("Phys. Tracts." "On Sensation." vi.)

* The theory of light here given seems to be not only erroneous in itself, but also inconsistent with Aristotle's explanation of the twinkling of the stars.—(See above, p. 119.)

Among the permanent contributions to mental science which were made by Aristotle, none is more famous than his doctrine of the "Law of Association," which he throws out while discussing Memory and Recollection in his "Physiological Tracts." He says, "Recollection is the recalling of knowledge. It implies the existence in the mind of certain starting-points, or clues, so that when you get hold of one you will be led to the rest. It depends on the law of association: we recollect when such and such a motion naturally follows such and such; we feel the latter motion, and that produces the former. In trying to recollect, we search after something that is in *sequence*, or *similarity*, or *contrast*, or *proximity*, to the thing which we want to recollect. Milk will suggest whiteness, whiteness the air, the air moisture, and this the rainy season, which was what we were trying to think of. No animal but man has the power of recollection, though many animals have memory. Recollection implies consideration and a train of reasoning, and yet it is a bodily affection—a physical movement and presentation." Aristotle adds that "persons with large heads are bad at recollecting, on account of the weight upon their perceptive organ (!), and that the very young and very old are so, on account of the state of movement they are in—the one in the movement of growth, the other in that of decay."

These considerations, however, whether correct or erroneous, all belong rather to psychology than to metaphysics. Let us conclude by endeavoring to gather Aristotle's opinions on three great metaphysical problems: The destiny of the human soul, free will, and the nature of God. His opinions on these subjects have to be "gathered," because, as said above (p. 5), he had no great taste for such speculations, and was in this respect

very unlike Plato. Over the mind of Plato the idea of a future life had exercised an absorbing influence. Rising to an almost Christian hope and faith, he had held out, as a consolation in the hour of death, the promise of an immortality to be spent in the fruition of truth; and, as a motive for human actions and a basis for morals, he had enunciated a system of future rewards and punishments, closely corresponding with Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory. What had been so prominent with Plato was by Aristotle put away into the extreme background. In early life, indeed, he had written a dialogue, called "Eudemus," which turned on the story that an exile had been told by the oracle that within a certain time he should be "restored to his home," and that within that time he had died, and thus in another sense had "gone home." It is conjectured that this youthful production may have treated of the survival of the individual Reason into another state of existence. But in Aristotle's maturer works, so far from such a doctrine being laid down, and deductions made from it, passages occur which would seem to render it untenable. "The Soul," says Aristotle, "is the function of the body, as sight is of the eye. Some of its parts, however, may be separable from the body, as not arising out of the material organization. This is the case with the Reason, which cannot be regarded as the result of bodily conditions, but which is divine, and enters into each of us from without. Reason, as manifested in the individual mind, is twofold, constructive and passive (see above, p. 146). The passive Reason, which receives the impressions of external things, is the seat of memory, but it perishes with the body; while the constructive Reason transcends the body, being capable of separation from it and from all things. It is

an everlasting existence, incapable of being mingled with matter, or affected by it; it is prior and subsequent to the individual mind; but though immortal, it carries no memory with it."*

This last sentence would seem logically to exclude the possibility of a future life for the individual, for memory is requisite to individuality; and if all that is immortal in us is incapable of memory, it would seem that the only immortality possible would be that of a Buddhist *nirvâna*, all the actions of this life and all individual distinctions having been erased. Thus, it would appear that the same *dictum* might be applied to the human race that is applied ("Soul," II. iv. 4) to the works of Nature: "Perpetuity, for which all things long, is attained not by the individual, for that is impossible, but by the species." These logical deductions are, however, never drawn by Aristotle himself, who in his "Ethics" (I. xi. 1) protests against any rude contradiction of the popular opinion that the dead retain their consciousness, and even their interest in what passes in this world. Thus, whether he did or did not believe in a future life has been a matter for controversy in modern times. On the whole, while we have hardly sufficient data for pronouncing one way or the other, it seems certain that no part of his philosophy, so far as we possess it, shows any trace of the influence of this doctrine.

As to Free Will: That is a question which has arisen out of theology, out of the ideas of the infinite power and knowledge of a personal God, which caused the question to be asked, Can man do anything except what he has been predestined to do? But such a diffi-

* Collected from "Soul," II i. 7-12; III. v. 2. "Generation," II. iii. 10.

ality implies two conditions, both of which were absent from the mind of Aristotle—namely, a strong apprehension of the personality and will of God, and a strong apprehension of the importance of human acts and of the eternal consequences attached to them. Aristotle, as we shall see, can hardly be said to have attributed personality to the Deity; he thought human actions to be of comparatively small importance; and he thought freedom to be, in a certain sense, valueless. Hence, we only mention the problem of Free Will in connection with him in order to show how his ideas contrast with those of the modern world. By a curious metaphor ("Metaphys." XI. x.), he figured the universe as a household, in which the sun and stars and all the heavens are the masters, whose high aims and important positions prevent any of their time being left to a merely arbitrary disposal, for all is taken up with a round of the noblest duties and occupations. Other parts of the universe are like the inferior members of the family—the slaves and domestic animals—who can to a great extent pursue their own devices. Under the last category man would be ranked. Aristotle does not regard the unchanging and perpetual motion of the heavenly bodies as a bondage, nor what is arbitrary in the human will as a privilege. His cosmical views tended to disparage the dignity of man. He would say with the Psalmist, "What is man in comparison with the heavens?" But he failed to reach the counterbalancing thought of Kant, that "There are two things which strike the mind with awe—the starry heavens and the moral nature of man."

Within an eternal and immutable circumference of the heavens, Aristotle placed a comparatively narrow sphere of the changeable, and in this, Nature, Chance,

and Human Will were the causes at work. He admitted a certain amount of determinism as controlling the human will, but he did not care to trace out the exact proportions of this; he merely maintained that the individual was a "joint cause," if not the sole cause, of his own character and actions ("Eth." III. vii. 20). He thought that mankind had existed from all eternity, and that there had been over and over again a constant process of development going on, till the sciences and arts, and society had been brought to perfection: and then that by some great deluge, or other natural convulsion, the race had invariably been destroyed—all but a few individuals who had escaped, and who had had to commence anew the first steps towards civilization.

To us, in the present day, it seems absolutely clear that when we speak of a person we do not mean a thing, and that when we speak of a thing we do not mean a person. In Grecian philosophy, however, this was not the case, for by both Plato * and Aristotle, God was spoken of both as personal and as impersonal, without any reconciliation between the two points of view, or any remark on the subject. In the same way they both pass from the plural to the singular, and speak of "the gods" or "God" as if it hardly mattered which term was used. This seems at first surprising, but when we look into the matter (confining our inquiry to the views of Aristotle), certain explanations offer themselves. When he speaks of "the gods," he is partly accommodating himself to the ordinary language of Greece, and partly he is indicating the heavenly bodies, as conscious, happy ex-

* See Professor Jowett's "Dialogues of Plato Translated" vol. iv. p. 11.

istences, worthy to be reckoned with that Supreme God, Who inhabits the outside of the universe, and imparts their everlasting motion to the heavens When he speaks of "God," he has in his mind that Supreme Being, Who, unmoved Himself, is the cause of motion to all things, being the object of reason and of desire—being, in short, the Good. Here the transition from a person to an abstract idea is obvious; but if God is the object of desire to the universe and to Nature, who or what is it that desires Him? Clearly, reason or divine instinct is placed by this theory within Nature itself. In other words, this is Pantheism: it represents Nature as instinct with God, and God in Nature desiring God as the Idea of Good. But Aristotle passes on from this view to describe God as "Thought"—that is, as rather more personal than impersonal—and he asks, on what does that thought think? Thought must have an object, and it will be determined in its character by that object; it will be elevated or deteriorated according as the object on which it thinks is high or low. But this cannot be the case with God, who cannot be subject to these alterations. "God, therefore, must think upon Himself; the thought of God is the thinking upon thought." Only for a moment ("Metaphys." XI. x. 1) does Aristotle seem to take up something like our point of view, when he says that God may be to the world as the general is to an army. This seems like the modern view, because it would imply something like will in the nature of God. But it is a mere passing metaphor, and none of the other utterances of the Stagirite would attribute anything like will, providence, or ordering of affairs to the Deity. We are told ("Eth." X. viii. 7) that it would be absurd to attribute to Him moral

qualities or virtues, or any human function except philosophic thought. He enjoys, however, happiness of the most exalted kind, such as we can frame but an indistinct notion of by the analogy of our own highest and most blessed moods. This happiness is everlasting, and God "has, or rather is," continuous and eternal life and duration.*

We have been unavoidably launched upon a solemn subject, because any account of Aristotle which did not sketch his theories of the Deity would have been incomplete. It will be seen that, on the whole, his tendency is to what we should call Pantheism. "Reason is divine, and Reason is everywhere, desiring the Good and moving the world:" that is a summary of Aristotle's philosophy. Of all modern speculators, the one who most nearly approaches him is John Stuart Mill, who represents God as benevolent, but not omnipotent. Aristotle also would say that the desire for the Good which runs through Nature is baffled by the imperfections of matter and the irregularities of chance. The great defect in Aristotle's conception of God is, that he denies that God can be a moral Being. This, in fact, entirely separates God from man; it leaves only Theology possible, but not Religion; it takes away from morality all divine sanctions. Plato's view was different; but even he fell short of that deep idea of God, as the Righteous One, which was revealed to the Hebrew nation through their lawgivers and prophets, and afterwards through our Saviour.

* The above statement of Aristotle's views of the Deity is collected from "Metaphysics," XI. vi.-x.

CHAPTER X.

ARISTOTLE SINCE THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

We have seen above (p. 36) that in the time of Cicero —that is to say, shortly before the Christian era—the works of Aristotle were very little known even to philosophers. The edition of those works by Andronicus was made and published in the last half century before the birth of Christ. And then—three hundred years after the death of Aristotle—there began silently and imperceptibly the first dawn of that wider reputation of him, which was destined to shine through the whole of Europe for a thousand years with evergrowing and increasing splendor.

During the period of the Roman Empire, the day for original philosophies was gone by. The works of Aristotle, in the form in which they were now presented to the world—being a culmination of ancient thought, and containing a dogmatic exposition of the outlines of every science; being rich in ideas and facts, precise in terms, and yet condensed, and often obscure—offered to the minds of intellectual men, and especially the subtle Greeks of those times, exactly the kind of food and employment which suited them. To study one of these treatises, and comment upon it, became now regarded as sufficient achievement for the life of one man. Aristotle thus shared the honors awarded to the sacred books of different nations; he became placed so high as an authority, that merely to expound or explain his meaning was a path to fame. The race of Greek commentators, or "Scholiasts," was spread over three or four centuries, the most distinguished names among them being those of Boethus,

Nicolas of Damascus, Alexander of Ægæ, Aspasius, Adrastus, Galenus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Dexippus, Themistius, Proclus, Ammonius, David the Armenian, Asclepius, Olympiodorus, Simplicius, and Johannes Philoponus. The writings of many of these worthies have been lost, and their memory only survives through their having been quoted in the more enduring commentaries of others. What remains of the whole body of these *Scholia* is various in worth, ranging from emptiest platitudes up to remarks of subtlety and ability. Occasionally, but too rarely, the Greek scholiasts preserve for us some precious sentence or tradition of antiquity. The late Professor Brandis has condensed into one closely-printed quarto volume all that he considered worth notice of the "*Scholia* upon Aristotle," and even with some of these we might have dispensed.

Gradually Christianity took possession of the Roman Empire, and then came the inundation of barbarians, whose uncultivated natures had no sympathy with literature, science, or philosophy. Libraries were destroyed, or, unused, underwent the course of natural decay. The arts fell into abeyance, and Western Europe, as if in order to be born again, seemed to pass through the waters of Lethe. From the sixth to the thirteenth century all knowledge of the Greek writers was lost. But long before the close of this period intellectual life had begun to stir again among the friars and ecclesiastics of the Continent; and the chief nourishment for that life consisted of a fragment from antiquity, being none other than Latin translations * of the so-

* These translations were attributed to Boethius, the "last of the philosophers," at the end of the fifth and beginning of the sixth century.

called "Categories" and "Interpretation" of Aristotle (see above, pp. 49–50), and of the "Introduction" of Porphyry to the first-named of the two treatises. In earlier and better-informed ages Aristotle had been repudiated by some of the Fathers of the Church as being, at all events, in comparison with Plato, "atheistical." But no harm to theology could arise from a study of the dry formulæ of logic and metaphysics. Nay, these formulæ, while totally devoid of all dangerous coloring or character—being merely some of the fundamental and ordinary principles of reasoning—were likely to do good service to the Church, by training her adherents to argue skillfully in her behalf. Thus, the "Categories" and "Interpretation" won their place as textbooks for youth; and thus the "Scholastic Philosophy," which consisted in lectures and disputations chiefly on matters mooted by Aristotle, took its rise out of the Latin translations of these Peripatetic treatises.

Afterwards a richer knowledge of Aristotle came to the schools of the West from what might have been considered an unlikely source—namely, the Arabs in Spain. Departing from the example of him who burned the Alexandrian library, and from the traditionary tendencies of Mahometans in all ages, the Arabs of Bagdad, Cairo, and Cordova indulged in a period of enlightenment and of intellectual activity. This period was chiefly inaugurated by Almamun, the son of Harun-al-Raschid, and seventh of the Abbasside Caliphs at Bagdad (A.D. 810), who "invited the Muses from their ancient seats. His ambassadors at Constantinople, his agents in Armenia, Syria, and Egypt, collected the volumes of Grecian science; at his command they were translated by the most skillful interpreters into the Arabic language; his subjects were exhorted assiduously to

peruse these instructive writings; and the successor of Mahomet assisted with pleasure and modesty at the assemblies and disputations of the learned." "The age of Arabian learning continued about five hundred years, till the great irruption of the Moguls, and was coeval with the darkest and most slothful period of European annals."* It was during the twelfth century that the Arabs of Cordova became the schoolmasters of the "schoolmen," and poured a flood of learning into Europe. The chief of them was the great Ibn-Raschid (A.D. 1120-1198), whose name was Latinized Averroes. Besides other philosophical works, he wrote "Commentaries" on all the principal works of Aristotle, and these were translated into Latin and published abroad. Averroes knew no Greek, and his commentaries were made upon the existing Arabic versions of Aristotle; but he quoted the translations of the text of each passage entire before elucidating the meaning, and thus he brought a great deal of the thought of Aristotle, though passed through a double translation, to the notice of Europe. In commenting upon Aristotle, his attention seems to have been drawn to that passage, above referred to (p. 172), on the difference between the Constructive and the Passive Reason. Following out this idea, he made it the basis of a doctrine of "Monopsychism," to the effect that the Constructive Reason is one individual substance, being one and the same in Socrates and Plato, and all other individuals; whence it follows that individuality consists only in bodily sensations, which are perishable, so that nothing which is individual can be immortal, and nothing which is immortal can be individual. These doctrines spread from the Arabs to the Jews of

* Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," chap.

Spain, and from them to the Christian schools, and Averroism became a leaven in the scholastic philosophies, causing, as might be expected, the most virulent strife between the opponents and supporters of the theory of "Monopsychism."

In the latter part of the thirteenth century Aristotle reached the height of his glory. At this time, partly from Arabian copies in Spain and partly from Greek MSS. which the Crusaders brought with them from Constantinople, Western Christendom had obtained the whole of his works. He was now commented on by eminent ecclesiastics; indeed he occupied and almost monopolized the most powerful minds of Europe. Chief among these may be mentioned Albert "the Great," the most fertile and learned of the schoolmen, who has left commentaries on Aristotle which fill six folio volumes; and his pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas, who prepared (1260–70), through the instrumentality of the monk Wilhelm of Moerbecke, a new translation of the entire works after Greek originals; and who himself wrote laborious commentaries on the "Metaphysics," the "Ethics," and other books. It may be observed that by these great churchmen Aristotle is treated with the most implicit confidence; they seem blind to all that is Greek and pagan in his point of view; they defend him from charges of Averroism; and treat him, in short, as one of themselves. All this, of course, argues a great want of the critical and historical faculty, and much mixing up of things—"syncretism," as it is called by the learned; but historical criticism was hardly to be looked for in the Middle Ages.

The Stagirite was now almost incorporated with Christianity. The *Summa Theologiæ* of St. Thomas Aquinas was a compound of the logic, physics, and

ethics of Aristotle with Christian divinity. But the highest honor of all came to him in the year 1300 A.D., when he was hailed in the "Divina Commedia" of Dante as "the master of those that know," sitting as head of "the philosophic family," to whom Socrates and Plato and all the rest must look up.* Him Dante figured thus sitting in the "limbo," or fringe, of hell, with all the great spirits of antiquity, who had lived before Christianity and without baptism; they were free from torment, but were sad, because they felt the desire, but had no hope, of seeing God.

Dante had been a diligent and reverential student of Aristotle, especially in the commentaries of St. Thomas Aquinas. In his "Convito," he says that "Aristotle is most worthy of trust and obedience, as being the master-artist who considers of and teaches us the end† of human life to which, as men, we are ordained." In the 11th canto of the "Inferno," he follows up Aristotle's views of the "unnatural" character of usury (see above, p. 107), and places usurers in hell among those who do violence to God and Nature, the reasons for which he sets forth in a learned discourse. But the most striking thing of all is to find that Dante, in the 24th canto of the "Paradiso," commences the statement of his own theological creed in words taken directly from Aristotle's definition of the Deity—

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* Dante, "Inferno," canto iv. 131—

"Vidi il Maestro di color che sanno
Seder tra filosofica famiglia;
Tutti lo miran, tutti onor gli fanno.
Quivi vid' io Socrate e Platone,
Che innanzi agli altri piu presso gli stanno."

† This, of course, refers to the "Ethics."—See above, p. 88.

"I in one God believe;
One sole eternal Godhead, *of whose love*
All heaven is moved, himself unmoved the while." *

And in the 27th canto, Beatrice, standing on the ninth heaven, points to the circumference, or *primum mobile*, of Aristotle (see above, p. 119), and discourses to Dante in the following thoroughly Aristotelian terms:—

"Here is the goal, whence motion on his race
Starts: motionless the centre, and the rest
All moved around. Except the soul divine,
Place in this heaven is none; the soul divine,
Wherein the love, which ruleth o'er its orb,
Is kindled, and the virtue, that it sheds:
One circle, light and love, enclasping it,
As this doth clasp the others; and to Him,
Who draws the bound, its limit only known.
Measured itself by none, it doth divide
Motion to all, counted unto them forth,
As by the fifth or half ye count forth ten.
The vase, wherein time's roots are plunged, thou seest:
Look elsehere for the leaves."

It was not till 240 years after these verses had been written that Copernicus propounded his system of the motion of the earth and the other planets round the sun; and that system only gradually won its way to acceptance, even in scientific minds, and with the aid of the demonstrations of Galileo. Till the end of the seventeenth century the Aristotelian system—further elaborated by the Alexandrian Ptolemy and by King Alphonso X. of Castile (1252–1284 A.D.)—maintained its influence, and filled the literature of all Europe with a particular train of associations.† Shakespeare lived

* Cary's Translation.—See above, p. 155.

† When Shakespeare wrote—

"And certain stars shot madly from their spheres,"

he was referring to the Ptolemaic or Alphonsine spheres. The

and died in the faith of the older system. Milton had been bred in it as a boy, and the plan of his universe in the "Paradise Lost" was drawn according to it. Yet still, as a learned man, he was well acquainted with all that could be said in favor of the Copernican system. And he puts these arguments into the mouth of Adam in the 8th book of "Paradise Lost." An angel, in reply, reminds Adam—what is, in fact, the case—that neither the motion of the sun nor of the earth can be absolutely proved; and adds that these are matters too high and abstruse for human inquiry. Milton's mind was "apparently uncertain to the last which of the two systems, the Ptolemaic or the Copernican, was the true one."* Surely, however, if but slowly, the Copernican theory established itself in the mind of Europe, and when once it had been established, then a great gulf was set between Aristotle and the modern world.

We have seen Aristotle an object of reverence to the great scholastic philosophers and the great poet of the Middle Ages. But we must not forget that the universities were, so to speak, founded in Aristotle—that for a long time the chief end of their being was to teach Aristotle. Chaucer describes the zeal of the poor Oxford student for this kind of learning in the following terms:—

> "A clerk there was of Oxenford also
> That unto logik hadde long y go:
> As lene was his hors as is a rake,
> And he was not right fast, I undertake;
> But looked holwe and thereto soberlye.
> Ful threadbare was his overest courtepye.

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common metaphor of a person's "sphere" is a survival of the same notion.

* See Professor Masson's edition of "Milton's Poetical Works" (Macmillan, 1874), vol. i. p. [illegible]

> For he had gotten him no benefice,
> He was not worldly to have an office.
> For, him was lever have at his beddes hed
> Twenty bookes clothed in blake or red
> Of Aristotle and his philosophie,
> Than robes rich or fidel or sautrie."

This almost living picture from the fourteenth century doubtless represented correctly the loyal and undoubting faith in the Stagirite, to be found among many generations of students, not only at Oxford, but at Paris and Padua, and the other seats of universities.

But a spirit of revolt against authority in general, and especially against the authority of Aristotle, was destined to show itself, being fostered by the progress of time, the revival of learning, and the Reformation. In the year 1536 we find Peter Ramus, then a youth of twenty years of age, choosing as the subject of his thesis for the M.A. degree, in the University of Paris, the proposition, that "Whatever has been said by Aristotle is false!" It may be imagined with what consternation the announcement of this thesis, which seemed scarcely less than blasphemous, was received by the academical authorities. However, the young Ramus acquitted himself with such ability, as well as boldness, that he obtained his degree and the license to teach. This license he employed in lecturing and writing against the Peripatetic logic. He propounded a method of his own in which more attention was to be paid to the *discovery* of truth. He formed a sect of Ramists, and rallied round himself the malcontent spirits of France, Germany, and Switzerland. In some of the universities Ramism obtained a firm hold. But he had to fight a hard battle with the Aristotelians, who were armed with official power, and not slow to use it in the way of persecution; his books were often

condemned to be suppressed, and finally he was a martyr to the cause which he had chosen. Being a Huguenot, he was assassinated by his Aristotelian enemies during the massacre of St. Bartholomew (1572 A.D.) The arguments of Ramus seem nowadays to have no weight against the "Organon" of Aristotle, but they are valid against that perverted use of the "Organon" which constituted the Scholastic method. It was quite necessary that the spell which Aristotle had so long exercised over the world should be broken and Ramus did good service in somewhat rudely assailing it.

If the first great attack upon Aristotle proceeded from a spirit of revolt within the logic schools, the second was a direct manifestation of the results of the Renaissance, and consisted in bringing learning and criticism to bear upon the works of Aristotle. This was done by Patrizzi, or Patricius, who brought out his "Discussiones Peripateticæ" at Bâle in 1571. Patricius possessed a combination of character which is fortunately not often seen,—being extremely learned and very able, but, at the same time, ill-conditioned, egotistical, and wrong-headed. Preferring in his own mind a sort of Neo-Platonic philosophy to the Peripatetic system, he set himself to work in the book just mentioned to pull Aristotle to pieces. The first section of the "Discussiones" treated of the life and morals of the Stagirite, and raked together against him all the personal charges to be found scattered through the remains of antiquity (see above, p. 26); the second section critically assailed with great learning the genuineness of the works of Aristotle, and proved them all to be spurious (?). The remaining sections undertook to refute the system of philosophy which they contained.

The attack of Patricius was overdone in malignity, yet still it had a powerful effect in inducing men to think for themselves when they saw the claims of their oracle thus stringently called in question.

Another impulse to reaction against authority was given by science itself, in the shape of discoveries which were irreconcilable with the *dicta* of authority. In the year 1592, Galileo, wishing to test the truth of Aristotle's principle that "the velocity of falling bodies is proportionate to their weight," ascended the leaning tower of Pisa, and launching bodies of different weight, demonstrated that they reached the ground simultaneously, and thus that the principle which had been so long held with undoubting faith was erroneous. The Aristotelians of Pisa, however, were so much annoyed by this demonstraton, that they compelled Galileo to leave the city.

Aristotle's philosophy had, since the days of St. Thomas Aquinas, been bound up with the Catholic Church. Therefore it is not to be wondered at that Luther, in the commencement of the Reformation, should have "inveighed against the Aristotelian logic and metaphysics, or rather against the sciences themselves; nor was Melanchthon at that time much behind him. But time ripened in this, as it did in theology, the disciple's excellent understanding; and he even obtained influence enough over the master to make him retract some of that invective against philosophy which at first threatened to bear down all human reason. Melanchthon became a strenuous advocate of Aristotle, in opposition to all other ancient philosophy. He introduced into the University of Wittenberg, to which all Protestant Germany looked up, a scheme of dialectics and physics, founded upon the Peripatetic school, but

improved by his own acuteness and knowledge. Thus in his books the physical science of antiquity is enlarged by all that had been added in astronomy and physiology. It need hardly be said that the authority of Scripture was always resorted to as controlling a philosophy which had been considered unfavorable to natural religion."* This system of Melanchthon's got the nickname of the "Philippic Method," and it was received with so much favor in the Protestant Universities of Germany, as to cause these Universities to oppose the spread of Ramism.

Scholasticism and the love of authority died hard, and not without many a struggle. It is recorded that so late as the year 1629 an Act of the French Parliament was passed forbidding attacks upon Aristotle! The Jesuits employed the Peripatetic tenets in arguing against free-thinkers like Descartes. Even to the present day the manuals of philosophy in Roman Catholic ecclesiastical establishments are a *résumé* of Aristotle.

Until the seventeenth century, when the authority of Aristotle was questioned, "his disciples could always point with scorn at the endeavors which had as yet been made to supplant it, they could ask whether the wisdom so long reverenced was to be set aside for the fanatical reveries of Paracelsus, the unintelligible ideas of Bruno, or the arbitrary hypotheses of Telesio."† But in the seventeenth century modern philosophy took a new and splendid start in Bacon and Descartes, while modern science commenced its glorious career with Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. Bacon, with his rich

* Hallam's "Introduction to the Literature of Europe." Part I., chap. iii.

† Hallam's Introduction. Part III., chap. iii.

scientific imagination and his stately language, was a fitting herald of the new era. He sometimes reflects the spirit of Ramus or Patricius, and applies to Aristotle harsh terms which were rather merited by the scholastic pedants who had been Aristotelians only in the letter. Could the Stagirite himself have returned to the earth at this moment, he would doubtless have declared for Galileo and Bacon against the Peripatetics. Aristotelianism was not refuted in Europe, but its long day was now past; it was superseded and quietly put aside when other and fresher subjects of interest came to fill men's minds. Bacon contributed to this result, not by railing at the "categories" and the "syllogism," but by exciting people's fancy with suggestions of the extension of human power to be gained by researches into nature—suggestions which subsequent results have verified a hundred-fold.

From henceforth it became impossible for an educated man to be an Aristotelian, because however much he might in his youth have learned from Aristotle, there was so much more to be learned which was not to be found in Aristotle, that Aristotelianism could only constitute a portion of his culture. In the Middle Ages it had constituted the whole of culture; but that time had gone by, and in the modern world it became possible to gain elsewhere even most of that which the study of Aristotle had to offer. The best of Aristotle's thought had now come to be the common property of the world, and men could become good logicians without reading the "Organon," and without being conscious of the obligations which, after all, they owed to its author.

Perhaps the period of the greatest neglect which the memory of Aristotle underwent since the Christian era was the eighteenth century. This was a period of an-

tithesis to mediævalism, and, at the same time, a period of mechanical philosophy and shallow learning. At the English universities all studies, except perhaps mathematics and verbal scholarship, were at a low ebb. Only small portions of Aristotle were taught, and these were ill taught, without reference to their context and real significance. But with the nineteenth century there came a restitution of the honors of the Stagirite, who was now regarded in his proper light—that is to say, historically, and not as if he were an authority for modern times. This came about with the rise of the great German philosophies. There have been two great periods of philosophy in the world: the period of Greek philosophy in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C., and that of German philosophy during the first part of the present century. And there is a certain affinity between the two. Kant and Hegel have more in common with Plato and Aristotle than they have either with the scholastic philosophy or with the psychological systems of the last century. An age which produced Kant and Hegel was likely to appreciate their ancient forerunners; and Hegel advocated the study of the works of Aristotle as "the noblest problem of classical philology." The Germans have applied themselves to this problem with splendid success, especially Immanuel Bekker, Brandis, Zeller, Bonitz, Spengel, Stahr, Bernays, Rose, and many others who might be mentioned. The great Berlin edition of the works of Aristotle, brought out under the auspices of the Prussian Royal Academy, is a monument of their labors. We have seen the vicissitudes of reputation through which Aristotle has passed —how at different times he was partially known, misconceived, over-rated, under-rated, and both praised and blamed on wrong grounds. Perhaps at no previous time

has he been more correctly known and estimated than he is at prerent.

The various services of Aristotle to mankind have been to some extent indicated in the foregoing pages. To attempt to summarize them all would be vain; but perhaps it may be said, in a word, that Aristotle has contributed more than any one man to the scientific education of the world. The amount of the influence which he has exercised may partly be inferred from the traces which his system has left in all the languages of modern Europe. Our everyday conversation is full of Aristotelian "fossils," that is, remnants of his peculiar phraseology. These mostly come through Latin renderings of his terms, though sometimes the original Greek form is preserved. The following are a few specimens of these fossils: "Maxim" is the major premiss of the Aristotelian syllogism. "Principle" has the same meaning—it comes from *principium*, the Latin for "beginning" or "starting-point," which was one of Aristotle's terms for a major premiss. "Matter" comes from *materies*, the Latin for "timber" (see above, p. 147); when we say "it does not matter," or it makes a "material" difference, we are indebted to Aristotle for our words. "Form," "end," "final cause," "motive," "energy," "actually," "category," "predicament" (the latter of these two being Latin for the former), the "mean" and the "extremes," "habit" (both in the sense of "moral habit" and of "dress"), "faculty," and "quintessence," are all purely Peripatetic; while the terms "Metaphysics" and "Natural History," are derived from two of the titles of Aristotle's works.

Aristotle, the strongest of the ancients and the oracle of the Middle Ages, must always hold a place of honor in the history of European thought. Writings which

have interested and influenced mankind so deeply and through so many centuries can never fall into contempt, even though they may be devoid of the graces of style and though the matter in them may be either superseded or else absorbed into the treatises of other authors. Nor is it from mere curiosity—from a merely antiquarian or historical point of view—that the works of the Stagirite continue to be studied. As long as the process of higher education in modern Europe consists so largely in imbibing the mind with the literature of classical antiquity, so long will a study of certain works of Aristotle remain as one of the last stages of that process. Those works—especially the "Rhetoric," "Art of Poetry," "Ethics," and "Politics"—have a remarkable educational value. They form an introduction to philosophy; they invite comparison of ancient and modern ways of thinking; they offer rich stores of information as to human nature—so much the same in all ages; and they train the mind to follow the Aristotelian method of analytic insight. This method consists in concentration of the mind upon the subject in hand, marshalling together all the facts and opinions attainable upon it, and dwelling on these and scrutinizing and comparing them till a light flashes on the whole subject. Such is the procedure to be learnt, by imitation, from Aristotle.

PLATO

BY

CLIFTON W. COLLINS, M. A.

H. M. INSPECTOR OF SCHOOLS.

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

THE Dialogues of Plato have been grouped together in this little volume as their subject or argument seemed to suit the requirements of the Chapter in which they will be found, without regard to chronological order. Nor has the vexed question of the "Platonic Canon," or what are or are not the genuine works of Plato, been entered upon in these pages. All the Dialogues attributed to him in Stallbaum's edition are accepted here, and discussed with more or less brevity, as their interest for the general reader seemed to require.

The writer desires to express his deep sense of his obligations to Professor Jowett for permission to use his valuable translation of Plato, from which most of the quotations found in the text (including the extracts marked "J.") have been made. Those marked "D." are taken from the translation of the "Republic" by Messrs Davies and Vaughan.

The other authorities most frequently consulted are Grote's 'Plato and the other Companions of Socrates,' Whewell's 'Platonic Dialogues,' Zeller's 'Socrates and Socratic Schools,' and the Histories of Philosophy by Maurice, Ritter, and Ueberweg.

The writer also wishes to record his sense of the kindness of H. W. Chandler (Wayntlete Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford), who was good enough to read through the proofs of the first four chapters of this volume.

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PLATO.

CHAPTER I.

LIFE OF PLATO.

"Eagle! why soarest thou above that tomb,—
To what sublime and star-y-paven home
Floatest thou?
I am the image of great Plato's spirit,
Ascending Heaven; Athens doth inherit
His corpse below."
—(*Epitaph translated from the Greek by Shelley.*)

PLATO was born at Ægina in B.C. 430—the same year that Pericles died—of a noble family which traced its descent from Codrus, the last hero-king of Attica. Little is told us of his early years beyond some stories of the divinity which hedged him in his childhood, and a dream of Socrates,* in which he saw a cygnet fly towards him, nestle in his breast, and then spread its wings and soar upwards, singing most sweetly. The next morning Ariston appeared, leading his son Plato

* Athenæus tells us of another dream, by no means so complimentary to Plato, in which his spirit appeared to Socrates in the form of a crow, which planted its claws firmly in the bald head of the philosopher, and flapped its wings. The interpretation of this dream, according to Socrates (or Athenæus), was, that Plato would tell many lies about him.

to the philosopher, and Socrates knew that his dream was fufilled.

It is easy to fill in the meagre outlines of the biography as given us by Diogenes Laertius; for Plato lived in a momentous time, when Athens could not afford to let any of her sons stand aloof from military service, and when every citizen must have been more or less an actor in the history of his times. Plato of course underwent the usual training of an Athenian gentleman, such as he has sketched it himself in the "Protagoras;" first attending the grammar school, where he learnt his letters, and committed to memory long passages from the poets, which he was taught to repeat with proper emphasis and modulation; and the frequent quotations from Homer in his Dialogues prove how thoroughly this part of his mental training was carried out * Then he was transferred to the Master who was to infuse harmony and rhythm into his soul by means of the lyre and vocal music. Then he learned mathematics, for which subject he showed a special aptitude; and we hear of him wrestling in the palæstra, where his breadth of shoulders stood him in good stead, and winning prizes at the Isthmian games. He also found time to study "the old masters" of philosophy, and (as might be expected) the two whose works attracted him the most were Heraclitus and Pythagoras. The melancholy of the one,

* Several pieces of poetry bearing Plato's name have come down to us; and there is a graceful epitaph on "Stella," ascribed to him, which Shelley has thus translated:

> "Thou wert the morning star among the living,
> Till thy fair light had fled;
> Now having died, thou art as Hesperus, giving
> New splendor to the dead."

and the mysticism of the other, found an echo in his own thoughts.

He was fifteen at the time of the expedition to Sicily, and was probably among the crowd which watched the great fleet sail out of the harbor of Piræus in all the pomp and circumstance of war; and two years afterwards he must have shared in the general despair, when the news came that the fleet and flower of the army had perished, and with them the hopes of Athens.

Then Decelea (only fifteen miles from the city) was fortified by the Spartans, and proved a very thorn in the side of Attica; for flocks and herds were destroyed, slaves fled thither in numbers, and watch had to be kept by the Athenians night and day, to check the continual sallies made from thence by the enemy. Plato was now eighteen, and was enrolled in the list which corresponded to the modern Landwehr, and had to take his share in that harassing garrison duty which fell on rich and poor alike, when the citizens (as Thucydides tells us) slept in their armor on the ramparts, and Athens more resembled a military fort than a city.

Then followed the loss of prestige and the defection of allies; for the subject islands either openly revolted or intrigued secretly with Sparta; and Alcibiades, the only Athenian who could have saved Athens, was an exile and a renegade, using Persian gold to levy Spartan troops against his country. Suddenly the Athenians, with the energy of despair, made a prodigious effort to recover the empire of the seas, which was passing from their hands. They melted down their treasures; they used the reserve fund which Pericles had stored up for such an emergency; and within thirty days they had equipped a fresh fleet of over a hundred

sail. Then followed a general levy of the citizens; every man who could bear arms was pressed into the service; freedom was promised to any slave who would volunteer; and even the Knights (of whom Plato was one) forgot the dignity of their order, hung up their bridles in the Acropolis, and went on board the fleet as marines. There is no reason to suppose that Plato shunned his duty at such a crisis; and we may therefore conclude that he volunteered with the rest, served with the squadron which relieved Mitylene, and was present at the victory of Arginusæ shortly afterwards.

Soon Alcibiades was recalled, and his genius gave a different character to the war; but the success of the Athenians was only temporary. Lysander came upon the scene; and on the fatal shore of Ægos-Potami the Athenian fleet was destroyed—almost without a blow being struck. Then followed the blockade of Athens, the consequent famine, and the despair of the citizens, with the foe without and two rival factions within, till at last the city surrendered, and the long walls were pulled down to the sound of Spartan music.

We have no clue, beyond a casual reference in Xenophon, as to what part Plato took in subsequent events. His own tastes and sympathies lay with the few; and all his intimate friends were among the oligarchs (the "good men and true," as they termed themselves), who by a *coup d'état*, effected what is known as the Revolution of the Four Hundred. A section of these formed the execrated Thirty Tyrants. Critias, the master-spirit of this body, was Plato's uncle, and probably had considerable influence over him. But be this as it may, we find Plato attracted by the programme in which the oligarchs pledged themselves to reform abuses and to purge the state

of evil-doers; and for a time, at all events, he was an avowed partisan of the Thirty. But they soon threw off the mask, and a Reign of Terror followed, which made their name forever a byword among the Athenians. Plato was probably in the first instance disgusted by the jealous intolerance of this new party, which drove the aged Protagoras into exile, and proscribed philosophical lectures; but when this intolerance was followed by numerous assassinations, he was utterly horrified, and at once withdrew from public life, and from all connection with his former friends.

There was little indeed to tempt a man of Plato's spirit and principles to meddle with the politics of his day. The great statesmen, and with them the bloom and brilliancy of the Periclean age, had passed away; and the very name of Pericles, as De Quincey says, "must have sounded with the same echo from the past as that of Pitt to the young men of our first Reform Bill." The long war had done its work. Not only had it wellnigh exhausted the revenues and strength of Athens, but it had brought in its train, as necessary consequences, ignoble passions, a selfish party spirit, a confusion of moral sentiments, and an audacious skepticism, which were going far to undermine the foundations of right and wrong. One revolution had followed another so rapidly that public confidence in the constitution was fast disappearing; and the worst symptom of a declining nation had already shown itself, in that men of genius and honor were beginning to despair of their country and to withdraw from public life. We can well believe that the picture which Plato draws of the Philosopher in his "Republic" was no fancy sketch:

Those who belong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession philosophy is, and have also seen and been satisfied of the madness of the multitude, and known that there is no one who ever acts honestly in the administration of states, nor any helper who will save any one who maintains the cause of the just. Such a savior would be like a man who has fallen among wild beasts, unable to join in the wickedness of his friends, and would have to throw away his life before he had done any good to himself or others. And he reflects upon all this, and holds his peace, and does his own business. He is like one who retires under the shelter of a wall in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries along; and when he sees the rest of mankind full of wickedness, he is content if only he can live his own life, and be pure from evil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and goodwill, with bright hopes.*

The next twelve years must have been the period of Plato's greatest intimacy with Socrates; and he was the great philosopher's constant companion until the day of his death. He had now no ties to bind him to Athens—perhaps, indeed, he did not feel secure there—and he went to live at Megara with his friend Euclid. Then he set out upon those travels of which we hear so much and know so little; "and" (says an old historian), "whilst studious youth were crowding to Athens from every quarter in search of Plato for their master, that philosopher was wandering along the banks of the Nile or the vast plains of a barbarous country, himself a disciple of the old men of Egypt."† After storing his mind with the wisdom of the Egyptians, Plato is said to have gone on to Palestine and Phœnicia—to have reached China disguised as an oil merchant—to have had the "Unknown God" revealed to him by Jewish rabbis—and to have learned the secrets of the stars from Chaldæan astronomers. But these extended travels are probably a fiction.

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* Republic, iv. (Jowett.)

† Valerius Maximus, quoted in Lewes' Hist. of Philos., i. 200.

His visit to Sicily, however, rests on better evidence. He made a journey thither in the year 387 B.C., with the object of witnessing an eruption of Mount Etna—already fatal to one philosopher, Empedocles. On his way he stayed at Tarentum with his friend Archytas, the great mathematician, and a member of the Pythagorean brotherhood. This order—which, like the Jesuits, was exclusive, ascetic, and ambitious—had formerly had its representatives in every city of Magna Græcia, and had influenced their political history accordingly. Even then their traditions and mystic ritual, as well as the ability shown by individual members, daily attracted new converts. Among these was Dion, the young brother-in-law of Dionysius, Tyrant of Syracuse. Dion was introduced by the Pythagoreans to Plato, and their acquaintance soon warmed into a friendship which has become historical. There was much on both sides that was attractive. In Plato, Dion found the friend who never flattered, the teacher who never dogmatized, the companion who was never wearisome. The gracious eloquence, the charm of manner, the knowledge of life, and, above all, the generous and noble thoughts so frankly expressed by Plato, must have had the same effect upon him as the conversation of Socrates had upon Alcibiades. His heart was touched, his enthusiasm was kindled, and he became a new man. There dawned upon him the conception of another Syracuse,—freed from slavery, and from the oppressive presence of foreign guards—self-governed, and with contented and industrious citizens—and Dion himself, the author of her liberties and the founder of her laws, idolized by a grateful people.

These day-dreams had a strong effect on Dion; and Plato partly shared in his enthusiasm. As in his own

model Republic, all might be accomplished "if philosophers were kings." Even as things were, if Dionysius would but look with a favorable eye upon Plato and his teaching, much might be done in the way of easing the yoke of tyranny which pressed so heavily upon the wretched Syracusans.

Accordingly Plato visited Syracuse in company with Dion, and was formally presented at court. But the results were unsatisfactory. It was not, indeed, likely that the philosopher, who was the sworn foe of Tyranny in the abstract, and who looked upon the Tyrant as the incarnation of all that was evil in human nature, would, either by flattery or plain speaking, convince Dionysius of the error of his ways. Plato had several interviews with Dionysius; and we are told that he enlarged upon his favorite doctrine of the happiness of the virtuous and inevitable misery of the wicked, till all who heard him were charmed by his eloquence, except the despot himself, who in a rage ordered him to be taken down to the market-place there and then, and to be sold as a slave to the highest bidder; that so he might put his own philosophy to a practical test, and judge for himself if the virtuous man was still happy in chains or in prison. Plato was accordingly sold, and was "bought in" by his friends for twenty minæ. Another account is, that he was put on board a trireme and landed at Ægina on the way home, where he was sold, and bought by a generous stranger, who set him at liberty and restored him to Athens. In any case, Plato might consider himself fortunate in escaping from such a lion's den as the court of the savage Dionysius; and he had learnt a salutary lesson, that theoretical politics are not so easily put into practice as men think,

and that caution and discretion are necessary in dealing with the powers that be.

On his return to Athens, weary of politics, and wishing to escape from the trumoil and distractions of the town, he retired to a house and garden which he had purchased (or inherited, for the accounts differ) at Colonus. There, or in the famous "olive grove" of the Academy close by, he gave lectures to, or held discussions with, a distinguished and constantly increasing body of pupils. Sauntering among the tall plane trees, or pacing those historic colonnades, might be found all the wit and genius of the day,—men of science and men of letters—artists, poets, and, in greater numbers than all, would-be philosophers. The pupils of Plato, unlike the poor crushed followers of Socrates, are described by one comic poet as dandies with curled hair, elegant dress, and affected walk; and we are told by another how the master's broad shoulders towered above the rest, and how he charmed them with his sweet speech, "melodious as the song of the cicalas in the trees above his head." No one must suppose, however, that the subjects of discussion in the Academy were trivial or frivolous. Over the gates was to be seen the formidable inscription—"Let none but Geometricians enter here;"* and, according to Aristotle, the lectures were on the Supreme Good—*i.e.*, the One, as contrasted with the Infinite.

Twenty years thus passed, and Plato's eloquence was daily attracting to the Academy fresh students from all parts of Greece, when he received a second summons to visit Sicily from his old friend and pupil Dion, with whom he had kept up a constant correspondence.

* Sir W. Hamilton considers this tradition "at least six centuries too late."—Essays, p. 27, note

Dionysius I. was dead, and his empire, "fastened" (as he expressed it) "by chains of adamant," had passed to his son—a young, vain, and inexperienced prince, who had not inherited either the ability or energy of his father. Dion still retained his position as minister and family adviser, and there seemed to be at last an opening under the new *régime* for carrying out his favorite scheme of restoring liberty to the Syracusans. Accordingly he spared no pains to impress the young prince with the wisdom and eloquence of Plato; and so successfully did he work upon his better feelings, that "Dionysius," says Plutarch, "was seized with a keen and frantic desire to hear and converse with the philosopher." He accordingly sent a pressing invitation to Plato, and this was coupled with a touching appeal from Archytas and other Pythagoreans, who looked eagerly forward to a regeneration of Syracuse. Plato (though reluctant to leave his work at the Academy) felt constrained to revisit Sicily—"less with the hope of succeeding in the intended conversion of Dionysius, than from the fear of hearing both himself and his philosophy taunted with confessed impotence, as fit only for the discussion of the school, and shrinking from all application to practice." *

He was received at Syracuse with every mark of honor and respect. Dionysius himself came in his chariot to meet him on landing, and a public sacrifice was offered as a thanksgiving for his arrival. And at first all things went well. There was a reformation in the manners of the court. The royal banquets were curtailed; the conversation grew intellectual; and geometry became so much the fashion that nothing

* Grote, Hist. of Greece, vii, 517.

was to be seen in the palace but triangles and figures traced in the sand. Many of the foreign soldiers were dismissed; and at an anniversary sacrifice, when the herald made the usual prayer—"May the gods long preserve the Tyranny, and may the Tyrant live forever," —Dionysius is said to have stopped him with the words—"Imprecate no such curse on me or mine." So deeply was he impressed by Plato's earnest pleading in behalf of liberty and toleration, that he was even prepared, we are told, to establish a limited monarchy in place of the existing despotism, and to restore free government to those Greek cities in Sicily which had been enslaved by his father. But Plato discountenanced any such immediate action; his pupil must go through the prescribed training, must reform himself, and be imbued with the true philosophical spirit, before he could be allowed to put his principles into practice. And thus, like other visionary schemes of reform, the golden opportunity passed away forever. The ascendancy of "the Sophist from Athens" (as Plato was contemptuously termed) roused the jealousy of the old Sicilian courtiers, and their slanders poisoned the mind of Dionysius, whose enthusiasm had already cooled. He grew suspicious of the designs of Dion, and, without giving him a chance of defending himself against his accusers, had him put on board a vessel and sent to Italy as an exile. Plato himself was detained a state prisoner in the palace, flattered and caressed by Dionysius, who appears to have had a sincere admiration and regard for him, but at the same time to have found the Platonic discipline too severe a trial for his own weak and luxurious nature. At last he was allowed to depart, after given a conditional promise to return, in the event of Dion being recalled

from exile. It is said that, as he was embarking Dionysius said to him—"When thou art in the Academy with thy philosophers, thou wilt speak ill of me." "God forbid," was Plato's answer, "that we should have so much time to waste in the Academy as to speak of Dionysius at all."

Ten years later Plato is induced—for the third and last time—by the earnest appeal of Dionysius to revisit Syracuse, and a condition of his coming was to be the recall of Dion. As before, he is affectionately welcomed, and is treated as an honored guest; but so far from Dion being recalled, his property is confiscated by Dionysius, and his wife given in marriage to another man; and Plato (who only obtains leave to depart through the intercession of Archytas) is himself the bearer of the unwelcome news to Dion, whom he meets at the Olympic games on his way home. Dion (as we may easily imagine) is bitterly incensed at this last insult, and immediately sets about levying an army to assert his rights and procure his return by force. At Olympia he parts company from Plato, and the two friends never meet again. The remainder of Dion's eventful career (more romantic, perhaps, than that of any other hero of antiquity) has been well sketched by Mr. Grote, who records his triumphant entry into Syracuse, his short-lived popularity, the intrigues and conspiracy of Heraclides, whose life he had spared, and his base assassination by his friend Callippus.

Once more restored to Athens, Plato continued his lectures in the Academy, and also employed himself in composing those philosophical Dialogues which bear his name, and of which some thirty have come down to us. Several reasons probably contributed to make Plato throw his thoughts into this form. First, it

was the only way in which he could give a just idea of the Socratic method, and of the persistent examination through which Socrates was wont to put all comers; again, he wished to show the chain of argument gradually unwinding itself, and by using the milder form of discussion and inquiry, to avoid even the appearance of dogmatism, especially as he must have often felt that he was threading on dangerous ground. Prolix and wearisome as some of these Dialogues may often seem to modern ears, we must remember that they were the first specimens of their kind; that they were written when the world was still young, when there was little writing of any sort, and when romances, essays, or "light literature" were unknown; while at the same time there was a clever, highly-educated, and sympathetic "public" ready then as now to devour, to admire, and to criticise. After the barren wastes of the old philosophy, with its texts and axioms, its quotations from the poets, and crude abstractions from nature, these Dialogues must have burst upon the Athenian world as an unexpected oasis upon weary travelers in the desert; and they must have hailed with delight these fresh springs of truth, and these new pastures for thought and feeling. As a new phase of literature, we may well believe that they were received with the same interest and surprise as the appearance of the 'Spectator' in the last century, or the 'Waverly Novels' at the beginning of our own. They were, in fact, the *causeries de Lundi* of their age. Plato assuredly knew well the lively and versatile character of those for whom he was writing. The grave and didactic tone of a modern treatise on philosophy would have fallen very flat on the ears of an Athenian audience, accustomed to see their gods,

statesmen, and philosophers brought upon the stage in a grotesque medley and unsparingly caricatured. But not Momus himself (as a Greek would have said) could have turned these Dialogues into ridicule; and their very faults—their want of method and general discursiveness—must have been a relief after the formal commonplaces of the Sophists. Plato himself makes no pretence of following any rules or system. "Whither the argument blows, we will follow it," he says in the "Republic," and he is fond of telling us that a philosopher has plenty of time on his hands. But the vivacity and variety, the subtle humor—which can never be exactly reproduced in a translation—the charming scenes which serve as a framework to the discussion, and, above all, the purity and sweetness of the language, which earned for the writer the title of "The Attic Bee,"—all these were reasons for the popularity which these Dialogues undoubtedly enjoyed.

There is no means of fixing the order in which they were written, but they probably all belong to the last forty years of his life. A story is indeed extant to the effect that Socrates heard the "Lysis" read to him, and exclaimed—"Good heavens! what a heap of falsehoods this young man tells about me!" but Socrates had in all probability died some years before the "Lysis" was published. The speakers in these Dialogues are no more historical than the characters in Shakespeare's plays, and Plato was (perhaps purposely) careless of dates and names. But the personages thus introduced serve their purpose. They give a life and a reality to the scenes and conversations which is wanting in Berkeley's Dialogues, and in all modern imitations, and their tempers and peculiarities are touched

by a master-hand. But there is one character which Plato never paints, and that is—his own. Except in two casual allusions, he never directly or indirectly introduces himself; and no one can argue, from the internal evidence of his writings, as to what he was or was not. Like Shakespeare, he deserves Coleridge's epithet of "myriad-minded," for he appears to us in all shapes and characters. He was "skeptic, dogmatist, religious mystic and inquisitor, mathematical philosopher, artist, poet—all in one, or at least all in succession, during the fifty years of his philosophical life."*

There is one pervading feature of similarity in all the Dialogues, and that is, the style.† If Jove had spoken Greek (it was said of old), he would have spoken it like Plato; and Quintilian—no mean critic—declared that his language soared so far at times above the ordinary prose, that it seemed as if the writer was inspired by the Delphic Oracle. But these very sentences which seem to us to flow so easily, and which we think must have been written *currente calamo*, were really elaborate in their simplicity; and the anecdote of thirteen different versions of the opening sentence in the "Republic," having been found in the author's handwriting is probably based upon fact.

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* Grote's Plato, i. 214.

† Sir Arthur Helps, himself a writer of purest English, has given us in 'Realmah' his ideas of what a perfect style should be. Every word in his description would closely apply to Plato, especially the concluding lines; . . . "and withal there must be a sense of felicity about it, declaring it to be the product of a happy moment, so that you feel it will not happen again to that man who writes the sentence, nor to any other of the sons of men, to say the like things so choicely, tersely, mellifluously, and completely."—Realmah, i. 175.

Up to the age of eighty-one, Plato continued his literary work—"combing, and curling, and weaving, and unweaving his writings after a variety of fashions;" * and death, so Cicero tells us, came upon him as he was seated at his desk, pen in hand. He was buried among the olive-trees in his own garden; and his disciples celebrated a yearly festival in his memory.

As might be expected, such a man did not escape satire and detraction even in his own day. To say that he was ridiculed by the comic poets, is merely to say that he paid the penalty common to all eminence at Athens: but he was accused of vanity, plagiarism, and what not, by writers such as Antisthenes and Aristoxenus, whose philosophy might have taught them better. Athenæus, with whom no reputation is sacred, devotes six successive chapters to a merciless attack on his personal character; and besides retailing some paltry anecdotes as to his being fond of figs, and inventing a musical water-clock which chimed the hours at night, he accuses him of jealousy and malevolence towards his brother philosophers, and tells a story to show his arrogance, and the dislike with which his companions regarded him. On the same evening that Socrates died (so says Athenæus), the select few who had been with him in the prison, met together at supper. All were sad and silent, and had not the heart to eat or drink. But Plato filled a cup with wine, and bade them be of good cheer, for he would worthily fill their master's place; and he invited Apollodorus to drink his health, and passed him the cup. But Apollodorus refused it with indignation, and said, "I would rather have pledged Socrates in his hemlock, than pledge you in this wine."

* Dionysius of Halicarnassus, quoted in Sewell's Dialogues of Plato, p. 55.

CHAPTER II.

PHILOSOPHERS AND SOPHISTS.

DIALOGUES: PARMENIDES—SOPHISTES—PROTAGORAS—GORGIAS—HIPPIAS—EUTHYDEMUS.

"Divine Philosophy,
Not harsh and rugged, as dull fools suppose,
But musical as is Apollo's lute."—*Milton.*

"PHILOSOPHY," says Plato in his 'Theætetus,' "begins in wonder, for Iris is the child of Thaumas." It is the natural impulse of the savage, wherever he sees force and motion that he cannot explain, to invent a god; and so the first stage of Science is a sort of Fetishism, or worship of the powers of nature. The Greeks, especially curious and inventive, carried this tendency to its furthest limits; and the result was an elaborate Mythology, in which every object and operation in the physical world was referred to a special god. Thus the thunder was caused by the wrath of Zeus; the earthquake was produced by Poseidōn; and the pestilence by the arrows of Apollo. Poets like Homer and Hesiod reduced these myths to a system, and perpetuated them in their verse; and so it may be said that Greek philosophy springs from poetry, for in this poetry are contained the germs of

all subsequent thought. Homer, indeed, has been called "the Greek Bible;" and every Athenian gentleman is said to have known the Iliad and Odyssey by heart. Their morality, it is true, was of a rough and ready character, suited to the high spirit of heroic times, when war and piracy were the hero's proper profession; but there are everywhere traces of a strict code of honor and a keen sense of rights and duties. The oath and the marriage tie, the claims of age and weakness, the guest and the suppliant, are all respected; and though all stratagems are held to be fair in war, Achilles, the poet's model hero, tells us that his soul detests the liar "like the gates of hell."

Hesiod looks back with regret to the heroes of this golden time, long since departed to the islands of the blest. His own lot has fallen upon evil days, the earth has lost its bloom; the present race of men are sadly degenerate; and Shame and Retribution, the two last remaining virtues, have gone forever.

Simonides and Theognis complete this gloomy picture; they and the other "Gnomic" poets, fragments of whose writings have come down to us, preach for the most part a prudential morality, unlike the chivalrous *naïveté* of Homer, and expressed in mournful sentences which read like verses from Ecclesiastes. The uncertainty of fortune, the inconstancy of friends, the miseries of poverty and sickness—these are the phases of life which strike them most.

Then come the "Seven Wise Men," of whom Solon was one, who stand on the border-land of romance and history, like the Seven Champions of Christendom. We know little of them beyond those aphorisms ascribed to each of them, and said to have been engraven in gold on the gates of Delphi, which

became as household words in Greece, and some of which have found their way into modern proverbs—"The golden mean," "Know thyself," "Virtue is difficult," "Call no man happy till he dies." Another of the seven was Thales—half star-gazer, half man of business—honored by Aristotle with the title of "the first philosopher." He and those who followed him tried to discover some one element or first principle underlying the incessant change and motion which they saw in the world around them. Thales believed this principle to be Water—improving on the old myth of Oceanus, the eternal river that girds the universe. Anaximander thought the universe originally was a bath of flames, or a ring of fire broken up into sun, moon, and stars, while the earth remained balanced like a column in the centre Anaximenes, again, said that "Air ruled over all things; and the Soul being Air, ruled in man" Thus these three Ionian philosophers took each some one element as the symbol of an abstract idea.

Then came Heraclitus of Ephesus, surnamed the Obscure,—"shooting," says Plato, "as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark. He is oppressed with the sense of the perpetual change in nature. Nothing is at rest, all is in continual movement and progression. Life and time are like a stream flowing on forever, in which thoughts and actions appear for a moment and then vanish. Pythagoras, again, maintained that Number was the sacred and unchangeable principle by which the universe was regulated; that there was a "music of the spheres;" and that the soul itself was a harmony imprisoned in the body: while his comtemporary Democritus, "the first materialist," held that by some law

of necessity countless atoms had moved together in the void of space, and so produced a world.

Lastly, the Eleatics took higher ground, and conceived the idea of one eternal and absolute Being which alone exists, while non-existence is inconceivable. Plurality and change, space and time, are merely illusions of the senses. This doctrine is set forth at some length by Parmenides, the founder of this school of thought, in an epic poem, in which he has been commissioned, he says, by the goddess of wisdom, "to show unto men the unchangeable heart of truth." Plato, who always speaks of him with respect—"more honored than all the rest of philosophers put together"—has given his name to one of his Dialogues, in which he introduces him as visiting Athens in his old age in company with Zeno, his friend and pupil, and there discussing his theories with Socrates, then a young man, of twenty.

The Dialogue turns upon the difficulties involved in the famous Eleatic saying that "the All is one, and the many are nought;" but, by an easy transition, the argument in the first part of the Dialogue discusses the doctrine of Ideas—the key-stone of Plato's philosophy. This doctrine seems to have grown upon him, and engrossed his mind; and his poetic feeling is continually suggesting additions and embellishments to it, just as an artist adds fresh touches to a favorite picture. He admits with Heraclitus, that all objects of sense are fleeting and changeable; and he admits with the Eleatics that Being alone can really be said to exist; but he blends these two theories together. Everything that we can name or see has its eternal Idea or prototype; and this particular flower, with its sensible bloom and fragrance, is merely the transitory image or expression

of the universal Flower that never fades. And thus, far removed from this material world of birth and death, change and decay, Plato conceived another world of pure and perfect forms, imperceptible by earthly senses and perceived by the eye of reason alone, each form in itself separate, unchangeable, and everlasting, and each answering to some visible object to which it imparts a share of its own divine essence, as the sun gives light to nature.

But (objects Parmenides in this Dialogue,) how can you bridge over the gulf which separates the sensible from the Ideal world? How do these earthly imitations of the Ideas partake of the essence of their divine prototypes? And how far can you carry your theory? Have the meanest as well as the noblest objects—hair and mud, for instance, as well as beauty and truth—their Ideal Forms? Again, there may be Ideas of Ideas, and so you may go on generalizing to infinity. Lastly, they cannot be only conceptions of the mind; while, if they are types in nature and have a real existence, we cannot know them; for all human knowledge is relative, and to comprehend these eternal and absolute Ideas, we should require an Ideal and absolute knowledge, such as the gods alone can possess. Of ourselves, therefore, we cannot know these Ideas; and yet, unless we admit that absolute and abstract Ideas exist, all discussion—nay, all philosophy—is at an end.

These objections, so skillfully put by Parmenides, are not answered by Plato in this, or indeed in any other Dialogue; and he thus makes out a strong case against his own favorite theory. Socrates himself is lectured by Parmenides on his defective mental training. His enthusiasm (says the old philosopher), which

makes him "keen as a Spartan hound" in the quest of truth, is a noble impulse in itself; but it will be useless unless he, so to speak, reads his adversary's brief, and studies a question in all its bearings, tracing all the consequences which may follow from the assumption or denial of some hypothesis. Above all, Socrates should cultivate "Dialectic," * which alone can enable him to separate the ideal from the sensible, and is an indispensable exercise, although most people regard it as mere idle talking.

Parmenides is then prevailed upon himself to give an example of this "laborious pastime;" though, as he says, he shakes with fear at the thought of his self-imposed task, "like an old race-horse before running the course he knows so well." He selects for examination his own Eleatic theory, and traces the consequences which follow from the contradictory assumptions that "One is," and "One is not." We need not follow him through the mazes of this chain of argument, which result after all in two contradictory conclusions. It is doubtful if Plato had any other object in this "legerdemain of words" than to stimulate the curiosity of a youthful inquirer like Socrates with a series of arguments as puzzling and equivocal as the riddle in his "Republic," to which Mr. Grote compares them: "A man and no man, seeing and not seeing, a bird and no bird, sitting upon wood and no wood, struck and did not strike it with a stone and no stone." The only difference is, that in one case the author knew the solution of his riddle; while it may be doubted if Plato himself held the key to the enigmas in his "Parmenides."

* The process by which the definitions of Logic are attained.

In this Dialogue we are introduced also to Zeno —"Parmenides' second self"—the able exponent of the art of Dialectic, and a type of a new stage of Greek thought which had just commenced with the Sophists. The appearance of these professors at Athens was a sign of the times. Hitherto, as we have seen, philosophy had resulted in rough abstractions from Nature, or in a vague Idealism; but now thought was directed to the practical requirements of life, and the Sophists supplied a recognized want in the education of the age. They were the professors of universal knowledge; and, above all, they taught Rhetoric—in the view of an Athenian the most important of all branches of learning. To speak with fluency and dignity was not so much an accomplishment as a necessary safeguard at Athens, where "Informers" abounded, where litigation was incessant, and where a citizen was liable to be called upon to defend his life and property any day in one of the numerous law-courts. Again, eloquence, far more than with us, was a source of success and popularity in public life; and as a French soldier was said to carry a marshal's baton in his knapsack, so every citizen who had the natural or acquired gift of eloquence might aspire to rise from the ranks, and become president of Athens. Provided that he had a ready and plausible tongue, neither his poverty nor mean descent need stand in his way; for the foremost place in Athens had been occupied in succession by a tanner and a lamp-seller. The small number of citizens, as compared with slaves, made political power more accessible than in our over-grown democracies; and every citizen was forced to become part and parcel of the state in which he lived. Moreover, the Greek Assembly was more easily moved by an appeal to their

feelings or imagination, especially on an occasion of strong public interest, than a modern House of Commons. Sometimes their enthusiasm broke through all bounds, and Plato's description of the effect produced by a popular orator is probably not exaggerated.

All motives, therefore—policy, ambition, self-defence—combined to induce the Athenian to learn the art of speaking, and there was an increasing demand for teachers. The Sophists undertook to qualify the young aspirant for political distinction; to teach him to think, speak, and act like a citizen, to convince or cajole the Assembly, to hold his own in the law-court, and generally to give him the power of making "the worse seem the better reason." Their lecture-rooms were crowded; they were idolized by the rising generation; and they not uncommonly made large fortunes, charging often as much as fifty drachmas (about two guineas) a lesson; for few of them would have the magnanimity of Protagoras, who left it to the conscience of his pupils to name their own fees.

The Sophists were the skeptics and rationalists of their times, and they headed the reaction against the dogmatism of previous philosophy. According to them, there was no fixed standard of morality; real knowledge was impossible; tradition was false; religion was the invention of lying prophets; law and justice were devices of the strong to ensnare the weak; pleasure and pain were the only *criteria* of right and wrong; each man should use his private judgment in all matters, and do that which seemed good in his own eyes.

We can hardly estimate the mingled feelings of fear and dislike with which an average Athenian citizen would regard the influence undoubtedly possessed by this class. Patriotism and religious prejudice would

intensify the hatred against these foreign skeptics; and added to this would be the popular antipathy which has in all times shown itself against scheming lawyers and ambitious churchmen—

"Chicane in furs, and casuistry in lawn."

For, inasmuch as philosophy was closely blended with their religion, the Sophist would seem to practice a sort of intellectual simony; tampering with and selling at a high price the divinest mysteries; holding the keys of knowledge themselves, but refusing to impart, except to such as came with full purses, those truths which were to the Greek as the very bread of life.

Doubtless Plato had sufficient reason to justify the repulsive picture which he has drawn of the Sophist in several of his Dialogues, as "the charlatan, the foreigner, the prince of *esprits faux*, the hireling who is not a teacher; . . . the 'evil one,' the ideal representative of all that Plato most disliked in the moral and intellectual tendencies of his own age, the adversary of the almost equally ideal Socrates."*

In the Dialogue called THE SOPHIST, an attempt is made to define, by a regular logical process called "dichotomy," the real nature of this many-sided creature; no easy task says Plato, "for the animal is troublesome, and hard to catch." He has a variety of characters. Firstly, he is a sort of hunter, and his art is like the angler's, with the difference that he is a fisher of men, and baits his hook with pleasure, "haunting the rich meadow-lands of generous youth." Secondly, he is like a retail trader, but his merchandise is a spurious knowledge which he buys from others or fabricates for himself as he wanders from city

*Jowett's Plato, iii. 448.

to city. Thirdly, he is a warrior, but his tongue is his sword with which he is eternally wrangling about right and wrong for money. Fourthly, since education purifies the soul by casting out ignorance or the false conceit of knowledge, men would have you believe that the Sophist does this; though as a matter of fact, he is about as like the real "purger of souls" as a wolf is a dog. Lastly, this creature aspires to universal knowledge, and will argue—ay, and teach others to argue—about any object in creation; and, like a clever painter, he will impose upon you the appearance for the reality, and thus he steals away the hearts of our young men, deceiving their ears and deluding their senses, while he disguises his own ignorance under a cloud of words. In fact, he is a mere imitator—and an imitator of appearance, not of reality.

"But how" (an objector replies) "can a man be said to affirm or imitate that which is only appearance, and has no real existence?" This quibble is followed by a perplexing discussion on "Not-Being"—the stumbling-block of Eleatic philosophers. To us nothing can be simpler than the distinction between "this is not," *i.e.*, does not exist—and "this is not," *i.e.*, is not true; but so oppressed was the Eleatic with the sense of "Being" as alone having existence, that he held that no reality could be attached to non-being; and therefore falsehood, which was merely the expression of non-being, was impossible. Nothing would be gained by following out the threads of this difficult argument; and we may dismiss the Eleatic theory with the consolation that, as Professor Jowett says, Plato has effectually "laid its ghost"—we will hope, forever.

PROTAGORAS.

The opening of this Dialogue is highly dramatic. Socrates is awakened before daylight by the young Hippocrates, who is all on fire to see and hear this Protagoras, who has just come to Athens. Socrates calms his excitement, and advises him to be sure, before he pays his money to the great Sophist, that he will get his money's worth; for it is a rash thing to commit his soul to the instruction of a foreigner, before he knows his real character, or whether his doctrines are for good or for evil. "O my friend!" he says, earnestly, "pause a moment before you hazard your dearest interests on a game of chance; for you cannot buy knowledge and carry it away in an earthly vessel: in your own soul you must receive it, to be a blessing or a curse."

Talking thus gravely on the way, they arrive at the house of Callias, who had spent more money on the Sophists—so Plato tells us—than any other Athenian of his times. The doorkeeper is surly, and at first refuses to admit them, thinking that his master has had enough of the Sophists and their friends already. But at last they enter, and find a large company already assembled within. Protagoras himself is walking up and down the colonnade, declaiming to a troop of youths who had followed him from all parts of Greece, attracted by the music of his words, "as though he were a second Orpheus." Hippias, another Sophist, whom we shall meet again, is lecturing on astronomy to a select audience in the opposite portico; while the deep voice of Prodicus, a younger professor, is heard from an adjoining room, where he lies still warmly wrapped up in bed, and conversing from it to another circle of listeners.

Socrates at once steps up to Protagoras, and tells him the purpose for which they have sought him; and the great man makes a gracious answer. "Yes—Hippocrates has done right to come to him, for he is not as other Sophists. He will not treat him like a schoolboy, and weary him with astronomy and music. No; he will teach him nobler and more useful lessons than these; prudence, that he may order his own house well; and political wisdom, that he may prove himself a good citizen and a wise statesman."

"But," asks Socrates, half incredulously, "can such wisdom and virtue as this be really taught at all? If it were so, would not our statesmen have taught their own children the art by which they became great themselves, and the mantle of Pericles have descended in a measure upon his sons?"

To this Protagoras replies by a parable. Man was overlooked in the original distribution of gifts by Epimetheus among mortal creatures, and was left the only bare and defenceless animal in creation; and though Prometheus strove to remedy his brother's oversight as far as he could, by giving him fire and other means of life, still there was no principle of government, and man kept slaying and plundering his brother man; till at last Jove took pity on him, and sent Hermes to distribute justice and friendship, not to a favored few, but to all alike. "For," said Jove, "cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts; and further, make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death as a plague to the state." The very fact that evil-doers are punished, not in retaliation for past wrong, but to prevent future wrong, is a proof that certain virtues can be acquired "from study, and

exercise, and teaching." In fact, a man's education begins in his cradle. From childhood he is placed under tutors and governors, and stimulated to virtue by admonitions, by threats, or blows. When he arrives at man's estate, the law takes the place of his masters, and compels him to live uprightly. He who rebels against instruction or punishment is either exiled or condemned to death, under the idea that he is incurable. "Who teaches virtue, say you? (Protagoras continues); you might as well ask who teaches Greek. The fact is, all men are its teachers,—parents, guardians, tutors, the laws, society—each and all do their part in forming a man's character."

Socrates professes himself charmed with the eloquence of Protagoras; but there is one little question further upon which he would like to have his opinion. "Is there one virtue, or are there many?" Protagoras, who at first argues that the virtues are separate—like the different features of a man's face—is forced much against his will to admit that holiness is much the same as justice,—and so on with the several others.

Then a line from the poet Simonides is discussed—"It is hard to be good;" and Protagoras, who had been hitherto the chief speaker, is himself put to the question by Socrates, with a reminder that short answers are best for short memories—like his own. This discussion is simply a satire on the verbal criticism so common in that age, and reduced to a science by the Sophists; when men in the very exuberance of thought, like the Euphuists in the Elizabethan age, fenced with sharp sayings—taking, as here, some well-known text from a poet, illustrating its meaning and

using it to point a moral, like a preacher in a modern pulpit.

But this criticism is admitted by both sides to be a somewhat commonplace amusement. To quote from the poets, says Socrates, with some sarcasm, especially when they are not present to tell us what they really meant, is a mere waste of time; it is like listening to a flute-girl after dinner, and betrays a dearth of invention on the part of the company. So the original argument on the plurality of Virtue is resumed; and it is proved, to the satisfaction at least of one disputant, that knowledge is not only a power in itself, but is also the main element in every virtue; and that even if pleasure were the rule of life—which it is not—still knowledge would be required to strike the balance between pleasure and pain.

GORGIAS.

Among the professors of the day none was more distinguished than Gorgias of Leontini, who came as an ambassador to Athens to obtain her aid against Syracuse before the great Sicilian war. His doctrines resulted in utter Nihilism. Nothing (he said) exists; if anything existed, it could not be known; and, even if it could be known, such knowledge could not be imparted. In this Dialogue he is the guest of Callicles, an accomplished Athenian gentleman; and he is pressed by Socrates to give an account of himself and his art. Rhetoric, replies Gorgias, is his art, and it is used by him and by others for the best of purposes—namely, to give political freedom to all men, and political power to a few. Of course, like other arts, it is capable of abuse; but it is not the teacher's fault if his pupils, like a boxer in the mere wan-

tonness of strength, use their weapons injuriously or unfairly.

Socrates (who seems to consider Sophistry quite fair in war against a Sophist) uses a fallacy as gross as any of those which he himself exposes in the "Euthydemus," and makes Gorgias contradict his previous assertion. The Rhetorician is asserted to have learned justice from his teacher—granted; he is therefore, *ipso facto*, a just man, and his art is equally just. How, then, can he act injuriously?

Polus—a young pupil of Gorgias—who is sitting near, is indignant at what he rightly thinks an intentional misuse of words, and plunges into the discussion with all the impetuosity of youth. Socrates, he says, has no right to force such a plain contradiction in terms upon Gorgias—nay, it is positive ill-breeding in him to do so.

"Most excellent Polus," says Socrates, in his politest manner, "the chief object of our providing for ourselves, friends and children, is, that when we grow old and begin to fail, a younger generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and actions; so now, if I and Gorgias are failing, we have you here, ready to be help to us, as you ought to be; and I, for my part, promise to retract any mistake which you may think I have made—on one condition."

And this condition is that his answers must be brief. True, it is hard that Polus should be deprived of his freedom of speech, especially in Athens; but it is harder still, says Socrates, for his hearers, to have to listen to long-winded arguments.

Then Socrates gives his views on Rhetoric, which was the question they had started with. It is not,

strictly speaking, an art at all, but, like cookery or music, is a mere routine for gratifying the senses, being, in fact, a part of flattery, and the shadow of a part of politics, and bearing the same relation to justice that Sophistry bears to legislation.*

In the course of his argument with Polus, Socrates makes two statements which sound to his audience like the wildest paradoxes—truisms as they may appear from a Christian point of view. It is better (he says) to suffer than to do a wrong; and the evil-doer, though possessed of infinite wealth and power, must inevitably be miserable. Though all the world should be against him, he will maintain this to be the truth—yes, and he will go a step further. The evil-doer who escapes the law, and lives on in his wickedness, is a more miserable man than he who suffers the reward of his crimes; and though the tyrant or murderer may avoid his earthly judge, as a sick child avoids the doctor, still he carries about with him an incurable cancer in his soul. For his own part, Socrates would heap coals of fire upon the head of his enemy by letting him escape punishment. "If he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep it, and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done

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* The following table exhibits the respective places which Socrates considers Rhetoric and Sophistry to hold in the education of his day:—

	Training.	
	Real.	Sham.
Of Body	Gymnastics, with its sham counterpart,	Cosmetics.
	Medicine, " " "	Cookery.
Of Mind	Law-making, " " "	Sophistry.
	Judging, " " "	Rhetoric.

things worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness."

Callicles—the shrewd man of the world—is amazed to hear such doctrines, which, if put into practice, would, he thinks, turn society upside down. "Is your master really in earnest, or is he joking?" he asks Chærephon.

"He speaks in profound earnest," is the reply.

"Yes," says Socrates; "and my words are but the echo of the voice of truth speaking within my breast."

But Callicles is not to be imposed upon by such "brave words." Gorgias was too modest, and Polus too clumsy an opponent to point out an obvious fallacy. Socrates has been playing fast and loose with the words Custom and Nature, and has confounded two distinct things. To suffer wrong is better than to do wrong by Custom, but not by Nature. Conventional Justice is the refuge of the coward and the slave, and was invented by the weak in self-defence. Naturally, Might is Right—

> "The good old rule, the simple plan,
> That they should take who have the power,
> And they should keep who can."

Socrates is surely not too old to learn a little common-sense. Philosophy, as a part of education, is a good thing, no doubt, to start with. But if a man carries it with him into later life, he becomes a useless and ridiculous member of society, at the mercy of any chance accuser; hiding in holes and corners, and whispering to a few chosen youths, instead of standing forth boldly before the world, and making his mark in life.

Socrates compliments Callicles on a frankness so rarely met with, but presses him as to the exact sense of "natural justice"—*i.e.*, the will of the stronger.

By "stronger" Callicles explains that he means the wise and stout-hearted politician, who has the ambition and spirit and desires of a king; and who, moreover, will not scruple to gratify them to the full. "Yes," says Callicles, emphatically, "luxury, intemperance, and license, if they are duly supported, are happiness and virtue—all the rest is a mere bauble, custom contrary to nature, and nothing worth."

Socrates, in his own fashion, disproves these monstrous doctrines, and forces Callicles, though much against his will, to admit that pleasure and virtue are not always identical; that really Virtue is, or should be, the end of all our actions; that in the long-run the just and temperate man alone is happy; and that he who leads a robber's life is abhorred by gods and men while upon earth, and goes down to Hades with his soul branded with the scars of his crimes. There must come a day of judgment and retribution, when each man shall receive the just reward of his deeds.

Now I (concludes Socrates) am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the Judge on that day. Renouncing the honors at which the world aims, I desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when the time comes, to die. And to the utmost of my power, I exhort all men to do the same. And in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict.—J.

But in spite of his triumphant defence of Virtue, there is a bitter tone of isolation and loneliness in the last part of this Dialogue. "I, and I only, am left," Socrates seems to say—like Elijah upon Carmel—among ten thousand who know not the truth. My own generation will not hear me or believe me; they will not even understand me; and in the end I shall

probably be accused—as a physician might be arraigned by a pastry-cook before a jury of children; and as I cannot refer to any pleasures which I have provided for the people, but can only appeal to my own blameless life, any one may foresee the verdict. "Not that I *fear* death"—he says, with a noble scorn—only the coward and the profligate need fear that. There is something nobler than mere ease and personal safety. "He who is truly a man, ought not to care much how long he lives; he knows, as women say, that none can escape the day of destiny, and therefore is not too fond of life; all that he leaves to heaven, and thinks how he may best spend such term as is allotted him."

THE "GREATER" AND "LESSER" HIPPIAS.

Two short Dialogues ascribed to Plato on doubtful grounds have come down to us bearing the name of Hippias, who is the representative of the younger generation of Sophists, clever and accomplished, but, as we shall see, intolerably vain of his personal merits.

"How is it," asks Socrates on meeting him, "that the wise and handsome Hippias has been so long away from Athens?"

"Public business has taken up all my time," Hippias replies; "for I am always singled out by my countrymen of Elis on any important occasion, as being the only man who can properly represent their city, and I have just been on an embassy to Sparta."

"Lucky fellow!" says Socrates, "to combine such dignity and usefulness, and to get large sums from the youth in return for that knowledge which is more precious than any gold. But how was it that the wise men of old took no practical part in politics?"

"Because they had not the ability to combine public and private business, as we do now."

"Ah, well," says Socrates, "I suppose wisdom has progressed, like everything else. Gorgias and Prodicus have, I know, made immense sums from their pupils; but those old sages were too simple-minded to ask for payment, or make an exhibition of their knowledge. Nowadays, he is wisest who makes most money."

"You would be astonished," says Hippias, "if you know what a fortune I have made. I got a hundred and fifty minæ in Sicily alone, though Protagoras was there at the same time."

"And where did you make most?" asks Socrates. "I suppose at Sparta, for you have been there oftenest."

"No," says Hippias; "not a penny could I get from the Spartans, though they have plenty of money. Indeed they care little for Astronomy or Music, or any new sciences; and as for Mathematics, they can hardly count. The only thing they cared about was Archæology—the genealogies of their gods and heroes, and so forth; and they were also greatly pleased with a lecture I gave in the form of advice from Nestor to Neoptolemus on the choice of a profession."

"By the way," says Socrates, suddenly, "there is one question which I want answered, and I have been waiting till I could find one of you wise men to tell me—What is the Beautiful?"

Hippias at first answers that a fair maiden is a beautiful thing; but Socrates shows that this is merely a relative term, and that compared with a goddess she would be ugly, just as the wisest man is an ape compared with a god. There must be some Form or Essence which makes a maiden or a lyre beautiful.

It is not "gold" (as Hippias foolishly suggests), for then Phidias would have made Athenè's face of gold instead of ivory: nor is it "the suitable," for that only causes things in their right place to *appear* beautiful, and does not really make them so. Nor, again, does the glowing description of a prosperous life according to Greek ideas, which is the next definition volunteered, satisfy Socrates.

"It is a beautiful thing, when a man has lived in health, wealth, and honor, to reach old age, and having buried his parents handsomely, to be buried splendidly by his descendants." *

Such vague language tells us nothing. Again, Beauty is not "the useful," nor is it even "power for the production of good," for this would make goodness distinct from beauty. And lastly, Beauty is not simply "that which pleases our sight and hearing." And then by an argument—more subtle than the occasion seems to require—Socrates shows that the pleasures from the other senses should not be excluded.

Finally, the question is left unanswered, and Hippias expresses his dissatisfaction at these "shreds and parings of argument." A man (he thinks) should take a larger view of debate, and learn to make a telling speech in court, instead of wasting time on this minute criticism, which profits him nothing.

No doubt, Socrates replies, his own doubts and difficulties, which some strange power compels him to make known, seem small and valueless to a wise man like Hippias. It has always been his unhappy destiny to seek and inquire, and be reviled by the world for doing so; but this discipline must be endured, if the

* Whewell's Platonic Dialogues, ii. 161.

result is his own improvement. In any case, this discussion has had one advantage, for it has taught him the truth of the old proverb, that "What is beautiful is difficult."

In the Dialogue known as the "LESSER" HIPPIAS, we again meet that philosopher, who has just delivered a lecture on Homer at Athens, and who boasts that he can talk on all subjects and answer all questions that may be asked; in fact, he is a professor of every science. Upon this, Socrates reminds him that on his last appearance at Olympia he had worn a tunic and embroidered girdle which he had woven himself, and a ring which he had engraved with his own hand; and had brought with him a quantity of his own writings in verse and prose, and. more wonderful than all, an Art of Memory, which he had himself invented.

The question on which Socrates wishes now to be enlightened by Hippias is the characters of the two heroes of the Iliad and Odyssey. Hippias maintains that Achilles is nobler than Ulysses, as being straightforward, and not mendacious. But Socrates objects to this; the mendacious man is capable, intelligent, and wise: if a man cannot tell a lie on occasion, he shows his ignorance. Those who do wrong willfully are better than those who do wrong through ignorance or against their will—just as to be willfully ungraceful is better than to be really awkward; and as a good runner can run fast or slow, and a good archer hit or miss the mark when he chooses.

Again, Socrates continues, if justice is a mental capacity, the more capable mind is the more just; and such a mind, being competent to exercise itself in good or evil, will, if it does evil, do it willingly;

and therefore the willful wrong-doer is the good man.

And with this gross paradox—established by arguments as sophistical as any which Socrates has elsewhere exposed—the Dialogue ends. He confesses himself to be puzzled and bewildered by the conclusion at which they have arrived; but (he adds) it is no great wonder that a plain simple man like himself should be puzzled, if the great and wise Hippias is puzzled as well.

EUTHYDEMUS.

Nowhere is Plato's humor more sustained than in this Dialogue, portions of which seem to have been written in a spirit of broad farce. The arrogance and self-conceit of the two principal personages, the mock humility of Socrates and the impatience of Ctesippus, form a contrast of character as amusing as a scene in a clever comedy.

Euthydemus and Dionysodorus are introduced as two brothers, possessed, by their own account, of universal genius—able to use their swords and fight in armor—masters, also, of legal fence, and professors of "wrangling" generally—able and willing, moreover, to give lessons in speaking, pleading, and writing speeches. But all these accomplishments are now, as they frankly tell Socrates, matters of merely secondary consideration.

"Indeed," I said, "if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary, what must the principal one be? Tell me, I beseech you, what that noble study is."

"The teaching of virtue, Socrates," he replied, "is our principal occupation; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man."

"My God!" I said, "and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was saying just now, that your chief accomplish-

ment was the art of fighting in armor; and this was what I used to say of you, for I remember that this was professed by you when you were here before. But now, if you really have the other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings, and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so vast, that a feeling of incredulity will creep in.

"You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact."

"Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you intend to exhibit this wisdom, or what you will do."

"That is why we are come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only to exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn."—J.

A circle is formed, and young Cleinias, a grandson of Alcibiades, is selected as the victim to be improved by their logic, and is questioned accordingly as to his ideas of knowledge and ignorance. The poor youth is puzzled and confounded by their ingenious questioning, and contradicts himself almost immediately; but Socrates good-naturedly reassures him by telling him that his tormentors are not really in earnest, and that their jests are merely a sort of prelude to graver mysteries to which he will be presently admitted, as soon as he has learnt the correct use of terms. Then Socrates, with the gracious permission of the two Sophists, gives an example of his own method, and by a series of easy questions elicits from Cleinias the admission that wisdom is the only good, that ignorance is evil, and that to become wise is at present his heart's desire.

Then Euthydemus begins again. "So you want Cleinias to become wise, and he is not wise yet?" Socrates admits this. "Then you want the boy to be

no longer what he is—that is, you want him to be done away with? A nice set of friends you must all be!"

Socrates is amazed at this retort; and Ctesippus, who is a warm friend of Cleinias, is most indignant, and calls the Sophists a pair of liars in plain language. To this Euthydemus replies that there is no such thing as a lie, and that contradiction is impossible. The dispute is growing warm, when Socrates interposes. There is no use, he says, in quarreling about words; if by "doing away with him" the strangers mean that they will make a new man out of Cleinias, by all means let them destroy the youth, and make him wise, and all of us with him.

But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with them, then, *fiat experimentum in corpore senis;* here I offer my old person to Dionysodorus: he may put me into the pot, like Medea the Colchian, kill me, pickle me, eat me, if he will only make me good. Ctesippus said: "And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when I am really not angry at all. I do but contradict him when he seems to me to be in the wrong; and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things."

"Contradiction!" said Dionysodorus; "why, there never was such a thing."—J.

And then he proves in his own fashion that falsehood has no existence; and that a man must either say what is true or say nothing at all.

One absurd paradox follows another; and the two brothers venture on the most extravagant assertions. According to them, neither error nor ignorance are possible; and they themselves have known all things from their birth—dancing, carpentering, cobbling—

nay, the very number of the stars and sands; till even Socrates loses patience, and Ctesippus cannot disguise his disgust at their effrontery.

Several passages of arms take place, of which the following may serve as an instance:

"You say," asks Euthydemus of Ctesippus, "that you have a dog?"

"Yes, a villain of a one," said Ctesippus.

"And he has puppies?"

"Yes, and they are very like himself."

"And the dog is the father of them?"

"Yes," he said, "certainly."

"And is he not yours?"

"To be sure he is."

"Then he is a father, and he is yours; *ergo*, he is your father, and the puppies are your brothers."

"Let me ask you one little question more," said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word—"you beat this dog?"

Ctesippus said, laughing, "Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat you instead of him."

"Then you beat your father," he said.

I should have had more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; "what could he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? Much good has this father of you and other curs got out of your wisdom."—J.

More arguments are advanced, in which the perversion of words is no less gross and palpable than in the passage above quoted—even to the most illogical mind. The fallacies, indeed, are generally so transparent as hardly to require serious refutation. The bystanders however, are represented as being marvelously pleased at the remarkable wit and ingenuity of the two brethren; and Socrates professes to be overcome by this display of their powers of reasoning. He makes them a speech in which he gravely compliments them on their magnanimous disregard of all opinions besides

their own, and their "kind and public-spirited denial of all differences, whether of white or black, good or evil."

"But what appears to me to be more than all is, that this art and invention of yours is so admirably contrived that in a very short time it can be imparted to any one. I observe that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments—there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an opportunity of learning; the exhibition would be best of all, if the discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be an audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee:—you should be careful of this—and if you are wise, you will also bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For only what is rare is valuable; and water, which, as Pindar says, is the best of all things, is also the cheapest. And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils."—J.

CHAPTER III.

SOCRATES AND HIS FRIENDS.

SYMPOSIUM—PHÆDRUS—APOLOGY—CRITO PHÆDO.

"There neither is, nor shall there ever be, any treatise of Plato. The opinions called by the name of Plato are those of Socrates in the days of his [youthful vigor and glory."—Plato, Ep. ii. 314 (Grote).

SOCRATES, in whom, as we have seen, Plato thus merges his own personality, and who is the spokesman in nearly every Dialogue, was the son of a sculptor at Athens, and was born in the year B.C. 468. He left his father's workshop at an early age, and devoted himself to the task of public teaching,—being, as he believed, specially commissioned by the gods to question and cross-examine all he met. Accordingly he might be found, day after day, in the workships, in the public walks, in the market-place, or in the Palæstra, hearing and asking questions; careless where or when or with whom he talked. His personal ugliness —about which he makes a joke himself in the "Theætetus"—his thick lips, snub nose, and corpulent body, and besides this, his mean dress and bare feet, made him, perhaps, the most remarkable figure in Athens, especially when contrasted with the rich dresses and classic features of the youths who often followed him.

Yet under that Silenus mask (as Alcibiades described it) was concealed the image of a god. None who had ever heard him speak could easily forget the steady gaze, the earnest manner, and, above all, the impassioned words which made their hearts burn within them as they listened. Many youths would approach the circle which always formed whenever Socrates talked or argued, from mere curiosity or as a resource to pass away an hour; and at first they would look with indifference or contempt on the mean and poorly-dressed figure in the centre; but gradually their interest was aroused, their attention grew fixed, and then their hearts beat faster, their eyes swam with tears, and their very souls were touched and thrilled by the voice of the charmer. They came again and again to listen; and so by degrees that company of friends were formed, whose devotion and affection to their master is the best testimony to the magic power of his words.

Among these followers might be found men of every shade of character—the reckless and ambitious Critias, the skeptic Pyrrho, the pleasure-seeking Aristippus, "the madman" Apollodorus, and Euclid, who came constantly twenty miles from Megara, although a decree at that time existed that any Megarian found in Athens should be put to death. Above all, Alcibiades was a constant companion of Socrates; and men wondered at the friendship between this strangely-assorted pair—literally "Hyperion to a Satyr,"—the ugly barefooted philosopher, and the graceful youth, the idol of the rising generation, whose brilliant sayings were quoted, whose wild escapades were laughed at, whose figure artists loved to model for their statutes of Hermes, and whose very lisp became the fashion of the day. Surrounded by flatterers and admirers, Alcibiades found one man

who paid him no compliments, who cared nothing for his rank and accomplishments, yet whose words had the effect of exciting all that was noble in his nature. A strong attachment grew up between the two, and they shared the same tent, and messed together in the winter siege of Potidæa. Alcibiades himself tells us, in the Dialogue which follows, how easily Socrates bore the intense cold of those northern regions, and how, "with his bare feet on the ice, and in his ordinary dress, he marched better than any of the other soldiers who had their shoes on." His personal courage was also remarkable. On one occasion he saved Alcibiades' life at the risk of his own; and in the disastrous retreat after the battle of Delium, we are told that, while all around him were hurrying in wild flight, he walked as unmoved "as if he were in the streets of Athens, stalking like a pelican, and rolling his eyes, while he calmly contemplated friends and foes."

Though Socrates thus discharged his duties as a soldier, he only twice in the course of his long life, took any prominent part in politics. The first occasion was when he opposed the unjust sentence of death passed by the assembly against the generals after the battle of Arginusæ; and again when, at the peril of his own life, he refused to obey the order of the Thirty Tyrants, and arrest an innocent man. The "divine voice," of which he speaks so frequently, and which interfered and checked him at any important crisis of his life, had forbidden him to take part in the affairs of the state. He was, however, devoted to Athens; and except on military service, we are told that he never left the city walls. Two Thessalian princes once tried to tempt him, by lavish offers of money, to settle at

their courts; but he replied with noble independence that it did not become him to accept benefits which he could never hope to return, and that his bodily wants were few, for he could buy four measures of meal for an obolus at Athens, and there was excellent spring-water to be got there—for nothing.

One secret of the influence exercised by Socrates lay in his genial humor, and in his entire freedom from conventionality. He was not (he says himself) as other men are. He conversed in the open air with all chance-comers, rich and poor alike, instead of immuring himself in a lecture-room. He would take no pay, while the Sophists round him were realizing fortunes. Instead of wasting time in the barren field of science, or wearying his hearers with the subtleties of rhetoric, he discussed the great practical questions of life and morality, and, as Cicero said, "brought down philosophy from heaven to earth." What is Truth? What is Virtue? What is Justice?—or, as he put it himself, "All the good and evil that has befallen a man in his home,"—such were the subjects of his daily conversation. He was the first who openly asserted that

"The proper study of mankind is man;"—

that is, man's nature and happiness, his virtues and his vices, his place in creation, and the end and object of his life.

In the defence which Plato puts into his mouth at his trial, Socrates gives an account of what he conceived to be his own mission. His friend Chærephon had asked the priestess of Delphi "if there was any man on earth wiser than Socrates?" and the oracle had replied that there was none. Socrates then resolved himself to test the truth of this reply, and accordingly

he had cross-examined statesmen, poets, philosophers, —all, in short, who had the reputation of wisdom in their profession,—and he had found that their pretended knowledge was only ignorance, that God alone was wise, that human wisdom was worthless, and that among men he was wisest who, like himself,

"Professed
"To know this only, that he nothing knew." *

This was the great point of contrast between Socrates and those professors of universal knowledge, the Sophists. In their presence he always assumed the humble position of a man "intellectually bankrupt," who knows nothing, and who is seeking for information. He addresses some master of rhetoric or science with a modest and deferential air; he will take it as an infinite obligation if the great man will condescend to relieve his doubts by answering a few easy questions on some (apparently) obvious question of morality; and, of course, the Sophist, to save his own reputation, has no alternative but to comply. Then Socrates, like a skillful barrister, leads his unsuspecting victim on through a series of what seem innocent questions, yet all bearing indirectly on the main point of the argument, till at last his opponent is landed in some gross absurdity or contradiction. This "irony" has been well termed "a logical masked battery," and is more or less a feature in every Dialogue of Plato.

The humor, the genial temper, and the quiet self-possession of Socrates, must have made him a welcome guest in many houses; and in the Dialogue called "The Banquet" (SYMPOSIUM), we have a sketch of the philosopher "at home," joking with his friends, and en-

* Milton, Par. Reg., iv. 294.

tering into the humor of the hour; and showing that, though he could abstain, he could also, if the occasion required it, drink as hard and as long as any reveler in Athens. A goodly company are assembled at Agathon's house. There is the host, a handsome young *dilettante* poet: there is Phædrus, another young aspirant in literature: there is Pausanias the historian, and Aristophanes the comic poet, apparently on the best of terms with the philosopher whom he had ridiculed so unsparingly in the "Clouds;" there is a doctor, Eryximachus, genial and sociable, but "professional" throughout: there is Socrates himself, who has put on sandals for the occasion, and who comes late, having fallen into a trance on the way; and lastly, there is his satellite Aristodemus,—"the little unshod disciple,"—who gives the history of this supper-party some time after to his friend Apollodorus.

When the meal is ended, and the due libations have been poured, and a hymn sung to the gods, Pausanias proposes that instead of drinking and listening to the flute-girl's music—("she may play to herself," says the doctor, considerately, "or to the women inside, if she prefers it")—they shall pass a sober evening, and that each of the guests in turn shall make a speech in praise of Love—hitherto a much-neglected deity. This prudent proposal is readily accepted by the company, many of whom have hardly recovered from the effects of the last night's carouse.

Phædrus accordingly begins, in a high-flown poetic style, and praises Love as being the best and oldest of the gods, and the source of happiness in life and death. It is Love (he says) that inspires such heroism as that of Alcestis, who died to save her husband's life,—unlike that "cowardly harper" Orpheus, who went

alive to Hades after his wife, and was justly punished afterwards for his impertinence. Love, again—passing that of women—inspired Achilles, who "foremost fighting fell" to avenge his friend Patroclus, and was carried after death to the islands of the blest.

Pausanias follows in the same vein, but distinguishes between the ignoble and fleeting love of the body and the pure and lasting love of the soul.

Aristophanes should properly have spoken next, "but either he had eaten too much, or from some other cause he had the hiccough." The doctor recommends him to drink some water, or, if that fails, to "tickle his nose and sneeze;" meanwhile he delivers his own speech—from a medical point of view—and shows how Love, like a good and great physician, reconciles conflicting elements, and produces harmony both in the physical world and in mankind.

Then Aristophanes (who has used the doctor's remedy) opens, as he says, a new line of argument, and gives a whimsical account of the origin of the sexes, which reads as if Plato meant it as a parody of his own myths. Once upon a time (he says) man had three sexes and a double nature: besides this, he was perfectly round, and had four hands and four feet,—one head, with two faces looking opposite ways, set on a single neck. When these creatures pleased, they could walk as men do now, but if they wanted to go faster, they would roll over and over with all their four legs in the air, like a tumbler turning somersaults; and their pride and strength were such that they made open war upon the gods. Jupiter resented their insolence, but hardly liked to kill them with thunderbolts, as the gods would then lose their sacrifices. At

last he hit upon a plan. "I will cut them in two," he said, "so that they shall walk on two legs instead of four. They will then be only half as insolent, but twice as numerous, and we shall get twice as many sacrifices." This was done, and the two halves are continually going about looking for one another;* and if we mortals (says Aristophanes, with a comic air of apprehension) are not obedient to the gods, there is a danger that we shall be split up again, and we shall have to go about in basso-relievo, like those figures with only half a nose which you may see sculptured on our columns.

Agathon, the young tragic poet, then takes up the parable. Love is the best and fairest of the gods, walking in soft places, with a grace that is all his own, and nestling among the flowers of beauty. Again, Love is

"the wonder of the wise, the amazement of the gods; desired by those who have no part in him, and precious to those who have the better part in him; parent of delicacy, luxury, desire, fondness, softness, grace; careful of the good, uncareful of the evil. In every word, work, wish, fear—pilot, helper, defender, savior; glory of gods and men."—J.

Lastly, Socrates tells them a story, which he has heard from Diotima, "a wise woman." Love is not in reality a god at all, but a spirit which spans the gulf between heaven and earth, carrying to the gods the prayers of men, and to men the commands of the gods. He is the child of Plenty and Poverty. Like his mother, he is always poor and in misery,

* "He is the half part of a blessed man,
Left to be finished by such a *she;*
And she a fair divided excellence
Whose fullness of perfection lies in him."
Shakspeare, "King John."

without house or home to cover him; like his father, "he is a hunter of men, and a bold intriguer, philosopher, enchanter, sorcerer, and sophist," hovering between life and death, plenty and want, knowledge and ignorance. Love is something more than the desire of beauty;—it is the instinct of immortality in a mortal creature. Hence parents wish for children, who shall come after them, and take their place and preserve their names; and the poet and the warrior are inspired by the hope of a fame which shall live forever. And Diotima (continues Socrates) unfolded to me greater mysteries than these. He who has the instinct of true love, and can discern the relations of true beauty in every form, will go on from strength to strength until at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science, and he "will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty —in the likeness of no human face or form, but absolute, simple, separate, and everlasting—not clogged with the pollutions of mortality, and all the colors and vanities of human life."

The murmur of applause with which this speech is greeted has hardly died away, when a loud knocking is heard at the outer gate, and the voice of Alcibiades shouting for Agathon. Presently he staggers in, at the head of a troop of revelers, flushed with wine, and crowned with a wreath of ivy-leaves and violets. Though he is drunk already (as he tells the company), he orders one of the slaves to fill a huge wine-cooler "holding more than two quarts," which he drains, and then has it filled again for Socrates, who also empties it. "Why are they so silent and sober?" Alcibiades asks; and Agathon explains to him that they have all been making speeches in praise of Love, and that it will be his turn to speak next.

Alcibiades readily assents; but instead of taking Love as his topic, he gives an account of his intercourse with Socrates. His face (he says) is like those masks of Silenus, which conceal the image of a god: he is as ugly as the satyr Marsyas; but, like Marsyas, he charms the souls of all who hear him with the music of his words. "I myself am conscious" (Alcibiades continues) "that if I did not shut my ears against him, and fly from the voice of the charmer, he would enchain me until I grew old sitting at his feet. For he makes me confess that I ought not to live as I do, neglecting the needs of my own soul, and occupying myself with the affairs of the Athenians: therefore I stop my ears, and tear myself away from him. He is the only person who ever made me feel ashamed of myself—a feeling which you might think was not in my nature, and there is no one else who has that effect on me. . . . And oftentimes I wish he were dead; and yet I know that I should be much more sorry than glad, if he were to die."

Then he goes on to tell some anecdotes of the temperance of Socrates, his endurance of fatigue, and his personal courage; and he assures them, in conclusion, that they will never find any other man who in the least resembles this wonderful being.

Again the doors are violently opened, and a fresh band of revelers enter. All is now confusion and uproar. Phædrus, the physician, and some of the more sober spirits, wisely take their departure; while the few who remain settle down to make a night of it. Aristodemus (who tells the story) falls asleep himself, and is only awakened by the cocks crowing at daybreak. All the last night's party have gone, or are asleep on their couches in the room, except Agathon, Aristophanes, and Socrates. These three are still pass-

ing a large wine-cup from one to the other; and Socrates is giving the two dramatists a lecture on their own art, and proving to his own satisfaction that the genius of Tragedy and Comedy is the same. His hearers are much too sleepy to argue with or contradict him; and at last the wine takes effect on Aristophanes, who drops under the table, where Agathon soon follows. Socrates puts them to sleep, and then goes tranquilly on his way—takes his bath at the Lyceum, and passes the day as usual.

The following Dialogue, though its main purpose is an attack upon the popular passion for Rhetoric, is perhaps more interesting as a social picture:

PHÆDRUS.

It is a hot summer afternoon, and Socrates meets young Phædrus (who was one of the guests at Agathon's banquet (walking out for air and exercise beyond the city walls, for he has been sitting since dawn listening to the famous rhetorician Lysias. Socrates banters him on his admiration for Lysias, and at last extorts from him the confession that he has the actual manuscript of the essay which he had heard read hidden under his cloak; and, after some assumed reluctance, Phædrus consents that they shall walk on to some quiet spot where they can read it together. So they turn aside from the highroad, and follow the stream of the Ilissus—cooling their feet in the water as they walk—until they reach a charming resting-place, shaded by a plane-tree, where the air is laden with the scents and sounds of summer, and the *agnus castus*, with its purple and white blossoms, is in full bloom; while above them the cicalas are chirruping, and at their feet is the soft grass and the cool water, with images of the Nymphs who guard the spot.

"My dear Phædrus," says Socrates, "you are an admirable guide."

"You, Socrates, are such a stay-at-home, that you know nothing outside the city walls, and never take a country walk."

"Very true," says Socrates; "trees and fields tell me nothing: men are my teachers;* but only tempt me with the chance of a discusssion, and you may lead me all round Attica. Read on." And Phædrus accordingly reads the formal and rhetorical essay to which he had been listening in the morning. It is on a somewhat wasted theme—the advantages of a sober friendship, which lasts a lifetime, over the jealousies and torments caused by a spasmodic and fleeting love.

Socrates, with an irony which even Phædrus sees through, professes to be charmed with the balanced phrases and the harmonious cadence of the essay which has just been read; but he hints that, if he is allowed to use a few commonplaces, he too might add something to what Lysias has said; and then, inspired (as he says) by the *genius loci*, he delivers himself of a speech, denouncing, in a mock heroic style, the selfish infatuation and the wolf-like passion of the lover. But he almost immediately pretends to be alarmed at his own words; for the divine monitor within tells him that he has insulted the majesty of Cupid, and forbids him to recross the brook until he has recanted his blasphemy. And so he does.

He had previously said that the lover was mad; but this madness is, he explains, really akin to the inspira-

* Socrates would have agreed on this point with Dr. Johnson. "Sir, when you have seen one green field, you have seen all green fields. Sir, I like to look upon men.—Let us walk down Cheapside."

tion of the prophet and Pythian priestess, or the frenzy of the poet, and is, in fact, the greatest blessing which heaven has given to men. And then he weaves his ideas of the origin of Love into a famous myth, which will be found elsewhere.*

"I can fancy," says Socrates, laughingly, "that our friends the cicalas overhead are listening to our fine talk, and will carry a good report of us to their mistresses the Muses. For you must know that these little creatures were once human beings, long before the Muses were heard of; but, when the Muses came, they forgot to eat or drink in their exceeding love of song, and so died of hunger; but now they sing on for ever, and hunger and thirst no more. Let us talk, then, instead of idling all the afternoon, or going to sleep like a couple of slaves or sheep at a fountain-side."

Then follows a severe criticism on the Rhetoric of the day. Truth and accurate definition, says Socrates, are the two first requirements of good speaking; but neither of these are necessarily found in an essay like that of Lysias: and rhetoric, though it undoubtedly influences the rising generation, has done little in the way of perfecting oratory, which depends rather on the natural genius of the speaker than on any rules of art; —indeed, Pericles himself learnt more from Anaxagoras than from the Rhetoricians.

Writing, continues Socrates, is far inferior to speech. It is a spurious form of knowledge; and Thamuz, the old King of Egypt, was right in denouncing letters as likely to spoil men's memories, and produce an unreal and evanescent learning. Letters, like paintings, "preserve a solemn silence, and have not a word to

* See p. 156.

say for themselves;" and, like hothouse plants, they come quickly to their bloom, and as quickly fade away. "Nobler far," he says, "is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who find a congenial soil, and there with knowledge engrafts and sows words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, and are not unfruitful, but have in them seeds which may bear fruit in other natures nurtered in other ways—making the seed everlasting, and the possessors happy to the utmost extent of human happiness."*

But severe as he is on ordinary Rhetoricians, he makes an exception in favor of Isocrates. Some divine instinct tells him that the temper of this young orator is cast in a finer mould than that of Lysias and his coterie; and that some day, when he grows older, his genius will surpass all the speakers of his day.

The heat of the day is now past, and the two friends prepare to depart; but first Socrates offers a solemn prayer to the deities who guard this charming spot where they have been resting all the afternoon.

"O beloved Pan, and all ye gods whose dwelling is in this place, grant me to be beautiful in soul, and all that I possess of outward things to be at peace with them within. Teach me to think wisdom the only riches. And give me so much wealth, and so much only, as a good and holy man could manage or enjoy. Phædrus, want we anything more? For my prayer is finished."

Phæd. "Pray that I may be even as yourself; for the blessings of friends are common."†

It was hardly possible that Socrates should be popular—puzzling and refuting all he met. "The world cannot make me out" (he says to Theætetus), "there-

* Jowett's Plato, i. 614.

† Sewell's Dialogues of Plato, 199.

fore they only say of me that I am an extremely strange being, who drive men to their wits' end." His passion for conversation in itself would annoy many; and they probably regarded him as a garrulous and impertinent pedant, whom it was wise to avoid. "I hate this beggar who is eternally talking" (says Eupolis, the comedy-writer), "and who has debated every subject upon earth, except where to get his dinner." And often this vague feeling of dislike would grow into a strong personal hatred. For no man likes to be defeated on his own ground, or to be forced to confess himself ignorant of his favorite subject or theory, still less to be stultified and made ridiculous before a crowd of bystanders. There were numbers who had suffered this humiliation from the unsparing "irony" of Socrates, and their collective enmity grew daily more formidable. Again, few who had seen the "Clouds" of Aristophanes acted some twenty years previously, had forgotten Socrates, as he appeared on the stage,—dangling in a basket between heaven and earth,—the master of "the thinking-shop," who was ready to make, "for a consideration," the worse appear the better reason. And some probability had been given to this picture by the recent career of two of his friends—probably at that time the most detested names in Athens—Alcibiades, the selfish renegade, and Critias, the worst of the Thirty Tyrants. But after all, the great offence of Socrates (as Mr. Grote points out*) was one which no society, ancient or modern, ever forgives—his disdain of conventionality, and his disregard of the sovereign power of Custom. As we shall see in the 'Dialogues of Search,' he questions and criticises, and often destroys, the orthodox com-

* Plato, i. 250.

monplaces of morality, handed down from father to son, and consecrated in the eyes of the Athenians by tradition and by those mighty household goddesses, "Use and Wont:"

"Grey nurses, loving nothing new."

In short, Socrates is a "dissenter," who will maintain his right of private judgment, and will speak what his conscience tells him to be right—though it be his own opinion against the world. Hence there grew up a widespread antipathy against this man who continually set at defiance the creed sanctioned by custom and society. This at length found its vent in the tablet of indictment, which was hung up one morning in the portico where such notices were displayed—"Socrates is guilty of crime, first, for not worshipping the gods, whom the city worships, but introducing new divinities of his own; secondly, for corrupting the youth. The penalty due is Death."

His three accusers were Anytus, a wealthy tradesman; Meletus, an obscure poet; and Lycon, a rhetorician. Socrates himself seems to have been little moved by the danger of his position, and to have hardly wished for an acquittal. He felt that he had done his work, and that "it was no wonder that the gods should deem it better for him to die now than to live longer."* Certainly the tone of his Defence, as we have it from Plato, is more like a defiance than an apology; and the speaker seems, as Cicero said, not so much a suppliant or an accused person, as the lord and master of his judges.†

He begins by disclaiming any resemblance to that Socrates whom they had seen on the stage—the star-

* Xen. Mem., IV. viii. 4. † Cic. de Orat., i. 54.

gazer and arch-Sophist—for he knows nothing of science, and had never taken a fee for teaching. His life has been passed in trying to find a wiser man than himself, and in exposing self-conceit and pretentious ignorance. To this mission he has devoted himself, in spite of poverty and ill-repute.

Next he turns upon Meletus, his accuser, and cross-examines him in open court. "How can you," he asks, "call *me* the corrupter of the youth, when their fathers and brothers would bear witness that it is not so? How can you call *me* the worshipper of strange gods, when the heresies of Anaxagoras are declaimed on the stage, and sold in our streets?"

Then he turns to the judges again. As for death,—is it likely that one who has never shunned danger on the battle-field—who dared to record his solitary vote at the trial of the generals, in defence of the innocent and in defiance of the popular clamor—who had braved the anger of the Thirty Tyrants,—is it likely that he would desert the post of duty *now?*

"O Athenians!" he says, solemnly, "I both love and honor you; but as long as I live and have the power, I shall never cease to seek the truth, and exhort you to follow it. For I seem to have been sent by God to rouse you from your lethargy, as you may see a gadfly stinging a strong and sluggish horse. Perhaps you will be angry at being thus awakened from your sleep. Shake me off, then, and take your rest, and sleep on—forever. I shall not try (as others have done) to move your pity by tears and prayers, or by the sight of my weeping children—for Socrates is not as other men are; and if," he concludes, "O men of Athens, by force of persuasion or entreaty I could overpower your oaths, then I should indeed be teaching you to believe that there are no gods, and convict myself, in my own defence, of not believing in them. But that is not the case, for I do believe that there are gods, and in a far higher sense than that in which any of my accusers believe in them. And to you and to God I com-

mit my cause, to be determined by you as is best, both for you and for me."—J.

It was not likely that any jury would be convinced by such a speech as this—marked throughout by a "contempt of court" unparalleled in Athenian history; and accordingly Socrates was found guilty on both counts of the indictment—though by a majority of only five votes out of some 550. It now remained for himself to propose (as was the custom in such trials at Athens) some counter-penalty in place of death.

But now that he is a condemned criminal, his tone becomes even more lofty than before. Of right, he says, they should have honored him as a public benefactor, and have maintained him, like an Olympic victor, at the expense of the nation. For his own part, he would not even trouble himself to propose an alternative penalty; but as his friends wish it, and will raise the sum (for he is too poor himself), then a fine of thirty minæ is what he will offer as the price of life.

Such a sum (£120) was plainly an utterly inadequate fine from an Athenian point of view, considering the gravity of the crimes of which he was accused, and that the utmost penalty of the law was the alternative. The question is again put to the vote, and Socrates is condemned to death—the majority this time being far larger than before.

Then he makes his farewell address to his judges. They have condemned him because he would not condescend to tears or entreaties; and perhaps if he had done so he might have escaped. But on such terms he prefers death to life, and indeed it is good for him to die; for death is either annihilation, where sense and feeling are not, or it is a passage of the soul from

this world to another. In either case, he will be at rest. He will sleep forever without a dream; or he will find in Hades better men, and a juster judgment, and truer judges, than he has found on earth; and there he will converse with Homer and Orpheus, and the great men of old; questioning the heroic spirits whom he meets there, as has been his wont to question living men, and finding out who are wise and who are foolish below the earth.

"What infinite delight," he concludes, "there would be in conversing with them and asking them questions! For in that world they do not put a man to death for this,—certainly not. For besides being happier in that world than this, they will be immortal, if what is said is true.

"Wherefore, O ye judges, be of good cheer about death, and know this of a truth—that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life or after death. He and his are not neglected by the gods; nor has my own approaching end happened by mere chance. But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me; and therefore the oracle gave no sign. For which reason also I am not angry with my accusers or condemners; they have done me no harm, though neither of them meant to do me any good; and for this I may gently blame them. . . .

"The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways—I to die, and you to live. Which is better, God only knows."—J.

So ends this famous defence which Plato has put into his master's mouth; and whether the substance of it was actually delivered or not, assuredly "few persons will be found to wish that Socrates should have defended himself otherwise." The account of his subsequent imprisonment and death is given us in the two following Dialogues.

CRITO.

Thirty days elapsed before the sentence passed on Socrates could be carried into effect. Every year the Athenians sent a vessel on a pilgrimage to Delos, in

memory of the preservation of their city in the days of Theseus; and from the moment that the priest of Apollo crowned the vessel before it left the harbor, to the hour of its return, there intervened a holy season, during which the city might be polluted by no executions. Now it happened that the vessel sailed on the day that Socrates was condemned, and his execution was accordingly deferred for a month.

His friends daily assembled in his prison, and the long hours were passed in conversation on the usual subjects. One morning Crito comes earlier than usual —when it is hardly light—and finds Socrates calmly sleeping. "Why have you come at this unusual time?" asks Socrates on waking. "I bring sad news," is the reply; "the sacred vessel has been seen off Cape Sunium on its way home, and will reach Athens by to-morrow." But Socrates is prepared for this. He has seen in a vision of the night "the likeness of a woman, fair and comely, clothed in white raiment, who called to him and said—"O Socrates, the third day hence to Pthia thou shalt go." He is inclined to believe that the dream will prove true, and that on the third day he will be dead.

Then Crito earnestly implores him to use the little time that is left in making his escape. Neither friends nor money will be wanting: the jailer can be bribed, and the mouths of the Informers stopped with gold. He will find a home ready for him in Thessaly, where he will be loved and honored. "It would be sheer folly," Crito continues, "to play into the hands of his enemies, and to leave his children outcasts on the world. If the sentence of death is carried out, it will be an absurd and miserable end of a trial which ought to have been brought to another issue."

But Socrates has only one answer to these arguments, which might have persuaded any but himself. Would it be right or lawful for him to escape now? Shall he who for half a century has been preaching obedience to the law, now, in the hour of trial, stultify the precepts of a lifetime? For all those years he has been enjoying the privileges of citizenship and the blessings of a free state, and shall he now be tempted by the fear of death to break his tacit covenant with the laws, and turn his back upon his city "like a miserable slave?"

He can fancy the spirit of the laws themselves upbraiding him:

"Listen, then, Socrates, to us who have brought you up. Think not of life and children first, and of justice afterwards, but of justice first, that you may be justified before the princes of the world below. For neither will you nor any that belong to you be happier or holier or juster, in this life, or happier in another, if you do as Crito bids. Now, you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim not of laws but of men. But if you go forth returning evil for evil and injury for injury, breaking the covenants and agreements which you have made with us, and wronging those whom you ought least to wrong—that is to say, yourself, your friends, your country, and us—we shall be angry with you while you live, and our brethren, the laws in the world below, will receive you as an enemy, for they will know that you have done your best to destroy us. Listen, then, to us, and not to Crito."

This is the voice which I seem to hear murmuring in my ears, like the sound of the flute in the ears of the mystic; that voice, I say, is humming in my ears, and prevents me from hearing any other. And I know that anything more which you may say will be vain. Yet speak, if you have anything to say.

Cr. I have nothing to say, Socrates.

Soc. Then let me follow the intimations of the will of God.—J.

PHÆDO.

Two days after this, his friends assemble at the prison-doors for the last time, somewhat earlier than

usual. There is a short delay, for the sheriffs have come to take the chains off the prisoner preparatory to his death.

The jailer soon admits them, and "on entering" (says Phædo, who had been present himself) "we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe sitting by him holding his child in her arms. When she saw us, she uttered a cry and said, as women will, 'O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you!' Socrates turned to Crito and said, 'Crito, let some one take her home.' Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself."—J.

Socrates then proceeds to talk in his usual easy manner. He has several times been told in dreams "to make music;" and he has accordingly been turning some fables of Æsop into verse. "Tell Evenus this," he says, "and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come after me, if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to be going, for the Athenians say I must." Then he considers the question—"Why, in a case where death is better than life, a man should not hasten his own end?" He finds the answer to be, Because man is a prisoner, and has no right to release himself, being, in fact, a sort of possession of the gods, who will summon him at their pleasure.*

"Then," says Cebes, one of the party, "the wise man will sorrow and the fool rejoice at leaving his masters the gods, and passing out of life."

"Not so," is the reply; "for I am persuaded that I am going to other gods, who are wise and good, and

* We may compare the argument used by Despair, and the answer of the Red Cross Knight, in Spenser (Fairy Queen, I ix. 40, 41).

also (I trust) to men departed, who are better than those I leave behind; therefore I do not grieve, as otherwise I might, for I have good hope that there is yet something awaiting the dead, and, as has been said of old, some far better lot for the good man than for the wicked."

He then explains the grounds on which he builds this hope of immortality. Death, he says, is the happy release of the soul from the body, In this life our highest and purest thoughts are distracted by cares and lusts, and diseases inherent in the flesh. He is wisest who keeps himself pure till the hour when the Deity Himself is pleased to release him. "Then shall the foolishness of the flesh be purged away, and we shall be pure, and hold converse with other pure souls, and recognize the pure light everywhere, which is none other than the light of truth." Hence the wise man leaves with joy a world where his higher and ethereal sense is trammeled by evil and impurity; and his whole life is but a preparation for death, or rather an initiation into the mysteries of the unseen world. Many, as they say, join the procession in such mysteries; but few are really chosen for initiation.

No fear that our souls will vanish like smoke, or that the dead sleep on forever, like Endymion. Our souls are born again; and as life passes into death, so, in the circle of nature, the dead must pass into life; for if this were not so, all things must at last be swallowed up in death.

Again, we have in our minds latent powers of thought—ideas of beauty and equality—which are not given us at our birth, and which we cannot have learnt from experience. Such knowledge is but the soul's recollection of a previous state of existence.

"Blank misgivings of a creature
Moving about in worlds not realized."*

It is only the mortal part of us (Socrates continues) that dies when earth rerurns to earth. The pure soul, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to the divine, the immortal, and the rational; where she dwells in bliss, in company with the gods, released from the errors and follies of men, their fears, their unruly passions, and all other evils of humanity. But the impure soul fears to go down to Hades, and haunts the earth for a time like a restless ghost.†

Then, by a further train of reasoning, Socrates concludes that the soul is beyond all doubt immortal and imperishable. This being so, a graver question follows—"What manner of persons ought we ourselves to be?" "If death had been the end of all things, then the wicked would gain by dying; for they would have been happily rid not of their bodies only, but of their own wickedness, together with their souls. But now, as the soul plainly appears to be immortal, no release or salvation from evil can be found except in the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul, on her journey to the world below, carries nothing with her but her nurture and education." After death comes the judgment; the guardian angel of each soul conducts her through the road with many windings that leads to the place where all are tried. After this the impure soul wanders without a guide in

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* Wordsworth's Ode on Immortality.

† "Such are those thick and gloomy shadows damp,
Oft seen in charnel-vaults and sepulchres,
Lingering, and sitting by a new-made grave,
As loth to leave the body that it loved."
—Milton, "Comus," 470

helpless misery, until a certain period is accomplished. and then she is borne away to her own place. But the pure soul, "arrayed in her proper jewels—temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth"—dwells forever in the glorious mansions reserved for the elect.

Thus Socrates ends his noble profession of faith in a future life—with him half instinct, half conviction. His "*Non omnis moriar*" has a triumphant ring about it; and, like the swans to whom he compares himself, "who sing more joyously on the day of their death than they ever did berore," he rejoices in the thought of his speedy release from life, and looks confidently beyond the grave.

The evening is fast drawing on, and the shadows are lengthening on the Attic hills, when Crito asks him if he has any last directions to give about his children or about his burial. "Bury me in any way you like," says Socrates, with a touch of his old humor; "but be sure that you get hold of *me*, and that I don't run away from you" Then he turns to the others and says with a smile, "I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument. He fancies that I am the *other* Socrates whom he will soon see—a dead body—and he asks, 'How he shall bury me?' You must all be my sureties to Crito, that I shall go away, and then he will sorrow less at my death, and not be grieved when he sees my body burned or buried."

Then he takes his bath, and bids farewell to his wife and children; and by this time the sun is low in the heavens, and the jailer comes in to tell him that his hour is come—weeping himself as he utters the words.

Soon the poison is brought. Socrates takes the cup, and

"in the gentlest and easiest manner, without the least fear or change of color or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said, 'What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not?' The man answered, 'We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough.' 'I understand,' he said, 'yet I may and must pray to the gods to prosper my journey from this to the other world: may this, then, which is my prayer, be granted to me.' Then, holding the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept over my self, for certainly I was not weeping over him, but in the thought of my own calamity in having lost such a companion. Nor was I the first; for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up and moved away, and I followed; and at that moment, Apollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out into a loud cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness. 'What is this strange outcry?' he said. 'I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not offend in this way, for I have heard that a man should die in peace. Be quiet, then, and have patience.' When we heard that we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel, and he said 'No;' and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said, 'When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end.' He was beginning to feel cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said (they were his last words), 'Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt?' 'The debt shall be paid,' said Crito; 'is there anything else?' There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes

were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth. Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, whom I may truly call the wisest and justest and best of all the men whom I have ever known." —J.

So ends the "Phædo;" and as we close the volume, we feel as though we too had lost a friend, so simply and yet so touchingly has every detail of that last scene in the prison be painted for us by a master-hand. Even across the lapse of centuries the picture rises before us distinct and lifelike, as it was to the mind of the writer who described it,—the passionate grief of Apollodorus, the despair of Crito, the silent tears of Phædo—even the jailer weeping, and turning away his face—and the composure meanwhile of the central figure of the group, talking cheerfully, and playing with Phædo's hair, who is sitting next him. We can well understand the mingled feelings of the spectators of the scene. "I could hardly believe" (says Phædo, telling the story to Echecrates) "that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did not pity him; his mien and his language were so noble and fearless in the hour of death, that to me he appeared blessed. I thought that, in going to the other world, he could not be without a divine call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there; and therefore I did not pity him, as might seem natural at such a time. But neither could I feel the pleasure which I usually felt in philosophical discourse. I was pleased, and I was also pained, because I knew that he was soon to die; and this strange mixture of feeling was shared by us all: we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus."

Cicero (who was by no means tender-hearted) declared that he could never read the "Phædo" without tears; and we all know the story of "the fair pupil of Ascham, who, while the horns were sounding and dogs in full cry, sat in the lonely oriel with eyes riveted to that immortal page which tells how meekly and bravely the first martyr of intellectual liberty took the cup from his weeping jailer."*

* Macaulay's Essay on Lord Bacon.

CHAPTER IV.

DIALOGUES OF SEARCH.

LACHES—CHARMIDES—LYSIS—MENO—EUTHYPHRO
CRATYLUS—THEÆTETUS.

"Socrates used to ask questions, but did not answer them, for he professed not to know."—*Aristotle.*

In the Dialogues which follow, we have the negative side of the teaching of Socrates strongly brought out. Both sides of the questions raised are fully argued by him, but no definite conclusion is arrived at. He never, indeed, assumes any attitude of authority. He is a searcher for truth, like the young men with whom he talks; the only difference being that his search is more zealous and systematic than theirs. "We shall" (he says in the Theætetus) "either find what we are looking for, or we shall get rid of the idea that we know what we really do not know. And we philosophers have plenty of leisure for our inquiries, for we are not tied down to time, like a barrister pleading in the law-courts, whose speech is measured by the clock." Socrates had begun, as he tells us, by catechising artisans and mechanics as to their arts and occupations (hence the constant allusions in the Dialogues to mechanical employments — shoemaking,

swordmaking, and the like), and from them he had got clear and satisfactory answers. But he found that if he asked a man what was his real work or object in life, or what was the meaning of the moral terms so frequently in his mouth, he got only vague answers or contradictions. Hence the questions which he examines in these 'Dialogues of Search' relate to the most familiar and obvious terms that meet us on the threshold of morality—Holiness, Courage, Temperance, and other cardinal virtues—qualities which many might possess themselves and easily recognize in others, but which they could not explain with any logical precision.

It is true that custom and tradition had given to these set phrases of morality a certain value and significance in the minds of those who used them; but few had learned to define or analyze their full meaning, and Socrates was the first who brought them under a logical scrutiny—examining their various uses, fixing their strict sense, and referring the individuals to their proper class, or, in the words of Aristotle, rallying the stragglers to the main body of the regiment.

In his arguments with the Sophists, as we have seen, Socrates shows his opponents no law. He proves himself a bitter and determined antagonist—turning where he can their own weapons against themselves, and leaving *them* to find out the fallacies in his statements; nor will he listen to any long defence from them, for, as he tells Protagoras, he has a short memory, and expects definite categorical answers. But when talking, as in these 'Dialogues of Search,' with some young noble of the rising generation, whose character is hardly formed and whose heart is still fresh and pure, the manner of Socrates entirely changes, and his voice

softens; he lays aside that terrible "irony" of his; he adapts his questions to the youth's comprehension, encourages and sympathizes with his attempts to answer, and uses the easiest language and the homeliest illustrations to explain his meaning.

We may take first the Dialogue entitled LACHES, in which Courage—the instinct of a child and the habit of a man—is discussed. The speakers bear historical names. There is Lysimachus, the son of Aristides, and Melesios, son of Thucydides (not the historian, but a statesman contemporary with Themistocles); but the genius of the fathers has not in this case been inherited by their sons, who are plain respectable citizens of Athens, and nothing more. They are conscious, however, of their own degeneracy, and complain that their education had been neglected, and that their fathers had been so much engrossed in affairs of state as to have neither time no inclination to act as tutors to their own children. "Both of us," says Lysimachus, "often talk to our boys about the many noble deeds which our fathers did in war and peace—but neither of us has any deeds of his own which he can show. Now we are somewhat ashamed of this contrast being seen by them, and we blame our fathers for letting us be spoiled in the days of our youth when they were occupied with the concerns of others; and this we point out to the lads, and tell them that they will not grow up to honor, if they are rebellious and take no pains about themselves; but that if they take pains they may become worthy perhaps of the names they bear." (The two youths, as was often the case, had been named after their grandfathers, Aristides and Thucydides.)

In their doubt as to the best means of carying out these good intentions, the two fathers came to Laches and Nicias—both distinguished generals and statesmen—and ask their advice in the matter; more especially as to whether the lessons of a certain swordsman, who has just been going through a trial of arms, are likely to be of use. The veterans discuss the merits of this new style of fencing,—just as two officers now might criticise the last improved rifle. Nicias is much in favor of the youths learning it, as it will usefully occupy their spare time, will be of real service in war, and will set them up and give them a military air and carriage. But Laches has no opinion of this new-fangled invention, and thinks that if it had been worth anything, the Spartans, the first military power in Greece, would have adopted it. He had indeed himself once been witness of a ridiculous scene in which this very swordsman had left his last invention—a spear with a billhook at the end of it—sticking fast in the rigging of the enemy's vessel, and was laughed at by friends and foes. "No," says Laches, "let us have simplicity in all things—in war as well as music: but these young men must learn something; so let us appeal to Socrates, my old comrade in the battle-field, who has much experience of youth."

Socrates, thus appealed to, joins in the discussion. His opinion is that they should find some wise teacher, not so much with a view to lessons in arms, as to a general education of the mind. For no trifling question, he says, is at issue. They are risking the most precious of earthly possessions—their children, upon whose turning out well or ill depends the welfare of the house. For his own part, he knows nothing of the matter. He is neither professor nor inventor himself,

and is too poor to pay fees to the Sophists. Nicias and Laches are wealthier and wiser men than he; and he will gladly abide by their decision. But why do *their* opinions differ?

Nicias thinks they will be drawn into a Socratic argument, as usual, but is very willing to go through an examination; and Laches, though not fond of arguing as a rule, is very ready to listen when the man is in harmony with his words, and willing therefore to be taught by Socrates, whom he knows as not merely a talker, but a doer of brave deeds.

Socrates thinks it will be better to consider, not so much the question of who are the teachers, as what they profess to teach,—namely, Virtue, or more especially that part of it which most concerns them at present—Courage. Then, by a series of questions, he limits the vague definition first given by Laches, and proves to him that there may be other forms of courage as noble as that of the soldier who stands his ground in battle—such as the endurance of pain, or poverty, or reproach; and it generally seems to be a certain wise strength of mind, the intelligent and reasonable fortitude of a man who foresees coming evil and can calculate the consequences of his acts, and is very different from the fearless courage of a child, or the insensate fury of a wild beast. But then the man who has this knowledge of good and evil, implied in the possession of real courage, must have also temperance and justice, and in fact *all* the virtues; and this would contradict the starting point of their discussion, in which they agreed that courage was only a part of virtue.

"No," Socrates concludes, "we shall have to leave off where we began, and courage must still be to us

an unknown quantity. We must go to school again ourselves, and make the education of these boys our own education."

The introduction to the CHARMIDES is another specimen of that dramatic description in which Plato excelled. "Yesterday evening," says Socrates, "I came back from the camp at Potidæa; and having been a good while away, I thought I would go and look in at my old haunts. So I went into the Palæstra of Taureas, and there I found a number of persons, most of whom I knew, though not all. My visit was unexpected, and as soon as they saw me coming in they hailed me at once from all sides; and Chærephon (who is a kind of lunatic, you know) jumped up and rushed to me, seizing my hand and exclaiming, "How did you escape, Socrates?" (I must explain that a battle had taken place at Potidæa not long before we left, the news of which had only just reached Athens.)

"You see," I replied, "that here I am."

"The report was," said he, "that the fighting was very severe, and that several of our acquaintance had fallen."

"That was too nearly the truth," replied I.

"I suppose you were there?" said he.

"I was."

"Then sit down and tell us the whole story."—J.

So Socrates sits down between Chærephon and Critias, and answers their eager inquiries after absent friends. Then there enters a group of youths, laughing and talking noisily, and among them is Charmides, a cousin of Critias, tall and handsome, and (so say his friends) "as fair and good within as he is without." He comes and sits near Socrates, who professes to know a charm that will cure a headache of which he has been complaining. This charm is a talisman given to Socrates (as he tells Charmides) by Zamolxis, physician to the King of Thrace; but which he is only allowed to use on the condition of his never attempting to cure the body without first curing the soul, and then temperance in the one will produce health in the

other. But the question is, "What *is* Temperance?" It is not always what Charmides understands by it, the quietness of a gentleman who is never flurried and never noisy; nor is it exactly modesty, though very like it; nor is it (as Critias defines it) "doing one's own business," even though our work as men be nobly and usefully done. Nor, again, is it true that the golden characters on the gates of Delphi, "Know thyself," simply meant, "Be temperate;" nor is it a "science of sciences," as Critias again explains it—or rather, the knowledge of what a man knows and does not know. All knowledge is relative, and must have some object-matter; and such a universal knowledge as Critias would imply by temperance would in no way conduce to our happiness.

Finally, Socrates confesses himself puzzled and baffled. They are no nearer the truth than at starting; and the argument, so to speak, "turns round and laughs in their faces." He is sorry that Charmides has learnt so little from him; "and still more he concludes:

"am I grieved about the charm which I learned with so much pain and to so little profit from the Thracian, for the sake of a thing which is nothing worth. I think, indeed, that there is a mistake, and that I must be a bad inquirer; for I am persuaded that wisdom or temperance is really a great good; and happy are you if you possess that good. And therefore examine yourself, and see whether you have this gift, and can do without the charm; for if you can, I would rather advise you to regard me simply as a fool who is never able to reason out anything; and to rest assured that the more wise and temperate you are, the happier you will be."

Charmides said: "I am sure I do not know, Socrates, whether I have or have not this gift of wisdom and temperance; for how can I know whether I have that, the very nature of which even you and Critias, as you say, are unable to discover? (not that I

believe you.) And further, I am sure, Socrates, that I do need the charm; and, so far as I am concerned, I shall be willing to be charmed by you daily, until you say I have had enough."

"Very good, Charmides," said Critias; "if you do this I shall have a proof of your temperance—that is, if you allow yourself to be charmed by Socrates, and never desert him at all."

"You may depend on my following and not deserting him," said Charmides. "If you who are my guardian command me, I should be very wrong not to obey you."

"Well, I do command you," he said.

"Then I will do as you say, and begin this very day."—J.

In the Lysis, the scene is again a Palæstra, near a school kept by Micon, a friend of Socrates. It is a half-holiday (like a saint's day in some of our public schools) in honor of the god Hermes; and the boys are scattered round the courtyard, some wrestling, some playing at dice, and others looking on. Among these last is Lysis, of noble birth and of high promise, with his friend Menexenus. Socrates professes himself charmed at the attachment of the two boys, and calls them very fortunate. All people, he says, have their different objects of ambition—horses, dogs, money, honor, as the case may be; but for his own part he would rather have a good friend than all these put together. It is what he has longed for all his life, and here is Lysis already supplied. "But," he asks, "what is Friendship, and who is a friend?"

Is it sympathy—is it, as the poets say, that "the gods draw like to like" by some mysterious affinity of souls? In that case, the bad man can be no one's friend; for he is not always even like himself—much less like any one else; while the good man is self-sufficing, and therefore has no need of friends. Is not Difference rather the principle? Are not unlike characters attracted by a sense of dependence, and do not the weak

thus love the strong, and the poor the rich? But this cannot be so always, for then by this very law of contraries the good would love the bad, and the just the unjust. No—there must be a stage of indifference, between these two; when one whose character is hardly formed—who is neither good nor bad—courts the society of the good, from some vague desire of improvement.

But Socrates is not satisfied yet. He thinks there must be some final principle or first cause of friendship which they have not discovered: "and here," he says,

"I was going to invite the opinion of some older person, when suddenly we were interrupted by the tutors of Lysis and Menexenus, who came upon us like an evil apparition with their brothers, and bade them go home, as it was getting late. At first we and the bystanders drove them off, but afterwards, as they would not mind, and only went on shouting in their barbarous dialect, and got angry, and kept calling the boys (they appeared to us to have been drinking rather too much at the Hermæa, which made them difficult to manage), we fairly gave way, and broke up the company. I said, however, a few words to the boys at parting. O Menexenus and Lysis, will not the bystanders go away and say, 'Here is a jest: you two boys, and I, an old boy, who would fain be one of you, imagine ourselves to be friends, and we have not as yet been able to discover what is a friend!'" —J.

Aristotle devotes two books of his "Ethics" to this much-debated question of Friendship—always romantic and interesting from a Greek point of view. He looks upon it in a political light, as filling up the void left by Justice in the state; and he traces its appearance in different forms in different governments. It is an extension of "Self-Love"—very different from Selfishness,—for a good man (he says) will give up honor and life and lands for his friend's sake, and

yet reserve to himself something still more excellent —the glory of a noble deed.* But Aristotle can, no more than Plato, give the precise grounds for any friendship, except that it should not be cased on pleasure or utility; and we are told of his saying more than once to his pupils, "O my friends, there is no friend!" Perhaps, after all, Montaigne was right —friendship is inexplicable; and the only reason that can be given for liking such a person is the one given by him, "Because it was he, because it was I."

The MENO of Plato, introduced in the Dialogue which bears his name, is a very different character from the Meno of history—a traitor who did his best to embarrass the retreat of the Ten Thousand Greeks. Plato represents him as a "Thessalian Alcibiades"—a rich young noble, the devoted pupil of the Sophists. He meets Socrates, and abruptly asks him the old question, whether Virtue can be taught; and Socrates, as usual, professes ignorance. He is not a Gorgias, that he can answer such a question offhand "in the grand style." He does not even know what Virtue is, much less who are its teachers: and he adds, with mock humility, that there is a singular dearth of wisdom at Athens just now, for the rhetoricians have carried it all away with them to Thrace. Perhaps Meno will kindly enlighten him with the opinions of Gorgias on this difficult question?

Yes, Meno will tell him. Every age and condition of life has its special virtue. A man's virtue is statesmanship, in which he will guard his own and his country's interests; while "a woman's virtue is to order her house and keep what is within doors, and

* Ethics, viii. ix.

obey her husband;"—a-stay-at-home view of her duties which would find little favor with the modern advocates of female suffrage.

But surely, objects Socrates, justice and temperance are needed by all ages and professions. Must there not be some one common element pervading these separate virtues, which are merely individuals of a class, like colors and figures? Virtue, like health, must be a common quality, though it may take various forms.

Meno then comes to understand that a definition is what is wanted, and accordingly quotes one from the poets. "Virtue is the desire of the honorable, and the power of getting it."

But Socrates is not satisfied with this. You must, he says, get what is honorable with justice (or it would not be virtuous); and justice is a part of virtue.

Meno is puzzled by this, and complains that Socrates is a wizard, and has bewitched him. His arguments are like the shock of the torpedo—they benumb and stupefy. But Socrates declares that he is just as much perplexed himself; he is ready, indeed, to search for the truth, but he knows no more what the truth is than Meno does.

"How then" (says Meno, acutely) "can you search for that of which you know nothing; and how, even if you find it, can you be *sure* that you have got it?"

This difficulty Socrates explains by that famous doctrine of Reminiscence, which is so important a principle in the Platonic philosophy. The soul (as the poets say) is immortal, and is continually dying and being born again—passing from one body to another. During these stages of existence, in Hades and in the upper world, it has seen and learnt all

things, but has forgotten the greater part of its knowledge. It is capable, however, of reviving by association all that it has learnt—for all nature is akin, and all knowledge and learning is only reminiscence. Socrates then proves his theory by cross-examining a boy—one of Meno's slaves—who gives the successive stages of a problem in geometry; and this implies that the knowledge was already latent in his mind,

Then Socrates goes on to show that knowledge is the distinctive element of virtue, without which all good gifts, such as health, or beauty, or strength, are unprofitable because not rightly used; and if virtue be knowledge, it cannot come by nature, but must be taught.

"But who are its teachers?" he asks, appealing to one of the company, Anytus, afterwards his own accuser: for he has failed, hitherto, to find them. "Shall Meno go to the Sophists—the professed teachers of all Greece?"

"Heaven forbid!" answers Anytus; "the Sophists are the corrupters of our nation. The real teachers are the good old Athenian gentlemen, and the statesmen of a past age."

But this Socrates will not allow. These great statesmen never imparted their own wisdom to their sons, and yet they surely would have done so had it been possible.

Anytus is indignant that his heroes should be so lightly spoken of, and angrily bids Socrates be careful of his words, and remember that it is easier to do men harm in Athens than to do them good.

Still the original question has not been answered, "Is Virtue teachable?" and Socrates inclines to think it "a gift from heaven," and that it may be directed

by another faculty, practically as useful as knowledge, namely, "right opinion;" and this is a sort of divine instinct possessed by statesmen, but which they cannot impart to others. The higher form of virtue—the ideal knowledge—is possessed by none; and if a man *could* be found both possessing it and able to impart it, he would be like Tiresias, as Ulysses saw him in Hades, who alone had understanding in the midst of a world of shadows.

EUTHYPHRO.

This Dialogue carries us back to the days when the trial of Socrates was still impending. One morning the philosopher meets the augur Euthyphro at the entrance of the law-courts.

"What are you doing here?" asks the augur. "I am defendant," Socrates answers, "in a suit which a young man named Meletus has brought against me on a charge of corrupting the youth;—and you?"

"I am prosecuting my father for murder," is the startling reply of Euthyphro; and then he proceeds to tell the story. A man employed on his father's estate, in the island of Naxos, had killed a fellow-slave in a drunken quarrel; and his father had bound the offender hand and foot, and thrown him into a ditch, while he sent to inquire of a diviner at Athens what he should do with him. But long before the messenger could return, the unfortunate slave had died of cold and hunger; and Euthyphro had felt it his duty to prosecute his father for murder. "My friends," says he, "call me impious and a madman for so doing; but I know better than they do in what true filial piety consists."

"And what is Piety?" asks Socrates; "the knowledge may be of use to me in my approaching trial?"

"Doing as I am doing now," replies the other, in the true spirit of a Pharisee—"bringing a murderer to justice without respect of persons, and following the example set by the gods themselves."

But (asks Socrates again) what is the specific character of piety?—for there must be other pious acts besides prosecuting one's father, and the gods may disagree as to questions of right and wrong. Even suppose they all agree in loving a certain act, the fact of their loving it would not make it pious.

Then Euthyphro defines piety to be that branch of justice which chiefly concerns the gods; and that man, he says, is most pious who knows best how to propitiate their favor by prayer and sacrifice. Thus piety becomes a sort of business transaction, on the mutual benefit system, between gods and men, where worldly prosperity is bestowed on one side, and honor and gratitude are rendered on the other.

But Socrates is not satisfied. They have, he says, been arguing in a circle, and have got back to the definition they before rejected—that piety is "what is dear to the gods:" for the honor we thus pay to them by prayer and sacrifice is most dear to them. So they must again seek for the true answer; and Euthyphro must tell him, for if any man knows the nature of piety, it is evidently he. But Euthyphro is in a hurry, and cannot stay.

"If Socrates had thought like Euthyphro, he might have died in his bed." Such is the moral M. Cousin*

* Fragm. de Phlos. Anc., 117.

draws from this Dialogue; and undoubtedly the subsequent impeachment of the philosopher might be attributed in part to the enmity of the Athenian priesthood—always jealous and intolerent of any new form of faith. Here the contrast is (as Plato probably meant it to be) a striking one between the augur Euthyphro—perfect in the letter of the law, but whose consistent "piety" is impelling him to be a parricide—and Socrates, even now about to be indicted for worshipping strange gods, yet proving a self-devoted martyr who refuses to save to save his life by tampering with his conscience, and who dies rather than break the law by attempting to escape, when escape was easy.

CRATYLUS.

This Dialogue turns entirely upon etymology, and hence it is extremely difficult to reproduce it in a modern form, as continual reference is made to Greek nouns and names. The humor is so extravagant and sustained, and the derivations, which Socrates gravely propounds, are often so fanciful and far-fetched, that Mr. Jowett thinks Plato intended the Cratylus as a satire upon the false and specious philology of the day; but that the meaning of his satire (as is often the case) has "slept in the ear of posterity."

Cratylus, an admirer of Heraclitus, has been arguing about names with Hermogenes—a younger brother of the rich Callias, whom we have met before as the hospitable entertainer of Protagoras—and his brother Sophists. Hermogenes maintains that names are merely conventional signs, which can be given or taken away at pleasure; and that any name which you choose to give anything is correct until you change it: while Cratylus holds that names are real and natural

expressions of thought, or else they would be mere inarticulate sounds; and that all truth comes from language. They invite Socrates, who has just joined them, to give his opinion. "Alas!" says Socrates, regretfully, "if I could only have afforded to attend that fifty-drachma course of lectures given by the great Prodicus, who advertised them as a complete education in grammar and language, I could have told you all about it; but I was only able to attend the single-drachma course, and know as little of this difficult question as you. Still, I should like a free discussion on the subject."

We cannot (he goes on) accept Hermogenes' principle, that each man has a private right of nomenclature: for if anybody might name anything, and give it as many names as he liked, all meaning and distinction of terms would soon perish—there being as much truth and falsehood implied in words as in sentences. No,—speaking and naming, like any other art, should be done in the right way, with the right instrument, and by the right man in the right place. "This giving of names," he continues, "is no such light matter as you fancy, or the work of chance persons; and Cratylus is right in saying that things have names by nature, and that not every man is an artificer of names, but he only who looks to the thing which each name by nature has, and is, will be able to express the ideal forms of things in letters and syllables." It is the law that gives names through the legislator, who is advised in his work by the Dialectician, who alone knows the right use of names, and who can ask and answer questions properly.

The Sophists profess to teach you the correctness of names; but if you think lightly of them, turn to the

poets. In Homer you will find that the same thing is called differently by gods and men—for instance, the river which the gods call Xanthus, men call Scamander; and there is a solemn and mysterious truth in this, for of course the gods must be right. And so with the two names that Hector's son went by—Astyanax and Scamandrius—which did Homer think correct? Clearly, the name given by the men, who are always wiser than the women. This is another great truth; and besides, in this case, there is a curious coincidence, for the names of the father and son—though having only one letter (*t*) the same—mean the same thing—Hector being "holder," and Astyanax "defender," of the city. The mere difference of syllables matters nothing, if the same sense is retained.*

All these old heroic names, continues Socrates, carry their history with them; and, if you analyze them properly, you learn the character of the men or gods who bore them. Atreus is "the stubborn" or "destructive;" Orestes, the wild "mountain ranger;" Zeus himself, the lord of "life"—and so on with the other personages in Hesiod's genealogy.

Hermogenes is startled by these derivations, and thinks Socrates must be inspired—his language is so oracular:

"Yes," say Socrates, "and I caught this inspiration from the great Euthyphro, with whom I have been since daybreak, listening while he declaimed; his divine wisdom has so filled my ears and possessed my soul, that to-day I will give myself up to this mysterious influence, and examine fully the history of names; to-

* So says Fluellen; they "are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations."—Henry V., act iv. sc. 7.

morrow I will go to some priest or sophist, and be purified of this strange bewitchment."

Sometimes, he continues, we must change and shift the letters to get at the real form of the word: thus *sôma*, "body," is the same as *séma*, "tomb"—meaning the grave in which our soul is buried, or perhaps kept safe, as in a prison, till the last penalty is paid. So also *Pluto* is the same as *Plutus*, and means the giver of riches, for all wealth comes from the world below, where he is king. It is true that we use his name as a euphemism for *Hades*, but we do so wrongly, for there is really nothing terrible connected with that word. It does not mean the awful "unseen" world, as people think; but Pluto is called Hades because he knows (*eidenai*) all goodness and beauty, and thus binds all who come to him by the strongest chains —stronger than those of Father Time himself. And so these other awful names, such as Persephatta and Apollo, have really nothing terrible about them, if you examine their derivation. But Socrates will have no more discussion about the gods — he is "afraid of them."

"Only one more god," pleads Hermogenes. "I should like to know about Hermes, of whom I am said not to be a true son. Let us make him out, and then I shall know if there is anything in what Cratylus says."

"I should imagine," says Socrates, "that the name Hermes has to do with speech, and signifies that he is the interpreter, or messenger, or thief, or liar, or bargainer;—language has a great deal to say to all that sort of thing, and, as I was telling you, the word *eirein* is expressive of the use of speech, and we have improved *eiremês* into Hermes."

"Then I am very sure," says Hermogenes, in a tone of conviction, "that Cratylus was quite right in saying that I was no true son of Hermes, for I am not a good hand at speeches."—J.

Then Socrates examines the names of the various elements, virtues, and moral qualities, most of which he derives in a manner that would shock a modern philologist. Some of them, he says truly, have a foreign origin, inasmuch as the Greek borrowed many words from the Barbarians; "for the Barbarians are older than we are, and the orignal form of words may have been lost in the lapse of ages" The word *dikaion*—"justice"—says Socrates, has greatly puzzled him. Some one had told him, as a great mystery, that the word was the same as *diaion*—the subtle and penetrating power that enters into everything in creation; and when he inquired further, he was told that Justice was the Sun,—the piercing or burning element in nature. But when he quotes this beautiful notion with great glee to a friend, he is met by the satirical answer—"What! is there then no justice in the world when the sun goes down?" And when Socrates begs his friend to tell him his own honest opinion, he says, "Fire in the abstract;" which is not very intelligible. Another says, "No,—not fire in the abstract, but the abstraction of heat in fire." A third professes to laugh at this, and says, with Anaxagoras, that Justice is Mind; for Mind, they say, has absolute power, and mixes with nothing, and governs all things, and permeates all things. At last, he says, he found himself in greater perplexity as to the nature of Justice than when he began his inquiry.

Then follow other derivations, more extravagant than any which we have noticed; but Socrates concludes with a long passage of serious etymology. We should get at *primary* names (he says), and separate the letters, which have all a distinct meaning—thus *l* expresses "smoothness," *r* "motion," *a* "size," and *e*

"length." When we have fixed their meaning, we can form them into syllables and words; and add and subtract until we get a good and true image of the idea we intend to express. Of course there are degrees of accuracy in this process, where nature is helped out by custom; and a name, like a picture, may be a more or less perfect likeness of a person or thought. Great truths may be learned through names; but there are higher forms of knowledge, which can only be learnt from the ideas themselves, of which our words are but faint impressions; and "no man of sense will put himself or his education in the power of names," or believe that the world is in a perpetual flux and transition, "like a leaky vessel." And with this parting blow at Heraclitus, the Dialogue, with its mixture of truth and fiction, of jest and earnest, comes to an end. But, wild and fanciful as many of the derivations undoubtedly are, it must still be admitted that "the guesses of Plato are better than all the other theories of the ancients respecting language put together."*

THEÆTETUS.

Euclid (not the mathematician, but the philosopher of that name) meets his friend Terpsion at the door of his own house in Megara; and their conversation happens to turn upon Theætetus, whom Euclid has just seen carried up toward Athens, almost dead of dysentery, and of the wounds he had received in the battle of Corinth. "What a gallant fellow he was, and what a loss he will be!" says Terpsion; and then Euclid remembers how Socrates had prophesied great things of him in his youth, and had proved—as he always

* Jowett's Plato, i. 620.

did—a true prophet; for Theætetus had more than fulfilled the promise of his early years. Euclid had taken careful notes of a discussion between Socrates and the young Theætetus in days gone by, and this paper is now read by a servant for the benefit of Terpsion.

As Socrates said, Theætetus was "a reflection of his own ugly self," both in person and character. Snub-nosed, and with projecting eyes, brave and patient, slow and sure in the pursuit of knowledge, "full of gentleness, and always making progress, like a noiseless river of oil." His answers in the Dialogue bear out this character: they are invariably shrewd and to the point, and would have done credit (says his examiner) to "many bearded men." Socrates is still the same earnest disputant, professing to know nothing himself, but willing to assist others in bringing their thoughts to the birth; for so far, he tells Theætetus, he has inherited the art of his mother Phænarete, the midwife. Hence those youths resort to him who are tortured by the pangs of perplexity and doubt, and yearn to be delivered of the conceptions which are struggling for release within their breasts. If these children of their souls are likely to prove a true and noble offspring, they are suffered to see the light; but if, as is often the case, his divine inward monitor warns Socrates that they are but lies or shadows of the truth, they are stifled in the birth.

The question discussed is Knowledge; and the first definition of it proposed is "sensible perception." This Socrates connects with the old saying of Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things;" and this he again links on to the still older doctrine of Heraclitus, "All things are becoming." "These ancient philosophers" (he says)—"the great Parmenides excepted—agreed

that since we live in the midst of perpetual change and transition, our knowledge of all things must be relative. There is no such thing, they will tell you, as real existence. You should not say, 'this *is* white or black,' but 'it is my (or your) impression that it is so.' And thus each man can only know what he perceives; and so far his judgment is true."

"Of course" (continues Socrates), "we might object that our senses may deceive us; that in cases where a man is mad or dreaming—who knows, indeed, whether we are not dreaming at this very moment?—he must get false impressions: or, again, that our tastes may become perverted; and as wine is distasteful to a sick man, so what is really good or true does not appear so to us. But Protagoras would reply that the sick man's dreams are real to him,—that my impressions of wine are certainly different in health and sickness; but then *I* am different, and my impressions in either case are true."

"I wonder (says Socrates ironically) that Protagoras did not begin his great work on Truth with a declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other strange monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then, when we were reverencing him as a god, he might have condescended to inform us that he was no wiser than a tadpole, and did not even aspire to be a man—would not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of any other is true or false but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom?"—J.

Then Socrates takes upon himself to defend Protagoras, who is made to qualify his original statement:

"Man is the measure of all things, but one man's knowledge may be superior in proportion as his impressions are better; still, every impression is true and real, and a false opinion is impossible."

Common-sense, replies Socrates, is against this theory, which would reduce all minds to the same level. Practically, men are always passing judgment on the impressions of others, pronouncing them to be true or false, and acting accordingly; they recognize superior minds, and submit to teachers and rulers: thus Protagoras himself made a large fortune on the reputation of having better judgment than his neighbors. And if one man's judgment is as good as another's, who is to decide? Is the question to be settled by a plurality of votes, or what shall be the last court of appeal? Protagoras may think this or that, but there are probably ten thousand who will think the opposite; and, by his own rule, *their* judgments are as good as his.

But even Socrates feels some compunction in thus attacting the theories of a dead philosopher who cannot defend himself.

"If he could only" (he says) "get his head out of the world below, he would give both of us a sound drubbing—me for quibbling, and you for accepting my quibbles—and be off and underground again in a twinkling."—J.

Then comes a break in the main argument, and Socrates wanders off into a digression, in which he draws a striking contrast between the characters of the lawyer and philosopher—the former always in a hurry, with the water-clock urging him on—busy and preoccupied, the slave of his clients,—keen and shrewd, but narrow-minded, and from his early years versed in the crooked paths of deceit: while the philosopher is a

gentleman at large, master of his own time, abstracted and absorbed in thought, seeing nothing at his feet, and knowing nothing of the scandals of the clubs or the gossip of the town—hardly even acquainted with his next-door neighbor by sight—shy, awkward, and too simple-minded to retaliate an insult, or understand the merits of a long pedigree.*

"Knowledge then," continues Socrates, resuming the argument, "cannot be perception; for, after all, it is the soul which perceives, and the senses are merely organs of the body springing from a common centre of life. In fact, we see and hear rather *through* them than *with* them. Furthermore, there are certain abstractions which we (that is, the trained and intelligent few) perceive with the eye of reason alone."

Then Theætetus suggests that knowledge may be defined as "true opinion;" but then, says Socrates, the old objection would be raised, that false opinion is impossible; for we must either know or not know, and in either case we know *what* we know. The reply is, that mistakes are always possible; you may think one thing to be another. Our souls, continues Socrates, using a metaphor which has since passed into a commonplace, are like waxen tablets—some broad and deep, where the impressions made by sight or hearing are clear and indelible; others cramped and narrow, where the impressions from the senses are confused and crowded together; and sometimes the wax itself is soft, or

* The Philosopher here argues that a long line of ancestors does not necessarily make a gentleman; for any one, if he chooses, may reckon back to the first Parent,—just as Tennyson reminds Lady Clara that:

"The grand old Gardener and his wife
Smile at the claims of long descent."

shallow, or impure, and so the impression is soon effaced. Often, too, we put, so to speak, the shoe on the wrong foot, or stamp with the wrong seal; and from these wrong and hasty impressions come false opinions. There can be no mistake when perception and knowledge correspond; but we often have one without the other. I may see an inscription, but not know its meaning; or I may hear a foreigner talk, but not understand a word he says.

But stay, says Socrates—we have been rashly using these words "know" and "understand," while all the time we are ignorant of what "knowledge" is. We must try again to define the term; and first, to *have* is quite different from to *possess* knowledge. Our soul is like an aviary full of wild birds, flying all about the place, singly or in groups. You may possess them, but you have none in hand; and until you collect, comprehend, and grasp your winged thoughts, you cannot be said to have them either. When you have once caught your bird (or your thought), you cannot mistake it; but while they are flying about, you may mistake the ring-dove for the pigeon, and so you may mistake the various numbers and forms of knowledge.

"Perhaps," says Theætetus, sharply, "there may be sham birds in the aviary; and you may put forth your hand intending to grasp Knowledge, but catch Ignorance instead. How then?"

"No," says Socrates; "it is a clever suggestion, but if you once know the form of knowledge, you will never mistake it for ignorance. Perhaps, however, there may be higher forms of knowledge in other aviaries, which help you to tell the wrong from the right thought; but on this supposition we might go on imagining forms to infinity."

A third and last definition of knowledge is now proposed—"True opinion *plus* definition or explanation." But what is explanation?—is it the expression of a man's thoughts? But every one who is not deaf and dumb can express his thoughts. Or is it the enumeration of the elements of which anything is composed? But you may know the syllables of a name without being able to explain the letters. Or, lastly, is explanation "the perception of difference?" For instance, (says Socrates, somewhat rudely), I know and recognize Theætetus by his having a peculiar snub nose, different from mine and all other snub noses in the world. But is my perception of this difference opinion or knowledge? If the first, I have only opinion; if the second, I am assuming the very term which we are trying to define.

And thus, in the true "Socratic manner," abrupt and unsatisfactory as it seems to us, the Dialogue ends; and "knowledge" remains the same unknown quantity as before. And yet (Socrates thinks) the discussion has not been altogether fruitless; for he has shown Theætetus that the offspring of his brain were not worth the bringing up.

"If," concludes the philosopher, "you are likely to have any more embryo thoughts, such offspring will be all the better for our present investigation; and if you should prove barren, you will be less overbearing and gentler to your friends, and modest enough not to fancy you know what you do not know. So far only can my art go, and no further; for I know none of the secrets of your famous teachers, past or present."—J.

CHAPTER V.

PLATO'S IDEAL STATES.

"Il faut bien réfléchir sur la Politique d'Aristote et sur les deux Republiques de Platon, si l'on veut avoir une juste idée des lois et des mœurs des anciens Grecs."—*Montesquieu.*

THE REPUBLIC.

In this, the grandest and most complete of all his works, Plato blends all the stores of past thought on religion, politics, and art, into one great constructive effort; systematizing, and, as far as might be, reconciling the conflicting theories and the various systems which had preceded him. Thus he first passes in review the prudential morality of an earlier age, built on texts from the poets and on aphorisms which had come down from the seven sages; he then puts to the proof the rash self-assertion of the Sophists, and the ingenious skepticism of the rising generation. But both these stages of thought, when tried, are found wanting, and the object of his search seems as far off as ever; for perfect justice and wisdom (so Plato thinks) cannot be found in any kingdom of this world. The result is that he frames a State of his own, ideal in one sense, but purely Greek in another, which was to combine the iron discipline of Sparta with the many-sided culture of Athens—a city where, as her own historian

said, men might unite elegance with simplicity, and might be learned without being effeminate.* And then like some painter who copies a divine original, to use his own comparison,† Plato first cleanses the moral canvas of his visionary state, then sketches the outline of the constitution, fills it in with the ideal forms of virtue, and gives it a human complexion in the god-like coloring of Homer; and the result is a glorious picture, as the world would acknowledge, he thinks, if they could be brought to see the truth; and a picture which might be realized in history, could a single king, or son of a king, become a philosopher.

Ethics and politics were so closely blended in Plato's view, that he regards the virtues of the Man as identical with those of the State, and thus exaggerates, says Mr. Grote, "the unity of the one and the partibility of the other." But we must remember that as the ancient state was smaller, so the public spirit pervading it was more intense; each man was, as we might say, citizen, soldier, and member of Parliament; and unlike modern society, which has been defined as "anarchy *plus* the policeman,"—where tolerance is carried to its furthest limits, and where state interference is restricted to the security of life and property,—the Greek theory was to secure as far as possible an absolute uniformity of sentiment and character, and to crush anything like heresy or dissent among the members of the social body. The state, if it existed at all, must be at one with itself; and they would point to Sparta as a triumphant proof that a rational character might be created by the all powerful hand of a legislator like Lycurgus. Pericles indeed might

* Thucyd. ii. 40. † Rep., vi. 501.

boast that at Athens there were no sour looks at a neighbor's eccentricities, and that it was emphatically

> "A land, where, girt by friends and foes,
> A man might say the thing he would:"

but, as we have seen in the case of Socrates, Athenian tolerance might be tried too far, and theories which tended in their view to outrage religion and morality, could not be endured with the same equanimity as in our skeptical and so-called enlightened age.

The opening scene in the "Republic" is such an excellent specimen of Plato's powers of description, that it is well worth giving in full. It is Socrates who speaks:

I went down yesterday to the Piræus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, to offer up prayers to the goddess, and also from a wish to see how the festival, then to be held for the first time, would be celebrated. I was very much pleased with the native Athenian procession, though that of the Thracians appeared to be no less brilliant. We had finished our prayers, and satisfied our curiosity, and were returning to the city, when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us at a distance as we were on our way towards home, and told his servant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant came behind me, took hold of my cloak, and said, "Polemarchus bids you wait." I turned round, and asked him where his master was. "There he is," he replied, "coming on behind: pray wait for him." "We will wait," answered Glaucon. Soon afterwards Polemarchus came up, with Adeimantus the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus the son of Nicias, and a few other persons, apparently coming away from the procession. Polemarchus instantly began: "Socrates, if I am not deceived, you are taking your departure for the city."

"You are not wrong in your conjecture," I replied

"Well, do you see what a large body we are?"

"Certainly I do."

"Then either prove yourselves the stronger party, or else stay where you are."

"No," I replied; "there is still an alternative: suppose we persuade you that you ought to let us go."

"Could you possibly persuade us, if we refused to listen?"

"Certainly not," replied Glaucon.

"Make up your minds, then, that we shall refuse to listen."

Here Adeimantus interposed, and said: "Are you not aware that towards evening there will be a torch-race on horseback in honor of the goddess?"

"On horseback!" I exclaimed; "that is a novelty. Will they carry torches, and pass them on to one another, while the horses are racing? or how do you mean?"

"As you say," replied Polemarchus; "besides, there will be a night festival, which it will be worth while to look at. We will rise after dinner, and go out to see this festival; and there we shall meet with many of our young men, with whom we can converse. Therefore, stay, and do not refuse us."—D.

And so they are persuaded to return with Polemarchus to his home, where they find his father, the aged Cephalus, surrounded by his sons and friends.

"You should come to see me oftener," says Cephalus to Socrates, "now that I cannot come to you. I find that the older one grows, the fonder one becomes of conversation."

"And what think you of old age itself?" asks Socrates. "Is the road to the grave rough or smooth?"

"Smooth and peaceful enough," answers Cephalus —"that is, to one of easy temper like myself; though some old men, I know, complain bitterly of the miseries of age, and mourn over the faded pleasures of their youth."

"Yes," says Socrates; "but the world would say that your riches make old age an easy burden."

"There is something in that; but I should say myself that a good man could not be happy in poverty and old age, nor again would all the wealth of Crœsus make a bad man happy."

"What do you think, then, to be the chief advantage of riches?" asks Socrates.

"If I mention it," he replied, "I shall perhaps get few persons to agree with me. Be assured, Socrates, that when a man is nearly persuaded that he is going to die, he feels alarmed and concerned about things which never affected him before. Till then, he has laughed at those stories about the departed, which tell us that he who has done wrong here must suffer for it in the other world; but now his mind is tormented with a fear that these stories may possibly be true. And either owing to the infirmities of old age, or because he is now nearer to the confines of the future state, he has a clearer insight into those mysteries. However that may be, he becomes full of misgiving and apprehension, and sets himself to the task of calculating and reflecting whether he has done any wrong to any one. Hereupon, if he finds his life full of unjust deeds, he is apt to start out of sleep in terror, as children do, and he lives haunted by gloomy anticipations. But if his conscience reproaches him with no injustice, he enjoys the abiding presence of sweet Hope, that 'kind nurse of old age,' as Pindar calls it. . . . And it is this consideration, as I hold, that makes riches chiefly valuable, I do not say to everybody, but at any rate to the good. For they contribute greatly to our preservation from even unintentional deceit or falsehood, and from that alarm which would attend our departure to the other world, if we owed any sacrifices to a god, or any money to a man. They have also many other uses. But after weighing them all separately, Socrates, I am inclined to consider this service as anything but the least important which riches can render to a wise and sensible man."—D.

"So, then, this is the meaning of Justice," says Socrates, seizing on the word Injustice—"to tell the truth and pay your debts?"

"Certainly, if we are to believe the poet Simonides," says Polemarchus (for Cephalus gives up the discussion, and quits the company); "his words are—to pay back what you owe to each is just."

"But you surely would never give back to a mad friend a sword which he had lent you?"

"No," says Polemarchus; "for Simonides says again, you should give back what is *proper* to each man—that is, good to your friends and evil to your foes: and if you ask how, by making alliance with one and going to war with the other: and in peace, Justice is of use in ordinary dealings between man and man—especially when you wish your money to be safely kept."

"That is," says Socrates, "when your money is idle and useless—*then* only Justice is useful! Again, since the doctor can poison as well as heal, and the general can overreach the enemy as well as protect himself, Justice, if it can guard, must also steal; and the just man is a sort of thief, like Homer's Autolycus—

"Who best could steal, and swear he never stole."*

Your poets have brought Justice to a pretty pass! And may not men make mistakes, and injure their real friends?"

"Yes," says Polemarchus; "but by a friend I mean one who both seems and really is one; and it is just to injure one's enemy if he is bad, and to help one's friend if he is good."

"But hurting a man is the same as making him worse with respect to virtue, and such moral injury belongs not to good, but to its contrary, evil; just as it is not heat that chills, but its contrary, cold. So it can never be just to injure either friend or foe; and this definition must have been invented not by Simonides but by Periander, or some other potentate, who thought his power irresistible."

Then Thrasymachus, who had been growing more and more impatient, takes advantage of a pause, and, "like a wild beast gathering itself up for a spring," bursts in upon the argument.

* Hom. Odyss., xix. 395.

"No more of this foolish complaisance, Socrates; answer yourself, instead of asking what justice is; and don't tell me that it is 'the due,' or 'the profitable,' or 'the expedient,' or 'the lucrative,' or any nonsense of that sort. And let us have none of your usual affectation of ignorance, if you please."

Socrates, who at first assumes to have been terror-struck at this sudden attack, tries to soothe Thrasymachus. "A clever man like you," he says, "should pity us in our perplexity, instead of treating us harshly; we are searching for what is more precious than any gold, and want all the assistance we can get."

Thrasymachus is somewhat pacified by this flattery, and gives his own theory, which is substantially the same as that we have already seen advocated by Callicles in the "Gorgias,"—that Justice is "the Interest of the Stronger." Rulers always legislate with a view to their own interests; and as a shepherd fattens his sheep for his own advantage, so do the "shepherds of the people" regard their subjects as mere sheep, and look only to the possible profit they may get from them. Justice is thus the gain of the strong and the loss of the weak; for the just man's honesty is ruinous to himself, while the unjust man, especially if he can plunder wholesale like the tyrant, is happy and prosperous, and well spoken of; and thus Injustice itself is a strong and lordlier thing than Justice.

To this barefaced sophistry Socrates replies that the unjust man may go too far; in overreaching his neighbors—just and unjust alike—he breaks all the rules of art, and proves himself an unskillful and ignorant workman, who has no fixed standard in life to act by. And in an unjust state, where every man is thus trying to get the better of his neighbor, there will be endless

discord and divisions, making all united action impossible; it will be like a house divided against itself. And as it is with the unjust state, so will it be with the unjust man. He will be ever at war with himself, and so unable to act decisively. Lastly, the soul (like the ear or eye) has a work of its own to do, and a virtue which enables it to do that work well. Justice is a work of the soul, and the just man lives well and is happy; and as happiness is more profitable than misery, so is Justice more profitable than Injustice.

Thrasymachus is now in a good temper again, and readily acquiesces in all that Socrates has said; but Glaucon, shrewd and combative, takes upon himself the office of "devil's advocate" (for he admits that his own convictions are the other way), and revives the defence of Injustice from a Sophist's point of view.

"Naturally," he says, "to do injustice is a good, and to suffer it an evil: but as men found that the evil was greater than the good, they made a compact of mutual abstinence, and so justice is simply a useful compromise under certain circumstances. If you were to furnish the just and unjust man each with a ring such as Gyges wore of old, making the wearer invisible to all eyes, you would find them both following the same lawless path; for no man would be so steeled against temptation as to remain virtuous, if he were invisible. As things are, he finds honesty the best policy.

"Again, let us assume both characters—the just and unjust—to be perfect in their parts, so that we may decide which is the happier of the two. Our ideal villain will reduce crime to a science—he will have wealth, and money, and honor, and influence—all that this world esteems precious; he will have a high reputation for justice (for this is the crowning exploit of in-

justice); he will accomplish all his ends by force or fraud, and the gods, whose favor he will win by costly offerings, will sanctify the means. While the perfectly simple and noble man, clothed only in his justice, will suffer the worst consequences of a lifelong reputation for seeming to be that which he really is not—unjust. He will be put in chains, scourged, tortured, and at last put to death. Which think you the happier of these two?"

Then Adeimantus takes up the parable,—for brother, he says, should help brother. "Men too commonly make the mistake of dwelling, not upon the beauty of Justice in itself, but on the worldly advantages, the honors, and the high reputation which attend a just life. It is in this spirit that parents advise their children, and that Homer and Hesiod recount the blessings which the gods bestow upon the pious:

"'Like to a blameless king, who, godlike in virtue andwisdom,
Justice ever maintains; whose rich land fruitfully yields him
Harvests of barley and wheat; and his orchards are heavy with fruitage.
Strong are the young of his flocks, and the sea gives him fish in abundance.'*

And other poets describe the glories of a sensual paradise, where their heroes feast on couches, crowned with flowers, and make the fairest reward of virtue to be 'immortal drunkenness;' while they doom the unjust to fill sieves and languish in a swamp through all eternity.

"Others, again, strike out a different line, and will tell you how narrow and difficult is the way of virtue, and how broad and pleasant is the path of vice; and

* Hom. Odyss., xix 109 (Davies and Vaughan).

they affirm, too, that the gods bestow prosperity on the wicked and adversity on the good. And lastly, there is a doctrine of indulgences preached by mendicant prophets, who profess to have power to absolve the rich man from his sins, in this world and the next, by spells and mystic rites; and they quote the poets to prove that vice and atonement are equally easy.

"What is a young man to do amidst all this conflicting advice? Shall he make Justice 'his strong tower of defence,' as Pindar says; or shall he fence his character with the appearance of virtue, and so by fair means or foul obtain that happiness which is the end of life? The gods—if at least there are gods, and if they care for men's affairs—can easily be wrought upon by prayer and sacrifice; and we need have no fear of Hades so long as we perform the mystic rites. And so, if he combines injustice with the semblance of justice, he will reap all the advantages of both, and will fare well in both worlds.

"The blame of all this evil rests with our poets and teachers, who have always dwelt on the glories and rewards following on a just life, but have never adequately discussed what Justice and Injustice really are. Could we see them as they are, we should choose the one as the greatest good, and shun the other as the greatest evil. It rests with Socrates," concludes Adeimantus, "to show how Justice is itself a blessing, and Injustice a curse, to the possessor; and to leave to others the task of describing the reputation and rewards which indirectly follow from either."

Socrates agrees to this: but he pleads that, as he has weak eyes, he must be allowed to read the larger writing first—that is, to look for Justice in the State, which is, after all, only the individual "writ large."

"The State springs," he says, "from the mutual needs of men, whose simplest outfit will require food, shelter, and clothing, so that the least possible city must consist of four or five men; and as they will have different natures, and one man can do one thing better than many, there will be a natural division of labor. Soon, however, fresh wants will arise. Smiths, carpenters, and shepherds will be found necessary, and thus a population will soon spring up. Then comes the necessity of importing and exporting, and this will produce merchants and sailors; and by degrees the exchange of productions will give rise to a market and a currency. Life in such a city will be simple and frugal. Men will build, and plant, and till the soil. Their food will be coarse but wholesome; and on holidays,

"spreading these excellent cakes and loaves upon mats of straw or on clean leaves, and themselves reclining on rude beds of yew or myrtle boughs, they will make merry, themselves and their children, drinking their wine, wearing garlands, and singing the praises of the gods, enjoying one another's society, and not begetting children beyond their means, through a prudent fear of poverty or war."—D.

Glaucon objects that if Socrates had been founding "a city of pigs," he could hardly have given them less; and suggests that he should add the refinements of modern life.

I see, continues Socrates, that we shall have to enlarge and decorate our State with the fine arts, and all the "fair humanities" of life; gold and ivory, paintings and embroidery will be found there; and a host of ornamental trades will soon spring up—dancers, cooks, barbers, musicians, and confectioners. So largely, in fact, will our population then increase, that the land will not be able to support it. Hence fresh territory must be acquired, and we must go to war to

get it. We shall thus want a camp and a standing army.

Now the art of war, more than any other, must be a separate craft; and the soldier's profession requires not only a natural aptitude, but the study of a lifetime. How shall we choose those who are to be our Guardians? Clearly, they should have all the qualities of well-bred dogs—quick to see, swift to follow, and strong to fight—brave and spirited, gentle to friends, but fierce against their foes. Their natures must be harmonized by philosophy; and philosophy involves education.

In our education we will follow the old routine: first, Music—that is, all training by words and sounds. But we will have a strict censorship of the press, and banish from our State all those lying fables of our mythology, as well as the terrific descriptions of the lower world. We will lay down, instead, types to which all tales told to children must conform. Our music, too, shall be simple and spirited strains after the "Dorian mood;" and in sculpture and in art we will encourage the same pure taste. Thus, with fair and graceful forms everywhere around them, our youth will drink into their souls, "like gales blowing from healthy lands," all inspirations of truth and beauty.

"In their bodily training, we will encourage a plain and healthy diet, and there shall be no sauces or made dishes. Thus we shall want few lawyers and few physicians; no sleepy judges, or doctors whose skill only teaches them how to prolong worthless lives. Our citizens will have no time to be invalids; with us it must be "either kill or cure," and the evil body must be left to die, and the evil soul must be put to death.

Our Rulers must be chosen from our Guardians—the best and oldest of the number; and they must be

tested—as gold is tried in the furnace—by pleasure and fear; and if they come forth unstained and unscathed from this trial, they shall be honored both in life and death. And in order that we may secure a proper *esprit de corps* among them, we will invent and impress upon them a "noble falsehood." "Ye are children of earth (we will tell them), all brethren from the same great mother, whom you are in duty bound to protect. Your creator mingled gold in the nature of your chiefs; silver in that of the soldiers; bronze and iron went to form the artisans and laborers. It is your business, Guardians, to keep intact this purity of breed. No child of gold must remain among the artisans; no child of iron among the rulers: for the State shall surely perish (so saith an oracle) when ruled by brass or iron." And this story must be handed down from father to son, as a sacred form of faith in our State.

Now our Guardians must have neither houses, nor lands, nor dwellings, nor storehouses of their own; but only fixed pay, and a soldier's lodging, and a common mess-table.

Adeimantus objects that the life of the Guardians can scarcely be happy on these terms—with no money to spend on themselves or their friends, kept on "board-wages," and always on duty.

It is not our business (answers Socrates) to insure the happiness of a class. But our Guardians will be happy—that is, if they do their duty, preserve the unity of the State, maintain the golden mean between wealth and poverty, and be ever on the watch against the spirit of innovation—dangerous even in music, doubly so in education—and leave the highest and most sacred legislation to our ancestral god of Delphi.

But (he interrupts himself suddenly) we are forgetting *Justice* all this time. We must light a candle and search our city diligently, now that we have founded one, till we find it. Clearly our State, if it be perfect, will contain the four cardinal virtues; and, if we can first discover three out of the four, the unknown remainder must be Justice.

Wisdom will be the science of protection, possessed by our Guardians; and true *Courage* will be engrained in the hearts of our soldiers by law and education; and *Temperance* will be that social harmony pervading the State, and making all the citizens to be of one mind, like strings attempered to one scale. But where is *Justice?* Here at our feet, after all, for it can be nothing else than our original principle of division of labor: for a man is just when he does his own business, and does not meddle with his neighbor's.

And, returning to Man, we shall also find three parts in his soul corresponding to the three classes in our State. Reason, which should rule; Desire, which should obey; and Passion,* which is properly the ally of reason, and is restrained by it as a dog is restrained by a shepherd. We shall also find the same cardinal virtues in the man as in the State.

The just man will live uprightly, and will reduce all the elements of his soul to unison and harmony; and as to the original question "whether injustice, if undetected, pays in this life?" we may answer that it is a moral disease—and that, as in the body, so in the soul, if the constitution is ruined, life will not be worth having.

* There is no English equivalent for the Greek word *thumos* —which combines the several meanings which we express in the words spirit, passion, honor, anger, all in one.

Then Socrates lays down the details of the system of Communism which he proposes to carry out in his State. "Following further our comparison of sheep-dogs, men and women are to have the same employment (for there is no real difference between the sexes), and will go out to war together. Marriages must be strictly regulated; and, as in the case of dogs or game fowl, we must keep up the purity of breed. The best must marry the best, and the worst the worst; and the children of the former must be carefully reared, while any offspring from the latter must be exposed. There must be a public nursery, and no mother must know her own child. Thus, where all have common sympathies and interests, and there are no jealousies arising from separate families or properties, the State will be most thoroughly at unity with itself.

"These children of the State shall be present in the battel-field—but at a safe distance—to stimulate the courage of our warriors, and accustom our young to the scene of their future duties. And in war, the runaway and coward shall be degraded: but the brave shall be crowned and shall wed the fair; he shall be honored at the sacrifice and banquet, and if he falls, we shall proclaim that he sprang from the race of gold, and now haunts the earth in the form of a holy and powerful spirit.

"War between Greek and Greek is an unnatural feud, and therefore we will not despoil the bodies of the dead—for there is a meanness in injuring a body whence the soul has fled; nor will we enslave a free Greek, nor lay waste Greek land, or burn houses, as heretofore."

Glaucon is willing to admit that this ideal State will have a thousand advantages over any at present in

existence, *if* only it could be realized. How is this to be brought about?

Our State might be realized, Socrates replies, on one condition—preposterous as it will seem to the world—"philosophers must be kings;" or, failing this, the princes of this world must be imbued with the true philosophic spirit.

And what, then, is a philosopher? He is a rare and perfect being, who takes all knowledge and virtue as his portion; he is "the spectator of all time and all existence," for he knows the absolute and real ideas of beauty, truth, and justice—far removed from the uncertain twilight of opinion. He is free from the meanness or injustice of petty natures; he is lordly in his conceptions, gracious in manner, with a quick memory, and a well-adjusted mind. It is no argument, continues Socrates, to say that among the so-called philosophers of the present day you will find many rogues and fools. It is so; but the fault rests not with philosophy itself, but with the ignorant multitude, and with the pretentious teachers of our youth; for rare talents may be perverted by bad training, and strong but ill-regulated minds will produce the greatest evils. A young and noble character has indeed little chance of withstanding the corruptions of the age. The fulsome compliments of friends and advisers, the senseless clamor of the law-court or the Assembly, combine to ruin him; and, worse than all, the influence of the Sophists, who act as keepers to this many-headed monster of a people, understanding its habits and humoring its caprices, calling what it fancies good and what it dislikes evil. And thus Philosophy herself is left desolate, and a crowd of vulgar interlopers leave their proper trades and rush in like escaped prisoners into a

sanctuary, and profane the Temple of Truth. There can be but one result to such a debasing alliance as this—a host of spurious sophisms. Few and rare indeed are the cases where men of nobler stamp have remained uncorrupted; whom some favorable accident, such as exile, or indifference, or ill health—or it may be (Socrates adds, as in my own peculiar case, an inward sign from heaven—has saved from such entanglements.

Clearly, then, the real philosopher, who is to stand aloof from that wild beast's den which we call public life, has no place or lot among us as things are now. He is like some rare exotic, which, if transplanted to a foreign soil, would soon fade and wither; for he requires a perfect State to fulfill the perfection of his own nature—a State such as may perhaps have once existed in the countless ages that are passed, or even exists now "in some foreign clime far beyond the limits of our own horizon." *

And in this State, of which we are giving the glorious outlines, philosophers must rule, in spite of their personal reluctance; for they owe us nurture-wages for their training; and must for a time forego their higher life of contemplation. They will be nobly fitted for their office, for their intellectual training will have taken them step by step through the higher branches of knowledge—Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy—all studied with a view to deeper and ideal truths. By a strict and repeated process of selection, all except those of a resolute and noble nature will

* Here, at the end of the Sixth and the beginning of the Seventh Book in the original, comes a description of the higher education which these philosophers must undergo, and of which a sketch is given in chap. vii.

be excluded from the number of these "saviors of the State;" again and again these will be tested and examined, and a select list made, till at last the studies of the chosen few will culminate in Dialectic, the coping-stone of all the Sciences. Their souls will then have mounted from gloom to daylight; they will comprehend first principles, and they will be privileged to know and define in its real nature the Idea of Good. At the age of fifty they shall be tested for their final work, and if they come out unscathed from the trial, the remainder of their life shall be passed partly in philosophy, partly in practical politics—till death shall remove them to the Islands of the Blest, and a grateful city shall honor them with monuments and sacrifices.

Such is our State, continues Socrates in the Eighth Book,—perfect, so long as its various parts shall act in harmony; but, like other mortal productions, it is fated to change and decay at a certain period, determined by a mystic number. So also there is a cycle which controls all human births for good or evil; and, in the lapse of years, it must be that our Gaurdians will miss the propitious time; a degenerate offspring will thus come into being, Education will languish, and there will be a gradual decline in the Constitution.

The first stage in this "decline and fall" will be a *Timocracy*, marked by a spirit of ambition and love of gain; in which the art of war will preponderate, and our Gaurdians will think lightly of philosophy and much of political power.

Then comes an *Oligarchy*, where gold is all-powerful and virtue is depreciated; and the State becomes divided into two hostile classes—one enormously rich,

the other miserably poor; and in it paupers and criminals multiply, and education deteriorates.

There is a change, says our theorist, in the character of the individual citizen corresponding to each of these changes in the form of government; but it must be confessed that the minute analysis of the causes of this change, and the result of certain characteristics in each parent, would strike a modern reader as something more than fanciful.

The intemperate desire of riches, and the license and extravagance thus encouraged, do their own work in the State, until you find everywhere grasping misers and ruined spendthrifts. Meanwhile the lower orders grow turbulent and conscious of their power. Their insubordination soon brings matters to a crisis: there is a revolution, and a Democracy is the result. This may be defined as "a pleasant and lawless and motley constitution, giving equal rights to unequal persons;" and it is pervaded by a marvelous freedom in speech and action, and a strange diversity of character. Each man does what he likes in his own eyes, with a magnanimous disregard of the law: he obeys or disobeys at his own pleasure; and if some criminal be sentenced to death or exile, you will probably meet him the next day, come to life again, and parading the streets like a hero. There is something splendid, concludes Socrates comically, in the forbearance of such a commonwealth, and in its entire superiority to all petty considerations.

Again, the democrat is like the democracy. Brought up in a miserly and ignorant way by his father, the oligarch, the young man is soon corrupted by bad company, and a swarm of passions and wild and presumptuous theories seize the citadel of his reason, whence temperance and modesty are expelled. Even if not

thoroughly reprobate, he is at the mercy of each fleeting caprice, and gives way to the humor of the hour, now reveling with wine and music, now fasting on bread and water—now an idler, and now a student; by turns politician, general, or trader.*

In a thoroughgoing democracy we have liberty and equality everywhere—in fact there is soon a universal anarchy. Respect for rank and age soon dies out. Father and son, teacher and scholar, master and servant are all on the same dead level. The very animals (says the speaker, with an amusing touch of satire) becomes gorged with freedom, and will run at you if you get in their way.

But extremes in politics produce a reaction; and the result of excessive freedom is excessive slavery. From a Democracy to a Tyranny is an easy stage. Some demagogue, who has shown unusual talent in extorting money from the richer class to feed those "stinging and stingless drones" of whom we spoke, is adopted by the people as their champion, and gradually strengthens his influence. It is always the same story—he banishes, confiscates, murders, and then his own life is threatened, and he obtains a body-guard. Woe to the rich man then, if he does not fly at once, for it will be arrest and death if he lingers.

At first the Tyrant will be all smiles and promises; but, once firmly seated, he will change his tactics. He will employ his citizens in incessant war to weaken

* Professor Jowett quotes Dryden's well-known description of the Duke of Buckingham—

"A man so various that he seemed to be
Not one but all mankind's epitome."

He thinks that Alcibiades is referred to; but the lines would apply equally well to Critias, Plato's uncle (Curtius, Hist. Greece, ii. 542).

their strength, and rid the state of bold and powerful spirits; he will increase his guards, he will plunder the rich and humble the strong, and thus free men will pass under the yoke of slavery.

The man who answers to the Tyrant in private life will have his soul under the dominion of monstrous lusts and appetites, squandering and plundering, and passing on from sin to sin.

Thus a Tyranny is the worst and most miserable State of all. Not only are the citizens in it reduced to slavery, and distracted by fear and grief, but the Tyrant himself, with all his power and splendor, never knows the blessings of peace and friendship. Like some great slave-master in a desert, he lives alone in a crowd: shunned and detested by those about him, tormented by remorse, and haunted by a lifelong terror, he is himself the most pitiable slave of all.

The only pleasure that such a man ever knows is mere sensual enjoyment—in itself worthless and fleeting. The attractions of gold or of glory are of a nobler stamp; but the best and purest of all pleasures that a man can feel, and the ineffable sweetness of which the world can never realize, is that which the philosopher alone finds in the study and contemplation of existence. For he prunes close the hydra-headed passions by which the many are enslaved, and subjects the lion to the man, by making reason rule his soul. Thus none can measure his happiness, but it cannot be possessed by any in perfection, save in our own ideal state—"which does not, indeed, at present exist in this world, but has, perhaps, its pattern laid up in heaven for him who is willing to see it, and, seeing it, rules his life on earth accordingly." *

* Rep. ix. ad fin.

Such is the Platonic State, with its strange medley of noble aspirations and impracticable details. How far Plato himself believed it to be ideal, or how far, if *he* had been Alexander's tutor, he would have tried to carry it out in history, we have no means of telling. But it is easy to understand his feeling, and the point of view from which he wrote. He is weary of the pretensions, the falsehood, and the low morality around him—("it is dreadful to think," he says, "that half the people we meet have perjured themselves in one of the numerous law courts")—and so he turns away with a sort of despair from the sad realities of Athenian life; and instead of writing a bitter satire, as a Roman might have done, or waging war against the society he despises in "latter-day pamphlets," he throws himself as far as he can out of the present, with all its degrading associations, and builds for himself (as we have seen) a new State—after a divine and perfect pattern—in a world a thousand leagues from his own.

Those "three waves" of the "Republic" (as Socrates terms them)—the communities of families and that of property, and the assumption that philosophers must be kings—which threaten to swamp the argument even with such friendly criticism as Glaucon and Adeimantus venture to offer, prove with less partial opponents insurmountable obstacles to the realisation of the Platonic State. Aristotle heads the list of objectors, and disapproves both of the end and the means to be pursued. So far from promoting the unity of the State, he argues that Plato's system of Communism will create an endless division of interests and sympathies; will tend to destroy the security of life and property; and, among other evils, will do away with the virtues of charity and liberality, by allowing no room for their exercise.

Modern critics generally touch upon the repression of all individual energy, the cramping of all free thought and action, and the necessary abolition of any sense of mutual rights and obligations which are necessary parts of Plato's system; and De Quincey has denounced in an eloquent passage the social immorality encouraged by Plato's marriage regulations, and his "sensual bounty on infanticide"—cutting adrift the little boat to go down the Niagara of violent death, in the very next night after its launching on its unknown river of life."*

Plato's "Republic" is the first of a long series of ideal States;† and we find the original thought "Romanized" by Cicero, "Christianized" by St. Augustine in his 'City of God,' and in more modern times reappearing in Sir Thomas More's 'Utopia,' and in Lord Bacon's 'New Atlantis,' with its wonderful anticipations of modern science. We have in our own day seen specimens of the same class of literature in works like 'Erewhon' and 'The Coming Race.'

THE LAWS.

This Dialogue is the last and the longest that Plato wrote, and bears traces of the hand of old age. The fire and spirit of his earlier works seems gone, while Plato himself is changed; he is not only older, but more conservative, more dogmatic, and—we must also say—more intolerant and narrow-minded than was his wont. Much had happened since he wrote the "Republic" to disenchant him of visionary politics. His mission to Syracuse had proved, as we have seen,

* De Quincey, viii.

† An interesting account of these States may be found in Sir G. C. Lewis's Methods of Reasoning in Politics, II. ch. xxii.

a miserable failure, and his grand schemes of reform had sadly ended in the violent death of his friend Dion. And so the tone of the "Laws" is grave, prosaic, and even commonplace in its trivial details. The high aspirations of the "Republic" have sobered down into a tedious and minute legislation. The king-philosophers, with their golden pedigree and elaborate training, are here superseded by a council of elderly citizens elected by vote. The celestial world of "Ideas" and the sublime heights of Dialectic have passed from view; the study of science is curtailed; and it is even hinted that a young man may possibly have too much of education. But Plato seems to have grown even more impressed than before with the belief that the State should mould the characters and keep the consciences of its citizens: he is imbued, says Mr. Grote, "with the persecuting spirit of mediæval Catholicism;" there is a strict "Act of Uniformity," and all dissenters from it are branded as criminals; while religion, poetry, music, and education generally are placed under State surveillance.

The first four books of the "Laws" form a kind of desultory preface to the detailed legislation which occupies the remaining eight. The scene of the Dialogue is laid in the island of Crete, and the speakers are three old men—an Athenian, a Spartan, and a Cretan—who meet on the road to the temple of Jupiter at Gnossus, and discuss, as they walk, the form of government in their respective States. Sparta and Crete were then standing instances of the perfection to which military training might be brought, and a war-like ideal realized. Both cities resembled permanent camps, with severe discipline, continual drill, a public mess, and barrack life taking the place of family

life and affections. But the Athenian, though not denying the superiority of Spartan troops, finds much to criticise in the principle of the Spartan system. It has only developed courage, which is, after all, but a fourth-rate virtue; and it has proceeded on the mistaken notion that man's natural state is war. Other virtues—such as wisdom and temperance—are thus made of little account; and Sparta has banished pleasure, which is really as effectual a test of self-control as pain. Wine, too, is forbidden there—though it is a most useful medium for discovering a man's strength or weakness; indeed, at the festival of Bacchus there ought, the Athenian thinks, to be a drinking tournament—with a sober president—and all honor should be paid to the youth who could drink hardest and longest. For it is clear that the man with the strongest head at the banquet will be the coolest and most imperturbable on the battle-field. Again, wine softens and humanizes the character; it cures the sourness of old age, and under its influence we renew our youth and forget our sorrows. And if you want to try a friend's honor and integrity—*in vino veritas;* ply him with wine, and you will read all the secrets of his heart. But with all this, there should be a stringent "Licensing Act." The times and seasons when wine may be drunk should be strictly defined by law; and no soldier on active service, no slave, no judge or magistrate during his year of office, no pilot on duty, should be allowed to drink wine at all; and, if these precautions are carried out, a city will not need many vineyards.

The use of wine as a means of training opens the general question of Education, which is examined again at greater length in the Seventh Book of the treatise:

and then Plato passes on to the origin of society. In the "Republic," the State is made to spring from the mutual needs of men; but here it is developed from the House—in fact, we find in this treatise the "patriarchal" theory.

In the illimitable past, says Plato, there must have been thousands and thousands of cities which rose and flourished for a time, and then were swept away; for at certain fixed periods a deluge comes, which covers the whole earth and destroys all existing civilization, leaving only a vast expanse of desert, and a few survivors on the mountain-tops. This remnant clings together with the instinct of self-preservation. Each little family, under the strict rule of the "house father," lives in a primitive and simple manner on the produce of its flocks and herds, like the Homeric Cyclops:

"Unsown, untended, corn and wine and oil
Spring to their hand; but they no councils know,
Nor justice, but forever lawless go.
Housed in the hills, they neither buy nor sell,
No kindly offices demand or show;
Each in the hollow cave where he doth dwell
Gives law to wife and children, as he thinketh well."*

Gradually several of these isolated units coalesced, and thus the family developed into the tribe, and several tribes uniting made the State. Then came a government, and a code of laws.

Plato next passes in review the ancient legends of his own country—the Trojan War, the Return of the Heraclidæ, the Dorian settlement in the Peloponnese; and he traces in the history of those times seven dis-

* Homer, Od. ix., Worsley's transl. There is an interesting account of this patriarchal age in Maine's Ancient Law, chap. v.

tinct and recognized titles to obedience—namely, the authority of parents over children, of nobles over inferiors, of elder over younger, of master over slave, the natural principle that the strong should rule the weak, and the no less natural principle that the wise should have dominion over the fool; and lastly, there is the power conferred by the casting of the lot—in which Plato recognizes, as distinctly as the Hebrew legislator, the hand of Heaven.

A great lesson, he continues, may be learned from these ancient States—for they all perished from internal discords—that limited power among the rulers, and harmony and obedience to the laws among the subjects, are the safeguards of every community. Thus Providence wisely tempered the kingly power in Sparta with Ephors and a Senate, and so produced a healthy balance in the constitution; while Persia fell from her high place among the nations from the excess of despotic power, and the want of good will between the despot and his people. The great Cyrus and Darius both received a warrior's training, and won their own way to the throne; while Cambyses and Xerxes, born in the purple and bred in the harem, proved weak and degenerate princes, and their ruin was the result of their evil bringing up. Athens, again, went wrong in the other extreme; for with us, says the Athenian, it is always excess of freedom that does the mischief. Of old, law was supreme in every part of the State—especially in music, with its four primitive and simple divisions. Reverence, and the fear "which the coward never feels," prevailed; all classes were united, and fought for their common hearths and sepulchres; and the grand result was Marathon and Salamis. But gradually a change has come over our national

character. There has been a growing lawlessness, beginning in the Music, and spreading thence throughout the community. We no longer any of us listen in respectful silence to the judgment of superior interests, but are one and all become accomplished critics, and every one knows everything. Awe and reverence have gone forever; and there is a shameless disregard for authority, whether of parents, or elders, or rulers, even the majesty of the gods is slighted, and the oaths sworn by them are made of no account.

Here, with the Third Book, ends "the prelude" to the "Laws." By a happy coincidence (says the Cretan in the Dialogue), his countrymen are just going to found a colony, and he is one of the ten commissioners appointed to give laws to the colonists. Will the Athenian give him some hints on the subject?

It is clear (replies the Athenian) that all legislation should aim at carrying out three principles—namely, freedom, unity, and wisdom; and that State will be best where the law is best administered by the rulers who are its servants, and where the happiness of the community is the sole object of their legislation.

"The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and just institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether in a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. You might as well hope to reproduce the charactar of Nestor, who is said to have excelled all men in the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance. This, however, according to the tradition, was in the times of Troy: in our own days there was nothing of the sort. But if such an one either has or ever shall come into being, or is now among us, blessed is he, and blessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. And this may be said of power in general: when the supreme power in man coincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws are by nature framed, and the best constitution; but in no other way will they ever come into being."—J.

If you could find a despot, young, noble, and enthusiastic—fortunate, moreover, in being advised by some great legislator—you will have your city founded at once; for the change from a despotism to a perfect government is the easiest of all.*

In our legislation we will head each enactment with a prelude or preamble, to show the nature of the case and the spirit of the law,—appealing thus to the reason of our citizens, that they be rather persuaded than forced to obey; more especially as there are many cases which the law can never reach, and where we can only declare the solemn utterances of Heaven, speaking through the law to all who are willing to hear and understand.

Our city, then, shall be built nine miles from the sea, in a country which has more hill than plain. There will be little timber for shipbuilding; but this is of no importance, as we shall not aim at naval power, nor will war be our normal state. The colonists should, if possible, be all of the same country—like a swarm of bees—as they will be then more united: though perhaps a mixed multitude would be more tractable.

The number of citizens shall be originally fixed, and as far as possible kept at 5040,† and to each citizen shall be awarded land sufficient to maintain his family (for community of property cannot be carried out),

* Plato's opinion of the "Tyrant" is greatly modified, since he declared in the "Republic" that "tyranny" was 729 degrees removed from perfection; but here he is probaby thinking of the younger Dionysius (see p. 7).

† Plato gives as his reason for fixing on this number, that it is easily divisible. He remarks also that it is not too large to admit of their all knowing one another,—though that would involve a somewhat large circle of acquaintances.

but son shall succeed father, and none shall sell or divide his lot, on pain of being cursed by the priests as an offender against heaven and the law. There shall be a State currency; but no usury or accumulation of private fortune shall be allowed, so that extremes of wealth and poverty may be equally avoided.

The State is to be governed in somewhat complicated fashion. There are to be thirty-seven guardians of the laws, and a council of 360 elected from the whole body of citizens. Each department of public business is to have its own officers. There are to be "country wardens," who would seem to combine the duties of modern county court judges and rural police. For municipal duties there are wardens of the city and market, all with magisterial powers. There are to be law-courts and judges—though arbitration is recommended where it is possible—and there is a high court of appeal.

Marriages are to be strictly regulated, since their object is to produce a noble and healthy offspring. Slaves should be treated with more perfect justice than we show to equals, and all levity and cruelty towards them should be avoided.

Then follow some desultory remarks on education, which should (Plato thinks) be compulsory—since children belong more to the State than to their parents—and should be directed by a competent minister of public instruction. Infants should be reared with great care—soothed with song, "for they roar continually the first three years of their life"—and carried about in their nurses' arms, "as you see our young nobles carry their fighting-cocks." At the age of six, boys are to be separated from girls, and are to learn riding and the use of weapons. There amusements are to be carefully watched,, as any change in them may breed

revolution in the State. They are to learn dancing to give them stately and graceful movement, and wrestling to give them quickness and agility, and music to humanize their souls. But both music and song are to be strictly regulated; there is to be a censorship of the press, and all objectionable poetry is to be expunged. (Plato hints that the "homilies" with which his laws are prefaced would be admirable exercise to be committed to memory.) Till the age of thirteen they are to learn their grammar and letters; afterwards the use of the lyre, and grave and simple melodies; and their education is to conclude with the rudiments of science, which should, if possible, be taught in an interesting manner.

There must be a religious festival (continues the Athenian) on every day in the year, and a monthly meeting of all the citizens to practice warlike exercises, when there should be public races for the youths and maidens.

In the Ninth Book, we have the somewhat wearisome details of a criminal code, in which Plato justifies the title given to him by Numenius of "the Moses who wrote in Attic Greek." Certainly some of the regulations are much in the spirit of the writer of Leviticus—such as, that no man shall remove his neighbor's landmark, or cut off his supply of water; that the traveler may pluck the grapes at the time of vintage; and we have also, as in the law of Moses, the "avenger of blood" and purification by the priest.

Plato here, as elsewhere, attributes crime in a great measure to ignorance—a sort of moral blindness. We should (he says) if possible, heal the distemper of the criminal soul, or, if he be incurable, he must be put to death. There are certain unpardonable offenders

—the profaner of temples, the would-be tyrant, the traitor or conspirator, and the willful shedder of innocent blood,—these must all suffer the extreme penalty. He distinguishes between the various kinds of homicide,—in some cases a fine, in others exile, is sufficient punishment; but for the parricide he reserves a more awful doom—he shall be slain by the judges, and his body exposed where three ways meet, and then cast beyond the borders; while the criminal "who has taken the life that ought to be dearer to him than all others—his own"—shall be buried alone in a desolate place, without tomb or monument to show his grave.

The deep-seated aversion and contempt with which every Greek regarded trade and traders is shown in Plato's regulations as to commerce and the market. Among his 5,040 citizens there was not to be found a single retail trader. Such a degrading occupation was to be left entirely to the resident foreigners, if any chose to engage in it. If some great personage ("the very idea is absurd," he says) were to open a shop, and thus set a precedent, things might be different. As it is, trade carries with it the stamp of dishonor. And then follow other restrictions, the necessity for which serves to show us that Greek shopkeepers practiced much the same imposition on their customers as our own. There was to be no adulteration, no tricks of sale, and all contracts were to be rigorously adhered to.

The last two books are taken up with a number of miscellaneous regulations respecting civil rights and duties. The law is to take the power of will-making into its own hands, and regulate the succession of property "without listening to the outcry of dying

persons." Orphans—"the most sacred of all deposits"—are to be protected by the State. A husband and wife with "incompatible tempers" should be divorced. Witchcraft is to be punished with death. No beggar is to be allowed in the land. No man under forty years of age may travel abroad. Bodies are to be exposed for three days before burial, to see if they are really dead. Magistrates shall give a yearly account of their office before certain public "Examiners," who must be carefully selected, and, if found worthy, shall have special honors paid to them during life, and at their death a solemn public burial,—not with sorrow or lamentation; but the corpse shall be clad in robes of white, and choruses of youths and men shall chant their praises, and yearly contests in music and gymnastics be celebrated at their tomb.

Lastly, there is to be a supreme council of twenty members—ten of the oldest citizens, and ten younger men afterwards added to their number—who shall hold their meetings before daybreak. This council, like a "central Conservative organ," * is to be the anchor of the constitution—carrying out in every detail the original intention of the founder, making his laws irreversible as the threads of fate, and securing that uniformity of faith among the citizens, and that belief in the unity of Virtue, which can be the only safeguard of the "City of the Magnetes"—the new colony which they are about to found.

* Grote, iii. 447.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MYTHS OF PLATO.

"The light that never was on sea or land,
The consecration, and the poet's dream."
—*Wordsworth.*

"As being is to Becoming," says Plato, "so Truth is to Faith." Where a man cannot prove, he must be content to believe; and the myths which the philosopher introduces here and there are guesses after this Truth which he believes and feels, but cannot precisely define. He is conscious that there are more things in heaven and earth than are "dreamed of in his philosophy," and that there are some unseen realities transcending all mortal experience; and so he builds up his doctrine of ideas, embodies them in circumstances, gives them "a local habitation and a name," and describes in detail the mysteries of the unknown future and the unrecorded past. These descriptions are not intended, he says, to be exactly true. "No man of sense ought to affirm *that.*" All that he claims for them is verisimilitude. "We may venture to think without impropriety that something of the kind is true." Nor, again, is it desirable that these myths should be strictly interpreted; so to interpret them would, he thinks, "be the task—and not

a very enviable one—of some person who had plenty of time on his hands." *

We have no means of telling how far these Myths are the creation of Plato's own prolific fancy, or how far they are compiled from the ancient Mysteries of his own country, from Pythagorean tradition, or from oriental legends. But whatever their source may be, his genius has given them a character and beauty of their own; nowhere is his style so grand and impressive as in these fictions, on which he lavishes, as on some "rich strand," all the treasures of his mind.

THE CREATION OF MAN.

(From the "Timæus.")

The world we live in, says the astronomer Timæus, being visible, tangible, and perishable—unlike the world of eternal Ideas—must have been created, and if created, must have been the work of some great First Cause or Architect, who fashioned it after an eternal pattern; "for the work is the fairest of creations; and he is the best of causes." Of this indeed we can have no certain knowledge, but only belief or conjecture, since after all we are but mortal men.

The Creator, being goodness himself, wished that his work should also be good like him; and thus he brought order out of Chaos, and "put intelligence in soul and soul in body, and framed the universe to be the best and fairest work in nature. And therefore, using the language of probability, we may say that the world became a living soul, and truly rational, through the providence of God." It was created of four entire elements, blended together in geometrical proportion; and its form was a perfect and solid sphere, smooth

* Phædrus, 229.

and complete, and moving in a circle. In the centre was the soul (also compounded according to a scale of harmony), and circulating all impressions from the ideal essence through every part of this vast and visible animal, which included in itself all visible creation.

"When the Father and Creator saw the image that he had made of the eternal gods moving and living, he was delighted, and in his joy determined to make his work still more like the pattern; and as the pattern was an eternal creature, he sought to make the universe the same as far as it might be. Now the nature of the intelligible being is eternal, and to bestow eternity on the creature was wholly impossible. But he resolved to make a moving image of eternity, and as he set in order the heaven, he made this eternal image having a motion according to number, while eternity rested in unity; and this is what we call time. For there were no days and nights, and months and years, before the heaven was created, but when he created the heaven he created them also. All these are the parts of time, and the past and future are created species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal essence; for we say indeed that he was, he is, he will be; but the truth is that 'he is' alone truly expresses him, and that 'was' and 'will be' are only to be spoken in the generation in time, for they are motions; but that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time, nor ever did or has become, or hereafter will be, older, nor is subject at all to any of those states of generation which attach to the movements of sensible things. These are the forms of time when imitating eternity and moving in a circle measured by number."—J.

Time was thus created with the Heavens, in order that if one was destroyed the other might likewise perish. Then the Deity created the moon and stars to move in their appointed orbits—some fixed, some wandering,—but all were bodies with living souls imitating the eternal nature; and he "lighted a fire which we now call the sun," that men might have light, and learn from the regular succession of day and night the use of

numbers. "And the month was created when the moon had completed her orbit and overtaken the sun, and the year when the sun had completed its own orbit." Of all these stars, which are really gods, the earth our nurse, was the first and oldest, and was made to revolve on her own axis in the centre of the spheres.*

Then the Creator commanded the other gods, of whose generation we know nothing except from tradition, to finish his good work by weaving together mortal and immortal elements, and forming living creatures. To these he distributed souls equal in number to the stars, assigning to each star a soul; and he showed to each the nature of the universe, and his own decrees of destiny: declaring that whosoever lived a righteous life upon earth "should return again to the habitation of his star, and there have a blessed existence;" but if he lived unrighteously, he should descend lower and lower in the scale of creation—from a man to a woman, and from a woman to some animal, until at last the spirit should triumph over the flesh, and his reason, which had never become extinct, should restore him to his first and higher self.

And in the head of man the gods put an immortal soul, to be master of the body; and they gave to the body itself its proper limbs and powers of movement and sensation, and in the eyes they placed a pure and gentle fire, which burns not, but streams forth and mingles with the light of day. And they gave man sight, that he might discern the unerring and intelligent motion of the stars, and order his own mind with

* The various revolutions and eclipses of the heavenly bodies, according to this Platonic myth, are much too perplexing to be dealt with here.

like exactness; and they gave him voice and hearing, that music might harmonize his soul.

Besides the invisible and imperishable forms of the elements, and the visible images of these Forms—namely, the elements themselves—there is a third kind of being, a formless space or chaos, where these images are stored up, and which is the source and nurse of all generation. From this choas the great Architect brought forth the four elements, and shook them together "in the vessel of space," and sifted and divided them "as grain is sifted by the winnowing fan," and fashioned them according to certain combinations of form and number. Thus the earth was formed like a cube, the most perfect and solid of all figures; while fire took the shape of a pyramid, and so with air and water. All these elements were formed according to continuous geometrical proportion.

[Then follows a curious but fanciful description of the various phenomena of light, sound, and color which, however, the reader may be spared.]

The gods (continues Timæus) gave to man a triple soul: firstly, an immortal soul, dwelling in the head, with the heart acting as its guard-house, and carrying out its commands by means of a fiery network of veins through every part of the body: secondly, a mortal soul, which is again divided—the nobler part dwelling in the breast, and, though itself moved by fear and anger, taking the side of rea on against desire; while the lower part, made up of unruly passions and carnal appetites, is chained like a wild beast in the belly, far from the council-chamber of reason, which it would otherwise disturb. Now the gods knew that this lowest soul would never listen to reason, and they therefore

ruled it by means of images reflected on the smooth and brilliant surface of the liver—the seat of prophetic inspiration—sometimes fair and sweet, sometimes dark and discolored by passion.

The marrow, which binds together soul and body, is the seed-plot of mortal life, and, like the world, was originally formed from triangles. These are sharpest and freshest in our childhood, but they grow blunted and gradually wear out in old age, till at last their fastenings are loosened, and "they unfix also the bonds of the soul, and she being released in the order of nature joyfully flies away."

Diseases spring from the disturbance of the original elements of which our bodies are composed; and the soul also suffers from two mental distempers—madness and ignorance. As far as possible, nature should be left to herself; but since there is a strong sympathy between soul and body, the conditions of health in both must be observed; the limbs should be trained by exercise, and the mind should be educated by music and philosophy. For no man can prolong his life beyond a certain time; and medicines ignorantly administered multiply diseases and destroy the constitution.

Man should exercise in due proportion the three souls implanted in him, more especially that highest and divinest element in our heads, which makes us look upwards like plants, and draws our thoughts from earth to heaven. If he seeks wisdom and truth, then he "must of necessity, so far as human nature is capable of attaining immortality, become all immortal, as he is ever serving the divine power, and having the genius that dwells in him in the most perfect order, his happiness will be complete." But if he gratifies ambition and desire, he will degenerate into a merely mortal

being, and after this life will lose his high place in creation, first passing into the form of a woman, and then into the still lower form of an animal; for animals are only deteriorated humanity—the birds being "innocent and light-minded men," who thought in their simplicity that sight alone was needed to know the truths of celestial regions; and the quadrupeds and wild animals being all more or less brutal and stolid, till at last the lowest stage of all is reached in the fishes.

"These were made out of the most entirely ignorant and senseless beings, whom the transformers did not think any longer worthy of pure respiration, because they possessed a soul which was made impure by all sorts of transgression; and instead of allowing them to respire the subtle and pure element of air, they thrust them into the water, and gave them a deep and muddy medium of respiration; and hence arose the race of fishes and oysters, and other aquatic animals, which have received the most remote habitations as a punishment of their extreme ignorance. These are the laws by which animals pass into one another, both now and ever changing as they lose or gain wisdom and folly."—J.

Thus we may call the world "a visible animal comprehending the visible—itself a visible and sensible God, the image of Him who is intelligible, the greatest, best, fairest, and one most perfect Universe."

THE ISLAND OF ATLANTIS.*

The day after the long discussion of the "Republic," Socrates meets three of his friends who had been present— Hermocrates, a rising statesman, Timæus,

* Only two fragments of this "Epic" have come down to us—the prologue and the catastrophe, found in two dialogues (the "Timæus" and the "Critias"), the latter of which is broken off abruptly.

a distinguished astronomer of Locris (who gives his name to the Dialogue just noticed), and Critias, a young Athenian, whose accomplishments made him seem "all mankind's epitome" — being politician, sophist, poet, musician, all in one. At their request Socrates sums up his theories of the previous day but professes himself to be hardly satisfied with his ideal sketch. Like one who has seen animals in a painting or at rest, and who would like to see them in active movement, so, he tells them, he would like to see how his imaginary State would really act in some great crisis, and how his citizens would bear themselves when they went forth to war; and he appeals to his friends to help him to exhibit his republic playing a noble part in history. And then Critias tells "an old-world story," handed down in his family from his great-grandfather Dropidas, who had heard it from Solon, and Solon had himself heard it in this wise.

Near the mouths of the Nile in Egypt stands the ancient city called Sais, where Amasis the king was born, founded by a goddess whom the Egyptians call Neith and the Greeks Athenê. Thither Solon came in his travels, and was received with great honor; and he asked many questions of the priests about the times of old, and told them many ancient legends, as he thought them, of his own land. But one of the priests, being himself of a great age said:

"O Solon, you Greeks are always children, and there is not an old man among you all. You have no traditions that are really gray with time, and your stories of Deucalion and Phæton are only the partial history of one out of many destructions by flood and fire which have come at certain periods upon mankind, sweeping away states, and with them letters and all knowledge.

The Nile has preserved our land from such calamities; and therefore we have faithful records of past ages preserved in our temples, while you are ever beginning your history afresh, and know nothing of what formerly came to pass in your own land or in any other; all your so-called genealogies are but children's tales. You do not even know that your own city, 9,000 years ago, before the great Deluge, was foremost of all in war and peace, and is said to have done the greatest deeds, and to have possessed the fairest constitution of any city under heaven. And the same great goddess who founded our city founded yours also; for she and her brother Hephæstus obtained the land of Athens as their lot, and they planted there a race of brave men, and gave them a fair and fertile soil, and rich pastures, and a healthy climate. And these ancient Athenians (so Critias tells Socrates) realized in actual life the strict division of classes laid down in your 'Republic;' and their guardian soldiers—both men and women—were trained and went out to battle together like yours; and none among them had house or family or gold that he could call his own, but they had all things in common. And the number of these guardians neither increased nor decreased, but was always twenty thousand. And their most famous victory was over the vast army sent forth from the island of Atlantis.

"Now, this island was of a great size—larger than all Asia and Libya together—and was situated over against the straits now called the Pillars of Hercules. It was founded by the god Neptune, who divided the land among the ten sons that were born to him by a mortal woman. And the eldest, who was called Atlas, he made king of all the island; and he made his brethren princes under him, and gave them rule over many men

and wide provinces. And the descendents of Atlas multiplied, and he had wealth and power such as no other king ever had before or since. And the soil and climate of this island were so good, that the fruits of the earth ripened twice a year; and there was abundance of both minerals and metals, and many elephants and other tame and wild animals of various kinds. And the city on the mountain in the centre of the island was a wondrous sight to behold; for bridges were built across the 'zones of sea' which Neptune had made, and a canal was dug from the city to the sea, and a fortress was built having stone walls plated with tin and brass and the red 'mountain bronze,' and in the midst was the king's palace and the vast temple of Neptune, covered with silver, and having pinnacles of gold and a roof of ivory. And within was a golden statute of the god himself riding in a chariot drawn by six winged horses—so huge that he touched the roof; and around were a hundred Nereids riding upon dolphins, and outside the temple were golden statues of the ten kings and their wives. Besides all these things there were many baths and fountains, and public gardens and exercise grounds, and dockyards and harbors full of merchant vessels and ships of war.

"And the plain around the city was sheltered by mountains, and guarded by a vast ditch 100 feet deep, and 600 feet broad, and more then 3,000 miles long. And the ten kings who ruled the island held council and offered sacrifice together, and were sworn to assist one another in peace and war. And they had 10,000 chariots and a fleet of 1,200 ships.

"And for many generations the people of the island were obedient to the laws, and their kings ruled them

wisely and uprightly, setting no value on their riches, nor caring for aught save for virtue only. But as time went on, the divine part of their souls grew faint, and they waxed insolent, and thus in the very plenitude of their power they provoked the jealousy of the gods, who determined to destroy them.

"It was then, or soon after, that the armies of Atlantis were sent to conquer Athens, as they had already conqered Libya and Tyrrhenia. But of the war which followed we know nothing, save that Athens stood alone in the struggle, and won a great battle over these barbarians, and that in the space of one day and night the victors and the vanquished disappeared together—for there was an earthquake and a deluge, and the earth opened and swallowed up all the warriors of Athens, while the great island of Atlantis sank beneath the sea. And to this day the sea which covers this island is shallow and impassable, and there is nothing in the Atlantic Ocean save mud and sandbanks."

THE CHARIOT OF THE SOUL.

(From the "Phædrus.")

Our soul, which has a triple nature, is as a charioteer riding in a chariot drawn by two winged steeds—one of a mortal and the other of an immortal nature. Their wings are the divine element, which, if it be perfect and fully nourished on the pastures of truth and beauty, lifts the soul heavenwards to the dwelling of the gods. There, on a certain day, gods and demigods ascend the heaven of heavens—Zeus leading the way in a winged chariot—to hold high festival, and all who can may follow. The gods and the immortal souls, whose steeds have full-grown wings, are

carried by a revolution of the spheres into a celestial world beyond, where all space is filled by a sea of intangible essence which the mind—"lord of the soul" —alone can contemplate: and here are the absolute ideas of Truth and Beauty and Justice. And in these divine pastures of pure knowledge the soul feeds during the time that the spheres revolve, and rests in perfect happiness, and then returns to the heavens whence it came, where the steeds feast in their stalls on nectar and ambrosia.

But only to a few souls out of many is it granted to see these celestial visions. The rest are carried into the gulfs of space by the plunging of the unruly horses, or lamed by unskilful driving; and often the wings droop or are broken, and the soul fails to see the light, and sinks to earth "beneath the double load of forgetfulness or vice." And then she takes the form of a man, and becomes a mortal creature; and, according to the degree in which she has attained to celestial truth, she is implanted in one of nine classes,—the highest being that of the philosophers, artists, poets, or lovers—and the lowest stage of all, the tyrant. Ten thousand years must be passed by the soul in this state of probation, before she can return to the place whence she came, and renew her wings of immortality. And at the end of each life is a day of judgment, followed by a period of retribution, either for good or for evil, lasting a thousand years; and after that each soul is free to cast lots and choose another life. Then the soul of the man may pass into the life of a beast, or from a beast again into that of a man. But the soul of him who has never seen the truth will not pass again into the human form.

But from the souls of those who have once gazed on celestial truth or beauty the remembrance can never be effaced. Like some divine inspiration, the glories of this other world possess and haunt them; and it is because their souls are ever struggling upwards, and fluttering like a bird that longs to soar heavenwards, and because they are rapt in contemplation and careless of earthly matters, that the world calls the philosopher, the lover, and the poet "mad." For the earthly copies of justice or temperance, or any of the higher qualities, are seen but through a glass dimly, and few are they who can discern the reality by looking at the shadow.

And thus the sight of any earthly beauty in face or form thrills the genuine lover with unutterable awe and amazement, because it recalls the memory of the celestial beauty seen by him once in the sphere of eternal being. The divine wings of his soul are warmed and glow with desire, and he lives in a sort of ecstasy, and shudders "with the misgivings of a former world." Often, indeed, a furious struggle takes place between the charioteer and the dark and vicious horse that wishes to draw the chariot of the soul on to unlawful deeds, and can only be curbed by bit and bridle. Happy are they who, with the help of the white immortal steed can win the victory in this struggle, and end their lives in a peaceful and genuine friendship.

THE OTHER WORLD.

(From the "Gorgias" and "Phædo.")

We mortals, says Socrates, know nothing of the real world, for we live along the shores of the Mediterranean like frogs around a swamp; and we think we are on the surface, when we are really only in one of

those hollow places of which our earth is full. But if a man could take wings and fly upwards, he would see the true world, which is a thousand leagues above our own; and there all things are brilliant with color, and sparkle with gold and purple, and a purer white than any earthly snow. And there are trees and flowers and fruits, and jewels on all the hills, more precious than the sardonyx or emerald. And there are living beings there, both men and animals, dwelling around the air; for our air is like their sea, and their air is purest ether. And they know neither pain nor disease; and they live longer lives than we creatures of a day; and all their senses are keener and more perfect; and they have temples in which their gods really dwell, and they see them face to face, and hear their voices, and call them by their names. Moreover, they know the sun and moon and stars in their proper nature.

Now the largest of all the chasms in our earth is that which Homer calls Tartarus; and through it many and mighty streams of fire and water are ever flowing to and fro, some driven upwards to our earth by a rushing wind, and others winding in various channels through the lower world. Of these streams four are larger than the rest; and the first of these is called Oceanus, which flows in a circle round the earth. The second is Acheron, which passes through desert places to a lake in Tartarus, where the souls of the dead wait until such time as they are born again. And the third river is Pyriphlegethon, which boils with flames and falls into a lake of fire. And the fourth river is Cocytus, and it passes into the Stygian lake, where it receives strange powers, and then, after many windings, it also falls into Tartarus.

Even in the days of Saturn the same law prevailed as now—that men should be judged, and that those who had done good should be sent to the Islands of the Blest, and those who had done evil should be thrown into Tartarus. But judgment was then given on the day of a man's death, and both the judges and the judged were alive, and owing to men being still arrayed in beauty or rank or wealth, and the garment of the body also acting as a veil to the perceptions of the soul in the case of the judge, the judgment was not always just. So Jupiter ordained that for the future the naked soul of the judge, stripped of all its gross mortality, should judge the souls that were brought naked before him.

For when the soul separates from the body, each part still carries with it its mortal features; and he who was tall in his lifetime will be tall after death, and he who had flowing hair will have flowing hair still, and the slave who was branded by the scourge will carry the scars upon his body into the other world. So also the soul of the tyrant will bear indelible marks of crime, and will be "full of the prints and scars of his perjuries and misdeeds." For such a soul as his there can be no cure; nor will there be any pardon for such as have been guilty of foul murder or sacrilege, but they will be thrown into Tartarus, whence they can never come forth, and their punishment will be everlasting.

But those whose crimes are not unpardonable will be condemned by the three judges to abide in Tartarus for a year; and after that they will be cast forth on the shores of Acheron, where they must wander lamenting, and calling out on those whom they have slain or wronged on earth to pardon and deliver them; and

until their prayer is heard, they are forced to return again to their place of torment.

Now the Three look with awe and reverence on the face of him who has lived a life of holiness and truth in this world, and who is probably a private citizen or philosopher, who has done his own work and not troubled himself about the business of oth rs, and they send him to the Islands of the Blest, or to that purer earth of which we spoke before; "and there," continues Socrates, "they live henceforth, freed from the body, in mansions brighter far than these, which no tongue may describe, and of which time would fail me to tell. And he concludes in language almost apostolic:

"Wherefore seeing these things are so, what ought we not to do, to attain virtue and wisdom in this life, when the prize is so glorious, and the hope so great?"

THE STORY OF ER.

("Republic," Book x.)

Er, the Pamphylian, a brave man, was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards his body, which, unlike all the other dead, was still uncorrupted, was brought home to be buried; but on the funeral pyre he returned to life, and told all that he had seen in the other world. When his soul left his body (he said) he journeyed in company with many other spirits until he came to a certain place where there were two openings in the earth and two in the heaven, and between them judges were seated,

"who bade the just, after they had judged them, ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand, having the signs of the judgment bound on their foreheads; and in like manner the unjust were commanded by them to descend by the lower way on the

left hand; these also had the symbols of their deeds fastened on their backs. He drew near, and they told him that he was to be the messenger of the other world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and seen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at either chasm of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at the two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and worn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright, and always, on their arrival, they seemed as if they had come from a long journey, and they went out into the meadow with joy, and there encamped as at a festival, and those who knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth curiously inquiring about the things of heaven, and the souls which came from heaven of the things of earth. And they told one another of what had happened by the way, some weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the things which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now the journey lasted a thousand years), while others were describing heavenly blessings and visions of inconceivable beauty."—J.

And for all evil deeds each soul suffered a ten-fold punishment, and for its good deeds it received a ten-fold reward. And Er heard one of the spirits ask another, where Ardiæus the Great was? (He had been tyrant of some city in Pamphylia a thousand years before Er lived, and had murdered his aged father and brother, and committed many other crimes.)

"The answer was: 'He comes not hither, and will never come.' And 'indeed,' he said, 'this was one of the terrible sights which was witnessed by us. For we were approaching the mouth of the cave, and, having seen all, were about to reascend, when of a sudden Ardiæus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants; and there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great criminals; they were just at the mouth, being, as they fancied, about to return to the upper world, but the opening, instead of receiving them, gave a roar, as was the case when any incurable or unpunished sinner tried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who knew the meaning of the sound, came up and seized and carried off several of them, and Ardiæus and others

they bound head and foot and hand and threw them down and flayed them with scourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns like wool, and declaring to the pilgrims as they passed what were their crimes, and that they were being taken away to be cast into hell. And of all the terrors of the place, there was no terror like this of hearing the voice; and when there was silence, they ascended with joy.' These were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as great."—J.

Er and his spirit companions tarried seven days in this meadow, and then set out again on their journey, and on the fourth day they came to a place where a pillar of light like a rainbow, but far brighter, stretched across heaven and earth, and in another day's journey they reached it, and found that this light bound together the circle of the heavens, as a chain undergirds a ship; and to either end of this pillar was fastened the distaff of Necessity, having a shaft of adamant and a wheel with eight vast circles of diver's colors, fitted into one another, and narrowing towards the centre. And in these circles eight stars were fixed; and as the spindle moved round, they moved with it—each slowly or swiftly according to its proper motion. And on each circle a siren stood, singing in one note, and thus from the eight stars arose one great harmony of sound. And round about these circles at equal distances were three thrones, and on these thrones were seated the three daughters of Necessity, clothed in white robes, with garlands on their heads. And they also sang as they turned the circles of the spindle—Lachesis singing of past time, Clotho of the present, and Atropos of time that shall be. The spirits, as they arrived, were led to Lachesis in order by a Prophet, who took from her knees lots and samples of lives, and, mounting a rostrum, spoke as follows: "Thus saith Lachesis,

daughter of Necessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of mortal life! Your genius will not choose you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who draws the first lot have the first choice of life, which shall be his destiny. Virtue is free, and according as a man honors or dishonors her he will enjoy her more or less; the chooser is responsible, heaven is justified." When he had thus spoken he cast the lots among them, and each took up the lot which fell near him, all but Er himself, who was not allowed.

And these lives were of every kind, both of men and animals, and were variously composed—beauty, and wealth, and poverty, and strength, and nobility all mingled together. But no definite character was yet attached to any; for the future nature of each soul depended on the life it might choose. And on the choice (so said the Prophet who had arranged the lots) each man's happiness depended: and to choose aright he should know all that follows from the possession of power and talent; and should choose the mean, and avoid both extremes so far as he may, not in this life only but in that which is to come. "Even the last comer, if he choose discreetly and will live carefully, shall find there is reserved for him a life neither unhappy nor undesirable. Let not the first be careless in his choice, neither let the last despair."

It was a sad yet laughable sight (said Er) to see the manner in which the souls made their choice. For the first chose the greatest despotism he could find, not observing that it was ordained in his lot that he should devour his own children; and when he found this out, he lamented and beat his breast, accusing the gods, and chance, and everything rather than himself. And their former experience of life influenced many

in their choice: thus the soul of Orpheus chose the life of a swan, because he hated to be born again of woman (for women had before torn him in pieces); and Ajax chose the life of a lion, and Agamemnon that of an eagle, because men had done them wrong; and Thersites, the buffoon of the Iliad, took the appropriate form of an ape. Last of all came Ulysses, weary of his former toils and wanderings; and after searching about for a while, he chose a quiet and obscure life, that was lying neglected in a corner, for all the others had passed it by.

"Now when all the souls had chosen their lives in the order of the lots, they advanced in their turn to Lachesis, who despatched with each of them the Destiny he had selected, to guard his life and satisfy his choice. This Destiny first led the soul to Clotho in such a way as to pass beneath her hand and the whirling motion of the distaff, and thus ratified the fate which each had chosen in the order of precedence. After touching her, the same Destiny led the soul next to the spinning of Atropos, and thus rendered the doom of Clotho irreversible. From thence the souls passed straight forward under the throne of Necessity. When the rest had passed through it, Er himself also passed through; and they all traveled into the plain of forgetfulness, through dreadful suffocating heat, the ground being destitute of trees and of all vegetation. As the evening came on, they took up their quarters by the bank of the river of Indifference, whose water cannot be held in any vessel. All persons are compelled to drink a certain quantity of the water; but those who are not preserved by prudence drink more than the quantity: and each, as he drinks, forgets everything. When they had gone to rest, and it was now midnight, there was a clap of thunder and an earthquake; and in a moment the souls were carried up to their birth, this way and that like shooting-stars. Er himself was prevented from drinking any of the water; but how, and by what road he reached his body, he knew not: only he knew that he suddenly opened his eyes at dawn, and found himself laid out upon the funeral pyre."—D:

CHAPTER VII.

RELIGION, MORALITY, AND ART.

"Religious ideas die like the sun; their last rays possessing little heat, are spent in creating beauty."—Lecky, Hist, of Morals.

In his famous picture of the School of Athens, Raphæl has represented Plato as looking up towards heaven, while Aristotle has his eyes intently fixed upon the earth, and Goethe has endorsed the idea expressed in this painting. "Plato's relation to the world," he says, "is that of a superior spirit, whose good pleasure it is to dwell in it for a time. . . . He penetrates into its depths, more that he may replenish them from the fullness of his own nature, than that he may fathom their mysteries."* Certainly the most careless reader cannot help being struck by the persistency with which Plato dwells upon his favorite thought, that this life is only the first stage of an endless existence, that death is the release of soul from body, which the wise man welcomes with joy, and that philosophy itself is but a "meditation of death," or "the resembling, so far as is possible, of man to God."† In fact, *disce mori* may be

* Quoted in Ueberweg's History of Philosophy, i. 103—English transl.

† Phædo, 80; Theæt., 176.

said to be the text of Platonism. Perhaps, he says in the Gorgias, Euripides was right, and our life here is after all a death, and our body is the tomb or prison of the soul. * And in the same spirit in which Socrates bids Crito not to be too careful about his burial, Plato prohibits in his "Laws" expensive funerals—"for the beloved one whom his relative thinks he is laying in the earth has but gone away to complete his destiny." The soul, he reiterates, really makes each of us to be what he is, and the body is only its image and shadow, and after death all that is divine in us goes on its way to other gods. † Man himself is nothing more than a puppet or plaything of the gods, acting his part on the stage of life with more or less success, and "with some little share of reality." ‡

His view of human nature, and of man's limited powers of knowledge, is best illustrated in his own famous allegory of the Cave, in the seventh book of the "Republic."

"Imagine," says Socrates, "a number of men living in an underground cavernous chamber, with an entrance open to the light, extending along the entire length of the cavern in which they have been confined from their childhood, with their necks and legs so shackled that they are obliged to sit still and look straightforward, because their chains render it impossible for them to turn their heads round: and imagine a bright fire burning some way off, above and behind them, and an elevated roadway passing between the fire and the prisoners, with a low wall built along it, like the screens which conjurors put up in front of their audience, and above which they exibit their wonders. . . . Also to yourself a number of persons walking behind the wall, and carrying with them statues of men and images of other animals wrought in wood and stone and all kinds of

* Gorgias, 492.

† Laws, xii. 959.

‡ Laws, vii. 803.

materials, together with various other articles, which overtop the wall; and, as you might expect, let some of the passers-by be talking, and others silent."—D.

"This cave," Socrates continues, "is the world, and the fire that lights it is the sun, and these poor prisoners are ourselves—

'Placed with our backs to bright reality:'

and all sights or sounds in this twilight region are but the shadows or echoes of real objects. And as sometimes a prisoner in this cave may be released from his chains, and turned round, and led up to the light of day; so may our souls pass upwards from the darkness of mere opinion, and from the shadowy impressions of sense into the pure sunlight of eternal truth, lighted by the Idea of Good—in itself the source of all truth and beauty."

But "What is the Good?" Plato tells us, truly enough, that it is what all men pursue under different names,—deriving its existence, seeking its reality, yet totally unable to explain its nature; and he compares it in a parable, as we have seen, to the sun which illuminates the eternal world of Ideas, but as to its own essential nature he leaves us still in the dark. The philosophers in his State will know it, he says, for *their* souls will be enlightened, but he does not know it himself; and although the knowledge of it is bound up with the existence of his State, and is the culmination of his system, all that he does is to "conduct us to the chamber where this precious and indispensable secret is locked up, but he has no key to open the door."*

Sometimes, indeed, he personifies this supreme Idea, and, as in the "Timæus" and "Philebus," abstract

* Grote's Plato, iii. 241.

goodness is merged in the concrete God. But even here, his conception of Deity rises far above the jealous and sensitive occupants of Homer's Olympus, who were immortal beings with mortal passions and sympathies, strongly attached to persons and places, and sharing in all the hopes and fears of their worshippers. A Christian writer could hardly frame a more exalted idea of divinity than that which Plato has expressed in many of his Dialogues. With him the Deity is a being of perfect wisdom and goodness, all-wise, and all-powerful, ruling the world which he has created by the supremacy of His reason. He can be only known to us through some type or form; but let none suppose that He would put on a human shape by night or by day, to help a friend or deceive a foe; for, being perfect goodness in Himself, such a change could be only for the worse; and, being perfect truth, He hates a lie either in word or in deed.*

In this conception of the Deity, Plato does but represent the tendency of Greek religion towards "Monotheism." Long before his time, all the deeper thinkers had ceased to believe in the old mythology. Even the sober piety of Herodotus had questioned some miracles and rejected others; and the keen common-sense of Thucydides had applied the historical test to the "Tale of Troy," looking upon it as a political enterprise, and accepting the catalogue of ships "as an authentic muster-roll."† Then Euemerus had allegorized these myths; and Palæphatus had softened them down into commonplace narratives of actual facts: thus the wings of Dædalus became a swift sailing vessel, the dragon which Cadmus slew was King Draco, and the

* Republ., ii.

† Grote's Greece, i. 333.

dragon's teeth were the ivory of commerce. And philosophy had aided this progress of rationalism. More than a century before Plato, Xenophanes had pointed out the discrepancies involved in the popular mythology, and had declared emphatically that there was "one God, not to be compared to mortals in form or thought—all eye and all ear—who without effort rules all things by the insight of his mind." So again Empedocles had recognized, amidst the crash of warring elements, one holy impalpable Spirit, whom none could come near, or touch, or see; and even Anaxagoras, with all his materialism, had paid homage to a sovereign Mind which ruled the universe.

"But," says Professor Maurice, "there lay in the very heart of the faith of the Greek a seed of unbelief which was continually fructifying." * While many clung with unwavering faith to the religion of their fathers; while a few (as we have seen) professed a purer and higher belief than mere anthropomorphism; —there were others who, though they rejected the ancient myths, accepted nothing in their place: and the Sophists seem to have encouraged this increasing tendency to atheism among the younger and more skeptical spirits of this age. Prodicus maintained that men in olden times had deified whatever was of use to them: thus wine was promoted into Bacchus, and bread was dignified with the name of Ceres. Critias, again, declared that the gods had been invented by some crafty statesman to secure the obedience of his subjects; and one daring skeptic of this school, Diagoras of Melos (subsequently banished from both Sparta and Athens for his impious theories), had

* Hist. of Philos., i. 86.

thrown a wooden statue of Hercules into the fire, saying that he might go through his thirteenth labor in the flames.

In the tenth book of the "Laws"—written, as has been said, in his declining years—Plato makes a bold stand against this growing impiety of his day. It springs, he says, from one of three causes; from utter atheism: or, second, from Epicurean apathy—the feeling that the gods exist, but never trouble themselves about mankind; or, thirdly, from superstition—the gods both exist and care, but you can pacify their anger by sacrifice. Heretics, in his ideal city, are to be punished by solitary confinement or by death, and the heaviest vengeance of the law is to light on the wolf in sheep's clothing—the impious hypocrite who dares to use his priestly garb to further his own ambitious or criminal ends. And then he gravely takes the skeptic to task, and justifies the ways of Providence.* "Do not" (he says, almost in the very words of the Psalmist) "the heavens declare the glory of God?" Does not the universal testimony of mankind teach us that a God exists? And woe to the rash and presumptuous youth who presumes to charge the Deity with indolence or neglect, merely because he sees the wicked in prosperity, and handing down their power to their children after them. God is no unskillful workman, but in His wisdom has taken thought for all things, both small and great. Each part of the creation has its appointed work and purpose, and all the parts work together to some common end. What is best for one portion is therefore best for the whole. It is impious, indeed, to think that this fair creation around us could have

* Laws, x. 886.

been the work of nature or chance; or, again, that matter could have existed before mind. Such doctrines will sooner or later meet with their reward.

"God, as the old tradition declares, holding in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, moves according to His nature in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end. Justice always follows Him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To that law, he who would be happy holds fast, and follows it in all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or money, or honor, or beauty —who has a soul hot with folly, and youth, and insolence, and thinks that he has no need of a guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others,—he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like himself, and dances about in wild confusion, and many think that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus ordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think?"—J.

The perfection of man's existence, according to Plato, is to bring his nature as far as is possible into harmony with God; and this can only be done by cultivating the soul, which is the divinest part of us, and came to us from heaven long before our earth-born body.* "Honor the soul, then," he says, in one of his homilies in the "Laws" "as being second only to the gods; and the best way of honoring it is to make it better. A man should not prefer beauty to virtue, nor sell his word for gold, nor heap up riches for his children; since the best inheritance he can leave them is the spirit of reverence. Truth is the beginning of all

* We may compare with this Kant's famous saying, "On earth there is nothing great but Man; in Man there is nothing great but Mind."

good; and the greatest of all evils is self-love; and the worst penalty of evil-doing is to grow into likeness with the bad: for each man's soul changes, according to the nature of his deeds, for better or for worse." †

In more than one passage Plato combats the objection always raised against every system of Optimism —the existence of evil, which implies, according to the atheist, either a want of goodness in the Deity to allow it, or a want of power to prevent it. Practically Plato refutes this argument in much the same language as a modern thinker might use. Evil in the creation does not imply evil in the Creator; its existence is part of a vast scheme of Providence: and because, with our limited faculties, we cannot discern the final cause or design of everything in nature (*e. g.*, the poison of the rattlesnake), we have no right to say, therefore, that no such final cause exists. Listen again to Plato (speaking in the person of Socrates) in the "Theætetus."

"*Soc.* Evils, Theodorus, can never perish; for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. Of necessity, they hover around this mortal sphere and the earthly nature, having no place among the gods in heaven. Wherefore, also, we ought to fly away thither; and to fly thither is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like Him is to become holy, just, and wise. But, O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, not for the reasons which the many give—in order, forsooth, that a man may *seem* to be good;—this is what they are always repeating, and this, in my judgment, is an old wives' fable. Let them hear the truth: In God is no unrighteousness at all—He is altogether righteous; and there is nothing more like Him than he of us who is the most righteous. And the true wisdom of men, and their nothingness and cowardice, are nearly concerned with this. For to know this is true wisdom and manhood, and the ignorance of this is too plainly folly and vice. . . . There

* Laws, x.

are two patterns set before men in nature: the one blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and they do not see, in their utter folly and infatuation, that they are growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they resemble. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends,—when they hear this, they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to fools."—J.

And in the same spirit the first great "type" to which all legends must conform, in his ideal State, is that God is good, and is the author of good alone; the evil He suffers to exist for the just punishment of men. And therefore Plato will expunge from his new mythology all those false and debasing stories which Homer tells about the gods and heroes, with their violent passions, loves, and hatreds; where even the great Achilles is represented as insolent and cruel,—as slaying his captives, cursing the Sun-god himself, and dragging Hector's body round the walls of Troy. He will have no sensational pictures of the lower world, with all its horrors of Styx and Tartarus, and with the souls of the dead "fluttering like bats" in sunless caverns. And the music shall be simple and ennobling: he will banish the wailing Lydian and soft Ionian measures, and he will have only martial strain in the Dorian mood, such as Tyrtæus sang when the Spartans marched out to battle; and he will dismiss with honor from the State the charming and versatile poet who can assume all shapes and speak in all voices, and will take instead the rough but honest story-teller who will recite simple and useful tales.*

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* Rep. iii. 398.

He again attacks the poets in the last book of the "Republic;" and here the ground of offence is their imitation, which is (says Plato) two degrees removed from reality; for taking any object, such as a bed, there is first the ideal bed, created by the Deity, which alone has real existence; and then there is the bed made by the carpenter in the image of the first; and thirdly, there is the shadow of this image, which the painter or poet delineates in his picture or his poem, as it may be. "I have a great liking and reverence for Homer" (Plato continues), "who is the great master of all tragic poets —indeed from childhood I have loved his name; but I love truth better. And what has Homer done for us, after all? He has not given us laws, like Solon or Lycurgus; he has not given us inventions, like Thales and Anacharsis, nor has he founded a brotherhood, like Pythagoras; nor, again, has he taught us any of the arts of war and peace. If he had done any real good to men, is it likely that he would have been allowed to wander about, blind and poor? No;—all that he does is to give us a second-hand imitation of reality, to exalt the feelings which are an inferior part of our soul, to thrill us with pity or terror, and so render us unmanly and effeminate." "There are enough sorrows in actual life" (he says, later on, in the "Philebus"), without multiplying them on the stage or in fiction."

Though Plato was more of a poet than a philosopher himself, and in his writings was said to strike the happy medium between poetry and prose, he is always disposed to regard the poets, as a class, in the light of harmless enthusiasts, often the cause of much mischief, but hardly responsible for their actions. In an earlier Dialogue—the "Ion"—Socrates meets the rhapsodist

of that name, and congratulates him on having just won the prize for recitation at a public festival. "It must be a fine thing" (he says with a tinge of irony) "to be always well dressed, and to study and recite passages from the prince of poets; but is Ion always master of his subject, and is his talent really an art at all? No" (Socrates goes on); "it must be inspiration —a magnetic influence, passing like an electric current from the loadstone of divine essence into the soul of the poet, and from thence into the souls of his hearers."

The simple-minded Ion is delighted at the idea of being inspired, and confesses that he does feel in a sort of ecstasy when he recites some striking passage—such as the sorrows of Andromache or Hecuba, or the scene where Ulysses throws off his rags, leaps on to the floor among the assembled suitors, and bends that terrible bow of his. "Then" (says Ion) "my eyes fill with tears, my heart throbs, my hair stands on end, and I see the spectators also weeping, and sympathizing with my grief."

And the conclusion of this short but graceful Dialogue is, that the Deity sways the souls of men through the rhapsodist or poet, who is himself only the vehicle of inspiration, and knows little or nothing of the meaning of the glorious words which it is his privilege to utter.

Plato's own view of poetry and art, then, is, that it should be pure, simple, and ideal—free from the sensational innovations of modern days; and he points with approval to Egypt, where certain forms had been consecrated in the temples, from which neither painter nor sculptor was allowed to deviate, and where for ten thousand years they had preserved their chants and the

statues of their gods unchanged.* The poet should not be left to his own devices, for bad music, like a bad companion, tends to corrupt the character: both the music and the words should be supervised by the magistrate, prizes for the best poems should be awarded by competent judges, and the moral of every lay or legend should be, that all earthly gifts—whether health, beauty, or wealth—are as nothing in comparison with a just and holy life. And in the "City of the Magnetes," where his own laws are to be promulgated, the following is to be the theme of the music consecrated by the State, and appointed to be sung by three choirs children, youths, and men:

"All our three choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children, reciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have already spoken, or are about to speak; and the sum of them shall be, that the life which is by the gods deemed to be the happiest is the holiest;—we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth, and the minds of our young disciples will be more likely to receive these words of ours, than any others which we might address to them. . . . . And those who are too old to sing will tell stories, illustrating the same virtues as with the voice of an oracle."—J.

We can never exactly tell how far Plato's views on religion are an echo of his master's, or how far they are his own original ideas. We have another description of Socrates and his teaching in Xenophon's "Memorabilia," and there, like Plato, he appeals to the excellence of the creation round him to prove the wisdom of the great "World-builder;" he recognizes the all-pervading and invisible presence of the Deity; he exalts the dignity of man, only "lower than the angels" in the possession of an immortal soul; and he points to signs and

* Laws, ii. 660.

oracles to prove how closely we may be brought into actual communion with God. But in other respects, if Xenophon can be trusted, he preached a far lower standard of morality—upholding, in fact, the utilitarian doctrines so strongly condemned by the Platonic Socrates in the beginning of the "Republic." "You should test an action," he is made to say, "by its advantages to yourself. Be just, because justice brings its own reward with it; be modest, because immodesty never pays in society; be brave, because you gain glory thereby; be true and faithful, because truth will bring you friends, the most useful of all possessions."* If this was really the tendency of Socratic teaching, it is clear that Plato took far higher ground than his master. Nothing, in fact, could be further from his thoughts than to degrade Virtue into a mere calculation of the chances of more or less possible happiness.

And in the "Philebus" (one of his latest Dialogues), where the relative nature of pleasure and knowledge is analyzed, Plato distinctly maintains that pleasures differ in *kind* as well as degree,† the lowest being the mixed pleasures of the senses, and the highest and purest the mental enjoyment of music or mathematics. He also holds that wisdom is "ten thousand times better" than pleasure, since it alone satisfies the three criteria of goodness—beauty, symmetry, and truth; while, in the scale of perfection, pleasure is degraded by him to the fifth and sixth places.

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* See Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools, chap. vii.

† The utilitarian maxims are: "Pleasures differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity" (Paley); "The quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry" (Bentham).

The only one of Bentham's four "Sanctions"* which he would allow to influence our conduct would be that described in his Myths—the rewards and punishments in a future world. Virtue *per se* is most excellent—being, in fact, moral health and strength, just as Vice is moral disease; and worldly advantages are not to balance our actions, or influence us in the choice between good and evil. Even in prayer he maintains that a man should not pray for gold, or honor, or children, but simply for what is good; and the gods will know best how to turn his prayer to his own profit. "The prayer of a fool," he says again, "is fraught with danger, and likely to end in the opposite of what he desires."† In the same spirit the quotes (in his "Alcibiades, ii.") some lines from an old poet, which, should, he thinks, be the model for all prayers: "King Jove, give us what is good, whether we pay for it or not; and ward off what is dangerous, even though we pray for it." And the spirit of the prayer he declares to be worth more than any offerings a man can bring—just as the oracle of Ammon had declared the simple prayer of the Spartans to be worth more than all the sacrifices of Athens.

In one sense Plato does not deny the "utility" of Virtue, any more than Cudworth or Butler would have denied it; and it is in this sense that we must take the famous sentence in the "Republic" which Mr. Grote has prefixed as the motto to his three volumes: "The noblest thing that is said now, or shall be said hereafter, is, that what is profitable is honorable, and what is hurtful is base."‡

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* See his introduction to Morals and Legislation, chap. iii.

† Laws, iii. 688.

‡ Rep., v. 457.

CHAPTER VIII.

LATER PLATONISM.

Speusippus, Plato's nephew, succeeded his uncle at the head of the Academy; and both he and those who succeeded him appear to have taken a few texts and phrases from their great master's writings, and on them to have built up ethical systems of their own; while others like Hermodorus, traded on those "unwritten doctrines," said to have been divulged only to a favored few. But all that time has brought down to us of the later Academy is some brief and fragmentary writings, and some untrustworthy traditions; and, for the most part, the memorial of these philosophers have perished with them.

Even in Plato's own day, divisions had sprung up among his followers; and one of his most promising pupils, who for twenty years had attended lectures in the Academy, founded that school which has ever since divided with his own the world of thought. "Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist:" their principles are mutually repugnant, and there is no common ground between the two; and if Aristotle himself could not understand his master's point of view, there is still less chance of a modern Aristotelian ever doing so. The very beauty of Plato's style, his

exuberant fancy, the myths and metaphors in which he clothed his noblest thoughts, were all so many offences to the shrewd common sense of Aristotle, who reasoned rigidly from fact to fact, who analyzed the constitutions of three hundred states before he wrote a line of his "Politics," and whose cold and keen temperament had little sympathy with a philosopher who "poetized rather than thought."* As for the Platonic "Ideas"—the very foundation of Platonism—he regarded them as inconceivable and impossible, or, if possible, practically useless.

Plato's method of doubt and inquiry—carried far farther by his pupils than he ever intended it to be—resulted in the "New Academy," a school of Skeptics, of whom Pyrrho, originally a soldier in Alexander's army, was the leader. These Skeptics were a sign of the times. A weariness and despair of truth was creeping over society, and hence there grew up a feeling of indifference as to all moral distinctions, which the philosophers who professed it termed a "divine repose." Plato had said that there was no reality except in an ideal world, and Pyrrho and his followers pushed this doctrine so far as to deny the existence of any fixed standard of right and wrong, or of any certainty which sense or mind could perceive.

Socrates, it has been said, "sat for the portrait of the Stoic sage;"† and Stoicism perhaps owes as much to Plato as to the Cynics, of which school it was the legitimate offshoot. The majesty of mind, the high ideal of a life in accordance with reason and untrammeled by self interest, the strong sense of a personal conscience, the doctrine that a man's soul was an ema-

* Arist., Met. ix. 5. † Noack, quoted by Ueberweg, 187.

nation from the Deity—all these tenets might have been held by Plato or his master. But the Stoic disregarded, if he did not disbelieve in, the immortality of the soul; and suicide, which Plato held to be cowardly and impious, was looked upon by Seneca and Epictetus as an easy and justifiable refuge against all the evils of life.

Zeno was the first who lectured at Athens in the Painted Porch, which gave its name (Stoa) to the sect. His pupil Cleanthes—so slow and sure that his master compared his memory to a leaden tablet, difficult to write upon but retaining an indelible impression—carried out in actual practice the principles of his training, drawing water and kneading dough the whole night long, that he might have leisure for philosophy in the day-time. Chrysippus followed, the second founder of the "Porch," who is said to have written upwards of seven hundred volumes; and lastly Posidonius, the most learned of all, whose lectures at Rhodes were heard both by Cicero and Pompey.

Rome was naturally the home of Stoicism. The pride and "majestic egotism" which was their ideal of virtue, suited stern and zealous characters like Cato or Cornutus; and this pride, when softened by religious sentiment, produced the noblest examples of pagan philosophy in the Emperor Marcus Aurelius and the slave Epictetus. But though Stoicism could raise up a school of heroes, it suppressed all softer emotions, and set up an ideal unattainable by any except the most exalted minds. A change was coming over society, and the want was felt of a more tender and attractive philosophy, and a longing for some deeper truth than the cold comfort given by a "creed outworn" like paganism. Hence a reaction set in against

the casuistry and skepticism of the later Stoics in favor of the more spiritual side of humanity. Allegory, Mysticism, Inspiration, and Ecstasy, were the characteristics of this new philosophy; a critical spirit and the strict inductions of reason were discouraged, to elicit divine ideas, and to subdue the senses, was held to be the end of life. And, like other creeds, this dawned in the East.

Alexandria was the meeting point of Eastern and Western civilization. In its vast gardens and libraries might be found a medley of all nations, creeds, and languages; for the policy of the first three Ptolemys — known as Soter, Philadelphus, and Euergetes ("Savior," "Loving-brother," and "Benefactor")— was a liberal and universal toleration. Accordingly, a temple of Isis might be found side by side with a Jewish synagogue, or a shrine dedicated to Venus; and freethinkers like Stilpo or Theodorus (banished from their own states in Greece for their impiety) were received with the same welcome at court as the translators of the Septuagint or the high priest from Eleusis. Everything, indeed, combined to make Alexandria the centre of attraction for philosophers and men of letters. Besides the natural charms of the place—the bright sunshine, the clear atmosphere, and the soil so rich in flowers and fruits that "a man," says Ammianus, "might almost believe himself in another world"—there was the certainty of royal favor, of learned and congenial society, and (better than all) of a comfortable pension and a luxurious residence in or near the palace. For the further encouragement of literature, Ptolemy I. had founded and liberally endowed the "Museum" (or, as we should call it, "university"), with its porticos and lec-

ture-rooms and dining-hall, and its library of 700,000 volumes—burnt when Alexandria was besieged by Cæsar. In connection with the library there grew up a school of grammarians and critics, whose lives were passed in the usual routine of a royal literary circle,—writing, publishing, dining together, talking scandal, and carrying on an incessant war of words.

In the learned world at Alexandria, some Jews founded a new system of philosophy by blending Judaism with Platonism. They sought for the deeper truth which they believed was hidden under every text of Scripture; intensifying all that was miraculous or supernatural, discarding the literal interpretation, and neglecting the ceremonial law as being merely the symbolism which veiled the truth. Philo headed this "mystical rationalism," tracing Plato's world of ideas back to Moses, but giving them a place in the Word of God as the plan of a building has a place in the mind of a builder. And, in language like that which Plato uses in the "Timæus," he describes how God, an invisible but ever-present Essence, created and ruled the world by means of ministering spirits or potencies, of whom the Word is highest, and second only to Himself.

Philo lived just before the Christian era; and from his time a succession of Alexandrian Jews continued to give to the world their transcendental theories, founded on one portion or another of Plato's writings; some, like Apollonius of Tyana, going back to Pythagoras for their inspiration, and others, like the Therapeutæ, seeking "illumination" in a lonely and ascetic life,—until, towards the end of the second century, the school of Neo-Platonists was founded by Ammonius Saccas. They united the Eastern doctrine

of "emanation" with the Platonic doctrine of ideas, believing that the ideas emanated from the One, as the soul emanates from the ideas, and that the last and lowest stage of emanation was the sensible and material world around us. They held it man's duty to purify his soul, and make it pass through various stages of perfection, until at last it should be freed from all contamination of the senses, and, in a sublime moment of ecstasy, enter into actual communton with God. Four times (so Porphyry tells us) his master Plotinus was thus "caught up" in a celestial trance. Indeed, this philosopher was so ashamed of having a body at all, that he would tell no one who were his parents or what was his country, and resolutely refused ever to have his portrait taken; for it was bad enough (he said) that his soul should be veiled at all by an earthly image, and he would never hand down an image of that image to posterity. How deeply he was imbued with Platonism may be seen from the mere titles of the fifty-four treatises which have come down to us. Providence, Time and Eternity, Reason, Being, Ideas, the "Dæmon" who has received each of us in charge,—such are the subjects of some of the chapters in his "Enneads." He at one time even obtained leave of the reigning emperor to found a city in Campania, to be called Platonopolis, whither he and his friends were to retire from the world; but happily the idea was never actually put into execution.

The next generation of Neo-Platonists carried their Mysticism still further. They revived divination and Astrology; they interpreted dreams and visions; they consulted oracles; and practiced those ancient rites of expiation which Plato himself had so strongly condemned. Iamblichus, one of their number, traced a

mysterious affinity between earth and heaven; and on one of Plato's texts—"all things are full of gods"—he constructed a hierarchy of heroes, dæmons, angels, and archangels. Proclus, again—a fanatic who wished that all books might be burnt except Plato's "Timæus" interpreted his "God-enlightened master" in his own fashion, and perfected himself in every form of ritual, fasting and keeping vigil, celebrating the festival of every god in the pagan calendar, and honoring with mysterious rites the souls of all the dead.

There was one Neo-Platonist in the reign of Trajan whose genial and sympathetic character stands out in strong contrast to the superstition and pedantry of his age. This was Plutarch of Chæronea, better known as a biographer than a philosopher. He discusses the Socratic morality with calm good sense, purges the old mythology, and preaches a purer monotheism than any of his contemporaries.

The last of the Neo-Platonists of whom we have any record was Boethius, who lectured at Athens; and shortly after his time the Emperor Justinian gave the death blow to Greek philosophy by interdicting all instruction in the Platonic school.

It has been said that "Mysticism finds in Plato all its texts," and certainly most of the Christian Mysticism may be traced back to the Neo-Platonists. From their time to our own we find this tendency towards a *theologia mystica* appearing in one form or another, —whether it be in the secret tradition of the Jewish Cabala—in the preaching of Eckhart in the fourteenth century—in the revival of Neo-Platonism at Florence in the days of Cosmo de Medici—in the science of sympathies taught by Agrippa and Paracelsus—in Jacob Behmen's celestial visions—or in Saint Teresa's

"four degrees" of prayer necessary to reach a perfect "quietism."

Plato was regarded by the early Fathers of the Church in the light of another apostle to the Gentiles. Justin Martyr, Jerome, and Lactantius, all speak of him as the wisest and greatest of philosophers. Augustine calls him his converter, and thanks God that he became acquainted with Plato first and with the Gospel afterwards: and Eusebius declared that "he alone of all the Greeks had attained the Porch of Truth." It is easy to understand the grounds of this feeling. Passages from his Dialogues might be multiplied to prove the close similarity which exists between them and the Scriptures, especially the books of the Pentateuch. The picture of the ideal Socrates preaching justice and temperance, and opposing to the self-assertion of the Pharisees of his age, the humility of the earnest inquirer and the soberness of truth—his declaration at his trial that he will obey God rather than man, and fears not those who are only able to kill the body—the description of the just man persecuted, scourged, tortured, and finally crucified, *—such passages serve to explain the prayer of Erasmus, who added to the invocation of Christian saints in his Litany, "*Sancte Socrates, ora pro nobis;*" and the belief of so many of the Fathers that Plato, like St. John the Baptist, was a forerunner of Christ. Again the strong faith in the immortality of the soul—the no less strong sense of the pollution of sin—the belief that virtue is likeness to God—the idea in the "Phædrus" of a word sown in the heart and bringing forth fruit in due season—the parable of the "Cave" and the Light of the upper world,—are a few instances

* The literal Greek is "impaled."

out of many which might be quoted to show the foreshadowings of Christianity so often traced in Plato. Once, indeed,—in the last conversation held by Socrates with his friends—a passage occurs which seems to point even more directly than any we have quoted to a Revelation hereafter to be granted. Simmias, one of the speakers in the Dialogue, thinks it impossible to hope for exact knowledge in the great question they are discussing—the unknown future of the soul; still, he argues, they should persevere in the search for truth, taking the best of human words to bear them up, "as on a raft" through the stormy waters of life; but their voyage on this frail bark would be perilous, unless they might hope to meet with some securer stay—some "word from God," it might be.

Passages of this sort explain sufficiently the grounds of the reverence with which Plato was regarded by the Eastern Church, and especially in the school for catechists at Alexandria, where Clement and Origen taught. They even go far to justify the belief of Augustine that Plato might perhaps have listened to Jeremiah in Egypt, and that in his esoteric lectures in the Academy he revealed the mystery of the Trinity to a few chosen disciples.

Tertullian, on the other hand, declaimed bitterly ta Carthage against all Greek philosophy. He headed the reaction which had set in against the Gnostics of a former century, who had changed Plato's "Ideas" into a world of Æons, and held that the Word, Wisdom, and Power, were so many emanations from the divine mind. Platonism, Tertullian held to be the source of all heresies, and denied that there could be any fellowship between the disciple of Greece and the disciple of heaven, or between the Church and the Academy.

Boethius, as we have said, was the last Neo-Platonist; and his "Consolations of Philosophy" is the link between the old world and the new. Then came the Dark Ages, when the classics were only read by monks and churchmen, till they were revived in the schools of Alcuin and Charlemagne.

Philosophy soon passed into scholasticism, and was confined to the dogmas of the Church; and throughout the Middle Ages we find two great hostile camps among the Schoolmen—the Realists and Nominalists—each fighting under the shadow of a great name; Plato being the first (said Milton) "who brought the monster of Realism into the schools," in his doctrine of Ideas so sharply criticised by Aristotle. The question at issue between these two parties was whether Universals had a real and substantial existence, subject to none of the change and decay which affects particulars, or whether (as the Nominalists argued) they were merely general names expressive of general notions.

Early in the thirteenth century came a reaction from the East in favor of Aristotle. His writings (which had escaped destruction by the merest accident) had been translated as early as the fifth century into Syriac and Arabic; the Jews had translated them into Latin; and the conquests of the Arabs in Spain had brought them to the knowledge of the Schoolmen. Averroes, the greatest of Arabian commentators, looked upon Aristotle as the only man whom God had suffered to attain perfection, and as the source of all true science. He died in A.D. 1198, just before the rule of the Moors in Spain came to an end; but "Averroism," with its pantheistic tenets, long survived its founder.

Albert of Bollstadt, Provincial of the Dominican order in Germany, "the universal doctor" (who bears

a kind of half-mythical reputation as Albertus Magnus) reduced Aristotle's writings to a system. His pupil, Thomas Aquinis, "the angelic doctor," soon followed in his steps, rejecting all the texts of Platonism, denying innate ideas, or *à priori* reasoning in theology; but he is so far a realist that he recognizes the existence of universals *ante rem*—that is, in the divine mind; and *post rem*—that is, obtained by the effort of the individual reason. His contemporary, Duns Scotus, "the subtle doctor," went further, and assailed Platonism with every weapon that the logic of his age supplied; while later on, William of Ockham, "the invincible doctor," revived Nominalism, and regarded universals as a mere conception of the mind. Realism passed out of date with Descartes in the sixteenth century, and the tendency of all modern philosophy has been distinctly towards Nominalism. Our own great philosophical writers, Hobbs, Berkeley, Hume, and Locke, all maintain that it is possible to have general names as the signs or images of general ideas.

Bacon, the contemporary of Descartes, denounced the wisdom of the Greeks as being "showy and disputatious;" their logic he considers useless, their induction haphazard, their dialectic "the mere chattering of children;" and among one of the grand causes of human error—"the idols of the theatre," as he terms them*—he ranks the Platonic "Ideas."

Once again an attempt was made to revive Platonism, at the end of the seventeenth century, by Cudworth, a writer of profound classical learning, who

* "I look upon the various systems of the philosophers," says Bacon "as merely so many plays brought out upon the stage—theories of being which are merely scenic and fictitious. —Nov. Org., i. 44.

maintained that there were certain eternal and immutable verities which can only be comprehended by reason, can never be learned by experience, and cannot be changed by the will or opinion of men. And in this sense every intuitive moralist may be said to be a Platonist; for the doctrine of a moral sense, which apprehends of itself the distinctions of right and wrong, and is not merely the product of society or association, has its origin in the Platonic theory of "reminiscence."

END OF PLATO.